





178
.M992
v. 2
C. 2




3 1293 20005 9883

L

LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

WITHDRAWN

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY




~~0831814~~ 111

0815 12
APR 16 2012

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

DEC 21 2023
WITHDRAWN



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2024

https://archive.org/details/bwb_W9-CGK-680



THEODORE ROOSEVELT

THE AMERICAN ADVENTURE

II FROM THE CIVIL WAR

BY

DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK



ILLUSTRATED

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND LONDON

1927

172
11974
V. 2
C. 2

AMERICAN ADVENTURE

Copyright, 1924, 1927
By David Saville Muzzey
Printed in the U. S. A.

K-B

CONTENTS

PAGE

CHAPTER I. THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA

THE PUNISHMENT OF THE SOUTH	I
PROSPERITY AND PROTEST	22
POLITICAL CONVALESCENCE	55

CHAPTER II. THE BASES OF A NEW NATIONALISM

THE FARMER AND THE LABORER	81
"HIS HONESTY, THE PRESIDENT"	101
THE TENTH CENSUS	124

CHAPTER III. A DECADE OF POLITICAL DEADLOCK

THE PASSING OF THE STALWARTS	142
CLEVELAND'S PATH OF THORNS	167
THE REPUBLICAN LEGISLATION OF 1890	196

CHAPTER IV. THE REVOLT OF THE WEST

POPULISM	228
PRESERVING THE PUBLIC CREDIT	248
THE FREE-SILVER CAMPAIGN	268

CHAPTER V. "DOMINION OVER PALM AND PINE"

OUR WAR WITH SPAIN	294
THE TURN OF THE CENTURY	324
DISTANT DEPENDENCIES	348

CHAPTER VI. THEODORE ROOSEVELT

THE <i>ANNUS MIRABILIS</i> —1902	375
PANAMA, PARKER, AND PORTSMOUTH	398
PRESIDENT IN HIS OWN RIGHT	425

CHAPTER VII. THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

SHALL THE PEOPLE RULE?	457
PRESIDENT TAFT AND THE INSURGENTS	483
1912—A STORY OF THREE CONVENTIONS	511

CHAPTER VIII. WOODROW WILSON, APOSTLE OF THE "NEW FREEDOM"

THE TRIPLE ATTACK ON PRIVILEGE	536
MEXICO AND THE CARIBBEAN	568
THE STRUGGLE FOR NEUTRALITY	597

CHAPTER IX. THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR

THE TOGA YIELDS TO ARMS	631
"OVER THERE"	664
THE TREATY AND THE LEAGUE	698

CHAPTER X. THE TEST OF THE REPUBLIC

PAYING THE PIPER	729
THE PROPHET OF A BETTER UNDERSTANDING	761
PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT DAY	794
INDEX	809

ILLUSTRATIONS

Theodore Roosevelt	<i>Frontispiece</i>
	FACING PAGE
Thaddeus Stevens in His Later Years	4
Cartoon, "King Andy I"	18
The Fate of the Carpet-bagger and the Scalawag	36
Cartoon by Thomas Nast Characterizing the Result of the Cincinnati Convention	44
Interior of the Main Building at the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition	72
Counting the Votes After the Disputed Hayes-Tilden Election of 1876	76
Samuel Jones Tilden	78
Rutherford Birchard Hayes	102
Cartoon, "Ideal Money"	116
James Abram Garfield	124
James Gillespie Blaine	162
The Inauguration, 1885. President Arthur and Mr. Cleve- land Leaving the White House for the Capitol	168
The Anarchist Riot in Chicago, Illinois. A Dynamite Bomb Exploding Among the Police	194
Benjamin Harrison	208
Grover Cleveland	248
William McKinley	268
William Jennings Bryan	280
The Capture of El Caney	316
William Howard Taft	482
Woodrow Wilson	538
General Pershing	664
President Wilson's Welcome in Paris	704
The President and Mrs. Coolidge at the White House	794

LIST OF MAPS

	PAGE
Emancipation and Restoration of Southern States	7
Political Organization of West, and Land Grants to Railroads	27
The Election of 1896	288
Cuba and Porto Rico	305
The Philippine Islands	311
The Election of 1912	533
Federal Reserve Districts, created under Act of 1913	549
Mexico and the Caribbean Region (In color)	570
The Greater United States and the Panama Canal Routes (In color)	592
The German Submarine Zone of January 31, 1917	641
The American Base in France	669
The German Drives and the Allied Response	687
The St. Mihiel Salient	688
The Meuse-Argonne Drive	691
The Territorial Growth of the United States (In color)	801

FROM THE CIVIL WAR

THE AMERICAN ADVENTURE

CHAPTER I

THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA

He serves his party best who serves his country best.—RUTHERFORD B. HAYES

THE PUNISHMENT OF THE SOUTH

A dozen winters had passed since Lee's surrender at Appomattox and the disbanding of the Confederate armies, and still the Federal bugles sounded the reveille in the state capitols of Louisiana and South Carolina. The reason why the United States forces had not been withdrawn wholly from the soil of the South when peace came was that a radical Republican Congress proceeded to enact a program of reconstruction for the seceded states which could be carried out only with the aid of Northern bayonets. Many motives, some noble, some sordid, were combined in this program; but the nobler motives were generally utopian and visionary, while the baser ones were practical and decisive. "The work of sentimentalists controlled by knaves," was E. L. Godkin's summary of reconstruction. How the program developed from the presidential purpose of getting the prostrate states of the South back into the Union with the least delay or friction, into the congressional plan of chastising those states by imposing humiliating terms for readmission, is the subject of the present section.

President Lincoln had seized every opportunity during the war of enforcing his theory that the Southern states had really never left the Union. He had treated loyal minorities in Virginia, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana as the true state

governments; he had offered to recognize in any of the states a government based on the oath of fealty of 10 per cent of the men who were voters at the time of the state's secession; he had refused to sign the Davis-Wade Bill because it would have interfered with his policy of clemency. At the cabinet meeting on the last day of his life, he had abhorred the idea of vengeance or reprisals on the South. Denying the validity of the secession ordinances as state enactments, Lincoln regarded the defection of the South as a great rebellion against the national authority. Consequently, executive pardon, based on proper guarantees of future loyalty and conditioned on the acceptance of the abolition of slavery, was the proper way of restoring the Southerners to the duties and privileges of citizenship in the Union. Along this way Lincoln was proceeding when the assassin's bullet struck him down.

The man upon whose shoulders the immense burden of Lincoln's uncompleted task fell was woefully incapable of bearing it. Andrew Johnson of Tennessee had been put on the Union ticket of 1864 as vice-president, partly to reward him for his stanch loyalty during the war¹ and partly to relieve the Republicans of the odium of being a purely sectional party. At heart Johnson was a states'-rights Democrat, but his love for the Union and his hatred of slavery (for he came from the "poor white" class of the South) had brought him into the Republican camp. Since his election as alderman of Greeneville, Tennessee, at the age of twenty, he had had over thirty-five years of practical experience in politics as mayor, member of his state legislature, governor of Tennessee for two terms, representative and senator in the national Congress, and military governor of his state under Lincoln's appointment. Still, the handicap of a rude and ignorant youth had not been overcome. He lacked the inherent nobility of character which had raised Abraham Lincoln from a position equally lowly and unblest to be a "true-born king of men." Present-day historians are somewhat milder in

¹ As senator from Tennessee, Johnson had been the only member from the seceding states who had not left his seat in the national Congress in 1860-1861. He had later been made military governor of Tennessee by President Lincoln.

their judgment of Andrew Johnson than were the writers of a generation ago.¹ The study of the Johnson papers in the Library of Congress has shown him to have been wise and moderate in his political theories; and the generous tribute of his Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, in his "Diary" (1911), reminds us that Johnson retained throughout his term the support of men of judgment and talent. It is almost certain today that the great majority of Americans who have any opinion on the relative merits of Johnson's plan for the reconstruction of the Southern states, and the plan thrust upon him by the radicals of Congress, prefer the former. Yet the man's tactlessness and egotism, his essential coarseness of fiber, his fatal faculty for doing even the right thing in the wrong way, chill the approval which we would fain give to his policies.


The war ended, as it had begun, in the month of April, soon after the expiration of Congress.² Lincoln had called Congress in extra session on July 4, 1861, to ratify his acts of belligerency and to supply money for the contest. But Johnson, believing that the political restoration of the South was a subject for executive action alone, proceeded during the summer of 1865 without summoning Congress to his aid. In this he was supported by the cabinet officers, all of whom had been invited to retain their portfolios on Lincoln's death, and three of whom (Seward, McCulloch, and Welles) continued to serve to the end of Johnson's term. On May 29 the President issued a proclamation granting amnesty to those persons formerly engaged in rebellion against the authority of the United States, on condition of their taking an oath to "faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Union of the states thereunder," and to abide by all the laws and proclamations made during the war in reference to the emancipation of the slaves. Certain classes—including military and naval offi-

¹ With the notable exception of James Ford Rhodes, in chapter xxx of his great work, "The History of the United States since the Compromise of 1850."

² Technically the war was not over until President Johnson issued his peace proclamation in August, 1866, but the surrender of Lee at Appomattox in April, 1865, virtually ended hostilities.

cers of high rank, diplomatic officials of the Confederacy, men who had left their seats in Congress or on the bench or their posts in the United States army or navy to serve "the pretended government" of the Confederacy, the governors of the seceded states, and secessionists owning property taxed above \$20,000—were excluded from the benefits of the proclamation. But persons in these classes were permitted to petition the president for pardon, and were assured that clemency would be "liberally extended" to them. On the same day Johnson began his work of executive reconstruction by appointing W. W. Holden as provisional governor of North Carolina, and directing him to summon "at the earliest practicable period" a convention to revise the constitution of the state to accord with the new era of triumphant unionism and emancipation. Before the end of July similar provisions had been made for the remaining states of the secession in which Lincoln had not inaugurated loyal governments; namely, Mississippi, Georgia, Texas, Alabama, South Carolina, and Florida.

The men chosen by Johnson to conduct the reorganization of the Southern states were former Unionists of Whiggish proclivities who had reluctantly followed their section into secession. Under their direction conventions were called in all the states (except Texas), constitutions were framed, legislatures were elected, the ordinances of secession were repealed or annulled (except in Mississippi), the Confederate debt was repudiated (except in South Carolina), and senators and representatives were chosen for the ensuing session of Congress. It was one of the most critical moments in our history when the Thirty-ninth Congress convened at noon on December 4, 1865. Would the legislators recognize the "Johnson governments" by seating the members whom they had sent up to Washington? The packed galleries of the House followed with intense interest the roll call of the states, but they heard not the name of a single state of the late Confederacy—not even the President's own state of Tennessee. As soon as the few protesting voices from the floor of the House were stilled, and Speaker Colfax had finished his brief speech of acceptance, Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania,



THADDEUS STEVENS IN HIS LATER YEARS

(Chairman of the House Committee in charge of the impeachment of President Johnson)

the man who was responsible for the instructions to the clerk of the House in regard to the roll call, moved that a joint committee of nine members of the House and six members of the Senate be appointed "to inquire into the condition of the states which formed the so-called Confederate States of America, and report whether they or any of them are entitled to be represented in either House of Congress." The motion was carried by a vote of 129 to 35. The next day the upper House laid upon the table the credentials of the senators elect from Mississippi. Congress had decided to ignore the work of Johnson and Lincoln alike, and to begin the reconstruction of the South *de novo*.


The causes for this momentous decision were many and various. During the war Congress had deferred to President Lincoln as commander in chief of the army and navy. Government by proclamation had encroached upon government by legislation. With the return of peace, however, Congress was determined to redress the balance and assert its constitutional prerogative. The adjustment of the relations of the states to the Union, it maintained, was its business and not the business of the President—especially of this "President by accident," this Tennessee Democrat, whom the Union party, as Thaddeus Stevens growled, had gone down into "the damned rebel provinces" to pick up. Obligated to wait through the long summer and autumn in impotent impatience while Johnson's "pretended" governments were being formed in the South,¹ the more radical members of Congress came to Washington in December, prepared to wreck the President's program. The harsh, cynical, vindictive septuagenarian Stevens ruled the House with a rod of iron, silencing opponents by sallies of withering sarcasm. In his eyes no punishment was too severe for the crime of rebellion. The South should be treated as a "conquered province" at the mercy of its conquerors. Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, the most influential radical in the Senate, was

¹ Thaddeus Stevens wrote to Sumner on June 14, "If something is not done, the President will be crowned king before Congress meets." Benjamin Wade of Ohio made a futile journey to Washington to beg Johnson to convene Congress in extra session.

moved less by vengeance than by "principle." He was an uncompromising theorist, obsessed with the humanitarian doctrine of the equal virtues and capacities of black men and white, and therefore insistent upon full political and civil rights for the negro—in the South. Stevens abhorred the program of the President chiefly because it let the South off too easily; Sumner, because it did not include negro suffrage.

Furthermore, the majority of Congress believed that to accept the hastily reconstructed Johnson governments as accomplished facts, and to seat their representatives and senators elect, would be to endanger the results of the war. The abolition of slavery had annulled the three-fifths rule of the Constitution, and henceforth the representation of a state in the House would be based on its total population, black and white. Might not the greatly enlarged Southern delegation to Congress combine with the "Copperhead" representatives of the North to repudiate the United States notes or assume the Confederate debt or—worst of all—oust the Republicans from power? The party that saved the Union must rule it! was the Republican slogan.

But it was not alone political theory, personal animosity, or partisan anxiety that determined the course of Congress in December, 1865. The behavior of the Johnson governments themselves contributed much to their repudiation. In the first place, they had sent up to Washington as senators and representatives elect a number of men prominent in the civil or military life of the Confederacy. The legislature of Georgia even chose Alexander H. Stevens as United States senator. It would have been hard for them to find many able men who had not eventually supported secession; yet even the more moderate senators of the North deemed it intolerable that the vice-president of the late Confederacy should sit with equal vote beside Charles Sumner, John Sherman, Lyman Trumbull, and William Pitt Fessenden. In the second place, the new legislatures (especially in the states where the negroes outnumbered or very nearly equaled the whites, like South Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana) had passed a number of laws, designated as



EMANCIPATION AND RESTORATION OF SOUTHERN STATES

Vagrancy Acts, Apprentice Acts, and Labor-Contract Acts, to regulate the relations of the two races in the South and to keep the negroes from the idle or insolent abuse of their new-found freedom. Although these "black codes" at the same time conferred benefits on the negro, such as the recognition of his family relations, the right to be protected in his property, and the privilege of testifying in court in cases in which the members of his race were concerned, they were condemned in the North as attempts to reduce the negro again to slavery. A Chicago newspaper declared that the North would convert Mississippi into a frog pond rather than allow a foot of the soil over which the flag of the United States waved to be disgraced by the application of these laws.

Scores of incidents, some serious, some trivial, still further prejudiced the case of the South: the inevitable clashes between blacks and whites, which were often magnified into horrible negro massacres in the reports which reached the North;¹ the persistent appeals for pardon for Jefferson Davis, who was execrated north of Mason and Dixon's line as the arch-traitor, and who was even believed by some to have been an accomplice in the assassination of Lincoln; the defiant assertion of a people smarting under defeat and poverty that they "had nothing to repent of" in their fight for independence; the irresistible temptation of men and women who had sacrificed everything for the "lost cause" to salute their tattered flags as "the sacred souvenirs of the courage and endurance of those who had gone forth to battle under their folds."² Carl Schurz, who spent the autumn months of 1865 investigating conditions in the lower South as President Johnson's special envoy, reported that while there was "at present no danger of another insurrection against the authority of the United States on a large scale," still there was "an utter absence of national feeling" among the people.

¹ Charles Sumner, with characteristic vehemence, in a speech in the Senate, on December 20, 1865, spoke of the "sickening and heartrending outrages where human rights are sacrificed and rebel Barbarism receives a new letter of license."

² The words of Governor Parsons in a message to the Alabama legislature, December 13, 1865.

Their submission to the Union sprang from "necessity and calculation"; and though they reluctantly accepted the abolition of slavery, they still believed that "some species of serfdom or peonage" for the negro might be introduced "without a violation of their pledge."¹

We have dwelt at some length on the action of Congress on December 4, 1865, because the whole policy of the reconstruction of the Southern states flowed from it. If the Lincoln-Johnson plan for the restoration of these states—which from the point of view both of its merits and of its expediency was widely approved in the North²—had been adopted, our country would have been spared the unedifying quarrel between the executive and Congress which lasted to the end of Johnson's term, and the South would have been spared the humiliating experience of negro domination, the carpetbagger, and the scalawag forced upon her at the point of the bayonet. But passion ran too high in the months succeeding the assassination of Abraham Lincoln and the imprisonment of Jefferson Davis to allow the leaders of either section of the country to deal with the situation in that calm and conciliatory spirit which a later generation so easily commends. Vengeance on the one side was answered by defiance on the other. Councils of moderation were denounced as treason in the North and as cowardice in the South. And the

¹ At the same time, General Grant, sent on the same errand, reported: "I am satisfied that the mass of thinking men of the South accept the present situation of affairs in good faith. . . . Slavery and the right of a state to secede they regard as having been settled forever by the highest tribunal, arms, that man can resort to. . . . The citizens of the Southern States are anxious to return to self-government within the Union as soon as possible. . . . They are in earnest in wishing to do what is required by the Government, not humiliating to them as citizens, and if such a course was pointed out they would pursue it in good faith."

² James Ford Rhodes, who certainly cannot be suspected of any undue indulgence toward Johnson, says (Vol. V, p. 548): "If his [Johnson's] plan had been sanctioned by the Republican majority in Congress it would undoubtedly have worked out pretty well the problem of reconstruction." Rhodes also quotes John Sherman's remark in his "Recollections" (Vol. I, p. 361): "After this long lapse of time I am convinced that Mr. Johnson's scheme of reorganization was wise and judicious. It was unfortunate that it had not the sanction of Congress and that events soon brought the President and Congress into hostilities."

tongue of the great leader whose kindly wisdom, tact, and patience might have guided the embittered sections on the path of reconciliation was silent in the grave.

While Thaddeus Stevens's joint committee was working at its plan of reconstruction, the quarrel between Johnson and the radicals broke out. Just before its expiration in March, 1865, the Thirty-eighth Congress had created a Federal Freedmen's Bureau to continue for one year after the close of the war. The object of the bureau was to protect the newly emancipated negroes, furnishing them charity and counsel, assigning to them abandoned lands, providing them with rations, medicine, and schooling. Although the head of the bureau, General O. O. Howard, was a conscientious official, many of the agents were rascals who took advantage of the negro's gullibility by selling him gaudily painted pegs with which to stake out claims on his former master's estate, and promising him "forty acres and a mule" at Christmas. In spite of some honest work of relief and education, the bureau as a whole had become somewhat of a nuisance by winter of 1865, interfering with the authority of the Federal commanders, exasperating the whites, and demoralizing thousands of the negroes. When Congress, early in 1866, passed a law continuing the bureau indefinitely and greatly enlarging its powers, President Johnson vetoed the bill on the grounds that it entailed needless expense and was an unconstitutional extension of the Federal control over the domestic concerns of the states, now that the war was finished. He was unwilling to see the negroes become either the wards of the nation or the victims of unscrupulous adventurers. The Senate failed to pass the bill over the President's veto, and Andrew Johnson registered his first and last victory over the radicals in Congress.

It need not have been his last victory if he had possessed the qualities necessary to win political support. He should have conciliated the moderate leaders in Congress by a frank and open policy of coöperation, and built up a following in the North by a dignified appeal to the reasonableness of his program. Instead of this he attacked Congress, calling it a "rump,"

because the eleven states of the secession were not represented in it—as if the voluntary withdrawal of the Southern members from their seats at Washington in 1861 offered any analogy to the exclusion of the Presbyterians from Parliament by Colonel Pride's dragoons! He was secretive and diffident where he should have given his confidence freely; and where he should have preserved a dignified reticence, he was volubly and coarsely communicative. A crowd gathered under the windows of the White House on the evening of Washington's birthday to congratulate Johnson on his veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill three days earlier. In his unpremeditated speech of acknowledgment he made a sorry spectacle of himself. Egged on by prompting voices, he forgot all sense of decorum and harangued the crowd for an hour or more, attacking Stevens, Sumner, and Phillips by name as enemies of the Constitution, declaring that threats of assassination should not deter him from following the path of duty, and boasting inordinately both of his exalted statesmanship and of his lowly origin. After this exhibition Johnson's chance of controlling a third of the members of Congress was gone. A Civil Rights Bill, conferring the privileges of citizenship upon the negroes, was passed over his veto; the Freedmen's Bureau Bill was revived and likewise passed over his veto; and a constitutional amendment, reported from Stevens's joint committee in April, 1866, quickly passed Congress with the necessary two-thirds majority.

The Fourteenth Amendment declared that every person born or naturalized in this country was a citizen of the United States and of the state in which he lived, and forbade any state to deprive him of the privileges of that citizenship. It penalized any state that should deprive the negro of the suffrage, by cutting down its representation in the House in just the proportion that the number of disfranchised adult males bore to the total number of adult males in the state. It excluded from seats in either House of Congress and from national and state offices all persons who, having taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, had thereafter engaged in rebellion against its authority or given aid or comfort to the Confederate cause.

And, finally, it affirmed the validity of the United States debt, and forbade the payment of the Confederate debt either by the nation or by any of the states of the secession. Although Congress made no promise to restore the Southern states to their place in the Union on condition of their ratification of the amendment, it actually did restore Tennessee when that state ratified in the summer of 1866, thus creating a precedent which it might have been hard to break. But, one after another, the ten remaining states of the secession rejected the amendment by overwhelming majorities. It made no difference that the amendment reflected the moderate sentiment of Congress and was regarded by radicals like Stevens and Sumner as a feeble, halfway measure, or that its terms were, with the exception of the disqualifying clause, a fair basis for reconstruction. Congress had disowned the governments of the South established by presidential proclamation, and the South would have nothing to do with the counter-plan proposed by Congress. Thus passed in the winter of 1866 the second opportunity for a peaceful and orderly restoration of the Southern states to their place in the Union.

While the South was compassing the defeat of the amendment, in the autumn of 1866, a stirring campaign was being waged in the North between the radicals and the moderates for the control of the Fortieth Congress. Johnson lost whatever chance he may have had, on the merits of his policy, of securing at least a third of the members of the new House to sustain his vetoes. Invited to participate in the dedication of a monument to Stephen A. Douglas in Chicago, he turned the Western trip into a campaign tour which he called "swinging round the circle." Out to St. Louis via Philadelphia, New York, Albany, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago, and back again through Indianapolis, Louisville, Cincinnati, Pittsburg, and Harrisburg, the President traveled, reiterating essentially the same speech of an "irritated demagogue" from city to city. He boasted of his devotion to the Constitution; he attacked the "Northern traitors" as "foul whelps of sin" who were seeking to break up the Union as wickedly as the Southern secessionists

had done; he threw upon the radical Congress the blame for the continued race riots in the South;¹ he bandied arguments and insults with the crowds that gathered round the platform of his car to spur him on with malicious encouragement or to hiss and hoot him with cries of "Traitor!" "Renegade!" "Don't get mad, Andy!" or "Oh, shut up!" His loyal cabinet supporters Seward and Welles, who had accompanied him, were saddened by the humiliating spectacle. Grant and Farragut, whom he had taken with the party as popular exhibits, were "disgusted," as the former put it, "at hearing a man make speeches on the way to his own funeral." The elections which followed in November returned 143 Republicans and 49 Democrats to Congress. Andrew Johnson was "reduced to a cypher" in the government. When the short session of the Thirty-ninth Congress convened in December, 1866, Thaddeus Stevens raised a laugh by remarking, "I was a conservative in the last session of Congress, but I mean to be a radical henceforth."

Stevens kept his promise. Before the session closed, "by sarcasm, taunts, dragooning, and by cracking the party whip," he got through Congress over the President's veto (March 2, 1867) a bill which Professor Burgess calls "the most brutal proposition ever introduced into the Congress of the United States by a responsible committee." Sweeping aside the "pretended state governments of the so-called Confederate States" (except Tennessee) that had been established "without the authority of Congress and without the sanction of the people," this Reconstruction Act divided the South into five military districts with a general of the United States army in command of each. Under the direction of these military chiefs, conventions were to be summoned in the ten states, the negroes were to be registered as voters, and the whites who were disqualified by the Fourteenth Amendment were to be excluded from the polls.

¹ In the opening days of May, 1866, there had been riots in Memphis, Tennessee, in which twenty-four negroes had been killed. A more serious conflict in New Orleans over the question of negro suffrage, on July 30, resulted in the killing or wounding of over one hundred and fifty negroes by the police, who were recruited largely from ex-Confederate soldiers (Rhodes, Vol. V, p. 611).

When the conventions should have framed new constitutions providing for negro suffrage; when these constitutions should have been ratified in the states and accepted by Congress; when the legislatures elected under them should have adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, and that amendment should have secured the indorsement of three fourths of the states of the Union, then the Southern states might be restored to representation in Congress.¹ Supplementary acts of March 23 and July 19 provided for the drastic application of the act of March 2, by giving the generals complete control of registration and the power of removing all civil officers, state and municipal, within their spheres of command, subject only to the veto of the General of the Army (Grant). At the same time, Congress deprived the President of his constitutional prerogative as commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States by attaching to an appropriation bill a "rider" to the effect that all military orders were henceforth to emanate from General Grant.²

After vain appeals by Mississippi and Georgia to the Supreme Court to enjoin President Johnson and Secretary Stanton from carrying out the Reconstruction Acts, the South submitted to the process of re-reconstruction under the generals. The governments set up in 1867 and 1868 were a sad travesty on republican institutions. In South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana the negroes, without a trace of political education or experience, composed a majority of the registered voters. In the other states they were a large minority. More than seven eighths of them could neither read nor

¹ To recognize the Southern states as states for the purpose of ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment and, at the same time, to prescribe conditions for their recognition as states was, of course, inconsistent. It was clearly inconsistent to provide by the same act that the states must give the negroes the suffrage and must ratify the Fourteenth Amendment (which left the granting of negro suffrage optional with the states). But Congress was little troubled by lack of consistency in its reconstruction program.

² By the Tenure-of-Office Act, which was passed, with the Reconstruction Act, on March 2, 1867, Congress still further humiliated Johnson by forbidding him to make dismissals without the consent of the Senate—a privilege which had been exercised by all our presidents from George Washington down.

write. At the same time that the radical Congress was forcing this illiterate electorate upon the South, the states of Minnesota, Kansas, Ohio, and Michigan rejected negro suffrage by large majorities.¹ By midsummer of 1868 (in ample time for participation in the impending election) Congress readmitted to the Union over the President's veto the states of Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. How well the new governments of these seven reconstructed states represented their people can be judged from the fact that four of the seven governors, ten of the fourteen United States senators, and twenty of the thirty-five representatives elected were "carpetbaggers," or Northern men who had come to the South after the war to make their political fortunes. The legislatures of these states promptly ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, which was declared a part of the Constitution on January 1, 1869. Virginia and Texas had not yet submitted their constitutions to the people of the states for ratification; and Mississippi, by dint of heroic efforts on the part of the Democrats, and not without some high-handed intimidation of the negro voters, had succeeded in defeating her constitution at the polls.² These three states, therefore, together with Georgia,³ remained under military rule until 1870, and were then obliged, as a further condition for readmission, to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment (see page 22).

Negroes sat in all the conventions chosen to form the new constitutions for the Southern states and in the legislatures elected to govern those states. The lower house of South Caro-

¹ At this time the negro had the suffrage in only six states of the North: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York.

² Alabama had also failed to ratify her constitution according to the provisions of the Reconstruction Act, because a majority of her registered voters had deliberately stayed away from the polls. There were grave doubts, also, as to the validity of ratification in Arkansas. But Congress, with a jaunty disregard of its own provisions, compelled these states to come into the Union in 1868, even as it had kept them out of the Union in 1865.

³ The legislature of Georgia, after that state had become reconstructed, expelled twenty-seven negroes from their seats and filled their places with whites ineligible under the Fourteenth Amendment. For this high-handed act Georgia was put back under the military rule and re-reconstructed only in 1870.

lina contained 78 blacks and 46 whites, the senate 21 blacks and 10 whites. Ninety-one of the members paid no taxes. In Alabama the members of the legislature paid altogether less than \$100 in taxes. A negro house-painter was elected lieutenant governor of Louisiana, and a mulatto printer was secretary of state of Mississippi. Clerks, supervisors, judges, school committeemen, justices of the peace, and a host of other officials in town and county were elected who "could not perform the smallest operation in arithmetic or correctly spell three words in succession." The sprinkling of competent and respected whites in the legislatures were unable to hold in check the combination of imported carpetbaggers, unprincipled scalawags, and gullible negroes, who entered upon an orgy of extravagance and fraud, piling up an intolerable burden of debt, squandering millions in thieving contracts, and sapping such recuperative power as was left to the South after the exhausting shock of war.¹ The oft-repeated story may be read in all its unedifying details in a collection of essays, each written by a prominent representative of one of the suffering states some fifteen years after the restoration of home rule in the South, and published under the title "The Solid South; or Reconstruction and its Results." The student who reads these essays will easily understand why the electoral votes of the two Carolinas, Florida, Alabama, and Arkansas appeared in the Republican column in 1868, and why no Republican candidate for the presidency since Rutherford B. Hayes has ever carried one of the ten states included within the military districts of the Reconstruction Act.

The governments founded in injustice could be maintained only by force. Over nineteen thousand soldiers of the regular

¹ "Many a sable legislator whose financial experience before 1868 had been bounded by the modest limits of a bootblack's or a field-hand's income was called upon to ponder the policy of enterprises whose cost to the state would run into the millions. The result was legislation of incredible recklessness, executed with inconceivable corruption and fraud. . . . A very conservative figure in 1872 put the increase of indebtedness of the eleven states since their reconstruction at \$131,717,777.81, of which more than two thirds consisted of guarantees to various enterprises, mostly railways" (W. A. Dunning, "Reconstruction, Political and Economic," p. 207).

army (approximately one third of its total force in September, 1867), stationed at one hundred and thirty-three places in the South, were ready at call to police elections, quell disaffection, and insure the enforcement of every order that came down from the radical dictators of Congress. The whole policy of congressional reconstruction under military supervision was a political blunder and a social outrage. With all due allowance for the defiant attitude of many Southern leaders and for the laudable purpose of the Northern statesmen to protect the negro in his civil rights, there can still be no justification for the vindictive legislation which committed the destinies of the Southern communities to interlopers and former slaves.¹ It defeated whatever chance there was for the reconstruction of the South by the competent native element, and drove the moderates into the arms of the irreconcilables; it deprived the negro of the sympathy of the only class that could be of eventual help to him—his white neighbors; it delayed for a decade the single-minded devotion of the South to the pressing problems of economic rehabilitation; and it deferred for a generation the reconciliation of the sections. In some of the reconstructed states four, in some six, and in some eight years elapsed—years filled with race conflicts, factional struggles, military interventions, fraudulent elections, costly misgovernment, and economic and industrial dilapidation—before the respectable white element of the South regained possession of their governments, and the radicals of the North abandoned the folly of attempting to keep “the bottom rail on the top” by armed force.

President Johnson had been reduced to political impotence, but still his enemies in Congress were not satisfied to let him finish his term of office in peace. He must be ignominiously forced out of the exalted position to which he had been elevated by Booth's fatal pistol shot. His impeachment was a “political necessity.” Representative James M. Ashley of Ohio got a bill

¹ General Pope, the military commander of the third district (Georgia, Alabama, and Florida), said that it was “surely better to have an incompetent but loyal man in office than to have a rebel of whatever ability”—all the men who had supported the Confederacy being still and always “rebels” in Pope's eyes.

for the impeachment of Johnson referred to the Judiciary Committee of the House in January, 1867; but although Ashley and Ben Butler eagerly pursued every clue and exploited every rumor that might lead to the indictment of the President for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," the report which the committee sent to the House was "a hotch-potch of calumnious and irrelevant trivialities," and the motion to impeach was defeated by a vote of 108 to 57. But the net was already spread for the President. The Tenure-of-Office Act of March 2, 1867 (p. 14, n. 2), had been passed chiefly for the sake of tempting Johnson to disobey it. Secretary of War Stanton was "virtually a spy in Johnson's cabinet." He was hand in glove with the radicals in Congress, who urged him to "stick" to his place. When Johnson asked him to resign in August, 1867, during the recess of Congress, Stanton refused in a curt and insolent note. Then Johnson suspended him and appointed General Grant Secretary of War *ad interim*. When Congress reassembled, the Senate refused to acquiesce in the suspension of Stanton, and Grant immediately relinquished the office to him;¹ whereupon Johnson dismissed Stanton in spite of the Tenure-of-Office Act, and named Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas in his place. A series of scenes followed, worthy of the vaudeville stage—including defiant dialogues between Stanton and Thomas at the war office; the arrest of Thomas before breakfast the next morning, on a complaint sworn out by the irate Secretary of War; the soothing of the ruffled spirits of the rivals, after Thomas's release on bail, by a friendly chat and a drink of whisky; and the barricading of the war office against the attempt of Thomas to take possession of it by force. The upshot of the serio-comic affair was that Stanton held the fort, and the House immediately voted (128 to 47) to impeach the President.

¹ For this Johnson was incensed at Grant, who, he claimed, had promised to hold on to the office or retire in favor of a person who would hold on to it, in order to bring the constitutionality of the Tenure-of-Office Act to the test of the court. Grant denied having made any such promise. But Johnson persisted in his charge of broken faith, and thereby completely alienated the general, who till then had been one of his supporters.



JOHNSON AS KING SUPPORTED BY SEWARD AND WELLES. IN THE DISTANCE
HENRY WARD BEECHER, WENDELL PHILLIPS, CHARLES SUMNER, AND OTHER
ABOLITIONISTS ARE FORMED IN LINE FOR EXECUTION

(From a cartoon by Thomas Nast, published in *Harper's Weekly*, November 3, 1866)

The trial before the Senate, acting as court and jury, under the presidency of Chief Justice Chase, was opened on March 4, and the final vote was taken on May 26, 1868. The charges, formulated in eleven articles, accused Johnson of obstructing the process of reconstruction, of declaring laws of Congress unconstitutional, of bringing the lawmakers into contempt by his unbecoming speeches, and of violating the Tenure-of-Office Act. Only the last charge formed any plausible basis for impeachment; and on this point Johnson's able counsel¹ showed, first, that the President's motive in dismissing Stanton had been to bring the constitutionality of the law before the courts, and secondly, that it was extremely doubtful whether the Tenure-of-Office Act applied to the relations between Johnson and Stanton at all. For the act protected cabinet officers from removal "during the term of the President by whom they had been appointed," and Stanton had been appointed by Lincoln. But arguments of legality or equity had little weight with the House managers of the prosecution, of whom the implacable Butler, Stevens, Bingham, Boutwell and Logan were the chiefs. They made the trial "a party caucus for the removal of Andrew Johnson." Their concern was not so much to prove his guilt as to browbeat the doubtful senators into voting for his conviction. Their procedure was political, not judicial. Like the Jacobins of the French Revolution, they urged the tribunal to punish the self-convicted traitor rather than to try the privileged defendant. "Tyrant," "incubus," "criminal," "apostate," "usurper," were some of the epithets that adorned the worst diatribes of Butler and Logan. Johnson was to be "hurled from the White House and consigned once more to the fond embraces of his rebel confederates in the South and their faithful allies in the North." In spite of threats and entreaties, however, the radicals could not muster the two-thirds vote (36) necessary for conviction. On the vote on the eleventh article

¹ They were Benjamin R. Curtis, ex-Justice of the Supreme Court; William M. Evarts, the leader of the New York bar; Attorney-General Stanbery; Judge Groesbeck of Illinois; and T. R. R. Nelson of Tennessee—all, but the last named, men of the highest legal qualifications.

(May 16) seven Republican senators joined the twelve Democrats in the response "not guilty."¹ Butler's "smelling committee" made desperate efforts to fix charges of fraud and bribery on the "seven traitors" and to coerce them into a change of heart; but the vote on the second and third articles (May 26) remained unchanged, at 35 to 19, and the President was acquitted by a single vote. The Senate then adjourned as a court *sine die*, and the radicals retired from the field in defeat. Stanton immediately resigned the war portfolio. His successor, General John M. Schofield, was confirmed by the Senate a few days later. Thus, for a second time (as in the acquittal of Justice Chase in 1805) the country was saved from the opprobrium of prostituting the ultimate constitutional safeguard of impeachment to the ends of political vengeance.

In the interval between the first and second votes on the articles of impeachment, the National Union Republican convention had met in Chicago (May 20) and unanimously nominated General Grant for the presidency, with Schuyler Colfax, the genial Speaker of the House, as his running mate. The platform indorsed the radical program of reconstruction, denounced the repudiation of the national debt in any form, and declared that while the regulation of the suffrage in the states of the secession belonged to Congress, in the loyal states it should be left to the people. The Democratic convention, which met in Tammany Hall, New York, on July 4, was confronted with a serious issue. The most promising candidates for the nomination,² General George H. Pendleton of Ohio and Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana, were "soft money" men. The platform adopted contained the "Ohio idea" advocated by Pendleton;

¹ These seven, who deserve to have their names recorded on the tablets of fame, were Fessenden of Maine, Fowler of Tennessee, Grimes of Iowa, Henderson of Missouri, Ross of Kansas, Trumbull of Illinois, and Van Winkle of West Virginia. In 1901 Henderson told Professor Dunning that at least two other Republican senators (Sprague of Rhode Island and Willey of West Virginia) were ready to vote "not guilty" if their votes had been needed to acquit the President.

² President Johnson had some supporters in the convention, and Chief Justice Chase was as anxious for the Democratic nomination in 1868 as Senator Chase and Secretary Chase had been for the Republican nomination in 1860 and 1864.

namely, that the government bonds (unless it was distinctly stated in the law of issue that they were payable in coin) should be redeemed in "lawful money"—that is, greenbacks.¹ It also favored the taxation of national bonds, and condemned the Reconstruction Acts as "unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void." But the delegates could not be held either for the platform or for the proposed candidates. After a good deal of electioneering, in which the noted Copperhead, Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio, took a prominent part, the convention was stampeded to its presiding officer, Governor Horatio Seymour of New York. Francis P. Blair of Missouri was named for vice president.

According to the electoral vote Grant won a decisive victory over Seymour (214 to 80). He carried every state in the North and West except New York, New Jersey, and Oregon, and every reconstructed state of the South except Georgia and Louisiana. But his popular majority was only 300,000 in a vote of 5,700,000, in spite of the odium still attaching to the Democratic party for its "sympathy with the rebellion," the activity of Vallandigham and the Confederate brigadier generals in the convention, and the charges of "copperheadism" against Seymour for his resistance to the draft in New York in 1863. But for the 650,000 negro votes cast for Grant in the reconstructed states, Seymour would have had a majority at the polls in November. Even the personal popularity of General Grant could not win the majority of the white voters of the country to indorse the reconstruction program of 1867.

¹ Although the question of the constitutionality of the greenbacks as "legal tender" had been presented to the Supreme Court as early as 1863 (*Roosevelt vs. Meyer*), it was not until 1870 that the court rendered a decision on the matter. Then, in the famous case of *Hepburn vs. Griswold* (February 7, 1870), by a vote of 4 to 3, it ruled that greenbacks were not legal tender in payment of debts contracted before the passage of the act authorizing their issue (1862). The next year, however, two new justices having been added to the bench, the court, in the case of *Knox vs. Lee* (May 1, 1871), reversed its decision by a vote of 5 to 4. Although this action brought considerable criticism upon the court, it had little effect on the business of the country, the legality of the greenbacks having been generally accepted.

Taught by the election of 1868 how necessary the negro vote was for the perpetuation of their power, the radical Republicans proceeded, early in 1869, to the passage of a Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, forbidding the United States or any state to deny the right of voting to any citizen on account of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."¹ This amendment, added to the Constitution in the spring of 1870, marked the logical conclusion and the culmination of the congressional reconstruction policy. The Enforcement Acts, the Federal Election Acts, and the Ku-Klux Acts passed later were chiefly for the purpose of maintaining the Fifteenth Amendment. The amendment satisfied the theorists who from the first had contended for negro suffrage as a matter of "principle," the avengers who thought no punishment too severe for the sin of secession, and the politicians who wished to secure the negro vote to assure the dominance of the Republican party. Six days after the passage of the amendment President Johnson's troubled administration came to an end, and the hero of Donelson and Appomattox moved into the White House.

PROSPERITY AND PROTEST

Reconstruction, in the narrower, technical use of the word, means the restoration of the states of the secession to their place in the Union; but in a broader sense it covers a great number of readjustments, in both public and private life, to new conditions created largely by the Civil War. The war settled three questions which had divided counsels and roused apprehensions ever since the foundation of the republic. It forever abolished slavery, it firmly cemented the Union, and it finally established the supremacy of the national government over the states. At the same time, the war opened new questions of hardly less serious import than those which it settled.

¹ Senator Morton, foreseeing that the Southern states would adopt measures to prevent the negroes from voting on other grounds, wanted the amendment enlarged to include property and educational clauses also; but such clauses would, of course, have hampered the states of the North in the regulation of their suffrage.

A devastated and destitute South awaited rehabilitation. A national debt of \$2,846,000,000, or \$74.28 per capita, confronted the government. The taxes supporting this debt were the heaviest that were levied in any civilized country of the world, amounting to \$11.46 in gold for every inhabitant of the land. The volume of paper money in circulation, increased some tenfold by the issue of \$450,000,000 of United States notes (greenbacks) and \$185,000,000 notes of the new national banks, doubled pre-war prices and made gold relatively scarce enough to become an object of speculation instead of a standard of currency values. Diplomatic controversies with France and Great Britain were imminent. The government's need in war time had been the opportunity for conscienceless profiteers who had made rapid fortunes by selling shoddy blankets and paper-soled shoes. Industrial gambling was rife, with its concomitant evils of extravagance, vulgar display, and shameless laxity in business ethics.

The political situation offered little promise of wise and constructive leadership. For four years after the surrender at Appomattox the President and Congress were engaged, as we have seen, in a bitter and unseemly quarrel over the policies of reconstruction. The older of the two parties was discredited in the North on account of the suspicion of "copperheadism" in many of its prominent members, and was reduced to impotence in the South by the penalties of the reconstruction legislation. The Republicans, on the other hand, were firmly established in the seats of power; but with the surrender of the Southern armies and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, they found themselves in the embarrassing position of a party with a completed program. The caustic Disraeli once referred to the members of a Gladstone ministry, sitting on the front benches of Parliament in some complacency after the accomplishment of important reforms, as "a row of extinct volcanoes." But now the Stevenses, Butlers, Boutwells, Chandlers, Wades, and Wilsons had no intention of playing the rôle of geological survivals. Invoking the first law of politics, they determined to remain in office, if not by the promise of a posi-

tive program, at least by virtue of past performances. The party which had saved the country must rule it. In the Republican vocabulary all the Southern whites except the scalawags were still "rebels," and the Northern Democrats "Copperheads." A vote cast against a Republican candidate for the humblest office in any village was a vote for "treason." Under such conditions it was impossible to get any political issue like the tariff, the currency, or the patronage considered purely on its merits.

The war, which had brought exhaustion to the South, had served rather as a stimulus to the North. Its draft upon her man power was not serious enough to cripple the productivity of factory and farm, nor had its levy upon capital been sufficient to retard the expanding volume of investment. "The nation," said David A. Wells, the special commissioner of revenue, "was infected with a spirit of enterprise which redoubled its energies with every additional burden placed upon it." Even before the secession of South Carolina there had been unmistakable signs of recovery from the panic of 1857, which the South had so grievously misunderstood as the collapse of Northern industry and commerce. The war was floated in the North on the rising tide of prosperity. To be sure, the cotton industry was temporarily checked, and the merchant marine, which in 1853 had surpassed Great Britain's, was ruined by the depredations of the Confederate cruisers.¹ On the other hand, the demand of the commissary's, quartermaster's, and ordnance departments created an unprecedented market for food, clothing, blankets, horses, and munitions of war; while the discovery of oil wells in Pennsylvania and veins of precious metals in the Rocky Mountain belt added spectacular and highly speculative elements to the industrial boom.

¹ The United States sank from first to fourth rank. In 1861 we had 191 ships in the South American trade, and in 1866 only 62. In 1860 two thirds of our foreign commerce was carried in American bottoms; in 1866 three fourths of that commerce was carried in foreign bottoms. It was not until the World War that the United States recovered its maritime strength. In 1914 we built only 200,000 tons of merchant shipping as against over 1,600,000 by Great Britain; but in 1918 we built nearly 3,000,000 tons to Great Britain's 1,300,000.

It was the development of the marvelous agricultural and mineral resources of our trans-Mississippi country that laid the foundations of a national wealth which mounted through the later decades of the nineteenth century until it became the admiration of the world. The stage was set for that development by a series of measures enacted by Congress during the war itself. In the first place, the political map of the West was laid out on essentially the same lines that it retains today. When Abraham Lincoln was elected president, Texas, California, and Oregon were the only states west of the Missouri River. Between the Missouri and California lay the territory of Kansas (1854); the huge and amorphous territory of Nebraska, reaching from the fortieth parallel to the Canadian border (1854); the two great territories of the Mexican cession, Utah and New Mexico (1850); and the territory of Washington (1853), or that part of the Oregon territory which lay north of the state of Oregon (1859). In 1861 Kansas was admitted to the Union as a state. In the same year the vast region of Nebraska north of 43° was erected into the territory of Dakota, and the eastern and western portions of Utah were organized as the territories of Colorado and Nevada respectively. In 1863 the western half of New Mexico was made into the territory of Arizona, and a new territory of Idaho was formed out of the western part of Dakota and the eastern part of the old Oregon territory. In 1864 the immense area between the present states of Idaho and the Dakotas was erected into the territory of Montana, and in the same year Nevada was admitted as a state. Save for the territory of Wyoming (1868) and the division of the Dakotas (1889), all the state boundary lines west of the Missouri were drawn before the close of Lincoln's first term (see map, p. 27).


This vast Western domain was made "free" territory, in both senses of the word, by congressional legislation. It was closed to slavery by the act of June 19, 1862 (which repealed both the Compromise of 1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and overrode the Dred Scott decision), and it was opened gratis to settlers by the Homestead Act of May 20, 1862. Previous to the passage of the Homestead Act the policy of the gov-

ernment in the disposal of its public lands had been extremely generous. By the Preëmption Act of 1841 any citizen or prospective citizen of the United States over twenty-one years of age who did not already own 320 acres of land might take 160 acres of the public domain as a farm, and if he built a house on it and lived there, he might at the end of a year secure title to the property by paying the minimum price of \$1.25 an acre. Now, however, by the Homestead Act, the settler was relieved of even the modest charge of \$200 for his 160-acre farm. If he cultivated it for five years, he received his title of full ownership on the payment of a fee of \$10 for registry. The liberality of the government was prompted by the desire to see the great West settled, and by the conviction that its supply of public land would last for generations if not for centuries.¹ Uncle Sam was "rich enough to give us all a farm." Up to the Civil War less than 400,000,000 of the 1,450,000,000 acres of the public domain had been granted or sold by the government. There were still over 1,000,000,000 acres left—an area equal to half the United States and capable, if populated as densely as Europe, of supporting about 600,000,000 people. After the war the prevailing high prices, the return of hundreds of thousands of men from the ranks, the renewal of immigration on a large scale,² and the government's encouragement of the trans-Missouri railroads all led to an eager rush for the West. The trade to the Rocky Mountain region, said General Dodge, was doubling annually at the close of the Civil War. Emigrant and freight trains followed each other in an unbroken stream across the plains. Millions of dollars were invested in the overland

¹ President Johnson thought that it would take six hundred years for the public domain to be occupied. A popular song of the sixties ran:

"Of all the mighty nations in the East or in the West
This glorious Yankee nation is the greatest and the best;
We have room for all creation and our banner is unfurled,
Here's a general invitation to the people of the world."

² From Saturday, May 13, to Wednesday, May 17, 1865, there landed in New York alone 6000 immigrants; 258,120 came to our shores in the year 1865, and 318,568 in 1866, of whom more than three fourths were British or German subjects.



The Federal Public Domain consisted of 1,442,000,000 acres in twenty-nine states (all but the original thirteen, with Maine, Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia). Up to 1867 Congress had granted 184,000,000 acres, or about 14 per cent of the public domain, to various railroad companies. It was an area equal to the New England States, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia combined.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF WEST, AND LAND GRANTS TO RAILROADS

transportation business. The *Daily Champion* of Atchison, Kansas, reported that the traffic west of the Missouri had increased fourfold between the years 1863 and 1865. In the three years following the war the amount of land granted under the Homestead Act alone rose from 1,160,000 to 2,302,923 acres; while the grants for railroads, agricultural and industrial colleges, public schools, soldiers' bounties, roads, canals, and other internal improvements raised the total annual distribution of the public lands to something like 6,000,000 acres.¹

By far the largest item in the government's liberality was the aid in lands and money granted to the projected Western railroads. In the decade preceding the war the roads east of the Mississippi had already been joined into systems and Congress had given some ten million acres of land to the states of the eastern Mississippi basin. Plans for railroad connections between the Mississippi and the Pacific coast had also received considerable attention from Congress, which had made several appropriations for surveys. But the opposition of the South to further expenditures by Congress for the development of free territory in the West had interrupted the plans for a Pacific railroad, just as it had postponed the free allotment of homesteads. On the withdrawal of the Southern members, however, Congress had revived the schemes for the development of the West. On July 1, 1862, six weeks after the passage of the Homestead Act, President Lincoln signed the bill incorporating the Union Pacific Railroad Company to build a line from the western boundary of Iowa to a point where it should meet the Central Pacific, building eastward from Sacramento, California. Half the public lands in a strip ten miles wide on both sides of the road were given to the companies, and a subsidy of \$16,000 in 6 per cent bonds for every mile of track completed.² Stock to the amount of \$100,000,000 was offered for sale at \$1000 per share. On December

¹ See the report of the Secretary of the Interior, House Executive Documents, Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Congresses.

² This subsidy was doubled for miles across the desert lying between the Rockies and the Sierras, and increased three fold (to \$48,000) for some three hundred miles of track across the mountains.

2, 1863, with flags flying and cannon booming, the first spadeful of earth was turned at the little town of Omaha, selected as the eastern terminus of the road. But in spite of further favors granted by the government in July, 1864,¹ capital was slow in seeking investment whose returns seemed so remote and uncertain, when hundreds of men were making a fortune overnight in oil or metals. The war had ended before the first rail was actually laid (July 10, 1865). Even then there were plenty of sensible people who maintained that it was an impossible task to build a railroad across the wilderness of the desert and over the towering mountain ranges. General Sherman declared in August, 1865, that he "would not buy a ticket on the Pacific Railroad for his youngest grandchild"; yet the general himself lived to have the opportunity to purchase a ticket to the Pacific coast over any one of five great systems.

If the actual difficulties and dangers confronting the builders of the transcontinental railroad were great, the prospective rewards were greater still. Before the close of the war Colorado had sent over \$10,000,000 of gold to the United States mints. Nevada was yielding \$20,000,000 of silver annually. From Alder Gulch in the new territory of Montana \$16,000,000 of gold had been taken in the years 1862-1866. "One vast field of bewildering wealth," was A. K. McClure's description of the territory. Men flocked to the mining regions of the Rockies in the early sixties, as they had flocked to the gold fields of California in the late forties. The trans-Missouri traffic multiplied sevenfold during the four years of the Civil War. In 1866 it was estimated that there were a million white inhabitants west of the "Big Muddy" River. Half of these million were on the Pacific coast, in the great state of California, exploiting the fertile wheat lands of the north or the rich fruit lands of the south; or still farther north, developing the valleys of Oregon and

¹ The land grant was doubled to include alternate sections in a strip twenty miles wide on each side of the track, the par value of the shares was reduced from \$1000 to \$100, the bonds were made a second mortgage on the road to facilitate the sale of the company's securities, and the company was given the priority in the sale of its lands over the other lands along the route.

Washington, and penetrating far up the Columbia River by the Oregon Steam Navigation Company's boats. San Francisco had been joined to New York in 1862 by the electric telegraph. Its harbor was a "forest of masts." The Pacific Mail Company, whose steamers plied up and down the western coast, purchased Vanderbilt's line between New York and Aspinwall in 1865, and on January 1, 1867, inaugurated regular sailings between San Francisco and the Orient. It was possible to buy a through ticket from New York to Shanghai or Yokohama.

The time was ripe for the all-rail connection between the Atlantic and Pacific shores. The stage service over the plains and mountains of the great West had reached the limits of its usefulness. Ben Holladay's famous "Overland Line," controlling nearly 3000 miles of traffic and owning 260 coaches and 6000 horses and mules, was taxed beyond its capacity to handle the trade. Holladay dispatched a coach a day eastward from Placerville and westward from Atchison. But the journey took weeks. The passengers were subjected to the discomfort of many weary hours in cramped positions and to the dangers of storms, drought, prairie fires, highwaymen, and hostile Indians. Besides the mail bags, only the lightest kinds of freight could be carried—all the heavier shipments going by the slow water route via the Isthmus.

As the railhead of the Union Pacific moved rapidly westward,¹ the rude mining camps, with their lawless gangs of desperadoes, began to be transformed into towns and cities. Churches, schools, libraries, appeared where only saloons and gaming-houses had been before. The trains brought families where the stagecoaches had carried adventurers. In Owen Wister's picturesque phrase, "The nomadic, bachelor West began to give place to the housed and married West."

¹ In November, 1866, it was 270 miles west of Omaha. July 1, 1867, it had reached Julesburg in the northeast corner of Colorado, proceeding at the rate of 50 miles a month. By the end of November, 1867, it had reached Cheyenne, Wyoming, 510 miles west of the Missouri; and in January, 1869, it passed the 1000-mile post at Weber Canyon, Utah. From the California end, with the Sierras to blast through and long snowsheds to construct, the work went more slowly. Thousands of Chinese were employed in the work on the Central Pacific.

Congress had given the Pacific companies until July 1, 1876, to complete their work. It is not unlikely that the task would not have been finished then, if it had not been for the energy of a group of wealthy men, including Oakes Ames (a congressman from Massachusetts) and his brother Oliver, the Hazards of Rhode Island, Governor Stanford of California, and others, who formed a construction company, called the *Crédit Mobilier of America*, for financing the work. Several officials of the Union Pacific Company were members of the *Crédit Mobilier*; and when it was later discovered by an investigating committee of Congress that these men in their capacity as officials of the road had awarded to themselves excessively profitable contracts in their capacity as members of the construction company, and had used the stock of the company for the virtual bribery of certain members of Congress, the *Crédit Mobilier* fell into merited disgrace and became a byword in our history. But this sad revelation does not alter the fact that Ames and his associates rendered a considerable service in getting the Union Pacific Railroad completed eight years before the date set by Congress.

The tracks building westward from Omaha and eastward from Sacramento met at Promontory Point, near Ogden, Utah, where, on May 10, 1869, amid impressive ceremonies, the last rail was fastened with spikes of silver and gold to a sleeper of polished California laurel. Wires connected with the silver sledge-hammer carried the welcome sound of the alternate strokes of President Stanford of the Central and Vice President Durant of the Union Pacific to telegraph offices all over the land. Then the two locomotives drew together "until their noses touched," while their gala decorations received a christening from the contents of champagne bottles broken over their cabs. The first through train from California to New York arrived at the Hudson River terminal on July 26, 1869, after a run of six and a half days.

The effects of this wonderful achievement, which brought the two shores of our country within less than a week of each other, were immediately visible. Our trade with China and Japan had increased from \$10,485,000 to \$14,814,000 (or about

41 per cent) in the three years preceding 1869. In the next three years it increased to over \$28,000,000, or nearly 100 per cent. In the first ten months of 1870 some 1,700,000 pounds of freight were shipped over the Central Pacific road, and 13,235,000 pounds in the corresponding months of 1871. The other Pacific roads which had been granted lands or subsidies were stimulated to complete their tracks.¹ From Duluth at the head of Lake Superior to New Orleans at the mouth of the Mississippi, there was scarcely a town of respectable size that did not cherish the hope of becoming the eastern terminal of a Pacific railroad.

The "Pacific fever" invaded Congress. A senate Pacific Railroad Committee, headed by the enthusiastic Stewart of Nevada, brought in a majority report early in 1869, recommending government aid to some five thousand miles of projected lines from the Mississippi Valley to the coast. The government was to guarantee 6 per cent interest on bond issues of \$30,000 a mile until the roads should earn the money. Stewart estimated that this would pledge the United States to a liability of about \$4,500,000 a year for a period of five years, and in return for this moderate outlay inestimable advantages would be reaped. Five dollars' worth of trade would be created for every dollar spent. The hostile Indians would be "permanently conquered."²

¹ Some of these roads were the Kansas Pacific, the Southern Pacific, the Memphis, Pacific, and El Paso, the Gulf and Pacific, the St. Paul and Pacific, and the Northern Pacific.

² One of the most serious problems of the period was the control of the Indians on our frontier from Montana to Texas. Resenting the invasion of their immemorial hunting-grounds by the steady westward migration of the "pale faces," they ambushed the stagecoaches, tore up rails, threw down telegraph poles, and massacred the inmates of the government posts. Dishonest agents of the Indian Bureau sold the savages whisky and firearms, which made the task of the soldiers who were trying to restrain ambush and massacres almost impossible. The Indian Bureau and the War Department were at loggerheads, each accusing the other of inefficiency and inhumanity. Commissioner Taylor of the bureau asserted in 1867 that it had cost the government over \$40,000,000 to conduct the campaign of 1865; and that at the present rate of extermination it would take twenty-five thousand years, at a cost of \$300,000,000,000, to be rid of the "red fiends."

Millions of the hardy people of northern Europe would be drawn to our great West. Canada west of the Great Lakes would soon be annexed to the United States by the attraction of the Northern Pacific road, while the Southern Pacific would draw the upper provinces of Mexico into the Union without the cost of purchase or the expense of conquest. But the more cautious minority of the committee so emphatically denounced this "gigantic omnibus scheme" for burdening with millions of additional liabilities a government striving to reduce taxes and restore a normal currency that the Senate refused to debate the Stewart report.

As the Pacific railroads joined the oceans which washed the shores of the New World, so the electric cable joined the shores of the Old World and the New. A cable laid in 1858 had "grounded" in less than a month, leaving its indomitable promoter, Cyrus W. Field, almost alone in his confidence that permanent communication between Europe and America could be carried by cable over the bed of the ocean. The war interrupted Field's plans, but did not discourage his zeal. A rival promoter, Perry M. Collins, secured concessions from the British and Russian governments for running an overland telegraph up the coast of British Columbia and Alaska to Bering Strait, where a cable of 400 miles under the Strait would connect with lines through Siberia and European Russia. Though the distance to Paris by the Collins Overland Line would be 14,000 miles, the scheme had the favor of the government and the public, while Field was ridiculed as a visionary and a fraud. The poles of the Collins line had already been set up for hundreds of miles through British Columbia before Field, after repeated visits to England and ceaseless efforts on this side of the water to raise the millions necessary for his enterprise, finally succeeded, in July, 1866, in joining Trinity Bay, Newfoundland, with the Irish coast. Since that day cable connection between America and Europe has been uninterrupted. The "visionary" Field was now hailed as "the modern Columbus." He was tendered dinners and receptions. Congress gave him a gold medal, and Queen Victoria regretted that she could not have the privilege

of knighting him. The success of the cable was immediate. Although the price per word was reduced from \$5 to \$1.25 between 1866 and 1869, the receipts mounted steadily. In April, 1867, more than twenty-five hundred messages brought in fees of \$178,700. The first year's income was over \$1,600,000.

The growing business of the cable, like the growing traffic of the West, was but one of the many signs of the remarkable prosperity of the country in the years immediately following the war. While the products of the mines, the forests, the fields, and the farms were transforming the modest cities of the Mississippi and Ohio valleys into great distributing centers for lumber, live stock, ore, and grain,¹ the large amounts of fluid capital created by profitable war contracts and swollen by high protective tariffs sought investment in new industries in the manufacturing region, which extended from New England southward to the Potomac and westward to the Alleghenies. The number of industrial wage-earners increased 57 per cent in the period from 1860 to 1870, as against 37 per cent in the preceding decade. Part of the new wealth was the result of honest toil and the legitimate expansion of business among an enterprising people, but far too much of it was fictitious and fugitive. Speculation in railroads, metals, and oil² had introduced a spirit of reckless gambling into our business. The transactions of the stock exchange far outran the balance sheets of the merchants and manufacturers. The trading in Wall Street

¹ For an interesting account of the growth of these cities see a series of articles in the *Atlantic Monthly* for 1867.

² No chapter in our economic history is more spectacular than the story of the oil fields of western Pennsylvania in the sixties. It recalls the wild days of John Law's "Mississippi Bubble" in the early eighteenth century. Small tradesmen, clerks, professional men, chambermaids, and day laborers rushed to invest their savings in the new "oil-dorado." Hundreds were made rich overnight; thousands were ruined by fraudulent "companies" whose only assets were "a bottle of oil in an office window and some gaudily decorated certificates of stock." Where the prospectors "struck oil," cities sprang up in a few weeks; and when the oil ceased to "gush," they returned as rapidly to a few acres of deserted land. Pithole, Pennsylvania, ranked next to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in post-office business in 1865; but two years later only ninety-two voters remained in the city, and it disappeared from the map the next year.

for the single year 1865 amounted to \$6,000,000,000. Defalcation, swindling, speculation, forgery, and failure were everyday occurrences. In a speech at Fort Wayne, Indiana, in October, 1865, Secretary of the Treasury McCulloch predicted that "the brief period of seductive prosperity" through which the country was passing would be followed by "widespread bankruptcy and disaster."

Only the prostrate South had no part in this program of stimulated industry. Its one important item of wealth—property in slaves mounting into the billions—had been wiped out; its social system was turned topsy-turvy; its political influence was nil. The price of cotton, to be sure, was high, owing to the shortage caused by the blockade; and some Northern capital was attracted to the South for investment in plantations. But the new owners did not make a success of it. They were unwelcome in the South and utterly inexperienced in handling negro labor. The old masters, on the other hand, did not have the capital to buy the fertilizers and implements necessary for the maintenance of the plantations or to pay the wages of free labor. They had to sell off parts of their large estates or work them on the share system. In 1860 the average size of the cotton plantation had been 335.4 acres. Fifteen years after the war it was only 153.4 acres.


It would have been hard enough for the South to recover from its poverty and confusion even if it had been allowed to work out its own salvation undisturbed; but the reconstruction policy of Congress, as we have seen, forced the South to postpone the task of economic rehabilitation to what it considered the more important work of social preservation. For if there was one subject on which the Southerners were in more perfect agreement than they had been on the necessity of negro slavery, it was the inconceivability of negro domination. Though emancipated and endowed with citizenship by amendments to the Constitution, the negro was still a member of an inferior race, whose numbers made it a menace to white civilization. Therefore, when the states of the South were forbidden by acts of Congress and Federal amendments from dealing with the social

and political status of the negro, various voluntary associations, known as White Leagues, Knights of the White Camelia, Rifle Clubs, Councils of Safety, Boys of '76, etc., took upon themselves the duty of maintaining the supremacy of the white race.

The most important of these associations was the Ku-Klux Klan (from the Greek *kuklos*, meaning "a circle"), which was organized by a group of young men at Pulaski, Tennessee, in the autumn of 1866, more in a spirit of jocose dare-deviltry than with any grim purpose of terrorism. They took advantage of the superstitious credulity of the negroes to keep them in a state of wholesome awe and deter them from meeting together or coöperating with the carpetbaggers and scalawags in any political activities. Weird notices, decorated with mystic symbols and rude drawings of skulls and coffins, would be posted on trees to warn undesirable white men out of the towns. Troops of horsemen, with steed and rider robed in white sheets, would appear suddenly to break up negro meetings; or a solitary rider would stop at night at a negro's cabin, and, calling for water, would pour a pailful or two down his neck into a rubber bag concealed beneath his disguise, remarking casually that he had not had a drink since he dug his way up from hell through the battlefield of Shiloh. The Klan spread rapidly over the South, organized as the Invisible Empire, with an elaborate hierarchy of officials (Genii, Dragons, Hydras, Furies, Goblins, Night-hawks), reaching from the Cyclops of the local den up to the Grand Wizard of the Empire.

As the hands of the carpetbaggers and scalawags were strengthened by the reconstruction legislation, and the negroes were drawn more and more into political activities through the Union Leagues of the South, the methods of the Ku-Klux grew sterner. To keep the negroes from the polls after the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Klan resorted to violence and brutality.¹ Stories of the beating, mutilating, and even murdering of the negroes came to the North with increasing fullness of

¹ A report of a commission appointed by Congress to investigate the Ku-Klux outrages was published in 1871. Its thirteen volumes contain harrowing pictures of the tortures of the negroes.



"Hang, cure, hang! * * * * Their complexion is perfect yellows." Stand fast, good
fate, to their hanging! * * * * If they be not born to be hanged, our case is miserable."

The above cut represents the fate in store for those great pests of Southern society—the carpet-bagger and scallawag—if found in Dixie's Land after the break of day on the 4th of March next.

The genus carpet-bagger is a man with a lank head of dry hair, a lank stomach and long legs, club knees and splay feet, dried legs and lank jaws, with eyes like a fish and mouth like a shark. Add to this a habit of sneaking and dodging about in unknown places—habiting with negroes in dark dens and back streets—a look like a bound and the smell of a polecat.

Words are wanting to do full justice to the genus scallawag. He is a cur with a contracted head, downward look, slinking and uneasy gait; sleeps in the woods, like old Crossland, at the bare idea of a Ku-Klux raid.

Our scallawag is the local leper of the community. Unlike the carpet-bagger, he is native, which is so much the worse. Once he was respected in his circle; his head was level, and he would look his neighbor in the face. Now, possessed of the itch of office and the salt rheum of Radicalism, he is a mangy dog, slinking through the alleys, haunting the Governor's office, deiling with tobacco juice the steps of the Capitol, stretching his lazy carcass in the sun on the Square, or the benches of the Mayor's Court.

He waiteth for the troubling of the political waters, to the end that he may step in and be healed of the itch by the ointment of office. For office he 'bums' as a toper 'bums' for the satisfying dram. For office, yet in prospective, he hath bartered respectability; hath abandoned business, and ceased to labor with his hands, but employs his feet kicking out boot-heels against jump-post and corner carb, while discussing the question of office.

THE FATE OF THE CARPET-BAGGER AND THE SCALWAG

(Cartoon by Ryland Randolph in the *Independent Monitor*, of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, September 1. 1868; reproduced from Lester and Wilson's "Ku Klux Klan" through the courtesy of the editor, Prof. W. L. Fleming, of the University of Louisiana)

detail, and raised protests that were no less emphatic if they were prompted in part by motives analogous to those which Macaulay attributed to the Puritans of the seventeenth century: "They hated bear-baiting, not because it gave pain to the bear, but because it gave pleasure to the spectators."

In fact, no sooner was the radical plan of reconstruction completed in theory with the Fifteenth Amendment than Congress was driven to use extraordinary measures to enforce it in practice. In spite of the efforts of the Union Leagues to create a permanent negro electorate in the South, state after state was returning to white control and deserting the Republican party. Louisiana and Georgia voted for Seymour in 1868. Tennessee recovered home rule in 1869; Virginia and North Carolina, in 1870. Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas were almost under white control. The Republican majority in Congress was reduced from 97 to 35 in the elections of 1870. An Enforcement Act was passed in May, 1870, visiting with severe penalties the infraction of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but the effect was only to redouble the repressive energies of the Ku-Klux Klan and other "regulative" associations. As the amendments forbade only *states* to curtail the civil and political rights of the negro, legislation by Congress to control or punish the actions of individuals or groups of individuals in the South was condemned by the moderates as an unconstitutional interference with the police powers of the states. Nevertheless the radicals persisted in their determination to override public opinion in the South. On February 28, 1871, a second Enforcement Act placed congressional elections under the control of supervisors appointed by Federal judges in the various states.¹ This was followed in April, after a message from President Grant urgently recommending "such legislation as, in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property and

¹ Rhodes (Vol. VI, p. 312) says, "It had reference to elections for members of Congress only, but, as the state elections generally took place on the same day, the protecting arm of the United States government was placed around the freedman who desired to vote for Republican governors and members of the legislature."

the enforcement of the law in all parts of the United States," by the famous Ku-Klux Act, which gave the President military powers for the suppression of the Ku-Klux outrages. In pursuance of this act Grant, in the autumn of 1871, suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus in nine of the counties of South Carolina.¹

The increasing severity of these laws and the steady encroachment of Congress upon the police powers of the states not only roused the opposition of the Democrats, who were pledged to the strict interpretation of the Constitution, but also alienated numbers of important Republicans from the Grant administration. Garfield, Trumbull, and Schurz opposed the Ku-Klux bill in Congress, the latter wisely warning the Senate that there were social disorders which could not be cured by laws. The policy of coercion, instead of restraining the activities of the Ku-Klux or retarding the inevitable restoration of home rule, only hastened the solidarity of the Democrat party in the South. Every year more people were becoming impatient of the persistence of the negro question and skeptical of its solution by the politicians at Washington. The best way to insure the humane treatment of the freedmen was to cease to attempt to array them in hostility to their former masters. Conciliation would win more than coercion; amnesty was a better policy than animosity. The war had been over for five years,

¹ The Ku-Klux Act and several sections of the Enforcement Acts were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1875. The Chief Justice, in delivering his opinion in the refusal of the court to consider an indictment against a group of men who had broken up a negro meeting, said: "The Fourteenth Amendment adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. . . . The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the states do not deny that right." It may be said, in general, that the reconstruction policy of Congress was carried out with as little regard for the judicial as for the executive branch of the government. After the Dred Scott decision the Supreme Court had been an object of suspicion and even of violent attack in the North as a "bulwark of slavery." Although the reorganization of the court following upon the secession of the Southern states and the death of Justice McLean and Chief Justice Taney had given Lincoln the opportunity of appointing five new members (Swayne, Miller, Davis, Field, and Chase), and left the venerable Justice Wayne of Georgia (appointed by Jackson in 1835) as the only Southerner on the bench at the close of the Civil War, yet this new court was as little inclined to radicalism as its predecessor of pre-war days. It decided unanimously in the case of

and, to borrow Horace Greeley's phrase, it was high time that one section of the country should cease to be pinned to the other by bayonets. Undoubtedly there were grave offenses against law and order in those regions of the South in which the negro population was large. But to proclaim martial law in South Carolina was to magnify the misdeeds of the Ku-Klux into armed rebellion against the authority of the United States!

The congressional policy of "thorough" in the South was only one of several counts on which hostility to the administration was developing as Grant's first term wore on. Few men have entered the White House with a greater opportunity for service through wise and healing statesmanship than the silent victor of Appomattox. He was the most popular man in the country, sharing with the martyred Lincoln the gratitude of millions for the preservation of the Union. For the Southerners he had been a generous victor and a kindly critic.¹ His inauguration had marked the end of the unseemly quarrel between the President and Congress which had filled the term of his predecessor. The laconic benediction of his speech of acceptance, "Let us have peace!" had promised an era of reconciliation. Yet from the very first Grant was a sad disappointment in the presidential office. Without any training in statesmanship, he quickly fell under the influence of astute radi-

Ex parte Milligan, in April, 1866, that the President had no power to substitute military tribunals for regular juries in places where the civil courts were open, and five of the judges (all Northerners) denied this power to Congress also. Nevertheless Congress proceeded, by the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, to "invest brigadier-generals with power to abolish jury trial and to suspend the privilege of Habeas Corpus in time of peace" (Gideon Welles, "Diary," April 29, 1867). When the attempt was made to bring the constitutionality of these acts before the Supreme Court in the *McCardle* case, Congress "clipped the wings of the court" by hastily repealing the act which granted appeals from Federal circuit courts to the Supreme Court in Habeas Corpus cases (March 27, 1868). "This Congress will brook no opposition from the court on political matters," said a radical paper, "and if the court interferes, the court will go to the wall." The subject of the relations of Congress to the Supreme Court in the reconstruction period is well treated in Charles Warren's "Supreme Court in American History" (1922), Vol. III, chaps. xxix, xxx.

¹ See page 9, note 1, for his report to President Johnson on conditions in the South in the autumn of 1865.

cals like Morton, Conkling, and Butler. He never rose to warm and trusting companionship with men of fine ethical sensibilities like E. Rockwood Hoar and George William Curtis. Intellectuals embarrassed him; idealists annoyed him. He was too ready to make friends with the devotees of mammon, though they were as vulgar as Jim Fisk and as rascally as Jay Gould. He was more interested in horses than in history and a better judge of their "points" than of human character. His integrity was above suspicion; but he failed often to detect the shortcomings of public servants for whose conduct he was ultimately responsible, or to protect himself against private associates whose dishonesty finally brought him to dire poverty. For his inestimable services in the war for the Union, Grant will always be held in grateful veneration; and for the pathetic courage of the last days, when, in the grim race with death, he toiled in excruciating pain to complete the "Memoirs" which were to pay his debts, he will be honored and loved as long as the appreciation of heroic deeds remain to the American people. Yet even these great merits cannot hide the fact that Grant was incapable of remedying, or even of wholly realizing, the abuses which made the years of his presidency one of the most deplorable periods in our history. For the existence of those abuses Grant himself was not responsible; and we may accept with full indorsement the humble apologia of his closing message to Congress, in December, 1876: "I have acted in every instance from a conscientious desire to do what was right, constitutional, within the law, and for the very best interests of the whole people. Failures have been errors of judgment, not of intent." Still, the American people has the right to expect rectitude of judgment as well as honesty of purpose in its chief magistrate. Tacitus's terse comment on the Emperor Tiberius might have been written for Grant: "*capax imperi, nisi imperasset.*"

The list of grievances against the administration was already long when the mid-term elections of 1870 came to cut the Republican majority in Congress from 97 to 35. Appointments to office had too often followed the dictates of personal and factional interests rather than disinterested considerations of pub-

lic service. So many of the President's relatives had positions in the Federal service that the charge of nepotism was raised. Of the three strong men in the cabinet, two had gone. In June, 1870, Grant had curtly asked for the resignation of the Attorney-General, E. Rockwood Hoar of Massachusetts, and had appointed A. T. Ackerman of Georgia in his place, in order that he might win the votes of the Southern senators for the ratification of a treaty annexing Santo Domingo to the United States—a project on which the President had set his heart in spite of widespread public opposition, and to which he had attempted to commit his cabinet by methods strongly suggestive of a general announcing his plan of campaign to his staff. A few months after Hoar's dismissal the Secretary of the Interior, Jacob D. Cox of Ohio, had been forced to send in his resignation because the President would not support him in his fight to keep the Indian Bureau out of politics and to defend the principles of civil-service reform against spoilsmen like Cameron, Conklin, and Chandler, who had easy entry at the White House. Columbus Delano of Ohio, a pliant tool in the hands of the politicians, succeeded Governor Cox, leaving Hamilton Fish of New York, the Secretary of State, as the only thoroughly competent member of the cabinet. "You are the bulwark now standing between the country and destruction," wrote Hoar to Fish on taking his departure from Washington.¹

Finally, Grant's lack of appreciation of the proprieties of the presidential office and his undisguised admiration for men of wealth had brought his name into an unfortunate connection with one of the most unsavory transactions of the times. Jim Fisk and Jay Gould, as disreputable a pair of rascals as ever disgraced the precincts of the money-changers, had engineered a bold conspiracy to corner the gold supply in the summer of 1869. In order to prevent the Secretary of the Treasury from moderating the premium on gold by the customary monthly

¹ Even Fish tendered his resignation when President Grant negotiated the Santo Domingo treaty in secretive fashion through his private secretary, Babcock. But the Secretary of State was persuaded to remain in the cabinet, and later became an advocate of the President's Santo Domingo policy.

sale of from \$2,000,000 to \$8,000,000 of the government's accumulations of gold,¹ the conspirators worked indirectly through Grant's brother-in-law, Corbin (for whom they agreed to "carry" \$1,500,000 of gold), and directly upon Grant himself, whom Gould and Fisk entertained lavishly on a trip from New York to Boston on one of their palatial Fall River steamboats. The argument which they used was that the high price of gold would stimulate the movement of grain eastward to the Atlantic seaboard for export—incidentally increasing freight traffic for their Erie Railroad. They had so far prevailed upon Grant as to get him to write to Secretary Boutwell to make no further sales of gold without his permission, before the guileless President became suspicious of their motives and again gave his Secretary free hand. Boutwell immediately threw \$4,000,000 of the Treasury's gold on the market. But Gould had learned through Corbin of the President's change of mind; and on the very morning that the government renewed its sales he went down to Wall Street and began to unload his \$50,000,000 of gold without taking his partner into his confidence. The unsuspecting Fisk bid the price up to 162 before the crash came. As Gould poured his millions of gold on the market the premium went down like the barometer before a storm. It took but a few minutes for the price of gold to fall from 162 to 135; and the Treasury's sale of \$4,000,000 gave the finishing stroke to the demolition of the corner. This hectic day of Friday, September 24, 1869, which sent a score of brokers on Wall Street down to ruin, is known as "Black Friday." It involved the President's brother-in-law and sister; and even his wife was unjustly accused of complicity in the plot. Grant was entirely innocent in the affair; but the fact that he had accepted the hospitality of Gould and Fisk, and had sat with his wife and daughter in Fisk's ostentatious box at the theater, made it impossible for him to stand forth as he should have done as the nation's leader in the protest against corruption in high places.

¹ This surplus represented the difference between the government's receipts from customs duties and its expenditure for interest on the public debt, both of which items were by law payable in gold.

That protest, however, was not long delayed. It was a movement in Missouri that formed the rallying point for the widespread dissatisfaction with the administration. The radicals of Missouri had secured the adoption of a constitution in 1865 which put to the political ban all those who had been in any way connected with the Confederate cause. Immediately the more liberal Republicans of the state began a campaign for universal amnesty and enfranchisement. The leader in this movement was B. Gratz Brown, formerly a Missouri lawyer and a Benton Democrat, who had served part of a term in the United States Senate during the war. Brown was joined in 1867 by Carl Schurz, who in the days of Europe's great mid-century revolution had escaped from his German prison and come to America to distinguish himself in politics, war, and journalism. The Brown-Schurz faction seceded from the regular Republican organization of the state in 1870 on the issue of the immediate removal of political disabilities. Under the name of Liberal Republicans they won a decided victory at the polls. Brown was chosen governor; Schurz was elected United States senator. The victory of the Liberals in Missouri roused great interest in the country at large, especially as it took place just at the time when the radicals in Congress were making every effort, by the Enforcement Acts, to delay the restoration of home rule in the South.

When it became evident that Grant's renomination could not be prevented, the Missouri Liberals issued a call in January, 1872, for a national convention to meet at Cincinnati on the first day of May. Influential Republican newspapers, like the *Springfield Republican* and the *Chicago Tribune*, supported the movement. Prominent men in all parts of the country joined it. It was naturally looked on with favor by the Democrats of the South, as a promise of relief from the rigors of the reconstruction policy. But whatever chance the Liberals may have had of defeating the intrenched, organized forces of the administration was entirely lost by the action of the Cincinnati convention. Excellent men were available for the nomination: Charles Francis Adams of Massachusetts, who had just sailed on an im-

portant mission to Geneva; Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, for a decade chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate; David Davis of Illinois, an associate justice of the Supreme Court; Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania; and others. But the dog-in-the-manger policy of selfish intrigue and petty dissensions—the curse of so many reform movements—defeated the choice of a worthy candidate.¹ A deal between the anti-Conkling faction in New York and the followers of Governor Brown and Senator Blair in Missouri resulted in the nomination, on the sixth ballot, of Horace Greeley, editor of the *New York Tribune*, with Governor Brown for vice-president.

Greeley was about the worst choice possible—"a preposterous candidate," as Rhodes calls him. A great majority of the Liberals were tariff reformers, and Greeley was "the most extreme protectionist living." Civil-service reform was one of the main planks of the Liberal platform, and Greeley was even less friendly than Grant to the merit system. The Liberals needed the coöperation of the Democrats to defeat Grantism, and Greeley had for years been pouring out his choicest vocabulary of invective against the party of "horse thieves" and "rebels." He was, said the *New York World*, "the most conspicuous and heated opponent of the Democratic party that could be found in the whole country, and a man for whom the honest, thinking mass of Democrats could no more vote . . . than the Union League Club could be persuaded to hang upon its walls a portrait of Jefferson Davis." On one point alone was Greeley a good Liberal. He advocated general amnesty for the South, urging his countrymen to "clasp hands across the bloody chasm."

It was a difficult task for genuine reformers like Schurz and Trumbull to give Greeley enthusiastic support.² It was a bitter

¹ The *New York Evening Post* said that most of the delegates were "as innocent as sucklings of any political manoeuvres" and that the politicians had captured them "like a bevy of quails under a net."

² Though Schurz at Cincinnati had rebuked the men whose slogan was "Anything to beat Grant!" his speeches during the campaign, say his biographers, were "naturally against Grant rather than for Greeley." Some of the politicians and editors deserted Greeley, and others gave him lukewarm support. Bowles of



CARTOON BY THOMAS NAST CHARACTERIZING THE RESULT OF THE CINCINNATI CONVENTION, IN "HARPER'S WEEKLY," MAY 18, 1872, ENTITLED "GREAT EXPECTATIONS"

("A mud mountain was once greatly agitated. Loud groans and noises were heard, and crowds of people came from all parts to see what was the matter. After long expectation and many wise conjectures from the by-standers out popped a—MOUSE")

pill for the Democrats to indorse a man who had never mentioned their party but to curse it. Yet the Democratic convention at Baltimore, seeing no other way to defeat Grant, accepted Greeley as their candidate. Of course the Southern delegates were solid in their support of a candidate of conciliation and amnesty. The campaign was waged with a bitterness of invective and vituperation rarely equaled in our history. Greeley, whose eccentricities of costume and carriage made him an easy mark for the cartoonist, was portrayed by Thomas Nast in *Harper's Weekly* as the humorous counterpart of villains like Boss Tweed and Jim Fisk; while Grant was characterized by a Baltimore paper as "that ambitious and utterly depraved horse-jockey who now oscillates between the White House and Long Branch." After the election Greeley remarked that he was uncertain whether he had been running for the presidency or the penitentiary. His defeat was crushing. He carried only three border states (Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri) and three of the states of the former Confederacy (Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas), giving him 66 electoral votes to 272 for Grant. The latter's popular majority was 750,000. The regular Republicans secured 49 seats in the Senate to 24 for the combined Democrats and Liberals, while a majority of more than 100 in the House (195 Republicans to 92 Democrats and Liberals) more than repaired the heavy losses sustained in the election of 1870. The administration again had a clear two-thirds majority in both Houses of Congress.

Although the Greeley campaign was an utter failure,¹ the Liberal Republican movement bore fruit. It probably influenced Grant to incorporate in his annual message of December, 1871, recommendations for reform in the tariff, the administra-

the *Springfield Republican* told his staff not to "gush" over the candidate. It was not strange that the advocates of low tariff and civil-service reform preferred Grant as "the lesser of two evils."

¹ Greeley's political defeat was swallowed up in personal calamity. His wife died in the midst of the campaign, and his mind gave way under the strain of domestic grief and public abuse. He died less than a month after his humiliating defeat; and his countrymen, touched with compassion, paid tribute to his great services for freedom and the Union.

tion of the public lands, the civil service, and the coercive policy toward the South.¹ It certainly influenced Congress to pass a general Amnesty Act in May, 1872, restoring to full political privileges all but about five hundred of the Southerners who had been excluded from office and the franchise by the Fourteenth Amendment and the reconstruction legislation.² It brought to public, organized expression the growing sentiment in the North in favor of home rule in the South; it pledged the Democratic party, by its acceptance of the Cincinnati platform, to acquiesce in the war amendments; and, finally, it furnished encouragement and impetus to movements of political and economic reform which made their influence felt in the next score of years.

One of the chief factors in the decisive Republican victory of 1872 was the successful conclusion, a few weeks before the election, of the arbitration negotiations at Geneva which settled the claims of the United States against Great Britain for the damages done by the *Alabama* and other Confederate cruisers to our shipping during the Civil War. This leads us to close the present section with a brief account of the diplomatic history of the years immediately following the war. There are two aspects to that history. In part it is a chapter of the long "continued story" of American expansion. In part it is a chapter of reconstruction in the broader sense of that word; namely, the adjustment of all the difficulties and complications that grew out of the four years of confusion and strife.

When the Russian Czar offered to sell us his huge domain of Alaska, the project met with a favorable response from Secre-

¹ "How completely our good President comes over to the advanced platform," wrote the editor of the *Springfield Republican*. "If he would only practice as he preaches, he would not leave a single inch for us to stand upon."

² Although Congress on petition had removed the disabilities of about 4600 men since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there were still between 150,000 and 160,000 ex-Confederates debarred from office-holding when the Amnesty Act of 1872 was passed. This act rehabilitated all except the former members of the Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh Congresses (1859-1863), former military and naval officers of the United States, Federal judges, cabinet officers, and foreign ministers. Congress continued for a quarter of a century to remove the disabilities of individuals belonging to these classes, until the act of June, 1898, granted full and unconditional amnesty.

tary Seward, who for years had been an ardent advocate of the establishment of our power on the eastern shores of the Pacific. A treaty was concluded on March 30, 1867, with Baron Stoeckl, the Russian minister at Washington, fixing the price of Alaska at \$7,200,000, or a little less than two cents an acre for an area (577,390 square miles) larger than that of the thirteen original states of the Union.¹ Seward won the powerful support of Charles Sumner, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate, and the treaty was ratified on April 9 with only two dissenting votes. Sumner, who was eager to have the British flag withdrawn from the North American continent, approved the treaty chiefly because it would "set a watchful Yankee on each side of John Bull in his far-western Canadian possessions." He emphasized the manifest destiny of our republic to spread from the Gulf of Mexico to the Arctic Sea. The acquisition of Alaska "would drive one more monarch from this continent." "One by one they have retired," he boasted; "first France, then Spain, then France again, and now Russia, all giving way to the absorbing unity declared in the national motto, *E. Pluribus Unum!*" Obviously, it was England's turn next. There was much opposition to the treaty, however, in the press, and a determined attack on it in the House debate over the appropriation of the money. Little was known of Alaska, which was supposed to be a "frozen wilderness." For a nation burdened with an enormous war debt and vexed with a disordered currency to spend \$7,200,000 for a "dreary waste of

¹ In the recently published "Letters of Franklin K. Lane" (1922) there is a most interesting Manuscript Note, dated December 29, 1911, recording a conversation with Mr. Charles Glover, president of the Riggs National Bank, who remembered as a boy handling two warrants upon the United States Treasury for the payment of \$1,400,000 and \$5,800,000 respectively to Russia. The existence of these two warrants was explained later to Mr. Glover by Senator Dawes. The first represented the price for which Russia had offered us Alaska before the Civil War. During the war Seward had invited Russia to make her friendly naval demonstration, secretly agreeing to pay the expenses of it out of "contingent funds." Those expenses amounted to \$5,800,000, and they were paid by adding this sum to the original purchase price of \$1,400,000. Therefore, although we paid Russia \$7,200,000, less than a fifth of that sum was all she actually asked for "one of the richest portions of the earth in mineral deposits."

glaciers, icebergs, white bears, and walruses" was the height of folly. The land was dubbed "Seward's ice box." But if these critics could have foreseen that by the close of the century Alaska would have yielded in fish, furs, and gold nearly \$150,000,000 of wealth, and that the revenue tax on her sealskins alone would have brought the government a sum (\$7,597,351) considerably larger than the purchase price, while her timber resources remained virtually untouched, they would have called the land Seward's treasure box.

From the frozen north Seward turned to the tropics. Six months after the purchase of Alaska a treaty was concluded at Copenhagen, ceding the Danish islands of St. Thomas and St. John to the United States for \$7,500,000. The ink was hardly dry on the treaty when a devastating earthquake and hurricane reduced the value of the islands to zero in the eyes of the American public. Not a single member of the Senate committee favored the treaty, and it was not reported to the Senate for action until the spring of 1870, when it was rejected.¹ Seward wanted to annex Hawaii and Santo Domingo, but he got no encouragement for these schemes.

Grant took up the Santo Domingo project, however, and clung to it with the tenacity which Jefferson had shown in regard to West Florida, and Polk in regard to California. He sent his private secretary, Orville E. Babcock, to Santo Domingo in the summer of 1869 with secret instructions; and when Babcock returned with a treaty of annexation, Grant first acquainted the Secretary of State with the matter by the casual introduction of the treaty into a cabinet meeting. The members of the cabinet received the communication with "frigid silence," while the President "colored and smoked hard at his cigar." Secretary Fish tendered his resignation, but Grant persuaded him to remain in office. A new treaty of annexation, duly negotiated by our agent in Santo Domingo, was submitted to the Senate, where it was rejected, on June 30, 1870, by a vote of 28 to 28. Grant

¹ On the occasion of our entrance into the World War in April, 1917, when we had vital interests to protect in the Panama Canal Zone and the Caribbean area, we purchased these islands of Denmark for \$25,000,000.

still persisted. He secured the appointment of a commission to visit the island and report on the desirability of annexation. Senator Wade of Ohio, President Andrew D. White of Cornell, and Samuel G. Howe made the visit and presented a favorable report. But the President, at last persuaded of the hopelessness of the Senate's ratification, let the matter drop. The net result of his dogged pertinacity had been a bitter quarrel with Sumner, who was deposed from the chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, the removal of John L. Motley from his post as minister to England, and the dismissal of Attorney-General Hoar from the cabinet (see above, p. 41).

Taking advantage of the preoccupation of the United States with the Civil War, the French Emperor Napoleon III had set the Austrian Archduke Maximilian upon an imperial throne in Mexico in 1864, supporting him with some thirty thousand French troops.¹ This action was doubly offensive to the United States, because it violated the Monroe Doctrine by subverting the republican form of government in Mexico, against the will of a vast majority of the Mexican people, and because Maximilian gave aid and comfort to the Confederacy by allowing ammunition and supplies to reach Texas across the Rio Grande and by receiving Confederate leaders at his "court" with honors and emoluments. Both Lincoln and Grant looked on the behavior of the French government as an act of war against the United States. During the visits of the President to Grant's headquarters at City Point, Virginia, in the winter of 1864-1865, the two men frequently discussed the plans for driving the French army out of Mexico at the close of the war. When that auspicious moment came, Grant stationed General Sheridan on the Mexican border with fifty-two thousand men, and made plans for General Schofield to lead a voluntary force of Americans to coöperate with the guerrilla troops of the dispossessed Mexican president, Benito Juarez. But Seward, firm in the belief that Napoleon would yield to diplomatic pressure, sent Schofield to Paris instead of to Mexico

¹ For Napoleon's intervention in Mexico, see "The American Adventure," Vol. I, pp. 619-620.

and, between September, 1865, and March, 1866, dispatched a series of notes to our minister in France, John Bigelow, which grew more and more insistent until they ended in an ultimatum.¹

Napoleon had already grown thoroughly sick of his Mexican enterprise. It had cost France hundreds of millions of francs and provoked the bitter attacks of the Republicans in the French Chamber. Moreover, Prussia, having seized the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in the Danish war (1864), was preparing to grapple with Austria for the leadership of the German states. Realizing the menace to France of Bismarck's program, Napoleon abandoned Maximilian as readily as he had taken him up; and in spite of his lavish promises to the newly crowned "emperor" of military support for five years, he ordered General Bazaine to send home the French troops in three detachments (October, 1866; March, 1867; October, 1867). Maximilian's beautiful consort, Carlotta, crossed the Atlantic to plead her husband's cause with Napoleon, with her brother Leopold II of Belgium, and with the Pope—all in vain. She lost both her entreaties and her reason. Prussia's decisive victory over Austria in the battle of Königgrätz (July 3, 1866) only hastened the recall of the French troops. The last regiments left Mexico before the middle of March, 1867. Maximilian might have gone back with them to his palace on the Adriatic. An Austrian frigate waited for him in the harbor of Vera Cruz. But with a quixotic fidelity he refused to "abandon" his Mexican subjects. He was captured at Querétaro by Juárez's soldiers, and in spite of the efforts of the government of the United States and of several European courts to secure his pardon and deportation, he was court-martialed and shot (June 19, 1867).

Seward meanwhile was cautiously feeling his way toward a

¹ At the same time President Johnson sent Lewis D. Campbell of Ohio to Mexico as the accredited minister of the United States to the government of President Juárez. After a wild-goose chase of several weeks, however, Campbell, accompanied by General Sherman, failed to locate the fugitive Mexican president and returned to the United States.

settlement with Great Britain for the damages done to the commerce of the United States during the Civil War by the *Alabama* and other Confederate cruisers built in British shipyards. At first Earl Russell maintained the same irritable haughtiness that he had assumed when our minister at London, Charles F. Adams, had made the first protests in the summer of 1862. "Her Majesty's government," said Russell, "are the sole guardian of their own honor." They could not admit that our claims were "founded on any grounds of law or justice." They had acted strictly in accordance with the laws of the realm, and "used all means in their power to prevent the fitting out and arming of vessels in their ports to cruise against the vessels of the United States." [!]¹ But with a change of ministry and with the ominous advance of Prussia's military power, the British government modified its stark *non possumus*. In case of a serious war into which England might be drawn it would be most annoying to have neutral maritime nations, sheltering themselves behind antiquated statutes which violated international obligations, let forth "a swarm of *Alabamas*" to vex her commerce. When, therefore, Lord Derby expressed his willingness to accept "a limited reference to arbitration" of our claims, Reverdy Johnson, the new minister sent by President Johnson to the court of St. James in August, 1868, found it easy to begin negotiations. In his anxiety to conciliate England, however, Johnson seemed to forget that his own country had a grievance. After a round of social festivities in England, during which he fraternized with men who had been conspicuous sympathizers with the Confederate cause and shook hands cordially with Laird, who had built the *Alabama*, he concluded the amazing Johnson-Clarendon convention (January 14, 1869), which contained no mention at all of the *Alabama*, but provided only for a general reference to arbitration of any claims that the two countries might have against each other since their last negotia-

¹ Many years later Lord Russell confessed that the escape of the *Alabama* from Liverpool was due to his own culpable indecision, which, he said, cost his country "a million a day" ("Recollections and Suggestions," pp. 235, 334).

tion in 1853. On April 13, 1869, the Johnson-Clarendon convention was rejected by the Senate by a vote of 54 to 1.¹

The vote followed upon a speech of Charles Sumner, in which the "massive grievance" of the United States against Great Britain was set forth with all the Senator's customary and unsparing vigor of rhetoric. Sumner contended that without England's hasty recognition of the South as a belligerent power and her subsequent aid to the Confederate cause, "the Rebellion would have soon succumbed under the well-directed efforts of the National Government." He presented Great Britain with a staggering bill of \$2,125,000,000, itemized as follows:

For direct damages, in the destruction of ships and cargoes by the Confederate cruisers	\$15,000,000
For indirect damages, in driving our commerce from the ocean by the terror of these cruisers	\$110,000,000
For indirect damages, in prolonging the war to at least double the time that it would have taken the United States to suppress rebellion, one half the cost of the war, to wit	\$2,000,000,000

Sumner's speech was warmly commended by President Grant (who changed his opinion after the breach with Sumner on the Santo Domingo question, and spoke sneeringly of "the indirect damage humbug"), by the members of the cabinet and of Congress, and even by men like Welles and James Russell Lowell, whose general attitude toward the administration was tartly critical. It appealed to the people of the country as a cogent statement of our just complaint against a power which we had been long accustomed to regard as unfriendly to the United States. Of course Sumner's speech did not help the new Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, toward an amicable settlement of

¹ The reader will note that between the negotiation of the convention and its rejection by the Senate, Grant had succeeded Johnson in the White House. Naturally, Johnson's followers in the United States agreed with the press in England that the defeat of the convention was due to "politics." The Republicans were not willing to let Andrew Johnson have the credit of concluding the settlement with England on any terms. But this is a puny explanation for a vote of 54 to 1. Democrats and Republicans in the Senate agreed in repudiating the treaty, and the public sentiment of the country heartily indorsed the vote.

the *Alabama* claims. Fish wisely refrained from further public discussion of the subject in view of the excited state of mind of the people on both sides of the Atlantic; while he encouraged a moderate, conciliatory attitude in his private correspondence and conversation, especially with John Rose, a Canadian statesman, who was working in England for a friendly settlement.

In 1870 came the Franco-Prussian War, the collapse of Napoleon III's empire at Sedan and Metz, and the siege of the French capital. The Prussian cannon, planted on the heights around Paris in the winter of 1870, held the hungry city in their iron grip. Then Grant returned to the subject of the *Alabama* claims in his annual message of December 5, 1870. Gladstone, now realizing that it was Prince Bismarck and not Jefferson Davis who had "created a nation," heeded the warning recommendation in Grant's message, that Congress assume the individual claims of our citizens against Great Britain. "The British cabinet," wrote Rose to Fish, "is disposed to enter on negotiations." Rose came over to Washington in January, 1871, where he and the British minister, Thornton, easily arranged for the submission of the various matters under the dispute (the *Alabama* claims, the northwest boundary, the Newfoundland fisheries) to a Joint High Commission.¹ The Commission, working "on the best of terms," concluded the Treaty of Washington (May 8, 1871), which provided, in the first eleven of its forty-three articles, that the *Alabama* claims should be adjudicated at Geneva, Switzerland, by a board of five arbitrators, appointed respectively by the president of the United States, the queen of England, the king of Italy, the president of Switzerland, and the emperor of Brazil.²

¹ The American commissioners were Secretary Fish, Justice Nelson of the Supreme Court, E. Rockwood Hoar, Robert C. Schenck, recently appointed minister to England, and Senator George H. Williams of Oregon. Great Britain was represented by Sir Edward Thornton, her minister at Washington, Earl de Grey and Ripon of Gladstone's cabinet, Sir Stafford Northcote, Professor Mountague Bernard of Oxford, and the prime minister of Canada, Sir John MacDonald.

² The members of the board were Charles Francis Adams (United States), Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn (Great Britain), Count Sclopis (Italy), Jacques Stämpfli (Switzerland), Vicomte d' Itajuba (Brazil). Count Sclopis presided.

It was midsummer of 1872 before the arguments of both sides were ready to be presented to the tribunal. The United States was in the midst of an exciting presidential campaign which was to test the strength of the Grant administration. The Fenian movement—a protest against England's coercive treatment of the Irish agitators for home rule—had enlisted wide support among the Irish of this country, resulting in attempts at armed invasions of Canada from points in northern New York and Vermont. Anything that looked like “truckling” to Great Britain would cost Grant the large Irish vote in the election. A brilliant diplomatic victory over Great Britain, on the other hand, would offset the criticism by Democrats and Liberals of Grant's vulnerable domestic policy. These political considerations probably influenced Assistant Secretary of State J. C. Bancroft Davis, who, as the agent for the United States, drew up our “case” at Geneva, to include in his voluminous brief of some five hundred pages the extravagant claims for “indirect damages” which Sumner had advanced three years before. The “attorney-like smartness,” “Yankee swagger,” and “acrimonious tone” of Bancroft's brief were highly offensive to the British arbitrator; and had it not been for the great tact and patience of Mr. Adams, supplemented by the efforts of members of Parliament like Forster and Earl Grey, the negotiations might have failed. As it was, however, the American claims for indirect damages were finally withdrawn, and the tribunal proceeded to a rapid and, on the whole, amicable settlement of the claims. The vote on Great Britain's responsibility for the depredations of the *Alabama* was unanimous. On the question of the *Shenandoah*, Count Sclopis and M. Stämpfli supported the American claims; on the question of the *Florida*, all the arbitrators except Chief Justice Cockburn were on our side. The tribunal awarded the United States \$15,500,000 damages, to be paid in gold. Cockburn alone dissented from the verdict and with considerable manifestation of bad feeling. The other matters under dispute were duly settled by special commissions. Great Britain was awarded \$1,929,819 for injuries done to the property or persons of her subjects during our

Civil War, and \$5,500,000 for our infringement of her rights in the fisheries of the north Atlantic coast. The northwest-boundary dispute, which had been referred to the new German emperor, William I, as umpire, was settled by the award of the island of San Juan to the United States.

The peaceful settlement of these claims and counter-claims of the two great nations of English speech and traditions was a long step forward—the longest that either country had ever taken—toward the substitution of frank discussion and “sweet reasonableness” for the appeal to arms in international disputes. It remains as an earnest and harbinger of that happy age, still how far distant none can say, when nations shall no longer be victims of the paradoxical delusion that their “vital” interests can be preserved only by broadcasting death and devastation.

POLITICAL CONVALESCENCE

Except for the years of anarchic rivalries and national impotence which immediately preceded the adoption of the Federal Constitution, no period of our history is less gratifying to contemplate than the decade between the close of the Civil War and the centennial of our independence. In spite of such relieving features as the Geneva Award and the general Amnesty Act of 1872, the period, on the whole, presents a dismal record of frenzied speculation, business demoralization, political corruption, financial confusion, and partisan audacity. It seemed as though the generosity and idealism of the nation had spent itself in the war. The tide ebbed, leaving only the ugly ill-smelling flats of politics. “My own public life has been a very brief and insignificant one,” said George F. Hoar in 1876, . . . “but in that brief period I have seen five judges of a high court of the United States driven from office by threats of impeachment for corruption or maladministration. . . . I have seen in the state of the Union foremost in power and wealth four judges of her courts impeached for corruption, and the political administration of her chief city become a disgrace and a byword through-

out the world.¹ . . . When the greatest railroad of the world, binding together the continent and uniting the two seas which wash our shores, was finished, I have seen our national triumph and exaltation turned to bitterness and shame by the unanimous report of three committees of Congress . . . that every step of that mighty enterprise had been taken in fraud. I have heard in the highest places the shameless doctrine avowed by men grown old in public office that the true way by which power should be gained in a Republic is to bribe the people with the offices created for their service, and the true end for which it should be used when gained is the promotion of selfish ambition and the gratification of personal revenge. I have heard that suspicion haunts the footsteps of the trusted companions of the President." This is a terrible indictment, but the facts bear it out in every particular.

Just a fortnight before Grant was inaugurated for his second term (March 4, 1873), the Poland Committee, which had been busy during the whole of the short session of Congress unearthing the scandals connected with the building of the Union Pacific Railroad (see page 31), made its report. It found Oakes

¹ The reference is to the unspeakable misgovernment of New York City by a gang of thieves during the five years following the war. The "boss" was William M. Tweed, Grand Sachem of Tammany Hall, who built up his power on votes secured by wholesale fraudulent naturalizations, generous doles to the poor, and lavish bribes to venal legislators and judges. In 1868 Tweed got the Tammany candidate, John T. Hoffman, elected governor, and obtained from the legislature a new charter for the city, turning the finances over to a group of four officials, consisting of the mayor (A. O. Hall), the comptroller (Richard B. Connolly), and the chairmen of two important committees (Tweed and Peter B. Sweeney). These men, in collusion with rascally plasterers, plumbers, pavers, builders, and furnishers, robbed the taxpayers of amounts "variously estimated at from \$45,000,000 to \$200,000,000" before the proofs of their guilt were revealed to the *New York Times* by a disgruntled member of the gang. They offered George Jones, the proprietor of the paper, \$5,000,000 to hush the matter up, but he was inexorable. The incriminating documents were published; and the chief offender, Tweed, after breaking jail and escaping to Spain, was brought back to end his days in Ludlow Street jail (1878). The overthrow of the "Tweed Ring" was due chiefly to the courageous work of Jones and Jennings of the *Times*, the cartoons of Thomas Nast in *Harper's Weekly*, and the diligence of the distinguished New York lawyer Samuel J. Tilden.

Ames guilty of having sold to members of Congress (or having "carried" for them on his books without payment) shares of *Crédit Mobilier* stock at prices "much below the true value of such stock, with intent thereby to influence the votes and decisions of such members in matters to be brought before Congress for action"; and recommended the expulsion of Ames and of James Brooks of New York, a director of the Union Pacific, from the House of Representatives. Nearly a score of men were implicated in the investigation. Some of these (Secretary Boutwell, Speaker of the House Blaine, and Senators Bayard and Conkling) were easily exonerated of the charge of listening to Ames's solicitations. Others, like Representatives Wilson, Boyer, and Bingham, were excused on the ground of having innocently welcomed a "good investment." Still others, like Dawes, Logan, and Allison, had accepted shares of stock and received cash dividends from Ames, but on second thought had returned the money and canceled their contracts. The genial Vice-President, Schuyler Colfax, became involved in a mess of prevarication and evasion. At first he denied having received a check for \$1200 from Ames; and when the voucher was produced, showing that he had deposited the money in the First National Bank, he said that it was a contribution to his campaign fund of 1868 furnished by a man named Nesbitt. When it appeared that Nesbitt was a manufacturer of envelopes who had received large contracts from the Post Office Department when Colfax was chairman of the Post Office Committee in the House, the Vice-President's case was finished. He retired, a thoroughly discredited man. Another public servant, whose defense seems on the face of it little better than Colfax's, emerged from the investigation to enjoy the continued support of his constituents and finally to be honored by election to the highest office in the land. James A. Garfield, convicted by Ames's inexorable memorandum book of having received dividends on *Crédit Mobilier* stock which he had never paid for, testified that he had received the money as a "loan." "Plainly, Garfield testified falsely," says Oberholtzer ("History of the United States since the Civil War," Vol. II, p. 605). At any

rate, the most charitable judgment on Garfield's character in the affair reflects seriously on his intelligence. If he was honest, both his memory and his reasoning were pitifully weak.

The Congress which had been laboring through the mire of the *Crédit Mobilier* exposures did nothing to redeem its reputation when, on the last day of the session (March 3, 1873), it passed a bill for generous increases in salaries. The added remuneration for the president, the vice president, the cabinet officers, and the justices of the Supreme Court was approved by the public as necessary and proper, but that part of the act which raised the pay of the senators and representatives from \$5000 to \$7500 a year roused an indignant protest. For not only had the legislators voted themselves an increase of 50 per cent, but they had made the bill retroactive, carrying a bonus of \$5000 for each member of the Congress about to expire. This raid on the Treasury was denounced as the "salary grab" and the "back-pay steal." It was the work of the notorious Benjamin F. Butler. The pressure of public opinion forced the repeal of that part of the act referring to the legislators when the Forty-third Congress met in December, 1873.¹

On the day after the passage of this act Grant delivered his second inaugural address. He spoke in a tone of modest, but firm justification of his policies; pledged himself to labor for various good causes, such as "the restoration of good feeling between the different sections of our common country," the rehabilitation of our currency upon a specie basis, the correction of abuses in the civil service; and closed with a grateful acknowledgment of the "vindication" which his countrymen had given him at the polls. "I have been the subject of abuse and slander scarcely ever equaled in political history, which today I feel that I can afford to disregard," he said, not realizing, perhaps, to what extent that verdict was a vote of lack of confidence in

¹ The president's salary was increased from \$25,000 to \$50,000 by the act. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was to receive \$10,500, and the associate justices \$10,000 each. At present the president receives \$75,000 (with \$25,000 for traveling expenses), the Chief Justice \$15,000, and the associates \$14,500. The salary of senators and representatives has been raised since 1907 from \$5000 to \$10,000.

Horace Greeley and the Democratic party, rather than an indorsement of the term just ended. Whether the vote of 1872 signified the indorsement of Grant as a good executive or the retention of Grant as a choice of evils may be open to question. The mid-term congressional vote of 1874, however, and the presidential vote of 1876 are subject to no ambiguity of interpretation. They were a decisive rebuke to an administration which, instead of using its renewed lease of power for the correction of the abuses of which it had received signal warning, only allowed the public life of the Republic to sink to lower levels, until it reached "the nadir of national disgrace."

President Grant devoted only a few lines of his inaugural to the South. "The states lately at war with the General Government," he said, "are now happily rehabilitated, and no executive control is exercised in any of them that would not be exercised in any other state under like circumstances." How "happy" the rehabilitation of the South was might be judged from the President's special message to Congress just a week earlier (February 25), in which he respectfully invited the attention of the members to the condition of affairs in the state of Louisiana. The election of the previous November had been a contest between the radical Republicans, who were determined to hold the state under carpetbag-negro domination, and the Liberals, who supported a ticket which would restore the state to native white rule. William P. Kellogg and John McEnery were the respective candidates for governor. Both claimed the victory, and two competing governments were set up in the state. "So many frauds and forgeries" had developed in the investigation of the election, said Grant, "as to make it doubtful what candidates received a majority of the votes actually cast." Nevertheless, Grant himself was not doubtful which candidate he should support. He allowed the United States Marshal, Packard, to use Federal troops to seize the statehouse and install the Kellogg government, while the radical Senator Morton blocked a bill for a new and fair election in Louisiana. Had it not been for this interference of the administration in behalf of a faction hateful to a vast majority of

the white inhabitants of the state, the McEnery government (according to the report of the investigating committee) "would have been peacefully inaugurated," and the people of Louisiana would have been spared two more years of anarchy—including massacres at Colfax in April, 1873, and at Coushatta in August, 1874; a revolt at New Orleans in September, 1874, quelled by a second intervention of United States troops to restore the Kellogg government; and a "Pride's Purge" of the legislature in January, 1875, to turn out the conservative members—before the state, which had "been converted into a South American republic," finally reached a peaceful truce that paved the way for its actual "happy rehabilitation" under President Hayes.

Conditions in several other Southern states were only less distressful than in Louisiana. The negroes in the Mississippi legislature increased from 36 in 1869 to 64 in 1873, and in the same period the state tax rate rose fourteenfold. In Vicksburg, where the blacks comprised over 50 per cent of the population, an armed conflict took place in December, 1874, to reinstate a carpetbag sheriff who had been forced to resign; and the usual slaughter of negroes occurred before General Sheridan sent troops up from New Orleans to restore order. The next summer there was rioting again at Vicksburg, and a brutal massacre at Yazoo City. Governor Ames (a carpetbagger from Maine and a son-in-law of Benjamin F. Butler) wired to Grant in September, 1875, that "domestic violence in its most aggravated form" existed in Mississippi, and begged the President to send him troops; but Grant, with a belated appreciation of the folly of the policy of coercion, refused the request. "The whole people," he wrote to the Attorney-General, "are tired out with these annual autumnal outbreaks in the South, and the great majority are ready now to condemn any interference on the part of the government." The Democrats, left with a free hand in Mississippi, carried the state by a large majority in the November election of 1875, by the drastic suppression of the negro vote. Ames was impeached by the new legislature, but the charges were removed on condition of his resignation and departure from the state. Then Mississippi was restored to

home rule—a rule which Grant, in the summer of 1876, regretting, perhaps, his refusal of the previous autumn, called one of “violence and fraud such as would be scarcely accredited to savages, much less to a civilized and Christian people.”

South Carolina was perhaps the worst sufferer of all the states under the reconstruction régime. Though actual riot and massacre were not so evident as in Louisiana and Mississippi, the general tone of public life was debased beyond belief. The state legislature was almost completely “Africanized.” The 85,475 colored men of voting age (82 per cent of whom were illiterate) were represented by 94 members in the lower House of 1872, while the 62,547 whites had but 30 representatives. The travesty on popular government enacted by such a legislature would have been as ludicrous as a minstrel show had it not been so disastrous to the credit of the state. Huge sums of money were voted for the purchase of swamp lands to be distributed to the freedmen, for the alleged rehabilitation of railroads, for fraudulent public contracts, for elaborate furnishings for the statehouse, and for a hundred other crazy objects, even to the appropriation of \$1000 to reimburse a governor who had lost that amount on a horse race. The value of the taxable property in the state shrank rapidly, while the taxes mounted steadily. Governor Scott (from Ohio) plundered the state for four years, and he was succeeded by a notorious scalawag named Moses, who led his people into a deeper bondage of debt. It was during the régime of “robber Moses” (the man who lost the money on the horse race) that James S. Pike of Maine visited Columbia and witnessed the antics of the colored legislature in the early spring of 1873. He may have been gazing on the scene at the very moment when Grant was delivering his inaugural remarks on the “happy rehabilitation” of the South. Pike has left us in his book on “The Prostrate State” the harrowing picture of the humiliation of South Carolina, whose people of culture and property he found “gloomy, disconsolate, and hopeless,” feebly struggling to avert “complete confiscation.” The tide turned in South Carolina with the election of an honest governor in the autumn of 1874. Daniel H. Chamber-

lain of Massachusetts, although a carpetbagger, won the gratitude and esteem of the South Carolinians by his single-minded devotion to the rescue of the state. He vetoed bills of plunder, appointed honest and intelligent men to office, curbed the "lawless behavior of the colored militia," and labored for the restoration of good feeling between his native state and his adopted state. With all his virtues, however, Chamberlain was a Northerner, a Republican, and believer in negro suffrage. On these counts he could not hope to be acceptable for long to a people bent on the recovery of home rule and white supremacy. After a single term he gave place reluctantly to General Wade Hampton, to whose election by the better element of the state his own reforming administration had largely contributed.

Of course, for those people of the North who believed that no punishment could be too severe for the sin of secession, the suffering of the Southern states under reconstruction rule awoke no sympathy, but only a grim determination to enforce the coercive legislation of 1867-1871 to the last syllable. Their position, if cruel and unwise, was not the position of President Grant; and the pity was that he allowed himself to be influenced by a few intransigent advisers, like Morton, Conkling, and Butler, to pursue a policy which counteracted his own better promptings and his repeated professions of conciliatory intent. He undoubtedly wished to have the Southern states "happily rehabilitated"; but, after all, as Rhodes justly remarks (Vol. VII, p. 112), "it was due to him more than to any other man" that they had to pass through varying periods of unregenerative humiliation before that desirable end was reached.¹

¹ Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas had been restored to home rule before the end of Grant's first term. Of the fortunes of Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina during the second term we have spoken briefly in the text. The other three states of the secession were Alabama, Arkansas, and Florida. Alabama and Arkansas both escaped from carpetbag rule in the election of 1874, and stayed "redeemed" in spite of the intervention of United States troops at the polls in Alabama and the ill-advised attempt of the radicals at Washington to oust Governor Garland of Arkansas in favor of the Republican claimant, Brooks. Florida, like Louisiana and South Carolina, was not delivered from the rule of the carpetbagger until the close of the Grant administration.

Before the first Congress of Grant's second administration met, in December, 1873, an economic crisis of unusual severity had overtaken the country. As far back as the autumn of 1865 Secretary McCulloch had warned his fellow citizens against mistaking the fever of speculative extravagance for the healthy glow of industrial prosperity. Still the signs of the evil day were slow in appearing. Year after year the mileage of new railroad tracks increased.¹ The demand for iron and steel exceeded all the capacities of our multiplying foundries and mills. Stimulation in other industries followed the rising barometer of the iron trade. The carriage of coal, ore, lumber, and grain on the Great Lakes and over the consolidating railroad systems increased rapidly. Workers were everywhere in demand. Wages were high. Capital poured in from Europe. Great banking houses, like Jay Cooke and Company and Fisk and Hatch, financed the new railroads until enough track had been built for the issue of bonds, and the public rushed to purchase the bonds, furnishing further capital for the extension of the roads. General optimism prevailed; the investors dreamed of golden profits. Suddenly, in the spring of 1873, a panic on the stock exchange of Vienna stopped the flow of European capital to America and threw upon the financiers of Wall Street the task of carrying the enormous burden of oversanguine pledges. Money grew tight. Optimism changed to sober calculation, and calculation to anxiety as men began to realize that far too much capital had been converted into fixed and as yet unremunerative forms.

Jay Cooke was the Morgan of his day. His name was a synonym for financial stability. For his great services in floating Secretary Chase's bond issues he had earned the title of "financier of the Civil War," as Robert Morris had been the financier of the Revolution. When, therefore, on September 18, 1873, the house of Jay Cooke and Company, which was marketing the Northern Pacific Railroad bonds, closed its doors, the failure came like a bolt from the blue. Nineteen firms on the stock

¹ The figures, taken from Poor's Manual, are 4953 for 1869; 5690 for 1870; 7670 for 1871; 6167 for 1872—a total of nearly 25,000 in the four years of Grant's first term, as against 47,961 miles built in all the years previous to 1869.

exchange followed Jay Cooke into bankruptcy the next day. Banks and trust companies failed; gilt-edge securities dropped 25 or 35 points; great industrial concerns went down with a crash. The stock exchange was closed for eight days. The Clearing House Association issued an emergency currency in the form of certificates, and the Secretary of the Treasury brought some relief to the situation by purchasing \$13,000,000 of bonds in the market and reissuing \$26,000,000 of the canceled greenbacks. The financial panic was checked; but a long period of industrial depression, the inevitable nemesis of reckless overtrading, set in. "No genuine revival of business," says Rhodes (Vol. VII, p. 52), "took place until 1878. The mercantile failures for 1873 and the three years following were \$775,000,000; the railway defaults up to January 1, 1876, \$779,000,000, of which \$226,000,000 of such defaults had occurred before the September panic began. These five years (1873-1878) are a long dismal tale of declining markets, exhaustion of capital, a lowering in the value of all kinds of property, including real estate, constant bankruptcies, close economy in business and grinding frugality in living, idle mills, furnaces, and factories, former profit-earning iron mills reduced to the value of a scrap heap, laborers out of employment, reductions of wages, strikes and lockouts, the great railroad riots of 1877, suffering of the unemployed, depression and despair."

To what extent, if any, the condition of our currency was responsible for the panic of 1873 is a question on which the experts differ. Business depression and tight money were general that year in Europe as in America. Paris, Berlin, and Vienna had their crises, as well as New York. It is hardly necessary to seek further causes for the economic panic than the coincidence of a period of reckless overtrading here with a critical moment in European finance. However, it is certain that our recovery from the panic was retarded by the currency situation. The new structure of business confidence would have risen more quickly on the sound foundations of a specie basis than on the shaky supports of a paper currency. This is shown by the fact that while the downward trend of prices was checked in Europe

in a few months, prices here continued to fall until the legislation of 1875 gave assurance of the return to specie payments. The greenbacks had been issued during the Civil War purely as an emergency currency. The debates in Congress on the issues in the early sixties make it evident that there was no thought of introducing an inconvertible paper into our currency as a permanent feature. Soon after the cessation of hostilities Secretary McCulloch had initiated a plan for the retirement of the greenbacks. Their volume had been reduced from about \$433,000,000 to \$356,000,000, when Congress suddenly put a stop to further contraction by the law of February 4, 1868.

The reason for this reversal in our financial policy was the growing conviction, especially in the West, that contraction was unfavorable to business and particularly hard on the debtor communities. The increasing volume of business demanded more rather than less money. Thus was set the currency problem which vexed the country in acute form for a generation after the close of the war, and which was not settled with final satisfaction until the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1914; namely, how to provide a volume of currency sufficient for the expanding business of the country and at the same time keep that currency up to the highest standard of national financial honor and on a par with the systems of gold countries like England and France, with which we must maintain international exchanges.¹ It was easier to solve the problem in theory

¹ James A. Garfield, with his usual clarity in debate, stated the case in a speech delivered in the House, May 15, 1868: "When the money of the country is gold and silver, it adapts itself to the fluctuations of business without the aid of legislation. If at any time we have more than is needed, the surplus flows off to other countries through the channels of international commerce. If less, the deficiency is supplied through the same channels. . . . Not so, however, with an inconvertible paper currency. . . . We are cut off from the money currents of the world. Our currency resembles rather the waters of an artificial lake which lie in stagnation or rise to full banks at the caprice of the gate-keeper. Gold and silver abhor depreciated paper money and will not keep company with it. If our currency be more abundant than business demands, not a dollar of it can go abroad; if deficient, not a dollar of gold will come in to supply the lack. There is no legislation on earth wise enough to adjust such a currency to the wants of the country."

than to apply the solution in practice. Many a financial expert, like John Sherman himself, who believed that the elimination of the greenbacks from our currency was sound policy, appreciated, nevertheless, the hardship which a too rapid application of the policy would entail. But while the advocates of contraction recommended caution for expediency's sake, the inflationists urged their demands as a matter of principle. They had incurred their debts in greenbacks, and did not wish to pay them in gold. Moreover, to the Western farmer, accustomed to the unreliable paper issues of the wildcat banks before the war, the greenbacks were a remarkably satisfactory currency. They were uniform in value and stamped with the guarantee of the United States government. They were the currency of patriotism, the "battle-scarred" greenbacks that had saved the Union. If they had been useful in war, why should they be dishonored in peace? An emotional appeal backed by economic interest is likely to be stronger than the dispassionate arguments of logic.

When Congress met, therefore, in the midst of the panic, a flood of petitions poured in praying for the relief of the financial stringency. After a lively debate, covering four months, both Houses passed a bill in April, 1874, to increase the issue of greenbacks to \$400,000,000. President Grant hesitated for a time between his own convictions and the argument of party expediency. "I never was so pressed in my life," he said some years later, "to do anything as to sign that bill, never. It was represented to me that to veto would destroy the Republican party in the West; that the West and South would combine and take the country and agree upon some even worse plan of finance." In the end conviction won. On the ninth day after the passage of the bill the President sent in his veto. By this courageous act Grant frustrated the hopes of the inflationists and gave notice to the world that the United States would pay its debt in coin. The veto paved the way for the act of 1875 providing for the return to specie payments, and set the precedent for the resistance of the sound-money men to later schemes to commit the country to a lowered standard of currency. The greenback movement lived on, to be sure, developing considerable strength

in the West. In 1875 the greenbackers formed a national party, and in the three succeeding presidential campaigns put candidates in the field, generally in fusion with the labor reformers. But the repudiation of their principles by Grant's veto of 1874 relegated them to the company of "third parties," which, in spite of earnest convictions and great activities, failed to register any conspicuous political success until their amalgamation into the People's Party in the early nineties.

President Grant's veto of the Inflation Bill undoubtedly cost the administration votes in the mid-term congressional election of 1874, as the "soft money" Republicans, like Morton, Logan, and Ferry, predicted that it would. The panic also injured the administration; for the people at large tend to blame the party in power for public misfortune of any sort. However, there was abundant cause in the political situation in the autumn of 1874 for opposition to the Grant régime. Aside from the persistent disorder in several of the Southern states, new scandals were added to the revelations of the *Crédit Mobilier*. A protégé of Benjamin Butler's in Boston, named Sanborn, was found to have made over \$200,000 in fees from "moiety" contracts with the Secretary of the Treasury, which allowed the agent who ferreted out and collected unpaid Federal revenue taxes to keep 50 per cent of the proceeds as a commission. Secretary Richardson resigned to avoid a vote of censure by the House. Alexander ("Boss") Shepard, governor of the District of Columbia, enriched his friends of the "District Ring" by fat contracts for paving, draining, and building, before the governorship was abolished and the District put under a commission form of government in 1874.¹ Benjamin H. Bristow, who succeeded Richardson in the Treasury Department in June, 1874, discovered the existence of a "Whisky Ring," with headquarters in St. Louis, which had been defrauding the government of several hundred thousand dollars annually in collusion with the revenue officers. Needless to say, President Grant had no part in the counsels of dishonesty; but the fact that such extensive schemes

¹ In spite of the outcry against Shepard, Grant nominated him as one of the commissioners. The nomination was rejected by the Senate by a vote of 6 to 36.

of fraud and collusion could go on without his knowledge, that some of the men who were implicated in them could retain his friendship and esteem, and that one of the main objects of the rings was to build up a "third term machine" for him all worked to his discredit as an executive.

As the election of 1874 approached, the Republicans realized that they had lost ground since 1872. They had no such splendid diplomatic victory as the Geneva award on which to appeal to the country;¹ they had no such vulnerable opponent as Horace Greeley for a target for ridicule and contempt. They tried to direct public attention to the Southern "outrages" as the issue of the campaign, urging the President to "give great prominence to the horrible scenes of violence and bloodshed throughout the South until after the election." But all to no avail. The Democrats won a sweeping victory, electing governors in important Northern states like New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts, and Indiana, and changing a Republican majority of over 100 to a Democratic majority of about 20 in the House.² The Republicans still controlled the Senate.

The election of 1874 marks an epoch in our political history. Since the Southern members had left their seats in Congress on the outbreak of the Civil War, the Democratic party had been reduced to a weak and protesting faction, suppressed in the

¹ The administration was strengthened, however, by the outcome of the *Virginius* affair. An American-built steamer, the *Virginius*, which was engaged in carrying aid to the Cuban insurgents in their insurrection against the Spanish authorities of the island, was captured on October 31, 1873, and taken into Santiago de Cuba, where 53 of her men, including 8 American citizens, were court-martialed and executed. Great excitement prevailed in the country, and the demand was loud for immediate war with Spain. But Secretary Fish handled the affair in a firm way, restraining the military ardor of our minister at Madrid, General Sickles. In December the Spanish government, disclaiming "any intent of indignity," surrendered the *Virginius* to a United States naval officer and released the surviving members of her crew and passengers. As it was found that the *Virginius* was carrying the American colors without legal registry, the salute to the American flag was not demanded of Spain.

² Authorities vary on the exact figures on account of differing classification of "independent" members. For example, fourteen members of this Forty-fourth Congress are listed as Liberal Republicans in the *Tribune Almanac*, but more than half of these men became Democrats before the close of the session.

South for rebellion and discredited in the North for suspected sympathy with rebellion. That situation was now ended. General amnesty had been extended to the South, and all the states of the Secession except four (Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida) had regained home rule and elected Democratic governments. The people of the North were no longer to be persuaded that the choice of a Democrat to office was a sign of treachery to the Union. The Democrats had won the popular branch of the legislature for the first time since 1860, and in the next election (1876) they were destined to cast a considerable majority of the popular vote. Since Lincoln's day the Republicans had had imposing majorities in both Houses of Congress; but from the end of Grant's term to the beginning of McKinley's they were to have a clear majority in House and Senate only twice. Moreover, there were other unmistakable signs that the reconstruction era, inaugurated by the legislation of 1866, was nearing its close. The first test of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment had come in the famous Slaughter House cases in 1873, when the Supreme Court had refused to interfere with a monopoly granted by the legislature of Louisiana. The right to relief from a monopoly, said the Court, was not a privilege of United States citizenship as distinguished from state citizenship, nor did the United States by the Fourteenth Amendment mean to assert a jurisdiction over "the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the states." This recognition of the police power of the state of Louisiana was a reversal of the policy of stark national control of the South which had marked the reconstruction era. The decision showed, said the *New York Nation*, that the Supreme Court was "recovering from the war fever" and "getting ready to abandon sentimental canons of construction." There was an obvious decline of interest, too, in the application of the Enforcement Acts on which President Grant and the radicals had laid so much stress in 1870 and 1871. While the convictions in other criminal cases in the year ending June 30, 1874, were about 50 per cent, only 102 convictions out of 966 cases were secured under the Enforcement Acts.

In the West, as well as in the South, there were signs of a new age. The farmers, organized into local and state "granges," were beginning to bring pressure to bear on legislatures and courts to secure relief from the falling prices of their produce and from what they deemed the exorbitant rates of the railroads.¹ Third-party movements sprang up, under the names Independent, Reform, National Reform, National Labor Reform, Greenback, Anti-Monopoly, and half a dozen other titles, to demand the regulation of railroad rates, a reduction of the tariff, economy in government, free banking, and various schemes to "bring industry under the political power of democracy." A Prohibition party and an American Labor party were in the field in 1872 with candidates for the presidency. While in the West the discontent generally took the form of the protest of the debt-burdened farmers against the "extortions" of the middlemen in credit and transportation, labor reform was the chief slogan in the more highly industrialized parts of the country. The platform of a National Labor Congress at Cincinnati in the autumn of 1870 inveighed against a "system of monetary laws" which tended "to subvert the government of our fathers and establish on its ruins an empire in which all political power shall be centralized to restrain and oppress the rights of labor, and subordinate its votaries to the merciless demands of aggregated capital." The panic of 1873 and the years of depression which followed gave sinister emphasis to these forces of discontent. The shock roused the people from the fool's paradise in which they had been living, and turned their attention from the old issues of the war and reconstruction to the rising problems of the business age.

The Republicans hastened to utilize the last months of their control of Congress by the passage of several measures which would have no chance of success after March 4, 1875. A Resumption Act, signed by the President on January 14, 1875,

¹ As a matter of fact, the trend of freight rates was downward, in spite of fluctuations due to the panic and to bitter rate wars, during the period under consideration. The drop was from 1.92 cents per ton mile in 1867 to 1.28 cents in 1876.

provided that the \$382,000,000 of greenbacks outstanding should be retired at the rate of \$80 for each \$100 of bank notes issued, until they were reduced to \$300,000,000, and that on January 1, 1879, these \$300,000,000 of greenbacks should be redeemed in coin. The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to accumulate gold for the redemption of the greenbacks by the sale of bonds. A tariff act of March 3, 1875, repealed the 10 per cent reductions on manufactured goods made the year before, and increased the duties on sugar and molasses and the internal revenue taxes on tobacco and liquor. A Civil Rights Act giving the negroes the privilege of enjoying equal rights with the whites in public conveyances, inns, theaters, and other public places of amusement, and allowing them to serve on juries, was signed by President Grant on March 1, 1875; but eight years later the Supreme Court held that the earlier clauses of this act were unconstitutional, since they dealt not with civil rights but with social rights, which were outside the jurisdiction of the Federal government. A fourth bill, granting the President the right to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus in the states of Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Alabama,¹ was put through the House by the radical friends of the President but failed to come to a vote in the Senate before March 4, 1875.

The election year of 1876 was also the centennial year of America's independence. Congress, the state of Pennsylvania, the city of Philadelphia, and many private citizens of wealth had contributed generously to a great exposition which was opened by President Grant at Fairmount Park, Philadelphia, on the tenth of May. A grandson of Richard Henry Lee read the Declaration of Independence from the original yellowed parchment, and a chorus of a thousand voices sang Whittier's "Centennial Hymn":

Our fathers' God, from out whose hand
The centuries fall like grains of sand.

¹ This bill, which, in the words of the *Nation*, converted the President into "a sort of tawdry Cæsar," read, "for two years and from thence until the end of the next session of Congress thereafter."

During the summer and autumn months nearly 3,000,000 visitors paid admission to the exposition, to which 39 foreign nations had contributed exhibits. If our own country had little to show in the line of art or of the more highly finished manufactures,—like Belgian laces, Bohemian glass, Russian enamels, French jewelry, Italian marbles, and Oriental ornaments,—our display of agricultural products, of farm implements, and of practical machinery was most imposing. The 60,000 drawings and 5000 models from the Patent Office illustrated the inventive genius of the American people. Among the novelties were the incubator, the typewriter, the high-wheeled bicycle, and the “lovers’ telegraph”—the embryonic telephone. Great as the progress of a century of material civilization seemed to the American of 1876, the man of today, could he stroll through the buildings of the Philadelphia exposition, would almost feel that he had been put back into the Middle Ages, with no sign of the utilization of electrical power in light, heat, transportation, and a thousand common conveniences of life, with no trolleys or telephones, no automobiles or airplanes, no wireless or radio, none of the marvelous productions of the age of refined steel and coal tar.

The centennial year, however, was by no means an occasion of unmixed self-gratulation. Our country was still in the throes of the panic of 1873. About a third of the railroad mileage was in the hands of receivers, after the failure, up to January 1, 1876, to pay some \$780,000,000 of interest on bonded indebtedness. Within the next five years over 20,000 miles of railroad, representing an investment of \$1,200,000,000, were sold under foreclosure. The Western farmer, with his lands and buildings mortgaged to the hilt, was demanding relief through the public regulation of freight and elevator charges and the government issue of a plenteous currency. The Greenback party, protesting against the Resumption Act, and demanding the unlimited issue of unsupported paper money by Congress, was preparing to enter the presidential campaign with the aged philanthropist Peter Cooper as its candidate. While hundreds of thousands



INTERIOR OF THE MAIN BUILDING AT THE PHILADELPHIA CENTENNIAL EXHIBITION

of our citizens were thronging the exposition grounds at Philadelphia to view the triumphs of civilization, the savages on our Western plains furnished a shocking demonstration of the ill fortune and ineptitude which seemed to attend all our efforts to deal with the Indian tribes.¹ On June 25, 1876, General George A. Custer, with 264 men, attacking what he supposed to be a small detachment of Sioux Indians near the junctions of the Big Horn and the Little Big Horn Rivers, in the present state of Montana, found himself surrounded by all the warriors of the tribe, under their chief, Sitting Bull, and was cut down with every man in his command.

But even more disheartening than panic and massacre was the persistence in the centennial year of corruption in high places.² There was grave apprehension in the minds of the Republicans as the time of the election approached. The *Crédit Mobilier*, the Sanborn contracts, and the "salary grab" were not yet forgotten. The prosecution of the whisky frauds was following a nauseous trail almost to the doors of the White House. On March 2, 1876, W. W. Belknap, the Secretary of War, was impeached by a unanimous vote of the House for having received, with Mrs. Belknap, some \$20,000 in graft from the sale of privileges at valuable government trading posts in the Indian Territory. Belknap escaped formal condemnation by the Senate, but at the same time confessed his guilt by hast-

¹ From 1865 to 1890 we fought a dozen Indian wars at an expense of \$25,000,000, and with a loss of over 1000 men.

² We have already noted Senator Hoar's lament over the situation (p. 55). James Russell Lowell, in lines of stinging irony, which contrast strangely with Whittier's pious stanzas, makes Brother Jonathan advise

"Columbia, puzzled what she should display
Of true home make on her Centennial day,"

to exhibit her civil-service scandals, her miscarriages of justice, her financial heresies, her "rings" and grafters,

"And challenge Europe to produce such things. . . .
She'll find it hard to hide her spiteful tears
At such advance in one poor hundred years."

ily resigning on the very day that impeachment was voted.¹ It was under such a moral handicap that the party entered on the campaign of 1876. Many of the "Stalwart" administration leaders—like Conkling, Cameron, Butler, and Chandler—wanted Grant nominated for a third term, believing that only the popularity of the great war hero could save the party from defeat. And Grant himself met the suggestion with the equivocal protest: "I do not want a third term any more than I wanted a first. . . . I would not accept a nomination unless it should come under such circumstances as to make it an imperative duty." But a resolution adopted by the House in December, 1875, by the decisive vote of 233 to 18, to the effect that a third term would be "unwise, unpatriotic, and fraught with peril to our free institutions," spiked the guns of the Grant boom.

The Republican convention, which met at Cincinnati on June 14, 1876, was for the first time since 1860 to witness a contest for the nomination. James G. Blaine of Maine was the favorite of the convention. He was nominated by the great orator Robert G. Ingersoll in an impassioned speech dwelling on the issues of the war. Blaine was the man who had "torn from the throat of treason the tongue of slander" and "snatched the mask of Democracy from the hideous face of rebellion." "Like an armed warrior, like a plumed knight," Blaine had "marched down the halls of the American Congress" and thrown his shining lance "full and fair against the brazen forehead of every traitor to his country and every maligner of his fair reputation."² It was a magnificent effort to drown the voices of protest in a burst of patriotic oratory; and had the balloting begun then and there, under the spell of Ingersoll's

¹ President Grant, with characteristic misplaced "loyalty" to friends under fire, immediately accepted Belknap's resignation "with great regret," even as he had the month before prevented his private secretary Babcock's conviction in the whisky frauds by personal intervention in his behalf.

² The references were to Blaine's motion, in January, 1876, to refuse amnesty to Jefferson Davis, "as the author, knowingly, deliberately, guiltily, and willfully, of the gigantic murders and crimes at Andersonville"; and to Blaine's spectacular *ex parte* defense, on the floor of the House (June 5), of his conduct in regard to certain questionable transactions in railroad bonds.

compelling voice, Blaine would have undoubtedly secured the nomination. But the day passed in the presentation of other candidates. When the voting began on the morrow, Blaine was far in the lead, and for the first six ballots maintained his advantage over all the other contestants, although the support of the administration "machine" was given to the Stalwart candidates Conkling and Morton. Secretary Bristow, the prosecutor of the whisky ring, was the candidate of the reform element of the party, and stood next to Blaine and Morton on the first two ballots, and second only to Blaine (but with less than half Blaine's strength) on the next three ballots. Senator Morton, the able war governor of Indiana, and Roscoe Conkling, the imperious senator from New York, declined slowly but steadily from their initial strength of 125 and 99 votes respectively, until, on the seventh ballot, their votes were distributed between Blaine and Hayes. The latter, starting a poor fifth, with 61 votes from 9 states, as against Blaine's 285 votes from 36 states and territories, showed little gain until the delegates from Michigan gave him their 22 votes on the fifth ballot. Then there began a drift toward Hayes, which on the seventh ballot swelled into a flood tide, carrying him into the nomination.¹

Rutherford B. Hayes at the time of his nomination was serving his third term as governor of Ohio. He was a man of sterling character and solid attainments. Without the brilliancy of Blaine or the audacity of Conkling, he had inherited from generations of New England ancestry a habit of industry, a deliberation of judgment, a scrupulousness of conduct which never failed him. A steadily increasing law practice in Cincinnati, with wise investments in real estate, had brought him, first, ease

¹ The votes for the chief contestants were as follows:

	BLAINE	MORTON	BRISTOW	CONKLING	HAYES
1st ballot	285	125	113	99	61
6th ballot	308	85	111	81	113
7th ballot	351	—	21	—	384

For a choice 368 votes were necessary. It was really Blaine's bitter enemy Conkling who defeated him for the nomination, since 61 of New York's votes were cast for Hayes on the final ballot.

and then wealth. Conspicuously gallant service as colonel of an Ohio regiment of volunteers in the campaigns in western Virginia, Maryland, and the Shenandoah Valley had earned him a brevet major generalship at the close of the war. He was elected to Congress in 1865, and then to the governorship of Ohio in 1867, 1869, and 1875. Every political honor, even to the supreme honor of the country, came to him unsought, found him prepared, and left him more respected. There was no hint of demagogism, smartness, or suspicious subtlety in his public career. He was a living exemplar of his maxim, "He serves his party best who serves his country best." If he gave offense, it was the offense of Aristides—the statesman embarrassingly just.

To carry the Republican party to victory in 1876 seemed like a hopeless task. "If confidence in the Democrats had been as strong as disgust with the Republicans," says Haworth, "there would have been little need of holding an election." But the Democratic party in the North and West had not yet wholly lived down its reputation for sympathy with rebellion. Furthermore, the Democratic candidate, Samuel J. Tilden of New York, in spite of his good work in exposing the rascality of the Tweed Ring, was open to objection as a shifty lawyer-politician who had shown too great servility to corporate interests and too little conscience in making out his income-tax returns. He was mercilessly pilloried by the Republican cartoonist, Thomas Nast, as too busy with a railroad case to hear the call of his country in 1861, but with ample leisure and funds to devote to his political ambitions fifteen years later.

As the election returns came in during the night of November 7, it seemed certain that Tilden was elected. He had carried the "doubtful states" of the North,—Indiana, Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey,—which, with the sure Democratic states of the South, gave him 184 votes, or only one less than the needed majority. The 19 votes of Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida were in doubt; also the vote of one Republican elector in Oregon, who was discovered to be ineligible because he held a postmastership (Constitution, Art. II, sect. 1, par. 2). Hayes himself believed that he was defeated; but the



COUNTING THE VOTES AFTER THE DISPUTED HAYES-TILDEN ELECTION OF 1876. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
OBJECTS TO THE VOTE OF FLORIDA

(From a sketch by Theodore R. Davis, published in *Harper's Weekly*, February 17, 1877)

day after the election Zachary Chandler, the chairman of the Republican National Committee, boldly claimed every disputed vote, and the *New York Times* posted the bulletin: Hayes, 185; Tilden, 184. There was no doubt of the fair claim of Hayes to the Oregon vote, but he needed every one of the disputed Southern votes to win. Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida had all sent in a double set of returns. There was no machinery in our government for deciding which sets were valid. The Constitution prescribes that "the president of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted." The Senate was Republican in January, 1877, and the House was Democratic. Evidently, if the Republican president of the Senate, T. W. Ferry of Michigan, was empowered to open such certificates and count such votes as he saw fit, Hayes would be elected. If, on the other hand, the disputed votes were thrown out, Tilden would still lack one vote of the majority, and the election would be thrown into the Democratic House, where Tilden would be chosen. A joint rule had been adopted by Congress in 1865 providing that if either House objected to the count of the vote from any state, that vote must be thrown out. But the Senate had rescinded this rule in 1876, and no substitute had been passed. The situation, therefore, was a complete deadlock. The time for the inauguration of a new president was drawing near. Unless some solution could be found before March 4, there was danger of the anarchy of an interregnum and even of civil war.¹

A joint committee of Congress sitting on the situation recommended the creation of a tribunal to hear the arguments for each set of returns and to decide which votes should be counted. The act passed late in January, on the recommendation of this committee, set up an Electoral Commission composed of three Republicans and two Democrats from the Senate, three Democrats and two Republicans from the House, two Democrats and

¹ For various "dire predictions" of civil war see Rhodes, Vol. VII, p. 242. "Henry Watterson announced in the *Louisville Courier Journal* that 100,000 unarmed citizens would march to Washington to maintain the rights of Tilden."

two Republicans from the Supreme Court, with a fifth justice of the Court to be chosen by his four colleagues on the Commission. It was expected that Judge David Davis of Illinois, an Independent, would be chosen as the fifth member from the Supreme Court. But just at the time of the selection of the tribunal Davis was elected to the United States Senate by a fusion of Democratic and Independent votes in the legislature of Illinois. As there remained only Republicans on the Supreme Bench, the Commission was perforce made up of eight Republicans and seven Democrats. When the sets of returns were brought before the Commission during the month of February, the decision in each case, by a vote of eight to seven, was in favor of receiving the votes regularly attested by the Republican canvassing board of the states. In other words, the Commission refused to "go behind the returns" and investigate the justice or injustice of the count in the states.¹ The disputed votes, therefore, were all counted for Hayes, who was declared elected on March 2, 1877, by a vote of 185 to 184. Three days later he was peacefully inaugurated, and the country breathed a sigh of relief.

Thousands of pages have been written on the disputed election of 1876, and high authorities continue to differ on the justice of the decision. Professor Burgess, for example, in his "Reconstruction and the Constitution" (p. 295), defends Hayes's title to the presidency as unimpeachable in law and equity: "A perfectly fair election in the 'states' of Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina, with the law of suffrage then obtaining, would probably have resulted in a popular majority for the Republican candidates for electors. Accepting the law of suffrage as then existing for the basis of our reasoning, it will have to be conceded that the Republicans were in the right both morally and legally, and that the title of Hayes and Wheeler . . . was entirely sound and unimpeachable." On the other hand,

¹ It is interesting to note here that the two parties changed sides on the issue of states' rights, the Republicans insisting on respecting the decision of the state boards, and the Democrats wishing Congress to override the certified returns from the states.



Samuel J. Tilden

SAMUEL JONES TILDEN

Mr. Rhodes believes that Democratic electors were chosen in Florida and Louisiana. "As a matter of fact," he writes (Vol. VII, p. 233), "Wells¹ and his satellites (the returning board) in secret conclave determined the presidency of the United States"; and adds, "If Hayes had envisaged the facts as I do now, he would have refused to accept the presidency from the Louisiana returning board." It is difficult to see how Hayes could have refused to accept the presidency, however, when the votes were adjudged to him by a legal commission created by Congress and approved by a Democratic vote.² Hayes believed that a fair election in the South would have resulted in a Republican victory, and was undoubtedly sincere in his declaration that he would not take the office unless it came to him by methods that would stand "the severest scrutiny." His conduct, like that of Tilden, was above reproach during the trying winter of suspense. Both men effaced themselves. Neither would give the slightest encouragement to suggestions of violence, intimidation, venality, or chicane.

Historians will probably never reach a consensus on the question of which man was really elected, because their judgment in the case depends on the balancing of one set of frauds against another. Large committees were sent by both parties to witness the counting of the ballots at New Orleans, Columbia, and Tallahassee. These "visiting statesmen" presented voluminous reports, which serve rather to confuse than to clarify the situation. In Louisiana, for example, a fair count of the ballots actually cast would have probably given the state to Tilden; but it is equally clear that a free election would have

¹ J. M. Wells, the Republican ex-governor of Louisiana, was chairman of the returning board of the state. He was surveyor of the port of New Orleans in 1876, and had a reputation for rascality. He is said to have offered to sell the electoral vote of Louisiana to Tilden for \$200,000.

² The Electoral Commission Act was passed by a vote of 47 to 17 in the Senate and 191 to 86 in the House. Only 19 of the total 103 votes against the bill were cast by Democrats; only 53 of the 238 for it were cast by Republicans. It was therefore a Democratic measure. The Republicans opposed the commission because they believed that Ferry would count the Hayes returns and that President Grant would use the army, if necessary, to enforce the decision.

given the state to Hayes. That many Democratic votes were thrown out by the returning board is certain; whether more or fewer than the illegal registrations is uncertain. Whatever we may think of the expediency of the Fifteenth Amendment, the negroes had the legal right to vote. But in one of the "bull-dozed parishes" (counties) of Louisiana in which more than 2000 negroes were registered not a single vote was cast for the Republican electors. Five parishes, with 13,244 colored and 5134 white voters, returned a Democratic majority of 4495. To these statistics, furnished by the Republican visiting statesmen, the Democrats replied that the Republicans of Louisiana had either purposely refrained from voting so that they could get the returns thrown out on the charge of intimidation, or that "a large number of colored men who had heretofore voted with the Republican party voted with the Democrats at this election." The student wanders in a maze of charges and counter-charges, incriminations, recriminations, and contradictions.

Viewed through the perspective of half a century, this unique electoral crisis in our history has quite a different aspect from what it had for the men of that day. The apprehensions that the seating of Tilden would mean the undoing of the results of the war, the reënslavement of the negro, the assumption of the Confederate debt, and the surrender of the government into the hands of unreconciled "rebels," seem to us now rather foolish; and the events soon proved that the seating of Hayes neither provoked an outraged majority of the voters to rise in arms to vindicate their thwarted will nor destroyed the confidence of the people in the continued workings of our democracy. Whether Hayes or Tilden took the oath of office in 1877 was of comparatively slight importance. What was of great importance, however, was the fact that the year which opened the second century of American independence found a nation of 45,000,000 so firmly rooted in the principles of democracy and so securely established in the habit of orderly self-government that a crisis which in many countries would have precipitated an armed conflict of factions was quietly passed without a gesture of revolution or the shedding of a drop of blood.

CHAPTER II

THE BASES OF A NEW NATIONALISM

*And what if trade sow cities like shells along the shore,
And thatch with towns the prairie broad, with railroads ironed o'er.*

RALPH WALDO EMERSON

THE FARMER AND THE LABORER

Absorbed first in the relentless task of winning the war, then in the adjustment of political, fiscal, and diplomatic questions which were chiefly raised by the war, the government at Washington paid little or no attention during the period from Lincoln to Hayes to certain economic and social stirrings which we, from the standpoint of a juster perspective, realize were of the utmost importance in our national development. Governments are naturally conservative. Long-established habits of administrative routine, a vast amount of unfinished business, apprehension of the dangerous lengths to which innovation may go, and the political necessity for keeping party solidarity intact, all act as deterrents to new departures in legislation and administration. The discontent with things as they are, which from time to time gathers in reform movements, seldom starts in the field of politics. It is a social protest, the expression of a grievance of a group or class of people who feel that they are the victims of neglect, discrimination, or oppression, by the powers in control of the government. No age, of course,—not even the most golden age of concord,—is entirely free from such protest, because a perfectly equitable government is a utopian dream. But there are periods in which conditions are peculiarly susceptible to the workings of the ferment of social and economic discontent.

Such a period followed our Civil War. Under the stimulus of unprecedented demands and unusual encouragements, agri-

cultural and manufacturing industries advanced at a rapid rate in the sixties. The frontier moved steadily westward as the demobilized soldiers and new hordes of immigrants joined the rush to take up the homesteads offered by the government. The clatter of the reaper and the rumble of the locomotive were heard farther and farther out on the treeless plains that had stretched silent toward the setting sun. The products of our mills and factories, protected against European competition by the high war tariffs, outran local demands and sought wider markets across the seas. In the ten years following the war our production of pig iron doubled, our output of coal was multiplied fivefold, and our output of steel one hundredfold. While our population grew from 31,443,321 in 1860 to 38,558,371 in 1870,—a gain of 22.6 per cent,—our railroad mileage increased 43.6 per cent, and our manufacturing establishments 79 per cent. Improved machinery, better business organization, enlarged transportation facilities, and the confident spirit of American enterprise all encouraged production on a greater scale. Unprecedented fortunes began to gather in the hands of successful men, providing large amounts of fluid capital for reinvestment or for ostentatious expenditure. It was the beginning of an era of the most astounding economic transformation that the world has ever seen in a single generation—the transformation of an America of pioneer farmers, independent manufacturers, staid business partnerships, and production measured to local needs into a vast complex structure of “big business,” with capital issues based on anticipated profits rather than on actual assets; with speculative production for as yet uncreated markets; with overbold extension of railway mileage; with cutthroat competition in rates and prices, preparing the way for huge combinations of capital in oil, steel, textiles, food products, transportation, and banking.

There had been a few rich men before the war: owners of rapidly appreciating real estate, like the Astors, the Goelets, and the Lenoxes; manufacturers, like the Spragues of Rhode Island or Peter Cooper of New York; “merchant princes,” like A. T. Stewart, Moses Taylor, William Aspinwall, and “Commo-

dore" Vanderbilt. A pamphlet entitled "The Wealthy Men of New York," published by the owner of the New York *Sun* in 1855, listed nineteen millionaires, headed by William B. Astor, with the enormous fortune of \$6,000,000. In those days a man worth \$100,000 was reputed "rich." But after the war these figures began to sink into insignificance. Men had become accustomed by the huge financial operations of the war itself to think in terms of hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars. The tens of millions of acres of the finest farming and wheat lands of the world, the hundreds of square miles of anthracite and oil fields of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, the iron deposits in Michigan and Minnesota, and the rich veins of precious metal in the Rocky Mountain region stimulated visions of wealth beyond the fabulous tales of the Arabian Nights. The country was swept into a veritable vortex of money-making. Its best energies were devoted to the conquest and exploitation of its material resources. The moderating influences of the Old World civilization were singularly lacking. We were still a young nation, undeveloped, and in many respects crude. We had no caste of ancient aristocracy settled on immemorial estates, no leisure class of assured position, no landed clergy, no rich and mellowed tradition of arts. The one avenue to distinction that opened, broad and inviting, to the ambitious American spirit was the road to wealth. The one disgrace was "failure," in the sense which that word has preserved in business parlance.

The preoccupation of America with money-making, which became the unenviable badge which distinguished our people in the eyes of Europe in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, was not the result of any deliberate public policy. It grew invisibly, like England's acquisition of a colonial empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "in a fit of absent-mindedness" on the part of the government. The conspicuous activities of the statesmen at Washington were centered on problems of a different kind. Johnson, Grant, Stevens, Sumner, Wade, Wilson, Fessenden, Boutwell, and all their kind were absorbed in the controversial questions of political and financial

reconstruction. They were winding up the affairs of the era which had come to a close with the triumph of the Union arms, and not heeding the signs of the new war of industrial expansion that was opening. If the names of Grant, Blaine, Garfield, and Colfax were brought into connection with gold "corners" or railroad scandals, it was wholly in their unofficial capacity—a matter of quiet, unavowed dealings on the side. Occasional attempts to interest the government in socioeconomic activities met with no success. Petitions to Congress praying for the investigation and relief of untoward conditions in industry were laid on the table. The Laborites, in their national convention of 1868 at New York, asked in vain that a department of labor be created in the government, and that the approaching census of 1870 be enlarged to include comprehensive industrial statistics. The Windom report of 1874 in the Senate, recommending some kind of public regulation of the railroads, was not taken up. Plainly, the national government was not ready in the seventies to turn seriously to such questions.

Nor does this reluctance seem strange when we remember that the spirit of the American government was opposed to paternalism. We had broken with England largely on the question of the mother country's interference with the freedom of the American merchant. During the "critical period" of our history the utmost jealousy had been shown toward the control by the central government of commerce, business, banking, coinage; taxation, and debts. Repeated efforts in later years by men of nationalistic mind, like Gallatin, John Quincy Adams, and Henry Clay, to commit the government to schemes of economic patronage or "internal improvements," had met with only very limited success. Even the United States Bank, which seemed like a firmly established institution under Jefferson and Monroe, had been destroyed by Andrew Jackson. The *political* power of the central government, in spite of determined opposition at every step, had increased steadily,—as the names of Hamilton, Marshall, Jackson, Webster, and Lincoln testify,—until the triumph of the Union in the Civil War silenced the particularis-

tic protests and relegated the doctrine of states' rights to the plane of academic discussion. But there had been no parallel development of the national power in the *economic* field. The whole policy of the government, in its disposal of public lands, in such help as it had given to canals, railroads, agriculture, and education, had been to encourage private enterprise. It had been generous, often lavish, in the bestowal of opportunities, but extremely cautious in the control of their use. Our presidents had no power to issue "orders," or "arrêtés," by virtue of which European executives often extended the authority of the state by proclamation. Our Congress was constantly reminded of the absence of any constitutional grant of power to legislate on social and economic matters. Our Federal courts tended in the pre-war period to confine themselves to the negative "police" function of defense against the impairment of contracts, the taking of property without due process of law, or other infringements of specific provisions of a Constitution which had not been framed to fit an age of great industrial expansion and business consolidation. Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations," the classic exposition of the theory of *laissez faire* (or the doctrine of economic liberalism), had been published in the year of American independence. It might be regarded, in a sense, as the birth certificate of the Republic. The government of business was no part of the business of government. Government was to confine itself to its political functions of making and enforcing the laws for the protection and welfare of its citizens and of defending the nation against internal and external foes. Business was an individual concern, governed by the natural economic laws of supply and demand.

These theories, generally acceptable in the pre-war days of moderate fortunes, began to be seriously challenged when the organization and consolidation of both capital and labor in the producing and distributing interests was progressing so far as to make concerted action possible. Was a government which permitted the economic subserviency of one section of the country or of one class of the population to another really providing

for the "general welfare"? The transportation, mining, and manufacturing interests were beginning to bring pressure to bear upon the national and state legislatures through their "lobbies." Ought the government longer to refrain from interfering with business when business was quite unblushingly interfering with the government?

Early in the decade of the seventies a concerted demand began to be made on the government for relief from oppressive economic conditions through legislation. The farmers of the West organized for the launching of the movement which Professor S. J. Buck has picturesquely called "the Agrarian Crusade" and which, with little intermission, has continued under one form of demand or another—public regulation of freight and elevator charges, abundant paper currency, tax reform, free silver, direct popular government, farm-loan banks, rural credits—to our own day. To understand this important and persistent factor in our politics it is necessary to know something of the social psychology and the economic situation of the farmer. He was still a pioneer in the generation immediately succeeding the Civil War, pushing our frontier westward year by year until it ceased to find recognition in the census of 1890. His isolation was not yet relieved by the telephone, which put him in touch with his distant neighbor; or the rural delivery of mail, which brought the news of the world to his door; or the Ford car, which carried him in an hour or two to the county seat with its general store, its theater, its library, and its railroad station; or the radio, which brought the voices of noted singers, preachers, and lecturers to his own parlor. From seed-time to harvest, from dawn to dark, he toiled in the field in the ever-recurring struggle against flood and drought, devastating storm and withering sun, blight, scale, pest, and all the manifold enemies of nature, to bring his crops to fruition and his stock to fertility. And through the frost-bound winters he and his strong sons did the heavier chores about the farm, while the wife and daughters continued, in season and out, to weave their Penelope's web of cooking, mending, cleaning, sewing, and washing. What leisure there was was even more monotonous

than the toil. For the cultural opportunities were limited to the scant supply of edifying books which the family had found room to bring out to their new home with their household effects, and to such instruction and inspiration as the frontier schoolroom and the weekly sermon could furnish. One family's life was much like another's. They were set alongside of one another like independent units rather than related in an organic interdependence. Those unequal levels of social and cultural potentiality created by wealth, genius, executive talent, and varied opportunity, which stimulate the flow of ambition and invite the rivalry of effort in the more highly organized societies, were almost wholly lacking in the rural communities. The farmer's labors, undeviating and recurrent, were spent in grappling with the problems of weather and soil, and not with the manifold opportunities offered in a differentiated community for improving one's economic status or increasing one's social prestige. It is due mainly to these conditions of isolated residence and monotonous occupation that the agricultural class, in contrast to the industrial workers of the populous cities, have so generally resisted organization. The farmer tends to be an individualist by nature and by profession.

Shortly after the Civil War an attempt was made to bring the farmers of the country together into an association for mutual aid. Impressed, during a tour in the South, by the condition of the farmer, Oliver H. Kelly, a clerk in the Department of Agriculture at Washington, organized a kind of farmers' league in 1867, which he called "the Patrons of Husbandry." In form the organization was patterned on the order of the Masons, with passwords, grips, symbols, and ritual. Its purpose was not at all political, but educational and social. The unit of the organization was the local farmers' club, or "Grange," which gave the name of "Grangers" to the association as a whole. The meeting of the Grange combined the features of a lyceum, an agrarian convention, and a county fair. There might be a lecture on fertilizers by an expert on the chemistry of soils, or a discussion of a plan for the coöperative buying of agricultural machinery, followed by games and races, and a

picnic supper cooked by the farmers' wives. Beginning with a nucleus of "six government clerks and an apple-grower," the Grange made slow progress in the first three or four years against the social inertia of the farmers; but early in the seventies it began to extend rapidly, as certain economic and political developments awakened the farmers to the realization of the disadvantages under which they were laboring, and the value of united efforts in removing them.

The abuses against which the Granger movement was directed were in the main connected with the marketing of the grain crops and the mortgaging of farm property, although other subjects of complaint were not lacking, such as the inadequate representation of the agrarian class in legislatures,¹ the discrimination against real estate as compared with personal property in the tax levies,² and the opportunities given to the manufacturer and the inventor to exploit the farmer under the tariff³ and patent laws.⁴

¹ Though 47 per cent of the population was agrarian in 1870, only 7 per cent of the members of Congress were farmers.

² In 1870 Illinois collected 79.82 per cent of her taxes from real estate and 20.18 per cent from personal property. The proportion in New York was 90.01 per cent to 9.99 per cent; but of course the real estate in New York included a far greater proportion of fancy-priced city lots. The farmers of Illinois contended that agricultural property paid about 70 per cent of the state's taxes, though it represented less than 50 per cent of the state's wealth. Naturally real estate cannot be hidden from the assessor like the more intangible forms of wealth in stocks and bonds.

³ None of the post-war tariffs made any pretense of protecting the farmer until the McKinley Bill of 1890. The Western grain producer in 1870 was in much the same situation in regard to the tariff as was the Southern cotton producer in 1830: in each case the commodity produced formed a large part of the exports of the country and had to compete in foreign markets with the products of free-trade countries. The reason why the agrarian West accepted the high tariffs so long, paying the piper while the industrial East called the tune, was that the West was bound to the East by close social and moral ties—migration and the common fight for the Union; whereas the North and the South, with their divergent social systems, had had only the much weaker, political bond of a variously interpreted Constitution to hold them together.

⁴ D. C. Cloud, in his "Monopolies and the People" (published in 1873), claimed that the manufacturers, protected by patents which had run for twenty-

During the decade from 1860 to 1870 the railroad mileage of the country increased from 30,000 to 52,000. This expansion was nowhere welcomed with greater enthusiasm than by the Western farmer, who saw new thousands of acres of homestead farms brought within easy reach of the market. The farmer himself invested in the securities of the new railroads and willingly paid the higher taxes necessitated by the purchase of the railroad bonds by his state and county. But with the new decade came a sharp reversal of feeling. Early in 1871 the capitulation of Paris brought to an end the series of wars with Denmark, Austria, and France by which Prince Bismarck had welded in blood and iron the new Prusso-German Empire. The return of peace, together with the production of large wheat crops in Russia, checked the European demand for our grain and left the Western farmers with surplus crops in a period of falling prices. The farmer had no facilities for storing his grain. He was in the hands of the middleman, whose capital had been necessary to him in the days of the rapidly widening markets. And now he was obliged to look on in impotent chagrin while wheat for which he was receiving 90 cents a bushel was selling for \$1.50 in New York, and to burn his corn in Iowa because, at 15 cents a bushel, it was the cheapest fuel that he could use.

The agricultural classes of the West were no more concerned with European conditions on the morrow of the Civil War than they were on the eve of the World War. They understood nothing of the intricacies of foreign exchange. They only knew that the demand for their products had been steady, and the prices high, in the days when the government was circulating abundant millions of greenbacks. They had little comprehension of the enormous initial cost of railroad-building, but real-

five years, were charging the farmers \$225 for reapers which cost \$60 to make, and were selling the same reapers in England for \$100, freight prepaid. When the farmers tried to supply themselves with agricultural machinery through cooperative manufacture, they found themselves involved in costly patent suits and soon desisted.

ized that the roads were owned by great capitalists of the East, and heard vague rumors of the crooked manipulation of their securities in Wall Street, of salaries of railroad magnates exceeding those of governors of states, of "deals" and "pirates" and "water" and "lobbies." Therefore, when they saw the price of their wheat decline 33 cents a bushel in the years 1868-1872 while freight rates fell only 9 cents a bushel in the same period, and when they found in some localities that it cost them three bushels of wheat to transport one bushel to market, they believed that they were being made the victims of the rapacious railroad and elevator companies. They sought relief from their straitened condition along two lines: control of freight and elevator rates through legislation, and agitation for a plentiful paper currency.

In 1871 Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota produced more than one third of the wheat grown in the country. It was in these states that the Granger Laws originated. The new constitution of Illinois gave a mandate to the legislature in 1870 to "pass laws to correct abuses and prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in rates of freight and passenger traffic." The legislature duly passed the regulative laws in 1871, but they were declared unconstitutional by the supreme court of the state in 1873. The other Granger states followed the lead of Illinois with similar laws. Not much came of them, however. The Wisconsin railroads, relying on the advice of prominent Eastern lawyers, flatly refused to obey the laws. The legislatures themselves halted between the influence of the railroads' capital and the farmers' votes. The farmers were absolutely dependent on the railroads, which could refuse to carry the grain of the "independent" farmer or could let it stand in damp cars and spoil, or could reduce their service and alter their timetables until they made it so uncomfortable for the public that the Granger Laws began to look to many less like measures of deliverance than provocations to persecution. The farmers of Illinois, angered by the decision of the court, threw down the gage of battle to the powers of "monopoly" in their "Farmers'

Declaration of Independence," published on the Fourth of July, 1873. The declaration read in part:

When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for a class of people, suffering from long continued systems of oppression and abuses, to rouse themselves from an apathetic indifference to their own interests . . . We, the producers of our state, in our several counties assembled, do solemnly declare that we will use all lawful and peaceable means to free ourselves from the tyranny of monopoly. . . . That to this end we hereby declare ourselves absolutely free and independent of all past political connections, and that we will give our suffrage only to such men for office as we have good reason to believe will use their best endeavors to promote the purity, honesty, and frugality with which our fathers inaugurated this government.

The severe panic of 1873, which struck the country only a few weeks after this declaration, gave point to its appeal and put an end to whatever illusion might remain in the farmer's mind as to the benefits that he would derive from the railroad expansion of the previous decade. More than 40 per cent of the mileage went into the hands of receivers, and the farmers saw their investments wiped out by preferred construction claims. The Granges multiplied rapidly, from about 1000 in 1872 to 8400 at the close of 1873. The Western states alone claimed a membership of 750,000. Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Nevada were the only states of the Union outside the organization. Fifty-three of the sixty-six counties in Illinois chose anti-monopoly candidates in the autumn elections of 1873. Wisconsin elected a fusion ticket pledged to reform. Four United States senators were elected by the anti-monopoly legislatures of Illinois, Kansas, and California. During the years 1873 and 1874 new parties were formed in eleven of the Western states, pledged, under the various names of Independent, National, Reform, and Anti-Monopoly, to fight for the public control of railroad rates, relief from the Eastern bankers, and economy and honesty in government.

The struggle against the railroads was the most spectacular

feature of the agrarian crusade because it could be waged in the state legislatures and the state courts.¹ The other chief object of the Granger movement, however (namely, a bountiful supply of currency), could be obtained only by action of the Federal government; for the Constitution forbade the state to "emit bills of credit" or to "make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts," and the act of Congress of March 3, 1865, put an end to the note issues of the state banks by imposing a tax of 10 per cent upon them. The reasons for the farmers' demand for a plentiful currency were as obvious as the reasons for the demand for the regulation of railroad rates. The farmer was a debtor, dependent on mortgage loans, just as he was a producer of a seasonal and perishable commodity dependent upon prompt transportation to a market. The government furnished the farmer his homestead gratis, but the capital for his buildings, implements, and harvesting was largely borrowed. Now a debtor community favors a cheapening currency; that is, a dollar with a diminishing rather than an increasing purchasing power. The farmer who had borrowed dollars worth half a bushel of wheat during the war did not relish paying the interest and discharging the principal of his loan in dollars worth a whole bushel of wheat. The greater the number of dollars in circulation, the cheaper would be their

¹ It was not till the autumn of 1876, when the Granger movement was already on the decline, that several of the "granger cases," as Mr. Justice Field called them, came up on appeal to the Supreme Court. In the first case, *Munn vs. Illinois*, the Court decided in favor of the right of the state to fix maximum rates for the storage of grain in elevators. Chief Justice Waite then made the significant remark that "property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large," and that "when, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good." In the case of *Peik vs. the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad* (1877), the Court upheld the right of the state of Wisconsin to regulate rates within the state, even though such regulation should affect persons outside the state, "until such time as Congress should legislate on this matter." However, in the famous case of the *Wabash Railroad Company vs. the State of Illinois*, nine years later (1886), the Court reversed this latter decision, and declared that the power to regulate interstate commerce was lodged in Congress alone.

value in terms of wheat or labor. Hence the farmer demanded not only that the currency should not be "contracted" (diminished in amount) but that it should be actually "inflated" (increased in amount). *Per contra*, the Eastern creditor advocated the policy of contraction, which would bring him payment of interest and principal in dollars of greater purchasing power than those which he had lent. Since the government had issued the \$450,000,000 of greenbacks during the war as an emergency currency, and then only after a considerable discussion in Congress as to the constitutionality of the procedure,¹ it was generally considered in financial circles not only sound policy, but common honesty as well, to retire this currency as soon as the state of the public credit would permit. It is to be noted, however, that this sound financial policy coincided with the interests of the Eastern creditor, while it meant increased hardship for the Western debtor. Senator John Sherman, perhaps the highest authority on finance in the country, said in 1869 that a return to specie payments at that time would increase by 25 per cent the currency debts in the United States.

We have seen in the last chapter how the government made a beginning of the retirement of the greenbacks under Secretary McCulloch in 1866, how the process was checked by Congress in 1868, how President Grant vetoed the Inflation Bill of 1874, and how the law of 1875 provided for the return to specie payments four years later (see pages 65-67, 70, 71). Spurred to action by the veto of 1874 and the legislation of 1875, the inflationists formed a party and held a national convention at Indianapolis in 1876, attended by two hundred and forty delegates from eighteen states. They entered the presidential campaign of that year with the octogenarian millionaire philanthropist Peter Cooper of New York as their candidate,² and with a platform advocating the increased emission of paper currency by the

¹ See "The American Adventure," Vol. I, pp. 605, 606.

² Cooper had made a large fortune, chiefly in iron mills in Maryland and New Jersey. He was devoted to the education and uplift of the industrial workers. He founded the Cooper Institute in New York, at an expense of \$800,000, for night classes on social and technical subjects.

national government, the repeal of the act of 1875, the prohibition of national bank-note issues, and the payment of the principal of the government bonds in greenbacks unless it was expressly stated at the time of the authorization of the bonds that they were to be paid in coin.¹ The words "The United States will pay to Bearer" printed on a greenback were sufficient security to make the "rag money" a sound national currency. "Brick" (Marcus M.) Pomeroy, one of the guild of inflationists whom the *New York Tribune* called the "prairie financiers," who earned his sobriquet by a series of sensational "Brickdust Sketches" intended to pulverize the arguments of the Eastern money lords, pledged the support of his journal, *Pomeroy's Democrat*, to "helping care for the rag baby, as the gold gamblers sneeringly term the child of the war and the savior of the country; till it reaches Washington and drives the money-changers from the temple of Liberty."

In spite of this messianic mission predicted for the greenback by Brick Pomeroy's *Democrat*, the Greenback party made a feeble showing in the election of 1876, polling only 82,640 votes in a total of some 800,000—more than one fifth of the votes coming from the single state of Illinois.² It was as yet too exclusively a farmer's movement; though, strangely enough, the agitation for cheap money did not originate with the Grangers, but was adopted by them as a second line of attack after their crusade against the railroads had begun to peter out. It was the industrial laborers of the East who began the fight against the banker and the bondholder. During the Civil War there had

¹ This scheme would have the double advantage in the eyes of the debtor class, says Professor Paxson, "of increasing the greenbacks in circulation and getting rid of the public debt without raising by taxation the funds to satisfy it" ("Recent History of the United States," p. 42).

² The strength of the independent vote in Illinois had an important bearing on our national history. As we have seen above (p. 78), the election of Judge David Davis to the United States Senate by the Illinois fusion legislature in 1876 kept him from serving as the fifth member of the Supreme Court on the Electoral Commission, and so perhaps prevented the seating of Mr. Tilden as president of the United States.

been a rapid increase in labor organization. Sixty-one new trade unions had been formed in the years 1863-1865. A National Labor Union held annual congresses, beginning at Louisville in 1865 (Baltimore, 1866; Chicago, 1867; New York, 1868), to equalize the conditions of competition as the markets widened to continental proportions, and to maintain standards of wages and work as the demobilized soldiers returned to labor and the immigrants began again to flock to our shores.¹ While the Western farmer was profiting by the high prices for his grain and hogs during the war, the Eastern factory hand, with no commodity but his labor to sell, was disturbed by the lag of wages behind prices in those same years. For retail prices, as measured in greenbacks, increased 76 per cent, while wages advanced only 50 per cent, during the period of the war. It is true that prices began to fall after 1865 and that wages continued to move upward; yet the wage-earner still felt a grievance. If he was better off absolutely, still his relative well-being was not improved. With the new machinery of industry he produced a greater and greater volume of goods, and at the same time felt the growing competition of women and children, who worked for lower wages. The share of profits due to the laborer had been much easier to estimate in the days of modest production for local markets. Now the wage-earner saw the great masters of industry growing rich; and as the economic cleft widened between them and their employers, they were sure that they were not getting a fair share of the new wealth which they were producing. A class consciousness developed rapidly among them, based on an economic "inferiority complex." The Knights of Labor, organized by the garment cutters of Philadelphia in 1869, adopted the

¹ Immigration, which had reached the 400,000 mark in the prosperous decade of the fifties, fell to one sixth of that figure during the Civil War. With the return of peace, however, and with the disturbed conditions in Europe, immigration increased rapidly, reaching 326,232 in 1868. It was checked during the years of panic and depression (1873-1878), but was resumed on an unprecedented scale during the boom years of the early eighties. In 1883 it reached 778,992—a record figure for ten years to come.

motto "The injury of one is the concern of all," and started a national resistance fund for "brothers in need against the aggression of employers."¹

In 1870, when the Grangers of Illinois were beginning to formulate their grievances against the railroads, a congress of the National Labor Union, meeting at Cincinnati, passed resolutions demanding the abolition of the national banking system, the issue of a "true national currency" of legal-tender greenbacks convertible at the option of the holder into 3 per cent government bonds, the taxation of the government bonds and their payment in paper currency, the reform of the tariff, an eight-hour day for government employees, the prohibition of Chinese immigration, and the creation of departments of labor and public lands at Washington. The congress further voted for the immediate organization of a new political party to be called the National Labor Reform party. At its meeting the next year the Labor congress adopted a platform upon which it proposed "to appear before the country in 1872 as a distinct political party." "Our government," it said, "is wholly perverted from its true design. . . . In this beneficent country of unlimited resources, with the land annually groaning beneath the products of human effort, the mass of the people have no supply beyond their daily wants, and are compelled from these unjust conditions, in sickness and misfortune, to become paupers and vagrants."² Chattel slavery has been abol-

¹ The Noble Order of the Knights of Labor was a secret organization in the first dozen years of its existence, and its purpose was the mutual aid of laborers in their own material and moral elevation. "Labor," it asserted, "is the only creator of values and capital." It was open to "all branches of honorable toil," but manufacturers of intoxicating drinks, lawyers, bankers, professional gamblers, and stockbrokers were excluded! Three quarters of its membership consisted of unskilled wage-earners under twenty years of age. It reached its greatest strength about the year 1885, with seven hundred thousand members. But its unwieldy size and its amorphous composition made it difficult to manage, and it fell a victim to the dictation of violent, undisciplined groups, and failed to hold together against the organization of the more highly skilled workers of the trades unions—the American Federation of Labor.

² The Labor Reformers of Massachusetts, in their state platform of the same year (1871), declared in still stronger language the necessity for "the overthrow of

ished, but the rights and relations of labor stand just where they did before emancipation, in respect to a division of its products. The difference lies only in the methods of abstracting the results and concentrating them in a few capitalists who are now masters and dictators of the terms, and thus all labor is practically placed in the condition of the slave before his emancipation."

The convention of the new Labor Reform party was held at Columbus, Ohio, early in 1872, at which a dozen states were represented, equally divided between the industrial and the agrarian type.¹ Judge Davis of Illinois was nominated for president, and Governor Joel Parker of New Jersey for vice president. Both the nominees, however, declined to run, to the great chagrin of the party leaders, who published a resolution of the party that the refusal of the nominees left "a suspicion upon the reputation of those men that they were influenced in their action by the mercenaries of either Grant or Greeley."² Of course such suspicion was utterly without foundation. Judge Davis had allowed his name to be used in the Liberal Republican convention at Cincinnati (see page 44), and very properly felt it unbecoming to run against the candidate whom the convention had regularly chosen; and Governor Parker, while expressing sympathy with the Labor Reforms, reminded them that he held his present office by the votes of the Democrats, with whom he had been associated for over thirty years, and whose nominee, Mr. Greeley, he felt bound to support. The Labor Reformers did not figure as an independent national party after this abortive attempt of 1872; but they still preserved a vigorous political life in several of the states, and re-

the whole profit-making system, the extinction of all monopolies, the abolition of the privileged classes, . . . and, best and grandest of all, the final obliteration of that foul stigma upon our so-called Christian civilization—the poverty of the masses."

¹ They were Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio on the one side, and Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska on the other.

² The Laborites substituted Charles O'Connor's name for David Davis's in August, but made no vice-presidential nomination. O'Connor received less than 30,000 votes at the election in November.

appeared as an influential factor in national politics by their fusion with the Greenback party near the close of the decade.

Neither the farmers of the West nor the industrial workers of the East felt any sympathy with the Liberal Republican movement of 1870-1872. They had little interest in the political questions of civil-service reform, amnesty for the Southern leaders, or antagonism to President Grant. The Liberal movement, as Professor Buck says, "failed to catch the ground swell of agrarian discontent." Its Western leaders, like Schurz, Brown, and Trumbull, had no particular interest in the farmer's problems; and Easterners, like Godkin and Greeley, ridiculed the "whiskered agitators" and the "prairie financiers" who were presuming to attack our railroads and debase our currency. James Buchanan of Indiana, a doughty champion of the Greenback cause, characterized the Liberal movement of 1872 as one which "commenced in the sanctums of a few editors and culminated in a set-up game between Horace Greeley and Gratz Brown"; whereas the new movement was of the people, still waiting for its leader who should come to the front like "a financial Henry of Navarre" and, "sticking a greenback in his hat, instead of a white plume," should lead the cohorts of the people from victory to victory. And it was Peter Cooper, aged eighty-five, philanthropist and iron and glue maker, who was cast for the part of the dashing Henri Quatre!

The Labor Reform party made no impression on the national election of 1872, and the Greenback party made little on the election of 1876. But shortly after each of these elections, events happened which stimulated the independent movement. The first was the panic of 1873, with its aftermath of depression. We have noted the effect of the panic years on the farmers of the West (see page 91). In the East it caused a sharp falling off in production,¹ with a consequent drop in wages and

¹ The value of our manufactured products, which had increased from \$1,880,000,000 to \$4,230,000,000 (or 125 per cent) in the decade from 1860 to 1870, grew only to \$5,360,000,000 (or 27 per cent) in the decade from 1870 to 1880; while the growth in the amount of capital invested in these decades was 110 per cent and 32 per cent respectively.

widespread misery from unemployment. It was natural under these conditions that there should be a marked increase in the numbers and activities of the labor unions. The great railroad strikes of the summer of 1877 (to be noticed presently) gave still further impetus to the labor movement. Many of the leaders of the Greenbackers and the Laborites had already come to realize the advantages of pooling their strength. In some of the states (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio) there were fusion tickets in 1877. On February 22, 1878, the alliance between the two parties was consummated in a convention held at Toledo, Ohio. Over eight hundred delegates from twenty-eight states responded to the call. A platform was adopted advocating the usual financial remedies for the relief of the debtor and the laborer, "so that overgrown fortunes and extreme poverty" might be "seldom found within the limits of our republic." The organization was baptized with the name of the "National Party," but it is commonly referred to as the Greenback-Labor party.

The effect of the panic, the strikes, the agitation for cheap money, and the approaching resumption of specie payment under the act of Congress of 1875 was shown in the extraordinary success of the National party in the elections of the autumn of 1878. As against O'Connor's 29,000 Labor votes in 1872 and Cooper's 82,000 Greenback votes in 1876, the Greenback-Labor vote of 1878 reached 1,000,365. Iowa led the poll, but the great manufacturing states of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York were next in order. Fourteen congressmen were elected. The executive committee of the party confidently predicted that the Greenback-Labor vote would carry the country in the election of 1880.

The National party convention met in Chicago in June, 1880, and, repeating the demands for currency, labor, and land reform which appeared in the independent-party programs for a decade, nominated General James B. Weaver of Iowa for the presidency. Originally a Democrat, Weaver had joined the new Republican party after the Kansas-Nebraska legislation, and had served with gallantry in the Civil War. He left the

Republicans in 1877 because he believed that they had "sold out to the bondholding and gold interests." He was one of the two Iowans elected to Congress by the Greenback-Labor party in 1878. A vigorous man of forty-seven, he made a "whirlwind" campaign in 1880, like those of Bryan and Roosevelt in later years, traveling from Maine to Arkansas and addressing audiences which aggregated more than half a million people.¹ But the results in November were sadly disappointing. The vote fell to 308,578, or less than one third the figure of the triumphant year of 1878. The causes of the slump are not far to seek. The very success of the Greenback-Labor party in the mid-term elections had provoked a concerted attack by the apprehensive press of the regular parties.² Dissension appeared in the ranks of the new party between those who favored fusion with the Democrats and those who insisted upon an independent ticket. In certain quarters the party was accused of sympathy with socialistic and communistic activities, which were beginning to appear in our rapidly congesting and heterogeneous urban population. Chief of all the causes for the decline of the movement, however, was the improved condition in our economic situation. "The sun of prosperity was beginning at last to dissipate the clouds of depression." With the year 1879 the panic had run its course, and the prosperous days of the early eighties were beginning to dawn. The crops of wheat, corn, and oats in 1880 were larger than ever before in our history, exceeding by 50 per cent the value of the crops of 1878. Gold was beginning to pour in from Europe, and a surplus to accumulate in the Treasury. The amount of currency in circulation

¹ "In General Weaver," says Mr. F. E. Haynes, "the radical progressive sentiment, the so-called 'third party,' according to our traditional method of describing such enterprises, found its first real leader" ("Third Party Movements since the Civil War," p. 143).

² The Iowa City *Daily Press* (Democratic) of July 5, 1880, proposed a platform for the new party, consisting of the twin planks "the Treasury of the United States shall pay \$50 a month for life to all persons resident in the United States who have worked for forty-eight years and are tired"; and "so much of the third chapter of Genesis as is contained in the words, 'In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, until thou return unto the ground,' be and hereby is repealed."

increased from an average of \$725,000,000 in the years 1876-1878 to \$1,114,000,000 in 1881. Wages were rising, and the laborer abandoned the Greenback cause. In the election of 1880 only two of the industrial states of the East (Pennsylvania and New York) cast more than ten thousand votes for Weaver.

In spite of the meager political results obtained by the Grangers, the Greenbackers, and the Laborites, in the decade 1870-1880, the significance of the variegated reform parties into which they grouped themselves from year to year looms large as we look back through the perspective of half a century. These earnest, if sometimes misguided, crusaders were the advance heralds in the battle for social and industrial justice, as their fathers had been the pioneers in the great work of opening up the Western lands. They assailed monopoly and privilege as a shameful caricature of the democratic ideal set up by the founders of the Republic. They scolded, harangued, and tormented a government which had been concerned only with political questions into realizing at least, if it did not yet attempt to remedy, the economic conditions which seemed to bear with intolerable weight upon large numbers of the people. Their influence continued, under other forms of organization, which we shall study in later pages, until many of their demands ceased to be regarded as the vagaries of madmen and were enacted into sober law.


"HIS HONESTY, THE PRESIDENT"

Rutherford B. Hayes belonged to that relatively rare class of public officials for whom principles are religious convictions of duty, and compromise an insidious temptation to infidelity. "I am determined from henceforth," he wrote in his diary at the age of nineteen, "to use what means I have to acquire a character distinguished for energy, firmness, and perseverance, . . . and if ever I am a public man, I will never do anything inconsistent with the character of a true friend and a good citizen." Thirty-five years later, on the eve of the election of 1876, he confided to the pages of that same lifelong record of

self-examination the pledge: "If elected, the firmest adherence to principle against all opposition and temptation is my purpose; I shall show a grit that will astonish those who predict weakness." He had need of all his grit; for, perhaps with the exception of John Quincy Adams (in whose character and policies we can discover many similarities), no president in times of peace ever had a more trying situation to meet. There was a cloud on his title. By an extraordinary procedure he had been raised to the presidency above a rival who had received a substantial majority of the votes of the people. His face appeared in the cartoons of the opposition press with the word "Fraud" written across the brow. The Democrats had control of the lower branch of Congress during the first half of his administration, and of both Houses during the second half. His own party was divided on issues of reform to which he was pledged; and the most conspicuous and influential of the party leaders in Congress—Blaine, Morton, Conkling, Logan, Cameron, Chandler—were not on his side.

Hayes considered himself a good party man. He had been "regular" in his support of the Whigs until the slavery question had disrupted the party, and he had devoted himself with even greater enthusiasm to the Republican program of Union and free soil. He had supported the radical position after the war, voting for the Reconstruction Acts and the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. He had approved the Fifteenth Amendment and the Federal Election Laws.¹ He recognized the value of party solidarity, declaring in his inaugural address: "The president of the United States necessarily owes his election to office to the suffrage and zealous labors of a political party, the members of which cherish with ardor and regard as of essential importance the principles of their party organization." Yet before his administration was two months old, President Hayes found himself almost literally a man without a party. The reason for this unfortunate situation can be stated in a word: for Hayes the Republican party was an instrument to be used in the

¹ Hayes was not in Congress when these measures passed, having entered on his first term as governor of Ohio in January, 1868.



RUTHERFORD BIRCHARD HAYES

service of the country; for his opponents it was an end in itself, the country's savior, "the most resplendent political organization the world had ever seen." What the President saw as an opportunity for reform they resented as a criticism of perfection. Could he not find enough regular Republicans for his cabinet without choosing for his Secretary of State (William M. Evarts) one of Andrew Johnson's counsel in 1868, or for his Secretary of the Interior (Carl Schurz) the man who had led the Liberal Republican movement of 1872, or for his Postmaster-General (David M. Key) a man from the "rebel" state of Tennessee? Had he not even been dissuaded from appointing General "Joe" Johnston as Secretary of War only by the explosive remonstrance of Senator Morton's brother-in-law, "Good God, Governor, I hope you are not thinking of doing anything of that kind!" Hayes's cabinet was one to compare favorably with Washington's, Jefferson's, and Lincoln's in talent, but the President's critics complained that it contained only four real Republicans.¹

During the campaign of 1876 both parties had made a bid for the votes of the Liberals, who demanded an end of the policy of Federal interference with the politics of the South. The Democrats had reproached the Republicans for "rekindling the dying embers of sectional hate between kindred peoples once estranged but now reunited," and the Republicans had promised the "complete protection of all the people of the South in the free enjoyment of their rights." Hayes was in thorough sympathy with this program, declaring in his speech of acceptance that if elected he would aid the Southern states "to obtain for themselves the blessings of honest and capable self-government." On March 23 he summoned to the White House the rival governors of South Carolina, Daniel H. Chamberlain and Wade Hampton (see page 62), and after securing from the latter the promise of the recognition of the rights of the negroes and the assurance of the maintenance of peace in the state, he

¹ Besides Evarts, Schurz, and Key, the members were John Sherman of Ohio (Treasury), George W. McCrary of Iowa (War), Richard Thompson of Indiana (Navy), and Charles Devens of Massachusetts (Attorney-General).

ordered the troops which were supporting the Chamberlain government to be withdrawn from the capital (April 10, 1877). Chamberlain abdicated graciously and turned over the state offices and records to his rival. Many years later (1901) he wrote in the *Atlantic Monthly* that he was "quite ready now to say that there was no permanent possibility of securing good government in South Carolina through Republican influences," owing to the "vast preponderance of ignorance and incapacity in that party" in the state. Under Governor Hampton, he continues, "good government was fully secured, economy succeeded extravagance, judicial integrity and ability succeeded profligacy and ignorance on the bench, and all the conditions of public welfare were restored."

Hayes sent a commission early in April to investigate the situation in New Orleans, where a carpetbagger from Maine, named Packard, was maintaining a legislature by the grace of several companies of United States troops, in rivalry with Nicholls, the native Democratic claimant for the governorship. The Nicholls government "rested upon the consent of the governed who possessed intelligence and property, which was exactly the reverse of the Packard government, whose support came almost entirely from negroes and place-hunting white men." Hundreds of New Orleans's leading citizens had sent a petition to Hayes praying for the withdrawal of the troops, and a large mass meeting had adopted the pledge never to pay a dollar of taxes to "the pretended Packard government." When the president had secured from Nicholls a promise to respect the war amendments and to provide a system of public education, supported by equal taxation, "so that all, without regard to race or color, might receive equal advantages thereunder" (a promise more honored in the breach than in the observance), he gave orders for the withdrawal of the Federal troops (April 20), and the Packard government collapsed.¹

Although by withdrawing the troops from the South the new

¹ In Florida, the third state where there were rival governors, an order of the supreme court of the state sustaining the Democratic claimant was quietly acquiesced in, there being no Federal troops at hand.

President was only carrying out the policy implicit in the Republican platform and in his letter of acceptance,—a policy consonant with good practical sense and, indeed, one contemplated six months earlier by his predecessor,¹—yet he was savagely attacked for his action by the uncompromising champions of the maintenance of the Republican program in its full vigor, whom Blaine proudly called “the Stalwarts.” Benjamin Wade, who had seconded Hayes’s nomination at Cincinnati, now declared that he felt “deceived, betrayed, and humiliated.” Blaine turned upon the President with the charge, “You discredit Packard, and you discredit Hayes.” To which it might be replied that Hayes did not have to rely on four companies of soldiers to keep him in the White House. At a Fourth of July meeting at Woodstock, Connecticut, Senator Chandler of Michigan denounced Hayes as “a president who had climbed to his high seat over the dead bodies of loyal men of the South”; and ex-Governor Chamberlain, repenting of his gracious gesture of a few weeks before, assailed the President as a traitor to his party, who was “exposing the brave Republicans of the South to the danger of death.” And all because Mr. Hayes, good party man that he was, refused to spell “republican” with a Capital *R* in the clause of the Constitution which reads, “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government.”

Two days after he had given the order for the removal of the troops from New Orleans, Hayes turned his attention to a subject which he pursued with zeal through his entire administration; namely, the reform of the civil service. The odious spoils system had flourished unchecked since Andrew Jackson’s day. Every change of administration, every assembling of Congress even, saw the capital thronged with office-seekers. The dispensing of patronage seemed to be the chief business

¹ See the remarks of Mr. Jones of Nevada, a friend of Grant’s, in C. W. Williams’s “Life of Hayes” (Vol. II, p. 34, note), to the effect that “Grant had determined that the colored voters of the South could not be protected by United States troops.” The policy of coercion was weakening the Republican party in the North and strengthening the Democratic party in the South.

of the President. Federal officials interfered with elections; congressmen dictated executive appointments; party machines levied assessments on officeholders for party funds; and party bosses dismissed competent clerks to make places for party "workers," however ignorant or untrained, who had to be "taken care of." A few earnest men, like Senator Sumner, Congressman Jenckes of Rhode Island, George W. Curtis, Dorman B. Eaton, Lyman Trumbull, and Carl Schurz, had been working for the overthrow of the spoils system since the days of the Civil War, and they had succeeded in securing the adoption of a provision in the sundry-appropriations act of March 3, 1871, authorizing the president "to prescribe such rules and regulations for the admission of persons into the civil service of the United States as will best promote the efficiency thereof," and to appoint a commission "to establish rules for testing the fitness of candidates" for the branch of service which they should seek to enter. Congress made a grudging appropriation. President Grant appointed Curtis as chairman of the commission, approved the rules submitted, and announced that he would put them into effect on January 1, 1872. Grant was doubtless sincere in his advocacy of civil-service reform, but he was not ardent for it.¹ And when the Mortons and Conklings and Butlers greeted the "newfangled notions" and "pharisaical pretenses" of the reformers with ridicule and scorn, the President obligingly lost his interest in the project. In his message of December, 1874, he said, "I announce that if Congress adjourns without positive legislation on the subject of 'civil-service reform,' I will regard such action as a disapproval of the system and will abandon it." Needless to say, this was the end of civil-service reform in Grant's term.²

¹ Rhodes says (Vol. VI, p. 388), "Had he put the same force into civil-service reform that he did into San Domingo annexation he could have obtained the necessary money from Congress and carried out the rules, as he would have had a strong public sentiment at his back."

² J. R. Young, in his "Around the World with General Grant" (Vol. II, p. 264), reports the ex-President as saying in 1879: "I think that our civil service is as good as any in the world. . . . I was anxious when I became President to have a civil-service reform broad enough to include all that its most earnest

With Hayes the reform was not an experiment, but a passion. "We should return to the principles and practice of the founders of the government," he said in his letter of acceptance. "They neither expected nor desired from the public officers any partisan service. They meant that the officers should owe their whole services to the government and to the people. They meant that the officer should be secure in his tenure as long as his personal character remained untarnished and the performance of his duties satisfactory. If elected, I shall conduct the administration of the government upon these principles, and all the constitutional powers vested in the Executive will be employed to establish this reform." If this account of the disinterestedness of public servants seems a little idealized, in view of the studies of Mr. Gaillard Hunt on office-seeking under Washington and Jefferson, the fact in no wise invalidates the soundness of President Hayes's plan for dealing with the evil in his own day. He revived the commission of 1871, which had never been legally dissolved; he retained as postmaster of New York Thomas L. James, who had continued to administer his office according to the rules of the commission; and he appointed to the headship of the Department of the Interior, with its important control of the Land and Patent Offices, Indian Affairs, and the Bureaus of Pensions, Education, and Mines, one of the most ardent civil-service reformers of the country, in the person of Carl Schurz. On May 26 he wrote to John Sherman, his Secretary of the Treasury: "It is my wish that the collection of the revenue should be free from partisan control and organized on a strictly business basis. . . . Party leaders should have no more influence in appointments than other equally respectable citizens. No assessments for political purposes on officers or subordinates should be allowed. No useless officer or employee should be retained. No officer should be required or permitted

friends desired. I gave it a fair and honest trial, although G. W. Curtis thinks I did not. One reason, perhaps, for Mr. Curtis's opinion may be that he does not know as much about the facts as I do. There is a good deal of cant about civil-service reform [so Conkling and Butler said!] which throws doubt upon the sincerity of the movement."

to take part in the management of political organizations, caucuses, conventions, or election campaigns." A month later he published the substance of this letter as a general order to Federal officeholders, "applicable to every department of the civil service."

The inevitable conflict with Congress came when Hayes started to reform the New York customhouse. Chester A. Arthur, the Collector of the Port, and Alonzo B. Cornell, the naval officer, were quite shamelessly using their influential Federal positions in building up the Republican machine in New York state. With Senators Conkling and Platt, they constituted the "Big Four" who ran the Empire State's politics. Cornell was also chairman of the Republican state and national committees. A committee appointed to investigate the condition of the customhouse reported that positions had for long been distributed by the Collector as rewards for partisan services, and that about 20 per cent of the men on the pay rolls were superfluous. The President intimated to Arthur and Cornell that their resignations would be acceptable, but they declined to relinquish their positions. Hayes then sent to the Senate the names of James Roosevelt and L. B. Prince to replace the tenacious officials, but under the lead of Conkling the Senate rejected the nominations by a vote of 31 to 25. Hayes, however, had no intention of abandoning the fight. On the adjournment of Congress in July, 1878, he removed Arthur and Cornell, appointing in their places, *ad interim*, General E. A. Merritt and Silas Burt. The issue was squarely joined. Arthur defended his conduct of the office in a letter to the public and to his chief, Secretary Sherman. Hayes was accused of undermining the power of his own party in New York at the instigation of "visionary," "irregular" Republicans like Curtis and Schurz. "The removal of Arthur and Cornell may lead to a severer test of Mr. Hayes's administration than did the removal of the troops from Louisiana and South Carolina," said the *New York Nation*. However, when Congress reassembled, the Senate, in spite of Conkling's opposition, ratified the new ap-

pointments by votes of 33 to 24 and 31 to 19.¹ On the day after the vote Hayes wrote an open letter to General Merritt, congratulating him on his confirmation and pledging him entire confidence.

Hayes won his fight for the reform of the New York custom-house, but he did not win the Stalwarts of the party for civil-service reform. His "victims," Arthur and Cornell, were honored the next year by nominations to the high offices of vice president of the United States and governor of New York respectively. In his annual message of December 1, 1879, the President devoted several pages to a review of the history of the civil service, renewing his recommendation of an appropriation by Congress for the resumption of the work of the commission, together with "such revision and extension of the present statutes as shall secure to those in every grade of official life or public employment the protection with which a great and enlightened nation should guard those who are faithful in its service." He returned again to the subject in his final message of 1880, asking for an appropriation of \$25,000 a year. But all to no avail. It took the shock to public opinion of the murder of the president of the United States by a crazed Stalwart partisan in the summer of 1881 to rouse Congress to the passage of an act for the reform of the civil service.²

¹ John Sherman, whose party loyalty was never questioned, was chiefly responsible for the Senate's reversal. He appealed personally to influential friends in the Senate—Windom, Morrill, Allison—not to let "the insane hate of Conkling" thwart the efforts of the President to improve the civil service, and even threatened to resign his portfolio if the appointments were not ratified.

² In spite of his failure to secure legislation on the subject during his term, Hayes must be regarded as the pioneer president in the movement for civil-service reform, not only for his constant urgency of the matter upon Congress and his scrupulous observance of his own recommendations but also for his faithful support of officials who were applying the reform in their own departments. "The examples of these officers," wrote Dorman B. Eaton, chairman of the Civil Service Commission, to ex-President Hayes, in January, 1883, "have been schools of political education, and an answer to misrepresentations and prejudices." A civil-service reform association was organized in New York in 1877, and in 1881 a national civil-service reform league was formed at Newport, Rhode Island.

Before President Hayes had been in office five months he was confronted with a railroad strike of unprecedented violence and destructiveness. The long period of depression following the panic of 1873 had thrown tens of thousands of men out of employment and reduced the wages of hundreds of thousands more. As the railroads had been the chief offenders in speculative over-extension in the days of prosperity, so they were the first to feel the shock of the reaction. A railroad cannot close down like a factory. It must continue to run or deteriorate. In a wild rivalry for such trade as was left, the railroads engaged in a series of rate wars in 1874-1875, until they were actually carrying freight at a loss. At one time the rate on cattle from Chicago to New York was a dollar a carload, and the president of the Pennsylvania Railroad testified that not one of the roads from the West to the Atlantic coast made "a farthing of profit on through freight in the first six months of 1877." To stop the losses from this cutthroat competition, the roads began to form "pools," or agreements for the division of traffic receipts according to a *pro rata* scheme. But the temptation to profit at a rival's expense was so strong that road after road broke these "gentlemen's agreements" in their competition for business. Failing to keep up income, the roads began to reduce outgo. If rates would not stay up, wages must come down. In July, 1877, the Baltimore and Ohio announced the fourth reduction in wages since 1870—a ten per cent cut for all the men receiving more than a dollar a day. The profits of the road, said the directors, had fallen off 50 per cent since the panic, and the freight rates had been reduced 30 per cent. The alternative which confronted the road was a general reduction in wages or the laying off of a good portion of the men.

On the day that the cut in wages was to take effect (July 16) the freight firemen and brakemen at Martinsburg, West Virginia, left their trains and forcibly prevented other men from taking their places. The strike spread rapidly, and by midnight the rioters were in control of the railroad for miles. The three volunteer companies which made up the entire militia force of the state being unable to handle the situation, the gov-

ernor of West Virginia called on President Hayes, who promptly sent two hundred and fifty troops to Martinsburg. At Cumberland, Maryland, the rioting was so serious that the governor of the state was asked to send militia; but when the Fifth Regiment attempted to reach the railroad station in Baltimore, it was attacked by a mob in sympathy with the strikers and prevented from leaving the city. Whereupon the governor called upon the President for help; and Hayes, issuing the usual anti-rioting proclamation, dispatched a force of United States troops from New York to Baltimore under the command of General Hancock (July 20). The worst situation developed at Pittsburgh. The Pennsylvania Railroad had laid off many of its trainmen by the device of running "double-header" freight trains; and it was furthermore unpopular with the merchants and shippers of Pittsburgh, because, having a monopoly of transportation at that point, it discriminated against them in rates in favor of places where it met competition with other lines. Therefore, when the strikers at Pittsburgh refused to let the double-headers pull out on July 19, they were supported not only by the crowds of unemployed but by many of the "prominent citizens" and most of the police force as well. Even the local militia, which was sent to break up the riot, fraternized with the strikers. Governor Hartranft was traveling in the Far West, and in his absence the adjutant general of Pennsylvania summoned a division of the National Guard from Philadelphia (July 20). When the Philadelphia troops arrived the next afternoon, six hundred and fifty strong, war broke out. It was Saturday, and the ranks of the rioters were swelled by thousands of miners, mill hands, and factory workers on their half-holiday. In a pitched battle fought at the 28th Street crossing ten of the strikers were killed and scores wounded. During Saturday afternoon and all day Sunday, Pittsburgh was under a reign of terror. The Philadelphia troops, denounced as "bloody mercenaries," were besieged in a roundhouse, which was set on fire, and had to fight their way out through a hostile city with a loss of four killed and thirteen wounded. The governor, on his way home, telegraphed to Washington for aid; and Presi-

dent Hayes issued his third proclamation of the week, ordering the dispersal of "all persons engaged in domestic violence and the obstruction of the law." Order was gradually restored in Pittsburgh, although the last of the Federal troops did not quit the city until the end of August.

The month of July, 1877, saw the railroad strike spread through fourteen states from New York to Kansas and Texas, with the destruction of \$10,000,000 worth of property and the sacrifice of lives in Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Reading, and Chicago. At the same time a strike of eight thousand anthracite miners in eastern Pennsylvania terrorized Luzerne County. The energetic mayor of Scranton tried to quell the disturbance in his city by a special posse of citizen police; but after the usual bloodshed he was obliged to call upon the state militia, and eventually upon General Hancock's regulars, some fifteen hundred of whom were dispatched to Scranton, Wilkesbarre, Easton, and Mauch Chunk¹ before the hectic summer was over. It was a new and terrible experience for our country, which prided itself on the reign of law within its borders, to see these forces of violence let loose. And it was a sharp reminder, when the scenes of the Paris Commune could be repeated in Pittsburgh, that no land in which modern industrialism has bred a bitter class consciousness can be immune from the danger of civil strife. The disturbance of 1877, to be sure, was of brief duration. Wherever the authority of the government appeared in the presence of the regular troops, the rioting was soon quelled. But the dead bodies, the looted buildings, the wrecked locomotives, the charred cars, and the flooded mines were a horrible witness to the hour of nightmare that we had passed through. President Hayes handled the trying situation with firmness and

¹ Mauch Chunk and Pottsville had been the scene, less than a month before, of the hanging of ten of the "Molly Maguires," a secret Irish society which for a dozen years had been terrorizing the counties of the anthracite region by cold-blooded assassinations of unpopular bosses and superintendents. The exciting story of the running to earth of the "Mollies" by the clever detective, James McParlan, is told in all its details by J. F. Rhodes in his "History of the United States from Hayes to McKinley," chap. ii.

calm confidence. Yet the government did not go beyond the role of the big policeman. It took another full decade, and the experience of another period of depression filled with strikes more numerous though less violent, before our Congress began to grapple with the great problems of interstate transportation and industrial combinations.

A president with strong convictions of principle and the courage to adhere to them will accomplish as much, perhaps more, by resistance to unwise legislation as by insistence on his own positive program. In the latter case he can be thwarted by a hostile Congress, thanks to the system of "checks and balances" which our Constitution provides. But he, too, has a powerful check on Congress by his veto power, his ultimate control of the patronage, and his sole responsibility for the execution of the laws. President Hayes, as we have seen, was not able to put through his program of civil-service reform. He was able, however, to prevent a good deal of mischief in financial legislation and to defend the prerogative of the president against the dictation of a Congress which tried to "Johnsonize" him.

On the currency question Hayes maintained a consistent and inflexible position—one which the country, after much vacillation and unfortunate experimentation, came to indorse thoroughly. He stated in his inaugural address the doctrine which he reiterated in all his messages; namely, that "the only sound paper currency is one which rests upon a coin basis, and is at all times promptly convertible into coin." The law providing for the redemption of the greenbacks in coin had been passed in 1875, but its enactment only stimulated the soft-money men to greater efforts. In the autumn of 1877 the Democratic House actually carried through a bill for the repeal of the Resumption Act. The powerful influence of the administration was brought to bear upon the Senate, through Secretary Sherman's remonstrances with the Finance Committee, and the upper House refused to concur in the repealing bill. Sherman went ahead bravely with his preparations for resumption, supported by the President at every step, though denounced in the

bitterest terms by the inflationists.¹ Through the sale of bonds the Secretary had accumulated a gold reserve of \$140,000,000 at the close of the year 1878, and the greenbacks had risen to par. Resumption was affected without the slightest disturbance to the business world at the beginning of the new year; and the confidence of the people in the government's pledge to pay its obligations in coin was shown by the fact that on the first day of resumption only \$135,000 of greenbacks were presented at the Treasury for redemption in gold, while \$400,000 in gold was exchanged for the more convenient paper money.²

Because our crops were abundant in 1878 and 1879, and the European demand for our breadstuffs and cotton was large, the critics of the administration belittled the Secretary's work and declared that "resumption was brought about by Providence and not by John Sherman." It is true that the resumption year itself witnessed a sharp recovery of the country from the effects of the panic of 1873; but it is also true that the years during which the administration was courageously preparing for resumption were years of deep depression and gloom, of unprecedented failures and bankruptcies, of industrial demoralization, violent strikes and riots, agrarian revolt, and the agitation for the free coinage of depreciated silver. Many years later the President wrote in his diary (May 15, 1891): "A two-thirds vote in both Houses of Congress were ready and anxious to

¹ When Sherman visited his home state of Ohio in the autumn of 1878 to plead the cause of sound money, he was received with hoots and jeers. At a great meeting at Toledo he was interrupted with the cries: "You are responsible for all the failures in the country"; "Capitalists own you, John Sherman, and you rob the orphans to make them rich." The headlines of a Democratic paper ran: "Howled Down! John Sherman's Welcome Home. Turbulent and Riotous Demonstrations at his Meeting at Toledo. Men Made Beggars by him Refuse to Listen to his Defense of the Process. The Architect of National Ruin Receives a Slight Foretaste of the Hereafter!" The student will note that the meeting took place just at the height of the greenback movement.

² In congratulating Congress on the success of resumption in his message of December 1, 1879, President Hayes said: "The demand upon the Treasury for gold and silver in exchange for United States notes has been comparatively small, and the voluntary deposit of coin and bullion in exchange for notes has been very large. The excess of the precious metals deposited or exchanged for United States notes over the amount of United States notes redeemed is about \$40,000,000."

repeal the Resumption Act and to launch the country on the dangerous sea of an unlimited and irredeemable paper currency." That the ship of state was piloted on a safer course was due to the clear vision and steady hand of the helmsman. President Hayes would have had the greenbacks entirely eliminated from our currency, as a war debt paid and canceled, but Congress would not support him in this recommendation.

While they were unable to stay the process of resumption, the inflationists won a partial victory in the passage of an act for the limited coinage of silver. The silver situation was a complicated one. It had been the policy of our government from the beginning to maintain both gold and silver as standard legal-tender coin at a fixed ratio—the policy of bimetallism. The ratio of 1792, fixed by Alexander Hamilton, was 15 to 1; that is, the gold eagle (ten dollars) contained 247.5 grains of pure gold, and the silver dollar 371.25 grains of pure silver. But a fixed mint ratio cannot continue to correspond with a changing commercial ratio. Silver was actually less than one fifteenth as valuable as gold when the mint began to turn out the coins. This "overvaluation" of silver at the mint caused gold to disappear from the currency, and in 1834 the ratio was changed to 16 to 1. But the new ratio, in turn, overvalued gold, and as a consequence silver was not brought to the mint.¹ When specie payments were suspended at the beginning of the Civil War, both gold and silver ceased to circulate, and our currency consisted of paper only: the notes of the state banks, then the greenbacks, then the national bank notes based on the bonds of the United States. In 1873 the coinage laws were revised,

¹ This displacement of an undervalued metal by an overvalued metal in the currency system, which is called Gresham's law, may be illustrated as follows: If the mint pays an ounce of gold for sixteen ounces of silver when, in the commercial world, an ounce of gold is worth only fourteen ounces of silver, silver is "undervalued" at the mint. Consequently the silver producers will not bring their metal to the mint for coinage, but will sell it to the silversmiths; and the money brokers will melt down the silver dollars and have two ounces of silver bullion as profit beyond the value of a "dollar." The silver dollar will thus disappear from the currency as a standard coin, as it did in the years from 1834 to 1878.

and the silver dollar (which had not been in circulation for decades) was dropped from the list of coins. Just about that time, however, a number of events occurred to reduce the value of silver in the commercial world. The German Empire went on a gold basis, and threw upon the bullion market large sums of silver which had accumulated in the imperial treasury; India, for various economic reasons, ceased to absorb the great quantities of silver which she had for decades been importing from Europe; and, finally, vast new deposits of silver were opened up in this country, the Comstock lode in Nevada yielding \$22,000,000 in the single year 1877. New processes in metallurgy reduced the cost of the extraction of the ore, and the new Western railroads insured its safe and cheap transportation.

Under these circumstances silver became so cheap that the mine owners would have profited substantially by selling it to the mint at the ratio of 16 to 1.¹ Now that they wanted to sell their silver to the government at a price above its market value, they raised the cry that the government had meant to discredit silver by dropping it from the list of coins. They spoke of the "crime of '73," as if the demonetization of silver had been a dastardly scheme of the "gold ring" of New York, and not the simple result of their own natural desire to sell their product in the most favorable market; or as if the law had been passed stealthily instead of having been, by John Sherman's testimony, "publicly and openly presented and agitated . . . and printed thirteen times in order to invite attention to it." They demanded the *remonetization* of silver and its free and unlimited coinage of the ratio of 16 to 1 as "the restoration of the people's birth-right." They had many allies. Free silver would increase the circulating medium and so please the inflationists. The government's patronage of silver would be in line with the policy of protection, to "do something" for the mine owners as it did for the mill and factory owners. The Greenbackers, failing to persuade the government to issue paper money and to pay its bonds in

¹ The decline in the value of silver is shown by the following ratios of its value to gold: in 1873 it stood at 15.92 to 1; in 1875, at 16.62 to 1; in 1877, at 17.22 to 1; in 1879, at 18.39 to 1.

U.S. TREASURY

IN GOD WE TRUST - BUT THE DEVIL IS TO PAY.

WE CAN-NOT
SETTLE ON
HARD-SOAP

WE MEAN TO
PAY OUR DEBTS
WE MEAN TO STAND
BY THE LAWS OF THE
COUNTRY AND THE
HONOR OF THE FLAG.

AND A WORD TO THE
TOUGHT TO BE ENOUGH,
THE STATESMEN OF THE
EAST WILL MAKE A
THOUGHTFULNESS OF
THEY WILL PROVE
A SUFFICIENT
ADJUSTMENT NOW

THEY CAN,
AND BEFORE

THE
DEVIL
IS
LOOSE

THE LOUISVILLE
COURIER-JOURNAL

SOME
PEOPLE
NEED
SOMETHING
MORE
THAN
OTHERS

CLOSED
UNTIL
WE
CAN GET
CREDIT AGAIN

ALL
ABROAD

CT.
MAT.

SOFT SOAP

ACT OF CONGRESS.
THIS IS MONEY.

AN ACT OF	CONGRESS
TO RESTORE	SOFT-SOAP
TO A LEGAL	IN-TENDER IN
PAYMENT OF	U.S. BONDS
OR PRINCIPAL AND	INTEREST, A.C.
PAYMENT FOR	CAPITAL
AND	
L A B	OR
THIS IS NOT IN	VIOLATION OF
THE PUBLIC	FAITH, NOR
DEGRADATION	OF THE CREDIT
OF THE PUBLIC	

0	SO	TRIN	THE
0	SO	TRIN	THE

TO RE-SETTLE THE
NATIONAL TEST
TO PROVIDE FOR THE
UMPTION OF
PAYMENTS

“IDEAL MONEY”

("Universal Suffrage can, if it likes, repudiate the whole debt; it can, if it likes, decree soft-soap to be currency."—*The Louisville Courier-Journal*)

(From cartoon by Thomas Nast, published in *Harper's Weekly*, January 19, 1878)

greenbacks, naturally preferred as a second choice that the country should use the cheaper and more abundant metal of the two.

Richard P. Bland of Missouri, chairman of the House Committee on Mines and Mining and familiarly known as "Silver Dick" for his interests in the Nevada mines, put a bill through the House in the autumn of 1877, by a majority of five to one, providing for the free and unlimited coinage of legal-tender dollars at the ratio of 16 to 1. The Senate, under the lead of Allison of Iowa, modified the bill, limiting the amount of silver purchases by the Treasury to not less than \$2,000,000 nor more than \$4,000,000 a month, and providing that silver certificates in denominations of not less than \$10 might be issued upon the deposit of silver dollars. In February, 1878, the Bland-Allison Bill passed the Democratic House by a vote of 203 to 72 and the Republican Senate by a vote of 48 to 21. It was not a party measure. The senators from states west of the Alleghenies cast only four votes against the bill, and not a senator from New England, New York, or New Jersey cast a vote in its favor. Though the bill received more than a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Congress, and though the pressure brought to bear on the President to sign it was enormous,¹ Hayes vetoed the bill on February 28, 1878. He contended that it would be a stain on the country's honor to pay its debts in dollars worth 90 to 92 cents. Over \$1,000,000,000 of the bonded debt outstanding had been issued before 1873, "when the silver dollar was unknown in circulation in this country"; \$583,440,000 of the debt had been issued since 1873, "when gold alone was the coin for which the bonds were sold, and gold alone was the

¹ Murat Halstead of the *Cincinnati Commercial* wrote Hayes that a veto would be "the greatest possible mistake." "On the side of silver," he said, "are the laws, the morals, the interests, of the country." Medill of the *Chicago Tribune* said, "Vast and uncalculable injuries may result from thwarting the popular will on the silver bill: silver will be worth 94 cents in thirty days after the bill goes into effect and will rise a cent a month until at par." He was completely mistaken in his prophecy. Silver was worth a little over 90 cents when the bill went into effect, and it declined in value steadily from 1878 on. Even John Sherman was in favor of the Bland-Allison compromise, believing that "the country could keep \$2,000,000 a month of silver addition to the legal-tender coin money on a par with gold indefinitely."

coin in which both partes to the contract understood that the bond would be paid . . . and when nobody would have bought them if it had been understood that they would be paid in silver." The government should not violate its implied contract, he urged. "There is no power to compel a nation to pay its just debts. Its credit depends upon its honor. The nation owes what it has led or allowed its creditors to expect. I cannot approve a bill which in my judgment authorizes the violation of sacred obligations." President Hayes was fully vindicated, after many years, when a Democratic Congress stopped all further purchase of silver for legal-tender currency in 1893, and a Republican Congress put the country squarely on a gold basis by the Gold Standard Act of 1900. But the Congress of 1878 overrode the President's veto on the day that it was read, and committed the government to the coinage of at least 24,000,000 depreciated silver dollars annually.

The Bland-Allison Act accomplished none of the results that its supporters prophesied, and President Hayes continued to the end of his term to urge its repeal. In his last annual message (December 6, 1880) he called attention to the fact that of the 72,847,750 silver dollars coined since the passage of the act, only 25,763,291 were in the hands of the people, despite the government's efforts to keep the silver in circulation,¹ and that the price of silver in the same period of two and a half years had fallen from 92 to 88½ cents. The Bland-Allison Act had called for an international conference on silver, which was held at Paris in August, 1878. The conference refused to support the American delegation's proposal for international bimetallism. President Hayes believed that both metals should be used in our currency, especially as the United States produced more silver than any other country in the world; but he insisted that the silver dollar should contain 100 cents' worth of silver.

¹ The government even paid the express on shipments of silver dollars to different parts of the country to induce the people to use them, but they tended constantly back into the Treasury. In 1886 the government gave up the effort to keep the coins in circulation, and authorized the issue of one-dollar, two-dollar, and five-dollar certificates to take their places. In this form the additional currency which was demanded by the increasing business of the country was furnished.

Unsuccessful as Hayes was in his fight for a thoroughgoing reform of the civil service and for the exclusion of a depreciated silver dollar from our currency, he nevertheless won an important victory in his contest with Congress for the preservation of the constitutional powers of the executive. The Democratic House was hostile to him throughout the administration. For more than a year after his inauguration it threatened to reopen the question of his title to the presidency, although the Electoral Commission, which had decided that issue, had been created largely by Democratic votes. The Republican Senate, however, got from the Western Union Telegraph Company some thirty thousand telegrams that had been sent out during the campaign, among them a number written in a secret code and dispatched either by or to Tilden's nephew, Pelton, at his headquarters in Gramercy Park, New York. Two men on the *New York Tribune* discovered the key to the code; and when some of the dispatches were translated and published in the *Tribune* (October 16, 1878), they were so embarrassing to the Democratic managers that the attacks on Hayes's title suddenly ceased.¹ But the President was not left in peace. The election of 1878 put the Democrats in control of both Houses of Congress. Carpet-bagger and scalawag representation from the South had come to an end, partly through Hayes's own action in withdrawing the troops, and all the congressional districts of the South except four sent Democrats up to Washington. These men were determined to repeal the Federal election laws, or "Force Bills," which provided for the supervision of elections by appointees of the Federal courts and empowered the Federal marshals and deputy marshals to use soldiers to keep order at the polls. Not having a two-thirds majority to override the President's veto, the Democrats sought to win their end by attaching "riders" to the appropriation bills necessary to carry on the government.

¹ These "cipher dispatches" showed that Pelton had attempted to bribe one of the Republican electors of Oregon to vote for Tilden, and that he had offered large sums of money to secure the returning boards of South Carolina and Louisiana. There was no proof, however, that Tilden himself was a party to these transactions or even knew of them.

The Forty-fifth Congress expired (March 4, 1879) without any provision for the maintenance of the army. President Hayes was forced to call the new Congress in extra session two weeks later in order to supply this deficiency. But the appropriation bill which both Houses passed contained an amendment forbidding the use of any part of the army for the purpose of keeping peace at the polls. Since such use of the army was sanctioned by laws of Congress,¹ and the president was bound by his oath of office to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,² Hayes vetoed the bill in a strong message to the House, April 29, 1879. The principle of the amendment, he said, "is that the House of Representatives has the sole right to originate bills for raising revenue, and therefore has the right to withhold appropriations upon which the existence of the government may depend, unless the Senate and the President shall give their assent to any legislation which the House may see fit to attach to appropriation bills. . . . To establish this principle is to make a radical, dangerous, and unconstitutional change in the character of our institutions. . . . It was not intended by the framers of the Constitution that any single branch of the government should have the power to dictate the conditions on which this treasure [the public money] should be applied to purposes for which it was collected. . . . That a majority of the Senate now concurs in the claim of the House adds to the gravity of the situation, but does not alter the question at issue. The new doctrine, if maintained, will result in a consolidation of unchecked and despotic power in the House of Representatives. A bare majority of the House will become the government." Congress gave way on the army bill, but shifted its rider to the bill providing for the maintenance of the judicial department. The marshals and deputy marshals were actually left without budgetary provision when Congress adjourned in the midsummer of 1879, but they continued to serve without pay at the request of the President. Finally, in 1880, after a long fight, eliciting five veto messages, President Hayes

¹ Revised Statutes of the United States, sects. 2002, 5528.

² The Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sect. 3.

won his point. The student should note that it was not so much for the intrinsic merit of the Federal election laws that Hayes was contending—although in his support of them he perhaps showed a partisan zeal that was inconsistent with his general policy of conciliation and reform; it was in the method of the congressional procedure that the offense lay. Whether or not the time had come for the repeal of the election laws, there was no justification for the attempt to force this repeal by blocking the wheels of government. The only lawful method was by an act of Congress signed by the President or passed over his veto, or by a decision of the Supreme Court declaring the laws unconstitutional.

If our presidents were renominated on merit alone, Hayes should have been the unanimous choice of the Republican convention of 1880. He had not only given the country an honest and efficient administration, in both domestic and foreign affairs,¹ but he had also served his party well in serving his country well, as the election of a Republican president and Congress in 1880 shows. There were, however, several reasons why he was not considered for renomination. In the first place, he was himself opposed to a second presidential term, and had made no slightest use of his power of patronage to secure a return to the White House. Furthermore, he had alienated the powerful Stalwart branch of the party by his Southern policy and his fight for civil-service reform. General Grant had landed at San Francisco in September, 1879, after a triumphal trip around the world; and the triumvirate of Stalwart senators—Conkling, Cameron, and Logan—had begun to boom him for a third term. Grant was the only man, they said, who could restore the party in the South, guarantee the fruits of the war, and enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. He had gained in wisdom and experience, they contended, in the four years since his retirement from office, and his prestige was greatly enhanced: the country's debt to the "hero of Appomattox" could never be paid. Grant himself at first announced that

¹ Hayes's treatment of the Chinese immigration question will be noticed in the next chapter.

he was not a candidate, but as the months passed he came to desire the nomination ardently. "If the party unanimously or nearly unanimously demand it," he wrote, "I shall deem it my duty to comply." Cameron in Pennsylvania and Logan in Illinois used high-handed methods to secure a solid Grant delegation to the convention, pledged to the "unit rule"; that is, that the entire delegation should vote as the majority directed. Conkling easily won the New York delegates to the support of Grant. But Blaine had a strong following among the Stalwarts, while a large number of Republicans who approved the policies of the Hayes administration were for John Sherman or Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont. It was clear that unless the triumvirate could force the unit rule upon the convention and accomplish the nomination of Grant on the first ballot, their chances to win against the Blaine and Sherman forces were slim.

General James A. Garfield came to the convention as a delegate at large from Ohio supporting John Sherman. He was the chairman of the Committee on Rules. In a spirited battle with Conkling he defeated the adoption of the unit rule. Conkling's speech nominating the hero of Appomattox was a masterpiece of eulogistic oratory, but the sarcastic senator made the mistake of speaking slightly of John Sherman and contemptuously of James G. Blaine. When the balloting began on the fifth day of the convention (June 7), Grant led with 304 votes. Blaine was but 20 votes behind (284); Sherman (93), Edmunds (34), E. B. Washburne (30), and William Windom (10), all together receiving considerably less than half the 378 votes necessary for a choice. The Blaine and Sherman forces united could have defeated Grant, but the gulf between the Stalwart leader and Hayes's Secretary of the Treasury was too wide to bridge. Neither was it possible for Blaine and Conkling, the bitterest of enemies, to yield an inch to each other. So the convention remained deadlocked between Grant and Blaine while thirty-three ballots were taken. On the thirty-fourth ballot Wisconsin gave 16 votes to Garfield, who had put John Sherman in nomination. Garfield rose to protest; but the chairman, George F. Hoar, interrupted him and ordered him to resume his seat. Garfield

obeyed immediately, and the stampede of the Blaine and Sherman delegates to him began. On the thirty-sixth ballot he received 399 votes and the nomination. Blaine was left with 42 votes, Sherman with 3. Grant's "Old Guard" of 306 remained faithful to him to the end. Chester A. Arthur was named for the vice presidency "as a sop thrown to Conkling and the Stalwarts."

In the campaign an attempt was made by the Democrats to discredit Garfield by reviving the charges against him in the *Crédit Mobilier* scandal, but his vindication had already been furnished by his successive elections to Congress (1874, 1876, 1878) and his unanimous choice by the legislature of Ohio (1880) for the Senate of the United States. He was warmly commended by President Hayes, and was supported generally by the reform element of the party (Schurz, J. D. Cox, G. W. Curtis). Even Conkling and Grant spoke for him at public meetings. The Democratic candidate, General Winfield Scott Hancock, the hero of Gettysburg, was, like Garfield, a gallant soldier and a winsome man; but he was wholly without Garfield's training and experience.¹ The attempt on the part of the Republicans to make the preservation of the results of the Civil War an issue of the campaign was effectively answered by Hancock's clear statement that "the government can never pay any debt, pension, or reward of any sort for waging war on its existence." Garfield won the election in November by 214 electoral votes to 155, but his popular majority was less than 9000. He carried all the states of the North and West except New Jersey, Nevada, and five of the votes of California.² Hancock carried the "Solid South," which, from the election of 1880

¹ Hancock was much ridiculed during the campaign for his assertion that the tariff is a "local issue." But our history has proved that he was not far from right. If the tariff has not been a strictly "local" issue, it has at least always been a pretty narrowly sectional issue.

² The loss of votes in California was due to the anti-Chinese sentiment in the state. On October 20 there was published in the New York *Truth* the so-called "Morey letter," in which Garfield was represented as a friend to the cheap labor of the Chinese on the coast. Though Garfield promptly denounced the letter as a forgery, his denial could not undo all the mischief of the suggestion.

to the election of Theodore Roosevelt twenty-four years later, did not contribute a single electoral vote to the Republican column.

President Hayes retired to private life on March 4, 1881, with a record unsullied by the temptations of ambition and with a reputation for statesmanship which has grown with the passing years. Carl Schurz said of him: "Public station in this country has seldom if ever been graced by a man of purer character or higher and more conscientious conception of duty and more patriotic motives." He met every public question with a calm decision that revealed the inflexible principle behind his actions, and, with the devoted coöperation of his gracious wife, Lucy Webb Hayes, made the White House the center of a quiet, dignified hospitality whose influence penetrated the whole social life of the capital. When Hayes visited Harvard College at the Commencement of 1877 to receive the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws, he had an even more fitting title conferred upon him by the poet Oliver Wendell Holmes in the prophetic line "His Honesty, the President."

THE TENTH CENSUS

The year of Garfield's inauguration marked the centennial anniversary of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown and of the adoption of the first constitution of the United States—the Articles of Confederation. At the close of each decade of the intervening century the Federal government had compiled a census. The earlier censuses were hardly more than the bare enumeration of the population, with its geographical distribution; but from the middle of the nineteenth century they grew more and more elaborate, until they came to fill several thick volumes with statistics illustrating a vast variety of industrial and sociological conditions. The tenth census (1880) has a special significance, not only as the record of our growth in numbers, efficiency, and wealth during the first century of the Republic but also as the sure indication of the new kinds of problems with which the Republic was to be called upon to deal



JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD

as the years of its second century wore on. It furnished the economic and social statistics which explain in large measure the political ideas which were developing in various parts of the country. It revealed the conditions of industry, commerce, and banking in the East which made that section a stronghold of conservatism in the generation to come; it showed why the West was the recruiting ground for groups and parties advocating radical measures in agrarian legislation, transportation, and currency; it heralded a "New South" founded on industrial expansion and diversified production, in place of the old monopoly of the cotton plantation. Without attempting any elaborate abstract of the census of 1880, it will be useful to cite a few of the figures which throw light upon the new ideas of national responsibilities and powers that had to be worked out by the generations which followed the men of the era of the Civil War and reconstruction.

The course of our political and constitutional history from colonial days to the present has been determined more by the competing or conflicting interests of certain sections of the population than by any abstract theories of government based upon political metaphysics. Indeed, the theories of a Jefferson or a Hamilton, a Calhoun or a Webster, a Rhett or a Seward, a Bryan or a Root, have generally been developed to justify and fortify the positions which the specific economic and social interests of their environment led these men to take. It will be helpful, therefore, to the understanding of the problems which underlay the new nationalism of the generation following the Civil War to consider some of the figures of the tenth census from the point of view of these sectional interests. For this purpose let us divide the country into three parts: (1) the group of twelve industrial states lying north of the Potomac and the Ohio and east of Indiana and Michigan;¹ (2) the group of twelve agricultural and mining states of the West;² and (3) the group of thirteen

¹ Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Ohio.

² Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and California.

Southern states, including the states of the secession plus Kentucky and Missouri.¹ West Virginia is included with Virginia in this enumeration. The remaining ten states of our present Union were still under the territorial form of government in 1880.

The states lying north of the Potomac and the Ohio and east of Indiana and Michigan, comprising about one fourteenth of the country's area, contained a population of 18,786,190 in 1880, or 34 per cent of the total population of 50,155,783. This section was the region of factory, warehouse, foundry, and mill. Of the total manufactured products of \$5,369,579,190, it is credited in the census of 1880 with \$3,661,645,971, or 68.2 per cent. Although the modern "trust" had not yet appeared, the trend toward concentration in industry was already manifest. For in the decade from 1870 to 1880, while the number of manufacturing establishments with an output of \$500 or more had shown hardly any change (253,882 as against 252,148), the number of employees had increased 36.8 per cent, and the value of the products 31.6 per cent. The mills and factories drew men by the thousands from the farms and villages, and absorbed tens of thousands of immigrants from the Old World. The industrial section of the country was rapidly becoming urbanized. Within its limits were to be found 166 of the 286 cities of over 8000 population and 3,079,937 of the 6,679,943 foreign persons in the country.

The social, economic, and political effects of this herding of people in the great industrial centers, which continued at an accelerating pace during the decade of the eighties,² were of enormous importance. Problems of housing, sanitation, health, and morals became acute as the slums extended and the

¹ Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas.

² By 1890 the cities of 8000 population and over had increased from 286 to 448 (56.6 per cent) and the value of manufactures from \$5,369,000,000 to \$9,956,000,000 (68.7 per cent). The 2,812,191 immigrants of the decade 1870-1880 increased to 5,246,613 in the decade 1880-1890. During this latter decade we received more than one third of all the foreigners who had come to our shores since the year 1819, when the statistics of immigration began to be kept.

"proletariat" multiplied. Strikes and lockouts, picketing and black-listing, increased as capital and labor, ever more "class-conscious," massed for the conflict. Controversies over wages, hours, the closed or open shop, the labor of women and children, the recognition of the unions, the liability of employers for the health and safety of their workers, invaded the legislatures and filled the columns of the press. The presence of large numbers of newly arrived and hastily naturalized foreigners offered the "bosses" of the cities unrivaled opportunities for political demagoguery. And the foundations were deeply and firmly laid for that régime of urban corruption which our foreign visitors like Mr. Bryce deplored as the canker of the American democracy, and which our own critics so mercilessly exposed in books on "The Shame of the Cities" and "The Boss and the Machine."

Of course these deplorable conditions were only the seamy side of the fabric, the ugly reverse of the pattern in which we took a great and justifiable pride. The national conscience had not yet been roused to combat political and economic evils as it had been roused to fight for the extirpation of slavery and the preservation of the Union. Men high in public life could openly sneer at reform and deliberately block remedial legislation, without losing their own self-respect or the political support of their constituents. Like Scipio of old, they could tear up the bill of indictment and invite the people to join in the triumphal procession to the Capitol. Was it not more patriotic, as well as more pleasant, to dwell on the great material accomplishments, which were registered in the census of 1880? Our national wealth had reached \$43,600,000,000, or \$870 per capita; while our national debt had shrunk from \$2,740,000,000 at the close of the war to \$1,922,000,000, or \$38.33 per capita. The grand total of our commerce, banking, manufactures, agriculture, and mining was \$10,395,000,000 as against \$10,130,000,000 for Great Britain and \$6,625,000,000 for France—our nearest competitors. We already led all the other nations of the world in the last three items, and were surpassed only by Great Britain, France, and Germany in commerce and by Great Britain in banking. With the completion of our first century of national

existence, the balance of trade turned definitely in our favor. Until 1876 our imports had exceeded our exports in every year but three (1858, 1862, 1874); but from 1876 on, there have been only three years (1888, 1889, 1893) in which our exports have fallen below our imports.

In spite of the increase in manufactures noted above, and the consequent concentration of population in large cities (New York City having already passed the million mark in population, and New York State the billion mark in manufactured products), we were still, and were destined for another full generation to remain, predominantly an agricultural people. Not 15 per cent of our exports in 1880 consisted of manufactures; and it was not until well into the second decade of the twentieth century that our products of iron, steel, and copper, our cotton and woolen goods, our harvesters, sewing-machines, typewriters, locomotives, automobiles, and electrical apparatus bulked larger in the export columns than the "raw," or extractive, products of the plantation, farm, ranch, and mine. Cotton, cereals, meat and dairy products, and petroleum still figure among the half dozen or so most important of our exports. According to the census of 1880, there were in this country 17,392,099 persons engaged in gainful occupations, divided as follows: agriculture, 7,670,493; professional and personal service, 4,074,238; manufacturing and mining, 3,837,112; trade and transportation, 1,810,256. In other words, 44.1 per cent of our population were farmers; and of these, about 90 per cent were native-born as against 68 per cent in the manufacturing industries. We have seen in a previous section how steadily through the decade of the seventies the farmers of the great West grew more conscious of their interests as a class and of their importance as a factor in the nation's prosperity. The census figures of 1880 throw a flood of light on the farmers' psychology and politics.

While the industrial states had gained 36.8 per cent in population during the period 1860-1880, and the Southern states 46.7 per cent (each group showing an increase of about 5,000,000), the agricultural and mining states of the West had more

than doubled their population as a group (112 per cent gain), and in some cases had grown fourfold, eightfold, even fourteenfold.¹ About 1,500,000 of the addition to the population of the West consisted of foreign immigrants attracted to the farms of the "prairie states" and the mines of Colorado, Nevada, and California. But the remaining 5,500,000 came mostly from the older states, drawn by the attraction of free lands offered by the Homestead Act, and by the advantages of widening markets provided by the new railroads and the marvelous improvements in agricultural machinery.²

In the single decade from 1870 to 1880 the number of American farms grew from 2,659,985 to 4,008,907, and 190,000,000 new acres (an area equal to that of Great Britain and France combined) were brought under cultivation. In Kansas, for example, the number of farms increased from 38,000 in 1870 to 138,500 in 1880, the acreage from 5,600,000 to 21,400,000, the corn crop from 17,000,000 bushels to 106,000,000, the wheat from 2,400,000 bushels to 17,300,000, and the total value of the crops from \$30,000,000 to \$105,000,000. In Nebraska, though the figures were not so large, the rate of increase was even more rapid: from 12,300 farms in 1870, producing \$2,000,000 of crops, to 68,000 farms in 1880, producing \$10,000,000 of crops. The total production of cereals in the country increased more than twice as fast as the population, leaving a mounting surplus for export. By 1880 we were already supplying half the needs of the wheat-importing countries of the world, with Russia, Hungary, Turkey, and the Argentine Republic as our chief competitors. Threatened with economic

¹ Immigration accounted for 17 per cent of the increase in the industrial states, which contained 860,733 more of foreign-born in 1880 than in 1860. The percentages of gain in the most rapidly growing states of the West were as follows: Minnesota, 354; Colorado, 467; Nevada, 808; Kansas, 829. Nebraska was the banner state, its population increasing from 28,841 in 1860 to 452,404 in 1880, a gain of 1472 per cent!

² Between 1860 and 1880 over 65,000,000 acres were allotted under the Homestead Act, an area exactly equal to the combined surface of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. The value of farm tools and machinery increased 65 per cent in the same period, and the per-capita production of wheat grew from 5.6 bushels to 9.2 bushels.

suffocation by the very abundance of their crops, and unable to control the transportation and storage agencies for their marketing, the farmers of the seventies developed that psychology of coöperative protest which we have studied in an earlier section.¹

Next to farming, the mining of the precious metals was the most important industry of the West. Ever since the mad rush of the "forty-niners" to the gold fields of California, every new discovery of placers or veins had drawn its crowd of gamblers and desperadoes to the ephemeral mining camps. Gold was discovered on Cherry Creek, Colorado, in 1858, and "within the next two or three years scores of thousands of people flocked to this new El Dorado. Denver sprang from a stage station to a city, it might almost be said, in a night. A line of alleged cities arose along the east base of the mountains, like Jonah's gourd. . . . Then followed the old story: the placers were quickly worked out under the wasteful system, or lack of system, which was pursued, and the greater part of the adventurers left the Territory to skim the cream from other mining regions, Nevada and Montana."² In the same year (1858) a vein of metal-bearing rock was discovered in Nevada, but its value was so little suspected that it was sold to one Comstock for "a few drinks of whisky and a bobtailed pony." From 1860 to 1876, when its richer ores began to be exhausted, there were taken from the Comstock lode \$234,000,000 in gold and silver; and the population of the state (admitted to the Union in 1864)

¹ Our exports of wheat and corn in bushels grew as follows:

	1850-1860	1860-1870	1870-1880
Wheat	51,700,000	187,700,000	550,800,000
Corn	54,800,000	102,500,000	439,600,000

Owing especially to large harvests in Russia and the Argentine, the world's wheat supply was increased by 262,000,000 bushels in the years 1875-1878. The price of wheat here dropped from \$1.38 to 98 cents a bushel between 1872 and 1878. There was no need to invoke the "crime of 1873" to explain this slump in prices.

² Robert P. Porter, "The West from the Census of 1880," p. 373.

rose from 6857 to 62,336—a gain of 808 per cent. In 1874 some miners in General Custer's force discovered gold in the Black Hills of Dakota Territory, a part of the Sioux Indians' reservation. The Indians had to retire before the rush of speculators,¹ who raised the population of the territory from 14,181 in 1870 to 135,180 in 1880, or 853 per cent. About \$3,500,000 of gold (one sixth of the total production of the country) was taken from the veins of the Black Hills in 1880. Soon after the discovery of gold in Dakota, large deposits of silver were found (1877) in Colorado, which had just been admitted to the Union as the Centennial State (1876). Again tens of thousands of fortune seekers rushed to the diggings. Stray Horse Gulch, which was decorated with about a score of miners' shanties left by the receding wave of a decade before, grew in a few months into the city of Leadville, "a city of 15,000 in a wilderness of sagebrush ten thousand feet above the sea." By 1880 the population of the state had grown to 194,000, a gain of 467 per cent over the figures of 1870, and the trains of the Denver and Rio Grande were running through the Grand Canyon of the Arkansas. The railroad mileage in the state increased from 157 in 1870 to 1750 in 1880.

The states of California, Colorado, and Nevada, and the Territory of Dakota, produced 90.1 per cent of the country's yield of gold in 1880 and 73.5 per cent of the yield of silver. The gold was readily absorbed by our expanding business, as the currency tended to contract by the reduction of the bonded debt, upon which the national bank notes were issued. But the silver, of which nearly eleven hundred tons were mined in 1880, depreciated steadily in market value; hence the determined efforts of the Western mine owners to stabilize the price of silver by its remonetization as legal tender at a fixed ratio with gold, and hence the alliance of the agrarian and silver interests against the Eastern bankers for a cheaper and more abundant currency.

¹ The Ambush and massacre of General Custer's entire force at the Little Big Horn River, in June, 1876 (see page 73), was an incident of the protest of the Sioux against their removal.

For the South the census of 1880 was both the reflection of conditions entailed by the war and the reconstruction era and a harbinger of new and better fortunes. Although the states of the secession were all restored to home rule, they had not yet been released from political quarantine. It was only with the advent of a Democratic president in 1885 that the South was to receive her proportionate allotment of Federal appointments, and not until the beginning of the next decade that she was to be freed from the threat of the revival of Federal control of her elections. In 1880 the "rebellion" had not yet faded into that phase of "past politics" which Freeman called history, although the Stalwarts had failed to make it the main issue of the campaign of that year. President Garfield could still maintain in his inaugural address that the most important duty of the nation was to safeguard the negro's right to vote—even if "honest local government" was thereby made impossible. "Bad local government," he said, "is certainly a great evil, which ought to be prevented; but to violate the freedom and sanctities of the suffrage is more than an evil. It is a crime, which, if persisted in, will destroy the government itself." It was more evident with every year that passed, however, that the end of the political tutelage of the South waited only upon the recovery of her economic fortunes, ruined by the drain of war and the extravagant waste of the reconstruction era.

The recovery was slow, for the exhaustion had been complete. Of the three factors entering into the production of wealth—namely, capital, labor, and land—the first had disappeared entirely; the second was in the most confused and demoralized state; while the third remained, full of promise, to be sure, but waiting for the coöperation of the other two for its fruition. The area of the Southern states, comprised in our third group, was 817,674 square miles as compared with an area of 217,622 square miles in the industrial states of our first group; yet by the census of 1880 the South fell far below the East in the value of its real and personal property and in the yield of its taxes. The assessed valuation, real and personal, in the industrial group of states was \$9,750,950,528, as against \$2,903,719,070

in the Southern group. Indeed, the valuation of the state of New York alone (\$2,615,940,006) was almost equal to that of the entire South, while the taxes collected in the state of New York (\$56,392,975) exceeded the total yield from the South (\$47,775,153) by 18 per cent. At the same time the public debt of the Southern states was \$285,303,776, or nearly 10 per cent of the assessed valuation, as compared with a debt representing 3.6 per cent of the valuation in the Western group of states and 7.1 per cent in the industrial group.¹

The economic ruin of the war and the liberation of the slaves put an end to the old plantation system of the South. Between 1860 and 1870 the total value of the land declined almost 50 per cent. The great plantations which had been worth \$100,000 or more were for sale at less than one tenth of that figure. The abnormally high price of cotton just after the war (ranging between 30 and 43 cents a pound in 1865-1866), coupled with the cheapness of the land, tempted some Northern capital into investment in cotton-raising, and offered to a large number of Southerners who could never have hoped to enter the "planter class" in the pre-war days the opportunity to try their hand in cultivating the great Southern staple. As the old owners seldom had the capital to make the necessary improvements on their land or to hire laborers, and the new owners seldom had the money to buy their land outright, the system of "farm-cropping," or cultivation on shares, was adopted. It was a sort of feudal land tenure. The proceeds of the land were divided between the owner and the tenant according to the shares of capital and

¹ Of course the discrepancy between the prosperity of the Southern and the industrial states was far greater than these percentages of debt indicate; for much of the debt of the industrial region represented legitimate extension of credit discounting future returns, whereas the debt of the South was retrospective—the burden entailed by the war and the reconstruction governments. A comparison of the ratio of the public debt to assessed valuation in some of the states of each of our three groups shows still more strikingly the handicap under which the South was laboring in 1880. In Alabama the ratio was 12 per cent; in Virginia, 14; in Tennessee, 18; in Louisiana, 27; in Ohio, 3.5; in Vermont, 5; in Massachusetts, 8; in New York, 10; in Oregon, 1.5; in Iowa, 2; in California, 3; in Colorado, 5.

labor furnished, or the risk assumed, by each. If the tenant furnished labor only, he received only the reward due to labor, either in a part of the crop (generally a third) or in a sum of money after the crop was sold. If he provided equipment in the form of farm animals, wagons, implements, seeds, or fertilizers, he received proportionally more, according to agreements struck. Capital and labor entered into a real partnership, says Professor Holland Thompson, "both embarking in a venture the deferred results of which were dependent chiefly upon the industry and good faith of the laborer" ("The New South," p. 67).

But there entered into the situation another factor, which was of the greatest importance in the development, or lack of development, of the South: namely, the system of agricultural credit. It had been a common practice, back in colonial days, for the tobacco and rice planters of the South to mortgage their crops to agents, or "factors," in England, in order to secure credit for a great variety of imported necessities and luxuries; and the colonial planter was pretty generally in debt to the British merchant. The habit of borrowing money on growing crops was encouraged as the increasing demand for cotton in the nineteenth century made the devotion of every dollar procurable to the purchase of new lands seem the most attractive investment possible. After the war, however, the policy of the crop mortgage was dictated not by the planter's ambitions but by his necessities. Food and clothing he must have; and these, with such other commodities as he could afford, were supplied to him by the country merchant on the security of his ungathered, and perhaps even unplanted, crop. Until his debt to the merchant was discharged—and it seldom was—the planter was in a state of economic servitude. He could not dispose of his crop in a free market or hold it for a rise in prices. He was obliged, on pain of having his credit cut off, to confine himself to the production of cotton or tobacco, because these crops were the "safest" in the eyes of the merchant-creditor. To quote Professor Thompson again, "Both could be stored conveniently with little danger of deterioration; neither was liable to a total

failure; a ready market for both was always available; and neither tempted the thief until it was ripe." Whereas a crop of corn could "easily be stolen, eaten by animals, or consumed by the tenant while still green" ("The New South," pp. 63, 64). Finally, it was to the interest of the creditor-merchant to discourage the cultivation of foodstuffs, in order that he might have a monopoly in supplying the community with corn meal, flour, hams, and bacon from his own imported stores. Obviously, until the South, by the progress of enlightenment and industry, could accumulate sufficient capital to purchase its economic freedom, it was doomed to political eclipse.

The problem of rehabilitation had to be worked out largely by the South itself. Before the war most of the Southern states had made laudable attempts to establish a system of public education, by the creation of "literary funds" and the devotion of their share of the Federal surplus of 1836 to the support of schools. But economic conditions and social traditions were both hostile to the development of a public-school system in the old South. The population was almost entirely rural, and so diffused that the radius of a community with sufficient children to furnish the classrooms was too large to let the children walk to school. The planters had long been accustomed to having their sons educated by private tutors or in private schools maintained in coöperation with the well-to-do professional and merchant classes; while the poorer whites in the Piedmont regions had been furnished the bare elements of literacy by an exiguous charity or had stagnated in shocking ignorance. Political tradition in the South ran against the expenditure of public money for "paternalistic" purposes, and the presence of the negro race of course intensified the consciousness of sharp social discrimination, which is fatal in any community to the spread of a common public-school system.¹

¹North Carolina forms a notable exception to this general statement. A flourishing system of public schools had existed in that state since 1840, and was maintained even through the Civil War. "This was due," says Philip A. Bruce, "to the fact that the landowners there came nearer to being a community of yeomen than they were in any other of the older Southern commonwealths.

By its leveling influence the war did much to remove the inherited social and political hindrances to the development of public education, but at the same time, the ruin of the economic system by the war and the impoverishment of the state treasuries by the reconstruction governments made impossible any practical assistance to schools and colleges. Help from outside was seldom either wisely proffered or gratefully received during the carpetbagger régime. Well-intentioned educational missionaries who went down from the Northern states generally had little understanding of the negro, whom they thought they could raise rapidly to an intellectual parity with the whites by the application of an imported academic curriculum. In many cases, also, they allowed a political motive to color their work, thereby incurring the hostility of communities which had none too pleasant memories of the activities of the Freedmen's Bureau. It was not until certain large sums donated by generous educational philanthropists¹ were made available for joint disposition by Northern and Southern administrators, in communities freed from the political control of the radical reconstruction congresses, that substantial improvement in Southern education began. This happy era was hardly inaugurated before 1880.²

The holdings were smaller, and the number of wealthy planters fewer, in consequence of which there was more of that equality of fortune observed in the rural districts of the North and West during the same period of time. It followed from the universal preponderance of the yeoman class in North Carolina that the framework of its local society was thoroughly democratic; practically, there were no class feelings to discourage the indiscriminate mingling of children in the schoolhouse" ("The Rise of the New South," pp. 323, 324).

¹ George Peabody, a London banker born in Massachusetts, led the way in 1867 by a gift of \$2,100,000 "to be applied for the promotion and encouragement of intellectual, moral, or industrial education among the young of the more destitute portions of the Southern and Southwestern States of the Union." Other large benefactors of Southern education have been John F. Slater of Connecticut, Miss Anna Jeanes of Philadelphia, Miss Caroline Phelps Stokes, Julius Rosenwald, and John D. Rockefeller.

² It was in 1880, for example, that Booker T. Washington, a graduate of the Hampton (Virginia) Agricultural and Normal Institute founded by General Armstrong in 1868 for the training of the negroes in the practical arts, was chosen principal of a newly founded normal school in Tuskegee, Alabama, and carried

The census of that year shows percentages of illiteracy as high as 47.4 (Louisiana), 47.2 (Alabama), 46.8 (South Carolina), 46.3 (Georgia) in the Southern states as against 9.5 (Rhode Island) and 5.9 (Pennsylvania) for the highest figures in the states north of Mason and Dixon's line. The banner states of the Union were Iowa and Wyoming with only 3.2 and 3 per cent of illiteracy respectively. About 16 per cent of the population of the South were enrolled in the public schools (a figure which did not compare unfavorably with the enrollment in other sections of the country), but the average school year in many parts of the South was not more than ten or fifteen weeks, and the number of negro children who went beyond the fifth grade was small. About 70 per cent of the American negroes over ten years of age were unable to write in 1880, and 22 per cent of the Southern whites; but the percentage of illiteracy has diminished steadily with the succeeding censuses.

Great as the handicaps were under which the South had to fight her way to economic and political rehabilitation, there were compensating advantages, too. If the South had the eternal negro problem on her hands, she was nevertheless spared the labor agitation which vexed the industrial centers. The white population of the South was (with the exception of Texas, which could as well be classed with the Western group in 1880) almost entirely native-born. Immigration had increased the foreign-born population of the industrial group of states by

into the lower South his splendid gospel of the redemption of his race through the work of its hands. In 1880, also, Dr. J. L. M. Curry, a native of Alabama, a veteran of the Mexican and Civil Wars, an ex-representative of both the Federal and the Confederate Congresses, and at the time of his appointment a professor in Richmond College and a minister of the Baptist Church, was made the agent of the Peabody Fund, which he administered for twenty-two years with unflinching wisdom and assiduous personal devotion. In 1882 the Slater Fund of \$1,000,000 was donated for the education of the negroes, and a little later the Jeanes and Stokes Funds were given for the improvement of the rural schools and the general survey of negro education respectively. The work of all these agencies was coordinated by the Southern Education Board in 1901, and two years later Congress incorporated the General Education Board, through which Mr. Rockefeller has donated several million dollars for the promotion of education and health in the South.

860,000 in the period from 1860 to 1880, but the Southern states east of the Mississippi actually showed a decrease of 6369 in the foreign-born population in the same score of years. In 1880 these states contained less than 1 per cent of foreign-born inhabitants. Again, even if the exploitation of the resources necessary for industrial development had been neglected for the exclusive devotion to cotton-growing in the lower South, those resources were nevertheless there in rich abundance. Coal, iron, and phosphates which had lain untouched beneath the soil began now to be brought to the surface. Mills and factories were built on the numerous sites of cheap water power, and began to collect the rural population of the Piedmont region into towns.

The census of 1880 shows the beginning of the transformation of the South into an industrial community. Cotton goods, flour, foundry products, sawed lumber, cotton seed and cake, agricultural implements, brick and tile, leather goods, woolens, saddlery, boots and shoes, drugs and chemicals, began to appear in the lists of Southern manufactures. The lists were not yet long, to be sure, when compared with those of the Northern states, nor was the total value of the manufactured products of the South (\$338,000,000) imposing beside the more than tenfold value (\$3,661,645,971) of the output of the mills and factories of the North; but still a beginning had been made. The number of persons engaged in manufacturing had increased from 360,000 in 1870 to 593,000 in 1880, and the number engaged in trade and transportation from 229,000 to 414,000. Already the output of coal in the South had reached 6,000,000 tons (to which every state but South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas contributed), and the output of pig iron 400,000 tons. The 300,000 cotton spindles of 1860 had doubled, and were to double again in the years 1880-1885.¹ The railroad

¹ An International Cotton Exposition at Atlanta, Georgia, in 1881, impressed on its three hundred thousand visitors the ability of the South—with its advantages of cheap land and labor, low taxes, lack of pressure from the unions, and ready-to-hand supplies of fuel and raw material—to compete with the New England mills in the production of the coarser grades of cotton goods.

mileage, after the close of the reconstruction period, began to expand rapidly, keeping pace with the rate in the country at large. The old South had passed away in humiliation and pain. The census of 1880 heralded the birth of another order, which Henry W. Grady, of the *Atlanta Constitution*, in a speech before the New England Society of New York in 1886, proudly called "the New South."

The figures of the tenth census are an eloquent witness to the divergent interests of the various sections of our country in 1880, but their significance is rather social and economic than political. Sectional interests cut across the old party lines. There were many high-tariff and hard-money Democrats in the industrial East, while the agricultural and mining interests of the West drew thousands of Republicans from their allegiance to the party founded on the principles of free soil and the preservation of the Union. The long and undisputed control of Congress by the Republicans had come to an end in the middle seventies, and for the next twenty years there were but two congresses in which a majority of both Houses was of the same political faith as the president.¹ This seesawing of party fortune prevented either Republicans or Democrats from carrying through any positive political program, and fixed their attention on the edifying task of keeping in power when they were in and getting back into power when they were out. Under the necessity of becoming all things to all men, that they might win a majority, they made their platforms "paragons of ambiguity" (see the clauses on the tariff and the currency, for example), and their legislation chapters of compromise. It was not until the radical movement of the West became strong enough, first, to frighten both the great parties, and then to capture one of them, that the economic and social sectionalism revealed in the tenth census found its full political expression.

An exception to this generalization must be made in the case of the South, though the comparative lack of influence of that

¹ Namely, the Fifty-first under Harrison in 1889, and the Fifty-third under Cleveland in 1893. During the entire period from Hayes to McKinley there was only once (1889) as large a majority as ten for either party in the Senate

section on national politics for many years after the close of the reconstruction era makes the exception of less significance. The "New South" was also the "Solid South." No problem of political expediency, no shift of economic interest, could win the vote of the South to the party which had put through the reconstruction program. The Republicans still bore the hated name of Radicals in the South, and were the party of the negro and the scalawag. The white citizens generally,—whether of Whig or Democrat antecedents, whether of the social class of the planters or the "crackers,"—under the name of Conservatives (which was officially maintained in Alabama until 1906), steadily supported the Democratic party. In 1880 only four of the one hundred and six congressional districts of the South were represented by Republicans in the House. A great majority of the Southern members of both Houses of Congress had served in the Confederate armies, while solid delegations of ex-Confederate officers sat in some of the Southern state legislatures. Here and there, under the pressure of some conspicuous economic interest (sugar in Louisiana or iron in Alabama) a few Southern congressmen voted for protection after 1880; but when it came to the election of a president, the solid electoral vote of the South was to be found in the Democratic column.¹

An adequate account of the bases of our new nationalism in the generation following the Civil War would have to deal with a number of inventions and discoveries, bold business enterprises and industrial exploitations, which it has been impossible

¹ From 1896 on, one or more of the border states (Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri) began to be carried by Republican candidates; but it was not till 1920 that a Republican carried one of the states of the secession (Tennessee)—a state, be it noted, to which the congressional reconstruction of 1867 had not been applied. In the overwhelming election of Harding in 1920 the Republicans claimed that the solid South was broken for good. Contributions aggregating \$350,000 were made by the Southern states to the Republican campaign fund in that year. Harding carried Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. Kentucky elected a Republican to the United States Senate. Democratic pluralities of 21,000 in Maryland, 50,000 in Oklahoma, 37,000 in Tennessee, and 28,000 in Missouri, in 1916, were converted into Republican pluralities of 62,000, 12,000, 12,000 and 120,000 respectively, in 1920. These figures are an interesting commentary on the economic transformation of the "New South."

even to mention in the limits of this chapter. The telephone (1877), the electric light (1879), and the trolley car (1882); the pipe line to carry the mounting tide of oil from the Pennsylvania and Ohio fields to the Atlantic seaboard (1881); the improved and cheapened methods of refining iron, which resulted in the increase of our steel production from 9000 tons in 1863 to 1,400,000 tons in 1880; the reorganization of our railroads after the depressing years of the middle seventies,—were some of the economic factors in the transformation of a people accustomed to ride in ambling horse-cars heated by rickety stoves, through roughly paved streets dimly lighted by flickering gas jets, or to travel at twenty miles an hour over light rails and quivering timber bridges in wooden cars drawn by wheezy locomotives. The new age brought in the names of Bell and Brush and Edison, of Carnegie and Rockefeller and Hill, the men of inventive genius and driving energy. It also brought its congenial philosophy of the dominance of private interest, ruthless, selfish, efficient, and sometimes lawless and corrupt—a philosophy which, in the forceful words of Professor Beard, “held that all the natural resources of the country should be transferred to private hands as speedily as possible, at a nominal charge or no charge at all, and developed with dashing rapidity”; which “believed that the great intangible social property created by community life, such as franchises for street railways, gas, and electricity, should be transformed into private property”; and which “looked upon state interference, except to preserve order and aid railways and manufactures in their enterprises, as an intrinsic evil to be resisted at every point.”¹ Out of the new age, with its glory of achievement for the few and its frustration of ambition for the many, came the conflict of two opposing interpretations of American freedom which has been waged in the last generation: freedom to be protected in the appropriation and development of the boundless resources of our country, and freedom to be protected by a democratic government in the enjoyment of equal economic opportunities and a fair share of the fruits of the labor of one’s hands.

¹ Charles A. Beard, “Contemporary American History,” p. 53.

CHAPTER III

A DECADE OF POLITICAL DEADLOCK

Neither party has any clear-cut principles, any distinctive tenets. Both claim to have tendencies. Both certainly have war-cries, organization, interests enlisted in their support. But those interests are in the main the interests of getting and keeping the patronage of the government.—JAMES BRYCE

THE PASSING OF THE STALWARTS

There are points of "dead center" in the history of nations as in the lives of individuals—periods of transition, when action wears thin, revealing the painful process of adjustment from a set of occupations or preoccupations of diminishing stimulus to new interests and problems. The decade of the eighties marked such a period in our history. New problems there were in abundance. Should the government deal with them, and, if so, how? Should it enter the field of economic legislation to attempt to adjust the growing conflict between capital and labor, or control the rapidly expanding transportation system? Should it restrict the enormous immigration which the return of prosperity was bringing to our shores? Should it grapple with the problem of a mounting surplus in the Treasury by a courageous reduction of taxes or a deliberate increase of public expenditures? Should it adopt a consistent currency policy, reform the tariff, purify the civil service? Neither of the parties was ready with a clear and unequivocal answer to these questions. Each seemed chiefly concerned, by the denunciation of its rival's evasion of ambiguous promises, to bring enough suspicion on the other party to oust it from power when it was in, and to keep it out of power when it was out. The pot called the kettle black, while the dinner waited. It took the murder of a president by a disappointed office-seeker to spur Congress to a belated reform of the civil service. It was not

till the decade was more than half over that an act was passed for the mild regulation of the railroads under the interstate-commerce clause of the Constitution. And it was not till the last year of the decade that a beginning was made, in a rather vague and feeble anti-trust act, to control the great business corporations, and that the first tariff bill since the war represented a frank political principle, however wise or unwise, instead of a timid compromise of expediency. The mountain of economic unrest labored in the decade of the eighties and brought forth a mouse of constructive legislation. That is why the period has a dull and drab aspect for the student who is not interested in the manipulation of petty party interests and the shift of party fortunes.¹

James A. Garfield was one of the most conspicuous examples of our self-made men. He was descended on his father's side from the English Puritans, and on his mother's side from the French Huguenots. A year before his birth the family had emigrated from New England to Ohio (1830), where his father soon died, leaving a widow in straitened circumstances with three small children. Beginning his career on the towpaths of an Ohio canal, young Garfield earned his way by carpentering, farming, and teaching, to Williams College, became professor of ancient languages and literature, and at the age of twenty-six was made president of Hiram College in Ohio. He was elected to the state Senate in 1859 as an ardent Republican. When the war broke out, he went to the front as lieutenant colonel of the 42d Ohio Volunteers, a regiment made up largely of his own former students. He served with distinction at Shiloh, became Rosecrans's chief of staff in the Army of the Cumberland, and was promoted to a major generalship for con-

¹ The deadlock was largely due to the fact that until December, 1889, the president did not have a clear majority of his party in Congress. In 1881 the Republicans had a majority of 9 in the House; but the Senate was divided 37 to 37, with Mahone of Virginia and Davis of Illinois as independents. The votes of these two men were generally given to the Republicans, thus assuring them of a precarious control. But the House was Democratic in Arthur's second Congress (1883-1885), and the Senate was Republican during Cleveland's whole term (1885-1889).

spicuous bravery on the field of Chickamauga. He yielded to Lincoln's request to enter Congress (December, 1863), where he was of great service as chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs and, after the war, as an authority on public finance. He approved the reconstruction legislation. When Blaine went to the Senate (1877), Garfield was left as the undisputed Republican leader and the best orator of the House. In the mid-summer of 1880 he had the unique honor of being at once a member of the House, a senator elect, and the Republican nominee for the presidency of the United States.

Garfield brought into the presidency great gifts of intellect and a long experience in public affairs. Whether he could have composed faction and become the strong leader of a united Republican party, had he not been assassinated a few months after his inauguration, no one can say. It seems unlikely, however. Men who knew him intimately expressed misgivings as to a strength of will or moral purpose commensurate with his intellectual gifts.¹ Indeed, such official utterances and action as we have from Garfield during his brief term give little promise of real leadership. His letter of acceptance was hazy on reform. His inaugural address contained no announcement of policy except a long and earnest plea for the maintenance of negro suffrage. He had no executive experience, and found himself somewhat bewildered when he had to face men who were clamoring for recognition and office. "I have been dealing all these years with ideas," he complained to his faithful mentor, Blaine, "and here I am dealing only with persons. I have been heretofore treating of the fundamental principles of government, and here I am considering all day whether A or B

¹ Hayes recorded in his diary that Garfield had "large faculties—memory, analysis, fluency, and the debating faculty," but that he was "not original, not firm, not a moral force." "His course at various times when trouble came betrayed weakness" (C. R. Williams, "Life of Rutherford B. Hayes," Vol. II, p. 364, note). John Sherman, another close friend, wrote in 1895: "His will power was not equal to his personal magnetism. He easily changed his mind, and honestly veered from one opinion to another" ("Recollections," Vol. II, p. 807). The reader will remember the rather sorry showing Garfield made in the *Crédit Mobilier* investigation (see pages 57-58).

shall be appointed to this or that office."¹ Finally, instead of holding the balance between Blaine and Conkling, as a strong executive would have done, Garfield gave Blaine the first place in his cabinet and his confidence, and allowed himself, under the guidance of his brilliant Secretary of State, to defy Conkling, after having apparently given him assurances of political recognition.²

As soon as the Senate was called in executive session for the ratification of the President's appointments (March 4, 1881), the battle opened. Conkling was already offended because he had not been able to persuade the President to give New York a better cabinet position than the postmaster-generalship, and he was reported to have threatened to break up any administration in which Blaine held the favored place. Therefore, when Garfield, without consulting either of the New York senators (as Conkling claimed that he had promised to do), sent in the name of William H. Robertson for the important office of Collector of the Port of New York, Conkling brought all his guns to bear to make the President "bite the dust" for his ingratitude. One need not be an apologist for the imperious New York senator to condemn Garfield in this matter. The incumbent of the collectorship, E. A. Merritt, was an honest and efficient officer whom Hayes had appointed, and whose term had still two years to run. The man whom Garfield nominated to replace him was Conkling's bitterest enemy in the state of New

¹ It is true that the pressure brought to bear on Garfield by office-seekers was shameful. They waylaid him "whenever he ventured from the shelter of his official residence, and followed him even to the door of the church in which he worshipped." But they pestered all the presidents. Hayes had resisted them: during the entire first year of his administration he had made only 74 removals, and those for good cause. Garfield in four months made 89 removals, mostly for partisan reasons.

² In spite of his disappointment at the defeat of his candidate, Grant, in the convention of 1880, Conkling had taken the stump for Garfield in New York and the West. Garfield had invited Conkling to his home in Ohio during the campaign and, according to Conkling's testimony, had expressed his gratitude to him in the words: "Conkling, you have saved me. Whatever man can do for man, that I will do for you" (A. R. Conkling, "Life and Letters of Roscoe Conkling," p. 623).

York and had been a thick-and-thin supporter of Blaine in the convention of 1880. There seems to have been no higher motive in the replacement of Merritt by Robertson than the humiliation of Conkling and the building up of a Blaine-Garfield machine in New York. When Conkling and Platt failed to prevent the confirmation of Robertson's appointment, they resigned from the Senate and appealed to the legislature of the state for indorsement by reëlection. Vice President Arthur went to Albany to aid them in the fight. But the legislature, after several weeks of balloting, upheld the President and returned Warner Miller and E. G. Lapham to the Senate. Conkling retired from politics; but his younger colleague reëntered the Senate sixteen years later to play an influential role as the "easy boss" of New York State. The elimination of Conkling completed the discomfiture of the Stalwarts, which was begun when their candidate was defeated in the convention of 1880.

But Blaine was not destined to enjoy his triumph over the political faction which he himself had christened and led in the earlier days. His ambitious plans for a brilliant administration in which he should play the major-domo to the Merovingian Garfield¹ were shattered at the very moment when their promise seemed brightest. Before the balloting was over at Albany, President Garfield himself had fallen a victim to factional hatred. On the morning of July 2, as he entered the railroad station at Washington with Secretary Blaine, to take the train for a college reunion at Williamstown, he was shot in the back by a cowardly wretch named Guiteau, who had been vainly seeking for an office, and who, at his trial, boasted that he was a Stalwart and wanted to seat Arthur in the presidential chair. Garfield lingered through the summer in great agony, while the entire country followed with fluctuating hope and despair the

¹ Blaine complacently remarked that, next to Garfield, he would make the administration "eminently successful, in view of the political forces which have been at work in the country for the past five years, and which have been significantly shown in the two great national conventions"; in other words, in view of his own waxing popularity and his great strength at Cincinnati (1876) and Chicago (1880).

daily bulletins which came from his bedside, and the slow poison of the bullet's track wore down the resistance of his splendid physique. He died at Elberon, New Jersey, on September 19, the anniversary of his gallant service at Chickamauga.

In the trial of Guiteau, which dragged through several weeks of nauseating testimony, no credible evidence appeared to show that the murderer was an accomplice in any plot to assassinate the President, yet it is certain that Guiteau's dastardly act was more than a piece of revenge for disappointed personal ambitions. The whole political atmosphere was permeated with the mephitic air of factional strife. The personal character of men in high places was attacked unsparingly. The President was called an ingrate and a hypocrite. During the struggle over Robertson's confirmation Conkling had published damaging correspondence of Garfield's to show that he was a spoilsman, and the prosecution of the Star Route frauds by Postmaster-General James (with Garfield's hearty support) had increased the venom of factional hate. The Star Routes¹ were lines of mail transportation in the thinly settled West, which were let out by contract to the lowest bidders, who engaged to carry the mail with "celerity, certainty, and security." Thomas J. Brady, the Second Assistant Postmaster-General, who had charge of letting the contracts, had been under suspicion, since certain congressional investigations in Hayes's term, of mismanaging the Star Routes; and when Mr. James became Postmaster-General, he determined to get at the bottom of the matter. With the help of some clever detective work on the part of P. H. Woodward, a former agent of the Post Office Department, James unearthed a mass of scandal and fraud. Millions of dollars were being paid annually to contractors, often on fake "straw" bids, for mail never delivered and routes not opened; and the graft was being shared by Brady, ex-Senator S. W.

¹ They got their name from the stars, or asterisks, with which they were marked in the postmaster's list. Their importance in 1880 is shown by the fact that they covered 215,480 miles as compared with 79,091 miles covered by the railroads, and their cost was \$6,401,834, or 38 per cent of the total cost of the mail service.

Dorsey, secretary of the national Republican committee,¹ and others in high position. Brady was forced to resign; and when Garfield refused to call off the investigation, he published a letter which the President elect had written on August 23, 1880, to "My dear Hubbell," chairman of the Republican congressional committee, showing that Garfield knew and approved the system of levying assessments on government employees for campaign funds. It would be impossible to show any direct connection between these exposures and the assassination of the President, but it is worth noting that Postmaster-General James expressed his belief that Garfield would not have been shot if he had not antagonized the Star Route ring and its powerful friends. Indictments were brought against the chief offenders, and some of them were tried in 1882 and 1883 for conspiracy and fraud; but, with the exception of one or two inconspicuous persons, they all managed to escape conviction and punishment.

The tragedy of Garfield's assassination obliterated from the minds of his countrymen any memory of compromising correspondence or arbitrary removals from office, and left only the halo of martyrdom about his head. The *New York Nation*—a paper not lavish with political apotheoses—wrote: "He will always remain one of the saints of American story, without a spot on the whiteness of his garments." The tragedy seemed all the darker because it elevated Chester A. Arthur to the presidential chair. This man, who had been Conkling's chief lieutenant in New York; this man, who had been removed for gross mismanagement from the only public civil office that he had ever held; this man, who had raised the cynical laugh of the spoilsmen at the Dorsey dinner; this man, who seemed to be in his proper element as the arbiter of fashion among the club men of New York, and who had been given the vice-presidential

¹ Dorsey, a carpetbagger from Arkansas, was tendered a dinner in February, 1881, at which General Grant presided, and Henry Ward Beecher asked grace—which, so far as Dorsey was concerned, was badly needed. At this dinner Vice-President-elect Arthur raised a laugh by referring to the financial methods which Dorsey had used in carrying the state of Indiana for the Republicans.

nomination only to placate the faction of the Stalwarts,—this “Chet” Arthur was now, to the amusement of the flippant and the consternation of the serious, President of the United States. John Sherman had written just after the convention of 1880: “The nomination of Arthur is a ridiculous burlesque. . . . It attaches to the ticket all the odium of machine politics and will greatly endanger the success of Garfield. I cannot but wonder how a convention, even in the heat and hurry of the closing scenes, could make such a blunder.” But the new president happily disappointed the apprehensions of those who feared that he would bring the methods of the “pothouse politician” into the White House. A latent dignity in him rose to meet the grave responsibilities of his high office. He conducted the government with wisdom, tact, and vigor, and retired to private life with the universal esteem of his countrymen and with the acknowledgment by a newspaper which had deplored his accession that his administration would not suffer by a comparison with any of its predecessors since Abraham Lincoln’s.

Whatever hopes the Stalwarts may have had that Arthur would restore their shattered fortunes were soon disappointed. In his brief inaugural address the new president paid a heartfelt tribute to his “lamented predecessor,” and promised to carry out the “measures devised and suggested during his brief administration to correct abuses, to enforce economy, to advance prosperity, and to promote the general welfare.” There was no proscription of Garfield’s appointees. Even the cabinet members were retained for a season. The annual message of December, 1881, for the first time since the war, omitted any reference to the political control of the South. It recommended the retirement of the silver certificates, the reduction of the tariff, honest administration of the pension system, and, chief of all, the reform of the civil service. “If Congress should deem it advisable at the present session,” wrote the President, “to establish competitive tests for admission to the service, no doubts such as have been suggested shall deter me from giving the measure my earnest support.” All of which was highly encouraging to the friends of reform, but wormwood to the Stalwarts.

Perhaps the most important result of Garfield's assassination was the elimination of James G. Blaine from office, when Arthur reorganized his cabinet in December, 1881. Blaine would unquestionably have been the dominating force in the Garfield administration. No one else in the cabinet could compare with him in talent, vigor, or prestige.¹ Even the President, as John Sherman wrote, "after the election, was chiefly guided by his brilliant Secretary of State." In his brief term of office (March 4 to December 19, 1881) Blaine had not only begun to build up the "Half-Breed's" fortunes by his influence in the distribution of the patronage, but he had embarked upon a vigorous foreign policy as well. A journalist, accustomed to the terseness of the editorial pronouncement; an Anglophobe; and, withal, something of a jingo,—Blaine had taken a rather high tone toward Great Britain on the subject of an Isthmian canal.² Ignoring the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which provided for a joint guarantee of the neutrality of the canal by Great Britain and the United States, he wrote an identical note to our ministers at the European capitals (June 24, 1881) to the effect that our treaty of 1846 with New Granada (Colombia) was a sufficient basis for the sole guarantee of the neutrality of the canal by the United States, and that "any attempt to supersede that guarantee by an agreement between European powers . . . would

¹ Garfield's cabinet reflected a desire to harmonize the various interests represented in the Republican party. William Windom of Minnesota, the Secretary of the Treasury, was acceptable to the silverites; Wayne MacVeagh of Pennsylvania, the Attorney-General, was a sympathizer with the Liberal Republicans of the seventies; Thomas L. James of New York, the Postmaster-General, was a Conkling man (though a reformer). The only member of Garfield's cabinet that Arthur permanently retained was Robert T. Lincoln (Abraham Lincoln's son), the Secretary of War.

² Discussion on this subject was very lively about the year 1880 because a French company, under the direction of De Lesseps, had obtained from the republic of Colombia a right of way across the Isthmus of Panama, and was raising large sums of money to construct a canal. Hayes thought it necessary to give warning to the European powers, in a message to Congress of March 8, 1880, that an Isthmian canal would be "virtually a part of the coast line of the United States," and must therefore be under American control. But he had made no demand for the abrogation or modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 with Great Britain.

be regarded by this government as an unfriendly act." And in a later note, in November, pressing for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, he took occasion to remark that "the military power of the United States as shown by the recent civil war, is without limits, and in any conflict on the American continent altogether irresistible." Such language, however welcome it might be to certain classes in America, was hardly calculated to improve relations with a friendly foreign power. The next month Blaine turned the Department of State over to F. T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, under whose less aggressive management the controversy gradually died down, especially as the failure of the French enterprise became evident.

Blaine's Isthmian policy was only a part of his general program for the increase of the diplomatic and commercial prestige of the United States in Latin America. He intervened in a war between Peru and Chile, sending W. H. Trescot of South Carolina as a special envoy to the latter country with peremptory terms of peace; he interfered in a boundary dispute between Mexico and Guatemala; and, finally, a few weeks before he left office he sent invitations to the countries of Central America and South America to attend a Pan-American congress in Washington the following year, disclaiming any thought of dictation or compulsion, although "the position of the United States as the leading power of the New World might well give to its government a claim to authoritative utterance for the purpose of quieting discord among its neighbors, with all of whom the most friendly political relations exist." Blaine's successor modified the language of Trescot's instructions, revoked the terms of settlement dictated to Chile, and withdrew the invitations to the congress; whereupon Blaine wrote an open letter to President Arthur, charging him with the "voluntary humiliation of this government before the European powers," and retired to private but not obscure life to write his famous volumes entitled "Twenty Years of Congress."

Meanwhile the first Congress in twenty years from which Blaine had been absent was beginning to show its talent for avoiding legislation which might cost either party a loss of

votes. Bills for the reform of the civil service were brought in and consigned to the committee graveyard. A futile attempt was made to commit the House to some program for the regulation of interstate commerce. The urgent question of the revision of the tariff to reduce an embarrassing surplus¹ failed to get beyond the reference of the whole matter to a commission of investigation—that unfailing last resort of the obstructionist. The only legislation of note passed during the long session of Arthur's first Congress were anti-polygamy and Chinese-exclusion bills which could injure the political prospect of neither party, and a "pork barrel" river and harbor bill which satisfied the greed of both.

The Mormons were a religious sect (the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints) founded in 1830 by a visionary person named Joseph Smith, who claimed to have received his new revelation written in a mystical language on a number of gold plates dug up on a hill near Palmyra, New York. Forced to migrate from their successive settlements in New York, Missouri, and Illinois, the Mormons had established themselves in 1847 in the Salt Lake basin, New Mexico, which was then under the jurisdiction of the republic of Mexico. By the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (1848) New Mexico was annexed to the United States, and two years later it was erected into a territory. Meanwhile the practice of polygamy, or plural marriages (originally forbidden by the Book of Mormon), had begun to be common, and in 1852 it was officially sanctioned by the Church. In spite of its prohibition by the Morrill Act of 1862, the practice had continued in the territory unchecked. Both the great parties condemned it. The Republican platform of 1860 called slavery and polygamy "twin barbarities" to be banished from the country. On March 22, 1882, President Arthur signed the Edmunds Act for the suppression of polygamy in Utah. The act disqualified all those who practiced or approved polygamy from

¹ The surplus was the result of the greatly increased income from both customs and internal-revenue duties which followed the return of good times in 1878-1879. In 1880 the excess of Treasury receipts over expenditures was \$65,000,000; in 1881 it was \$100,000,000; in 1882 it was \$145,000,000.

voting, holding office, or serving on juries dealing with prosecutions for polygamy, and imposed penalties of fine and imprisonment on those convicted of the offense. For several years the Church fought the act (and the sterner supplementary Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887) as an unwarranted interference of the State with religious freedom; but as the prosecutions and convictions under the act multiplied, and the "gentile" population of the territory grew, the Church gave way and officially withdrew its sanction of the practice (1890), which gradually died out.¹

Up to 1870 the Chinese, who had been coming to our Pacific shores since the middle of the century, had been welcomed for their qualities of industry and frugality. Thousands of Chinese coolies had been imported by Leland Stanford to work on the Central Pacific Railroad. The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 had given Chinese subjects the unlimited right of immigration into the United States and the guarantee of the treatment here accorded to the citizens of the most favored nation. By the census of 1870 there were 63,199 Chinese in the country, of whom 49,277 were in California and most of the rest in Idaho, Arizona, Nevada, and Montana. Less than 500 lived in the region east of the Rockies. With the completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869, great numbers of Chinese were thrown into various industries in competition with white labor.²

A violent antipathy toward the Chinese developed during the seventies, based on both economic and social reasons. While American labor was using its newly acquired strength to secure better wages, shorter hours, and an American standard of comfort, the Chinese were willing to work far into the night and live on rice to amass the modest fortune needed to take them back to the Celestial Empire to end their days in ease. Immigrants from Scandinavia and Germany, Russia, Poland, and Italy be-

¹ Early in 1893 President Harrison issued a proclamation of amnesty for former offenders against the Edmunds Act, and restored their confiscated property. Three years later Utah was admitted as the forty-fifth state of the Union, with a constitution which contained the clause "Polygamy, or plural marriages, are forever prohibited."

² In 1870, for example, Chinese shoemakers were brought all the way from California to North Adams, Massachusetts, to break a strike in a shoe factory.

came Americans; but the Chinese remained orientals, unassimilable, with furtive traits and incomprehensible habits. Their quarters in Chinatown were squalid, reeking with opium and vice. In 1877 a sharp business depression in California, following on drought, crop failures, and the collapse of mining stocks, threw great numbers of men out of employment. In San Francisco they vented their resentment on the unfortunate and unresisting Chinese. Great crowds gathered every Sunday night on the "sandlots" to listen to the incendiary harangues of Dennis Kearney on the text "the Chinese must go." They paraded the streets with banners bearing the slogan "Four dollars a day and roast beef." They invaded the quarters of Chinatown with threats of murder. Kearney was arrested, but was released by the supreme court of California; in fact, the municipal and state authorities on the Pacific coast and the members of Congress from that region all shared the popular antipathy toward the Chinese.

A bill passed Congress in January, 1879, instructing the President to notify the Chinese government that the privilege of free immigration accorded to its subjects by the Burlingame Treaty would cease after the first day of July ensuing; but Hayes very properly vetoed this unilateral abrogation of an international agreement, and sent a commission to China to secure such modification of the treaty as would protect American labor. The Chinese government courteously agreed to an amendment which permitted the United States to "regulate, limit, or suspend" (but not to prohibit absolutely) the immigration of Chinese laborers, whenever such immigration tended to harm the interests of our country. On the basis of the modified treaty Congress passed a bill in the spring of 1882 forbidding the entrance of Chinese laborers into the country for a period of twenty years. This bill President Arthur vetoed on the ground that the "suspension" of immigration for so long a period was virtually a "prohibition" of it. He suggested "a shorter experiment"; and Congress, unable to secure the two-thirds majority to pass the bill over the President's veto, reduced the term to ten years. Arthur signed this bill on May 6,

1882. So far as the results were concerned, he might as well have signed the first bill; for the exclusion of Chinese labor was renewed by the Geary Act at the close of the ten-year period, and became the established policy of the country.¹

Whatever reluctance Congress might have to reduce the surplus by a reform of the tariff, it showed no hesitancy in disposing of it by appropriations for rivers and harbors. Nothing enhanced the popularity of a congressman more than securing a generous amount of the public money for the dredging of a river, the improvement of a canal, or the construction of a breakwater in his district. The legitimate expenditure for such purposes was limited by the Constitution to appropriations for national defense, the general welfare, or the promotion of commerce between the states; but since the Civil War there had been developing an unseemly rivalry among the members of Congress for the allotment of public money for local improvements. The river and harbor bill of 1870 carried an appropriation of \$3,975,900. By 1880 the appropriation had more than doubled (\$8,976,500), and in 1882 it was more than doubled again (\$18,748,875). This huge appropriation was made to satisfy some five hundred local demands, including the improvement of "rivers" whose names (the Choptank, the Waccemaw, the Yal-labusha, and the Cheesequake) were known only to the congressman of the district, and whose sites were unmarked save on the county map. President Arthur vetoed the bill of 1882, declaring that the extravagant expenditure of public money produced "a demoralizing effect upon those who are intrusted with official duty through all the ramifications of government." But the smell of the pork barrel was sweet in the nostrils of Congress. Both Houses passed the bill over the President's veto.²

¹ A further restriction on immigration was embodied in an act of August 3, 1882, excluding criminals, paupers, convicts, and insane persons.

² Senator George F. Hoar, who defended the measure, wrote in his "Autobiography" (Vol. II, p. 113) that "the river and harbor bill cost the Republican party its majority in the House of Representatives" in the election of 1882. But Democrats and Republicans were about equally responsible. The Democrats cast 56 votes for the bill and 28 against it, the Republicans 66 for it and 31 against it — a two-thirds majority on each side.

Thus, far from doing anything to avert the usual reaction of the mid-term election against the party in power, Congress, by its failure to tackle the problems of the civil service and the tariff, and by its extravagant pension grants¹ and pork-barrel appropriations, had rather invited a rebuke. A poor cereal crop in 1881, followed by business depression, diminished exports.² High interest rates, inadequate wages, and industrial unrest added to the general dissatisfaction with the administration. The November elections turned a Republican majority of 19 into a Democratic majority of 78 in the House. More than half of the 57 Republican chairmen of committees were defeated for reelection. In ten of the thirteen states in which gubernatorial elections were held, including New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Michigan, and California, Democrats were chosen.

Aroused by this unmistakable manifestation of popular disapproval, the short session of the Forty-seventh Congress, which assembled in December, 1882, heeded President Arthur's plea for the reform of the civil service. "The people of the country," he said, "apparently without distinction of party . . . have given expression to their earnest wish for prompt and definite action." Within a week of the opening of the session Senator George H. Pendleton (Democrat) of Ohio reintroduced a bill which had lain dormant in the last session, to "regulate and improve the civil service of the United States." The purpose of the bill was twofold: to substitute merit for political "pull" in appointments to the Federal service and to safeguard the government employees from dismissal for the refusal to contribute a percentage of their salaries to the party funds. The President was authorized to appoint a bipartisan commission of three men to aid and advise him in the classification of the grades of service, and to supervise a system of competitive

¹ These were especially due to the Arrears of Pensions Act, passed in 1879, which made all pensions payable from the date of the discharge of the recipient and increased the number of applications more than threefold (from 44,587 to 141,466) in the last two years of Hayes's administration.

² The excess of exports over imports was \$259,712,789 in 1881, and only \$25,902,683 in 1882.

examinations by which the candidates might qualify for appointments. Political assessments were forbidden, and no one was to be removed from office for failure to make a "voluntary" contribution to a political campaign.

The provisions of the bill were as unwelcome to the Republican spoilsmen, who sneered at the "snivel service" as a "holier-than-thou" movement, as they were to the Democrats, who, flushed with their November victory, expected to capture the government in 1884 and make a clean sweep of the Republican officeholders.¹ But in the face of the public sentiment stirred by the assassination of President Garfield and nurtured by the activities of the National Civil Service League, formed the month after the President had been stricken down, not all of those who declaimed against the bill dared to vote against it. It passed the Senate on December 27 by 38 votes (25 Republican, 13 Democratic) to 5 (all Democratic), and the House on January 14, 1883, by 155 votes (102 Republican, 49 Democratic, 4 Nationalist) to 47 (7 Republican, 39 Democratic, 1 Nationalist), and was signed by President Arthur on January 16. The significant thing in the vote was not the size of the majorities, but the fact that thirty-three senators and eighty-seven members of the House (almost equally divided in each chamber between Republicans and Democrats) revealed their time-serving timidity by refusing to vote either way.

President Arthur showed his sincerity in the cause of reform by appointing as chairman of the Civil Service Commission Dorman B. Eaton of the National League, who had drafted the Pendleton Bill, and by offering the post of chief examiner to Silas D. Burt, whom Hayes had made naval officer of the port

¹ Senator Brown of Georgia asserted that the elections of 1882 had been a mandate to turn the Republicans out of office, and not to pass a reform bill. And Senator Williams of Kentucky said: "I am for a house cleaning from garret to cellar. I am for ferreting out all these old rats who have been in the Treasury so long that they know where the ripest cheeses are, and the best kind of cheeses too. I am for pouring water into their holes and bringing the last one of them from the bottom of his berth. The only way to reform is to put a good honest Democratic president in in 1884, then turn on the hose and give him a good hickory broom and tell him to sweep the dirt away" (*Congressional Record*, 47th Congress, 2d session, pp. 597, 595).

of New York in the place of Cornell (see page 108). In May, 1883, the President promulgated a set of twenty-three rules for the enforcement of the act, classifying the Federal employees into three branches: the Departmental Service (including those in the executive departments at Washington), the Customs Service (including those in the eleven customs districts of the country which employed as many as fifty men), and the Postal Service (including those in the twenty-three post offices which employed as many as fifty men). The rules governing the competitive examinations were published, and it was ordered that vacancies in any department must be filled by selection from a list of the four highest names in the respective tests. Certain officials, such as confidential clerks, secret-service employees, custodians of money for whom bonds had been given, and persons whose employment was "purely professional" were exempted from the examinations. Before he left office President Arthur had put 15,573 government employees into the classified service, and the list has been extended by every one of his successors—notably by Cleveland, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson. The Civil Service Act of 1883 was one of the finest pieces of legislation ever put upon our statute books. It was justly called by the publicist Ostrogorski "the Magna Carta of civil-service reform."

Unfortunately no such praise can be given to the tariff legislation of 1883. That was only a feeble stop-gap, designed to prevent drastic reform by an incoming Democratic House. The tariff commission of nine members appointed in May, 1882 (see page 152), spent the summer in traveling through the country and taking testimony from over six hundred witnesses, chiefly advocates of the protective system. In spite of the fact that its chairman, John L. Hayes of Massachusetts, was the secretary of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers, and that three other members (Oliver of Pennsylvania, Garland of Illinois, and Kenner of Louisiana) were the avowed representatives of the protected interests of iron, wool, and sugar, the report which was submitted to Congress in December justified the assertion of the commission that it had divested itself of "polit-

ical bias, sectional prejudice, or considerations of personal interest," and surprised Congress and the public by recommending "a substantial reduction of tariff duties . . . demanded not by a mere indiscriminate popular clamor, but by the best conservative opinion of the country."¹ The report suggested a bill lowering the tariff by at least 20 per cent; and President Arthur, who urged an enlargement of the free list and reduction and simplification in the duties on iron, steel, cotton, wool, sugar, molasses, and silk, would have gladly approved such a bill as the commission proposed. But Congress was not disposed to delegate its privilege of drafting legislation to a lay commission. Bills carrying duties higher than those which the commission proposed were prepared in both Houses; and when neither House would accept the other's bill, a conference committee (craftily manipulated by Thomas B. Reed so that it contained a majority of protectionists) reported a "compromise" bill with rates higher still. It was a farcical procedure, which revealed clearly enough that neither party in Congress believed in tariff reform. The compromise bill just squeezed through the Senate by a vote of 32 to 31, with the help of the protectionist Democratic senator McPherson of New Jersey, and received the vote of sixteen Eastern Democrats in the House. Protection to industries outweighed the fiscal considerations of revenue or taxation. President Arthur signed the bill on March 2, two days before the expiration of the Republican Congress.

The revenue act of 1883 left the tariff practically unchanged, although it reduced the surplus by removing a number of the internal-revenue taxes.² The Democratic House which assembled

¹ It must be added, however, that Chairman Hayes confessed that a reduction of the tariff was "by no means desirable to us." "It was," he continues, "a concession to public sentiment, a bending of the top and branches to the wind of public opinion to save the trunk of the protective system. . . . We wanted the tariff to be made by our friends!"

² Namely, the taxes on bank deposits and capital, and the stamp duties on bank checks, perfumery, cosmetics, patent medicines, playing-cards, and matches. The tobacco taxes were also reduced. Partly as a result of these measures and partly owing to the business depression, the surplus declined from \$133,000,000 in 1882-1883 to \$104,000,000 in 1883-1884 and \$64,000,000 in 1884-1885.

in December, 1883, with the largest majority for a decade, made two futile attempts to revise the tariff. William R. Morrison of Illinois, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, prepared a bill in the spring of 1884, providing for a "horizontal" reduction of 20 per cent. The bill would have cut down the revenue by about \$30,000,000 and fulfilled approximately the program of the commission of 1882. But in spite of the Democratic majority of 78, the House rejected the Morrison bill (May 6) by a vote of 155 to 159, the Democrat Randall leading the attack against it. Six days later Abram S. Hewitt of New York proposed a somewhat more moderate bill, with reductions ranging from 10 to 20 per cent, but Congress adjourned before coming to a vote on it. The net result of all the tariff agitation in Arthur's administration—of traveling commissions and conference committees and heated debates in Congress—was an act reducing the rates about 2 per cent!

Before the barren session of 1884 came to an end in July the country was absorbed in the quadrennial turmoil of a presidential campaign. The Republican nominating convention met at Chicago on June 3. On the merits of his administration President Arthur, like Hayes before him, deserved a second term. His execution of the laws had been faithful, and his recommendations of policy wise. His administration had been free from offensive partisanship and political scandal. He had shown himself to be an honest if not an ardent advocate of the reforms which public opinion was pressing upon a reluctant Congress. Every Republican state convention that met in 1884 indorsed his administration. Yet there was little prospect of his receiving the nomination at Chicago. Stalwarts like Platt resented his defection from their ranks when he entered the presidency. He could have gained the support of the Half-Breeds only by submitting to the leadership of Blaine. And he had too dignified a conception of his high office to use the patronage to build up a machine for himself. Moreover, he was under the handicap of having come into office through the death of the chosen leader of the party—a handicap which no man in our history except Theodore Roosevelt has been able to over-

come.¹ Finally, the party had suffered serious reverses under his administration, though not through his fault; and his own candidate for the governorship of New York, his Secretary of the Treasury, Charles J. Folger, had been defeated by Grover Cleveland in 1882 by an unprecedented majority.

On the other hand, the brilliant secretary whom Arthur had sent into retirement in December, 1881, was at the height of his popularity with the masses of Republican voters throughout the country. The way seemed cleared at last for James G. Blaine to realize the ambition of his life. The Stalwart opposition which had blocked his nomination in 1880 had melted away. General Grant, ruined in fortune and humiliated in spirit by the failure of a financial house to which he had lent his money and his name, was destined to live but a single year longer, battling heroically with the ravages of cancer, until he could complete the "Memoirs," the sale of which was to discharge his debts. Conkling had retired from politics. The Cameron machine in Pennsylvania had fallen on evil days in 1882, when a young Democrat name Pattison had captured the governorship on a program of reform. Platt was at Chicago actually working for Blaine. Only Logan remained of the old Stalwart guard to contest the nomination, and after receiving 63 votes on the first ballot to Blaine's 334 he was content to take the second place on the ticket.

There was some opposition to Blaine in the convention from delegates representing the reform element in the party, toward which the Maine statesman had shown himself unsympathetic. Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and George William Curtis of New York were prominent among them, as well as young Theodore Roosevelt, who was serving his third year in the New York Assembly. They felt that Blaine would be a vulnerable candidate, obliged to wage a defensive campaign against attacks on his own past record. They wanted a standard bearer unembarrassed by questionable connections with railroad deals, or by a reputation for sarcastic scorn of civil-service reform and for the manufacture of political capital by the perpetuation

¹ Further exception must be made in the case of President Coolidge.

of the animosities of the reconstruction era. They supported Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont as a statesman identified with every constructive measure of the great Republican past and a pioneer in every measure of its future of reform. Edmunds was chairman of the Senate committee on the Judiciary and one of the ablest lawyers in the country, a man of sterling character and imposing dignity; but he lacked that appeal to personal devotion which made men burst into a frenzy of cheering at the mention of the name of Blaine. He was nicknamed "the presidential glacier" at the convention. Had the Edmunds supporters been willing to fuse his 93 votes with the 278 cast for Arthur (whom they preferred to Blaine) they would have slightly outnumbered Blaine on the second ballot. But they could not have prevented the nomination of the popular candidate. "It was Blaine's turn now," as Platt remarked. He was the "man of destiny." On the fourth ballot he was nominated amid a pandemonium of cheers.

No sooner had Blaine been nominated than the independents began to compass his defeat. On July 7 the Massachusetts Reform Club repudiated the Republican ticket. The next week congresses of independents in Boston and New York invited the Democrats to select a reform candidate to whom they could give their support. The Democrats responded in their convention of July 8 by nominating Grover Cleveland, the governor of New York. Cleveland was as complete an antithesis to Blaine as could be imagined. There was not a trace of the histrionic in his nature. He had none of the ingratiating arts of the politician. He cared less, perhaps, than any other statesman in our history for the effects of his official acts upon his own political fortunes. He was deliberate in the formation of his opinions and adamant in the adherence to his principles. He regarded office as a trusteeship to be administered solely in the interests of the public, and to be accepted neither as a reward for political partisanship nor as an opportunity for personal preferment. His whole career is summed up in the simple, straightforward letter which he wrote to his brother on the evening of his election as governor of New York (1882) by a majority of 192,000



JAMES GILLESPIE BLAINE

votes: "I will tell you, first of all others, the policy which I intend to adopt, and that is to make the matter a business engagement between the people of the state and myself, in which the obligation on my side is to perform the duties assigned me with an eye single to the interests of my employers. I shall have no ideas of reelection or higher political preferment in my head, but be very thankful and happy if I can well serve one term as the people's Governor." As the people's governor Cleveland had fulfilled his pledge—guarding the public money against appropriations for partisan or sectarian purposes, courageously vetoing unwise legislation in the face of popular clamor, and consistently supporting measures for the reform of the civil service, the welfare of labor, and the improvement of municipal government. Two weeks after Cleveland's nomination a convention of more than five hundred independent Republicans, representing sixteen states, met at New York, and, condemning Blaine as "an unfit leader, shown by his own words and his acknowledged acts to be unworthy of respect and confidence," issued a call for all the friends of reform to vote for Cleveland, whose name was "a synonym of political courage and honesty." Not all the men who had opposed Blaine's nomination bolted the ticket. Lodge, Roosevelt, Andrew D. White, Hamilton Fish, and Senator Edmunds himself gave it grudging support. But a host of influential Republican writers and speakers (including Carl Schurz, T. W. Higginson, Josiah Quincy, Henry Ward Beecher, James Freeman Clarke, Samuel Bowles, and Presidents Eliot and Seelye of Harvard and Amherst) worked for Cleveland;¹ and Republican and independent papers, like the *Boston Advertiser*, the *Philadelphia Record*, the *Chicago News*, and the *New York Times*, *Herald*, *Post*, and *Telegram*, gave him their support.

Since neither of the parties could make an honest appeal to

¹The Republican supporters of Cleveland were called "Mugwumps," an Indian word meaning "big chief." This epithet was first used by the Indianapolis *Sentinel* in the Liberal Republican campaign of 1872, but it did not become a common term in our political vocabulary until it was applied to the Cleveland Republicans by the *New York Sun* (which supported the Anti-Monopoly candidate, Benjamin F. Butler, in 1884).

the country on its record on the issues before President Arthur's congresses, and since the platforms of both were equally non-committal on all subjects except mutual condemnation, the campaign degenerated into an exhibition of personal abuse, which the *New York Nation* said was "worthy of the stairways of a tenement house." The past behavior of both candidates was examined in its minutest details for evidences of scandal, and dragged before the public in nauseating accusations and innuendoes. Not even the sanctities of personal religion and domestic life were spared. Blaine was coarsely cartooned as the "tattooed man," decorated with worthless railroad bonds, fraudulent contracts, and compromising letters. Cleveland was pictured as a sot and a libertine, a vulgar politician transferred from the back parlor of a Buffalo saloon to the executive mansion at Albany.¹ Blaine's elements of strength lay in his personal popularity, his presumed acceptability to the Irish and the labor vote, the unbroken control of the executive by the Republicans for a quarter of a century, and the belief that Butler's candidacy (which was rumored to be subsidized by Republican funds) would draw heavily from the Democratic vote. Cleveland was under the further handicap of complete inexperience in national politics, never having sat in either House of Congress or held a Federal office. Moreover, he was exceedingly unpopular with Tammany Hall for his support of reforms in the government of New York City, and had given offense to many interests by his veto messages as mayor of Buffalo and governor of New York.

But all Blaine's advantages were offset by the suspicions of

¹ Unfortunately one of the charges against Cleveland, relating to a long-forgotten liaison with a married woman of Buffalo, was true, and was frankly acknowledged by the candidate. The confession caused some consternation among the independents, who were supporting Cleveland, until the tension was removed by the incontrovertible argument of a gentleman from Buffalo that, since Cleveland seemed to have been remiss in his private life and Blaine's public career was open to suspicion, the obvious course of wisdom would be to retain the former in public office where he had been so conspicuously faithful, and relegate the latter to private life for which he was so eminently fitted by his domestic virtues!

his integrity which had defeated him for the nomination in 1876 and had dogged his political footsteps ever since. The story of the transactions with the Union Pacific and the Little Rock and Fort Smith railroads rose like Banquo's ghost and would not down. Many years earlier, while a member of the House, Blaine had written a number of letters to Warren Fisher, Jr., of Boston, who was connected with the Little Rock and Fort Smith, expressing gratitude for being "admitted to participation" in certain enterprises, in his "present state of crippled and deranged finances," and promising in return that he would not be a "deadhead" in the business. When the Democratic House ordered its Committee on the Judiciary to make an investigation of the matter, just before the meeting of the national convention of 1876, and James Mulligan, a former bookkeeper for Fisher, testified that letters from Blaine to Fisher were in his possession, Blaine, much perturbed lest the letters should be produced in evidence, "borrowed" them from Mulligan and refused to return them as he had promised that he would. It is true that Blaine read the letters (or such parts of them as he wished), with comments, from his desk in the House a few days later, while "inviting the confidence" of forty-four million of his countrymen. But this dramatic gesture of self-justification, though it had carried the House off its feet, did not satisfy the forty-four million of Blaine's innocence; neither did the perusal of the letters in cold print as they appeared in the *Congressional Record*.

Now, eight years later, the Mugwump managers republished the Mulligan letters (with the addition of a new lot furnished by Mulligan and Fisher) and scattered them broadcast over the land. To counteract the attack on his record by the magnetism of his personal appeal, Blaine made a speaking-tour through Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois during the last month of the campaign, and had the satisfaction of helping the Republicans carry the "October state" of Ohio by more than 11,000 plurality. He returned to New York, tired and overwrought, to meet with an experience which probably cost him the election. A group of clergymen gathered at the Fifth Avenue Hotel

on the afternoon of October 29 to pledge him their support. The spokesman, Reverend S. D. Burchard of Maine, had the effrontery to refer to the Democrats as "the party of rum, Romanism, and rebellion." If Blaine heard the remark, he made a fatal mistake in not rebuking Burchard in his response. The insulting alliteration (insulting even to Blaine himself, since his mother was a Roman Catholic and his sister a Mother Superior in a convent) was featured by the anti-Blaine press and justly resented by every Catholic voter in the state. The same evening Blaine gave further cause for criticism by attending a "millionaires' dinner" at Delmonico's, and hobnobbing with such conspicuous representatives of predatory wealth as Jay Gould, Russell Sage, H. H. Rogers, and P. D. Armour.

On election night, November 4, it was known that Cleveland had carried the doubtful states of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Indiana, together with the solid South, giving him 183 electoral votes. The 182 votes of all the other states, except New York, were secure for Blaine. For three or four days the votes of New York, which were to decide the election, hung in the balance, until the completed returns showed that the Cleveland electors had won by the narrow plurality of 1149 votes out of a total poll of 1,127,169. The defeat of Blaine was attributed to various causes—the Mugwump revolt, the Burchard incident, the Mulligan letters, the last flicker of Stalwart revenge in Conkling's refusal to support his old rival,¹ the commercial depression and "panic" of 1884, and the bad weather on election day. Blaine himself, though "quite serene over the result," attributed his defeat directly to the misfortune that "the Lord sent upon us an Ass in the shape of a Preacher, and a rain storm to lessen our vote in New York," and indirectly to the lawless defiance of the South in suppressing the negro Republican vote. That Blaine was weaker than his party was shown by the fact that the Republicans gained 18 seats in the House, reducing the Democratic majority to 45, and retained their control of the Senate by a slightly increased margin (41 to 35).

¹ When urged to take the stump for Blaine, Conkling had replied with quiet sarcasm, "You know I don't engage in criminal practice."

The election of the first Democratic president since Buchanan was an event of marked significance in our history. It meant that the party which had been under the persistent reproach of disloyalty to the Union since the Civil War was to be given the opportunity to prove the baselessness of the suspicion; it meant the substitution of the more healthy rivalry of two great parties for the strife of factions within a single party, confirmed in a long tenure of power; it meant that the South was to be admitted to a real partnership in the government by executive recognition in the distribution of the patronage; it meant, in a word, that the cycle of reconstruction had run its full course, and that henceforth a truly united country would be free to give its belated attention to the pressing problems of economic legislation.

CLEVELAND'S PATH OF THORNS

Frustration was the keynote of Cleveland's administration, as it had been of Arthur's. The new president, though amply endowed with courage and initiative, found himself thwarted at every point of his program of reform. The Democratic party was still widely suspected of hostility to the whole body of reconstruction legislation; and where the rumor that the fruits of the war would be sacrificed failed to rouse opposition, the big business interests, fearing an executive bent on a drastic reduction of the tariff, predicted disaster. Serious labor troubles, culminating in strikes and riots almost as violent as those of 1877, brought their inevitable embarrassment upon the administration. Moreover, President Cleveland was hopelessly at variance with his Democratic House on the question of reform in taxation, the currency, and the civil service, while a Republican Senate confronted him with hostile defiance through his entire term. The Democrats were in office, but not in power. Cleveland was the elected president, but not the accepted leader of the country. The Republicans made the advent of a Democratic president in 1885 the text for the same dismal prophecies of national ruin that the Federalists had indulged in on the advent of a Republican president in 1801.

An example of the Senate's animus was furnished soon after the meeting of the Forty-ninth Congress, in December, 1885. In July Cleveland had suspended George M. Duskin, a Federal district attorney in Alabama, and appointed in his place John D. Burnett. The Senate now called upon Attorney-General Garland to submit the papers relative to Duskin's suspension, which Garland, by the President's advice, refused to do. Whereupon the Senate passed a resolution censuring the Attorney-General. Cleveland replied in a special message to the Senate, March 1, 1886, in which he defended his executive prerogative. The Tenure-of-Office Act, on which the Senate based its action, had been passed in 1867, at the height of the struggle between President Johnson and the radical Congress, solely for the purpose of hampering the executive in the control of the offices under his patronage (see page 18). When General Grant, a *persona grata* to the radicals, succeeded Johnson in 1869, that part of the act which required the president to report to the Senate within twenty days after the assembling of Congress the evidence and reasons for his suspension of any officer during the recess had been repealed. Now, "after an existence of nearly twenty years of almost innocuous desuetude," said Cleveland, the Tenure-of-Office Act was revived in order to embarrass him in making needed reforms in the government. The President pointed out that the Senate was primarily a branch of the legislative department of the government, and that its executive functions were strictly limited by the Constitution to the ratification of appointments and treaties. All papers or information bearing upon appointments he would continue to furnish the Senate, and in case of the Senate's refusal to confirm his appointees he would not "assume the right to question its determination"; but the dismissal of Federal officers must rest in the hands of the executive alone, where it had been since the foundation of the government. The president was charged by the Constitution with the sole responsibility for the execution of the laws, and it would be intolerable for him to be dependent upon subordinates forced upon him by a body not responsible to him for its actions. No resolutions of censure by



THE INAUGURATION, 1885. PRESIDENT ARTHUR AND MR. CLEVELAND
LEAVING THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE CAPITOL

(From a drawing by T. De Thulstrup, published in *Harper's Weekly*, March
14, 1885)

the Senate or threats to refuse confirmation of his future appointees would "discourage or deter" him from following the way which he was convinced "leads to the better government of the people." Public sentiment supported Cleveland in his stand against senatorial interference with his executive rights, and he had the satisfaction of seeing the total repeal of the Tenure-of-Office Act, on the motion of the Republican senator, George F. Hoar, on March 3, 1887.

The motive of the Senate in this contest was not at all a desire for the improvement of the civil service. Indeed, they signified their willingness to approve the President's suspensions from office if he would put them squarely on the ground of partisan rivalry. Their censure of Attorney-General Garland was doubtless meant as a rebuke to Cleveland for appointing an ex-governor of the secessionist state of Arkansas to a cabinet position. But Cleveland was determined that sectional discrimination in the distribution of Federal offices should cease. The Southerners had long since been reinstated in Congress, and, with trifling exceptions, the disabilities imposed on them by the reconstruction legislation had been removed. It was time that they had their recognition in the higher posts of the government. President Cleveland appointed as Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard of the border state of Delaware, a member of a distinguished family which has furnished United States senators for six consecutive generations. For Secretary of the Interior he named L. Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi, who had drafted the secession ordinance of his state twenty-five years before and had shown his devotion to the restored Union by a touching eulogy on Charles Sumner, delivered in the Senate in 1874. Bayard, Lamar, and Garland were all members of the Senate at the time of their appointment to the cabinet.¹

¹The other members of the cabinet were these: Secretary of the Treasury, Daniel Manning, the president of a bank in Albany, who was a Tilden man, and not especially acceptable to Cleveland (he was replaced in 1887 by Charles S. Fairchild); Secretary of the Navy, William C. Whitney of New York; Secretary of War, William C. Endicott of Massachusetts; Postmaster-General, William F. Vilas of Wisconsin.

When Cleveland was inaugurated, there were but seven Southerners among our foreign ministers and consuls general. Cleveland redressed the balance by dividing the seventy diplomatic and consular offices almost equally between North and South (38 to 32) in spite of fervid protests in the Senate against sending abroad to represent the United States government "Confederate brigadier generals," who had been fighting for its dissolution a score of years earlier.

Cleveland was a sincere advocate of civil-service reform. In a letter written December 24, 1884, to George William Curtis, president of the National Civil Service League, he promised that he would enforce the Pendleton Act "in good faith and without evasion," making removals from the classified service only in cases of "offensive partisanship." In his inaugural address a few weeks later he said: "Our citizens have the right to protection from the incompetency of public employees who hold the office solely as the reward of partisan service, and from the corrupting influence of those who promise and the vicious methods of those who expect such rewards; and those who worthily seek public employment have the right to insist that merit and competency shall be recognized instead of party subserviency or the surrender of honest political beliefs." But the pressure of a party excluded for a quarter of a century from the rich pastures of government patronage proved too strong for the reform President. There were over one hundred thousand offices outside those classified under the Pendleton Act. Thomas A. Hendricks, the Vice President, was disgusted with Cleveland for not making a clean sweep of the Republican incumbents. Hendricks had won the support of Tammany Hall for the ticket only after traveling from Indiana to New York to assure "Boss" Kelly that Cleveland would not antagonize the Wigwam. Now a cartoon appeared representing Cleveland with a club approaching the snarling Tammany tiger, with the legend: "Beware! for he is very hungry and very thirsty." Democratic as well as Republican spoilsmen had nothing but contempt for the "vagaries" of the civil-service reformers. Senator Gorman of Maryland used his great influence for the rankest kind of

partisan appointments. The First Assistant Postmaster-General, Adlai E. Stevenson, wielded his headsman's ax with vigor. Seney in the House and Vance in the Senate brought in bills for the repeal of the Pendleton Act.¹ "Marse Henry" Watterson of the Louisville *Courier Journal*, commenting on Cleveland's promise to remove only "offensive partisans," wrote that every official not in sympathy with the party was "offensive." It would have been impossible for Cleveland to redeem his promise of reform without disrupting his party. He yielded reluctantly to the pressure brought to bear upon him. Eventually all the 85 internal-revenue collectors, 100 out of the 110 collectors of customs, and four out of every five of the land officers and the fourth-class postmasters were replaced.² Nevertheless, Cleveland showed his sympathy with reform by adding the railroad post-office employees to the classified service, increasing the number of places from 15,573 to 27,380. By the common testimony of reformers like Charles Francis Adams, George W. Curtis, and Theodore Roosevelt, he went as far as he could without breaking up his party—too far to keep the support of the spoilsmen, who charged him with "disloyalty" to Democratic interests, and not far enough to satisfy the independents, who claimed that they had elected him president.

Strict economy in the public expenditures and the limitation of taxation to the amount necessary to run the government were principles which accorded with Cleveland's conception of his office as a stewardship for the American people. A surplus in the Treasury, he believed, was a double evil: it betokened excessive taxation, which drew capital from the channels of business, and it tempted to extravagant appropriations. He was opposed to every form of paternalism. It was the part of the

¹ Vance characterized the reformers as "a sickly, sentimental, Sunday-school, Goody-Two-Shoes party, which appears desirous of ruling the world not as God has made it, but as they would have it." As if the spoils system were a divine ordinance!

² In ten months (March-December, 1885) Cleveland made six hundred and forty-three removals, to the growing sorrow of the Civil Service League, which as late as August had commended him for his "fidelity, amid perplexities and difficulties, to the principles asserted in his letter of December, 1884."

people to support the government, he said, but no part of the government to support the people. The Republicans in general were not disturbed by a full Treasury, which would furnish the means for the improvement of rivers and harbors and coast defenses, the building of a navy, the subsidizing of a merchant marine, the encouragement of new transcontinental railroads, and a host of other projects. Enough Democrats coöperated with the Republicans in 1866 and 1877 to pass large river and harbor bills, the first of which President Cleveland signed, but the second of which he killed by a pocket veto.

The matter on which the President exercised his veto power most freely, however, was the great mass of private pension bills introduced in his term.¹ No other country has ever treated the veterans of its wars with such liberality as the United States. On July 1, 1885, there were 345,125 names on the pension rolls, drawing \$56,000,000 from the Treasury. It was estimated that one out of ten of the men who had enlisted in the war were receiving pensions, in addition to the dependents of the dead soldiers. The government had paid over \$800,000,000 in pensions since 1861. In March, 1879, Congress had passed a bill allowing arrearages of pensions from the date of injury in the case of all claims filed before July 1, 1880. Under this bill the applications for pensions had jumped from 36,832 to 110,673 in a single year, and a host of pension agents, or brokers, pervaded the country soliciting applications from soldiers or their dependents who could produce any shadow of a claim to compensation by the government. The New York *Nation* spoke of "the pension craze." If the Bureau of Pensions worked too slowly or showed a disposition to reject claims, private pension bills could be introduced by any member of Congress and passed with the approval of a single member of the Committee on Pensions. From 1861 only 1987 such bills had been passed,

¹ Cleveland had been known as the "veto mayor" of Buffalo, and had continued the practice as governor of New York. In his first presidential term he vetoed 310 bills and killed 109 more by pocket vetoes, whereas all the former presidents from Washington to Arthur had sent but 132 veto messages to Congress.

but in the four years of Cleveland's term the number was 2042. The President made it a point of duty to examine these claims in detail. He vetoed 233 of them, and was convinced that many of the 284 which became laws because he had not had the time to examine them in the ten days allowed him by the Constitution should have been rejected. One is amazed in reading the one hundred and fifty or more large pages in Richardson's "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," in which these veto messages appear, to discover the vast amount of therapeutic detail with which the President must have made himself familiar in order to pass upon these claims. One is also amused to read many of the pretexts on which the claims were founded. One man had been killed by a snowslide in Colorado in 1884; another had been drowned when his buggy overturned in crossing a creek; another had fallen into a new cellar during his furlough and broken his leg; another had been shot by a neighbor who was supposed to be aiming at an owl; another had been injured by an explosion of powder packed into his pipe by a comrade as a practical joke; another had been driven to suicide by a nagging wife; another had been wounded by firing a cannon on the Fourth of July, 1866; another had been struck on the head with a gunstock by a drunken tent companion because he refused to get some whisky for him; and so on. All these calamities, together with every infirmity of the flesh that advancing years brought, were ingeniously connected with service in the army.

No wonder that the President indulged at times in sarcasm when analyzing these fraudulent claims,¹ or that he indignantly exclaimed at the end of one of his messages: "I believe that if the veterans of the war knew all that was going on in the way

¹ "The theory seems to have been adopted," he wrote in one veto message, "that no man who served in the army can be the subject of death or impaired health except they are chargeable to his service. Medical theories are set at naught, and the most startling relation is claimed between alleged incidents of military service and disability or death. Fatal apoplexy is admitted as the result of quite insignificant wounds, heart disease is attributed to chronic diarrhœa, consumption to hernia, and suicide is traced to army service in wonderfully devious and curious ways" (Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VIII, pp. 683-684).

of granting pensions by private bills they would be more disgusted than any class of our citizens." Again and again Cleveland asserted his sympathy for "the crippled soldier who is honored in the just recognition of his government." No expenditure of public funds, he said, was more cheerfully approved by the people than honest pension grants. It was just because the pension roll was a roll of honor that the utmost care should be taken to protect the soldier who had served his country from the dishonorable competition of men who would stoop to any expedient to plunder the public treasury. Cleveland signed more pension bills (even more private bills) than any of his predecessors, and yet his opponents dwelt only on the vetoes. The Republican organization of New York State condemned his "sneery and flippant language" as "insulting to the veterans and degrading to the Executive."

Early in 1887 a Dependent Pension Bill was passed by large majorities in Congress, granting \$12 a month to every soldier and sailor who had served three months, regardless of whether he had received any injury or even participated in a battle, if he was now "disabled and dependent upon his own labor for support." This bill President Cleveland vetoed (February 11) in a long message, pointing out that the cost of such a blanket measure could not be even approximately estimated; that the men receiving less than \$12 a month (of whom there were 202,621 on the pension list on July 1, 1886) would be tempted to claim "total inability to procure their subsistence by daily labor" in order to get the increased pension; and that twenty years after the close of the war, when most of the combatants were still in the days of vigorous manhood, was far too early a date for the passage of a general-service bill. It had been thirty-five years after the close of the Revolution (1818) that such relief had been granted to dependent soldiers who had served at least nine months, fifty-six years after the close of the War of 1812 (1871), and thirty-nine years after the close of the Mexican War (1887). And the Mexican War pension bill (which Cleveland signed, and was ridiculously accused of signing because so many of its beneficiaries would be Southerners)

provided that the claimant must be at least sixty-two years old. The outcry against Cleveland for vetoing the Dependent Pension Bill was so bitter—especially from certain leaders in the Grand Army of the Republic—that the President deemed it necessary to recall his acceptance of an invitation to address the encampment of the G. A. R. at St. Louis in September, 1887, lest he should be subjected to open insult.¹

Cleveland's unpopularity with certain types of patriots was increased by his "rebel-flag order." On April 30, 1887, Adjutant General Drum wrote to the Secretary of War that a number of flags captured from the Confederate armies were lying in the attic of the War Office building, and gracefully suggested that as "over twenty years have elapsed since the termination of the late Civil War" and "many of the prominent leaders, civil and military, of the late Confederate States are now honored representatives of the people in the national council," these flags might with propriety be restored to the respective states in which the regiments that bore them were organized. Secretary Endicott approved the idea, and the President issued an executive order directing the return of the flags. The protests against what John Sherman called "the President's recognition of a lost cause" were so strong that Cleveland revoked the order about a week later, declaring that a more careful consideration of the matter had convinced him that he had no authority for his action and that any direction as to the final disposition of the flags should originate with Congress. Governor Foraker of Ohio won great applause when he declared that no rebel flags would be returned while he was in the chair of

¹ Nevertheless, Cleveland's veto message was convincing enough to be upheld by Congress and by the G.A.R. encampment itself. The original bill had been passed by the Democratic House by a vote of 180 to 76 (more than a two-thirds majority) and by the Republican Senate without a division; but the vote to override the veto fell 25 short of a two-thirds majority in the House (175 to 125). In spite of the agitation of Commander Tuttle of Iowa, the encampment refused to condemn the President's veto, and voted (318 to 173) against a general-service pension. It is interesting to compare Cleveland's veto of the Dependent Pension Bill of 1887 with Harding's and Coolidge's vetoes of the Bonus Bills of 1922 and 1924.

state, and described Cleveland's frank recognition of his administrative error as "quailing like a whipped spaniel" under the lash of outraged public opinion. Twenty-two years later a solid Republican Congress ordered the return of the flags by a unanimous vote, and President Roosevelt signed the resolution with the hearty approval of the country.

Like Hayes and Arthur before him, Cleveland was opposed to the continued purchase and coinage of silver in greater amounts than was needed for a sufficient circulating medium. In every one of his annual messages (except the third, which was wholly devoted to the tariff) he urgently recommended the repeal of the Bland-Allison Act of 1878, "by which every month \$2,000,000 of gold in the public Treasury are paid out for 2,000,000 or more of silver dollars, to be added to the idle mass already accumulated." Only 50,000,000 of the 215,000,000 dollars coined under the act were in circulation at the time of Cleveland's inauguration. The hoarding of gold had already begun; silver was being paid into the Treasury in increasing proportions for customs duties; the excess of exports over imports of gold had reached \$40,000,000 in 1886; and Cleveland foresaw as a result of the continued purchase of depreciating silver that distressing condition of the Treasury which, as we shall see, was one of the vexing problems of his second term. The great business prosperity of the country, after the recovery from the temporary panic of 1883-1884, staved off the evil day for a time; and Congress, in 1886, by substituting for the greenbacks of smaller denominations silver certificates of one, two, and five dollars, enabled the country to absorb most of the silver purchases in the shape of paper.¹ But it was only a makeshift that in no wise remedied the vicious practice of coining and storing silver "dollars" (worth 78 cents at the close of 1886) which could not be used in our foreign exchanges and which

¹ This process was helped by the shrinkage of the national bank notes on account of the redemption of the bonds on which the bank notes were based. Between the years 1882 and 1889 the national bank-note circulation declined from \$356,000,000 to \$190,000,000, while the silver notes increased from \$62,000,000 to \$277,000,000.

would not be used by our people at home. However, the President had no chance of getting the Bland-Allison Act repealed in the face of the strong silver sentiment in Congress and the demands of the agricultural and mining interests of the West. His own party in the House voted (April, 1886) by 96 to 70 in favor of a bill for the free and unlimited coinage of silver, which was defeated only by the 93 Republican votes cast against it. So the Treasury continued to pay out \$24,000,000 of gold annually for silver dollars that were worth 73 cents at the close of President Cleveland's administration, and the Director of the Mint called for more vault room to store the depreciating metal.

The chief need of the country, in the President's opinion, was such reform in our system of revenue "as to relieve the people of unnecessary taxation, having due regard to the interests of capital invested and workingmen employed in American industries, and preventing the accumulation of a surplus in the Treasury to tempt to extravagant waste." Under the high tariff, essentially unchanged since the Civil War, the surplus piled up rapidly year by year. It increased from \$63,000,000 on June 30, 1885, to \$94,000,000 in 1886, to \$103,000,000 in 1887, and to \$119,000,000 in 1888. The retention of a single year's surplus in the Treasury meant a curtailment of from 10 to 15 per cent in the circulating medium of the country. Obviously the surplus could be remedied either by increasing expenditures or by cutting down receipts, just as a fraction may be reduced either by enlarging the denominator or by diminishing the numerator. The various possible forms of increased expenditure were all open to objection. From the Democratic standpoint of the limitation of public expense to the strict needs of a government economically administered, the appropriation of large sums for internal improvements, for the encouragement of industry, for the aid of land and water transportation, or for any schemes of "paternalism" was an unwarranted squandering of the people's money. "Pork barrel" bills only incited to local jealousies and afforded opportunities for public plunder. Extravagant pensions tempted to fraudulent applications. The government had a war debt of about \$1,375,000,000 in 1885.

Why not apply the surplus to the reduction of the debt? A private individual heavily in debt would find a surplus anything but an embarrassment. But a government debt differs widely from a private debt. It is a form of investment, consisting of bonds with fixed rates of interest and dates of maturity. Moreover, our bonded debt since 1863 had been the basis of a necessary element in our currency, the national bank notes. Less than \$200,000,000 of the national debt was redeemable in 1885. For any further reduction the government would have to enter the market and buy back its own bonds at such premium as they commanded. Secretary Fairchild doubted whether he had a constitutional right to do this unless he should be so authorized by Congress. But quite apart from the constitutional question, there was the danger that the government's entrance into the market would stimulate speculation in the public securities. Nevertheless the government did spend some \$28,000,000 in 1887 in the purchase of 4 and 4½ per cent bonds, paying premiums of 24 and 8 per cent on them respectively. But even this expenditure, of doubtful wisdom, absorbed only about a quarter of the surplus for the year.

There remained the second method of reducing the surplus; namely, cutting down the receipts. This remedy could be applied to either of the two main sources of the government's income—the internal-revenue taxes or the tariff. The former had already been removed, by a series of acts of Congress since 1866, from all articles except tobacco, beer, and spirituous liquors; and public opinion favored the retention of these taxes, not so much for the revenue that they produced as for their moral effect. Thus, by a process of elimination, the tariff was left as the fit object for reform. And it was against the tariff, as a source of excessive revenue and an instrument of excessive taxation, that President Cleveland directed his attack.

The President warmed to the combat as his administration progressed. From a scant page in his first annual message, he proceeded to a more detailed examination of the subject in his second message, characterizing the excessive tariff as a "ruthless extortion and a violation of the fundamental principles of a

free government." The third message, of December 6, 1887, he devoted entirely to the discussion of the tariff as "a vicious, inequitable, and illogical source of unnecessary taxation" which "ought to be at once revised and amended." In this exceptionally able state paper Cleveland reviewed and rejected the various possibilities of reducing the surplus by further expenditures, scored the trusts for maintaining high prices, and showed that the American laborer and farmer were both injured by the "selfish schemes" of the protected manufacturers. Of the 17,392,099 of our people who were engaged in industries of all kinds according to the census of 1880, only 2,623,089 were employed in the protected industries. The other 85 per cent were obliged to share with the rest of our population the burden of artificial taxes on almost every necessity of life, without any compensation in the shape of increased wages. Moreover, a broader competition with the manufacturers of other countries, "who cheapen their wares by free material," would give our people "the opportunity of extending their sales beyond the limit of home consumption," saving them from the losses caused by business depression and a glutted domestic market, and "affording their employees more certain and steady labor with its resulting quiet and contentment." Cleveland warned the highly protected interests, in language which recalls Cicero's admonition to the nobles behind the Catilinarian conspiracy, that "financial panic and collapse, to which the present conditions tend, afford no greater shelter or protection to our manufactures than to other important enterprises."

The President preached to deaf ears, however. Prosperity and confidence, not panic and collapse, were in the vision of the country of the later eighties. It was not till a few months before the close of his administration (and then only as a result of an unprecedented appeal) that Cleveland could persuade the Democratic House to frame and pass a bill for tariff reform.¹

¹ In June, 1886, thirty-five Democrats, under the lead of the high protectionist Randall of Pennsylvania, had joined with the Republicans of the House in declining, by a vote of 140 to 157, to consider a bill for the reduction of duties and the enlargement of the free list, brought in by Morrison, the author of the

The Fiftieth Congress, which assembled in December, 1887, saw the Democratic majority in the House reduced from 39 to 12, owing, as Governor Hill of New York sarcastically remarked, to "Cleveland's civil-service nonsense." Morrison had been defeated in his Illinois district, and the new chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means was Roger Q. Mills of Texas. The Mills Bill, introduced early in the session, in response to Cleveland's message, put wool, salt, hemp, flax, and tin plate on the free list and aimed to reduce the internal-revenue taxes by about \$25,000,000 and the tariff duties by \$50,000,000. But the bill was poorly drawn, no public hearings upon its rates were held, the Republican members of the committee were virtually ignored in its preparation, and sectional discrimination was patent in its schedules. Southern industries, like sugar, rice, and iron ore, were left protected, while the reductions were considerable on articles of Northern manufacture. The bill was debated in the House until the middle of July, 1888, and then passed by a majority of only 13—a strict party vote, secured, as the opposition press charged, by the administration's threat to deprive any recalcitrant Democrats of appropriations for public buildings in their districts. The national nominating conventions of 1888 had already been held when the bill finally passed; and the Republican platform had declared unequivocally for the maintenance of the protective tariff, even at the entire sacrifice of the internal-revenue taxes. Naturally the Republican Senate took no notice of the Mills Bill. We shall return presently to the effect of Cleveland's message of 1887 upon the campaign of 1888.

Such is the story of the frustration of President Cleveland's efforts for reform in the civil service, the currency, and the tariff. The opposition was due partly to honest differences of opinion on the wisdom of the policies proposed, partly to sectional economic rivalry, partly to inveterate habits of partisanship, but chiefly to the sedulous cultivation by the Republicans

unsuccessful bill for the horizontal reduction in 1884 (p. 160). Again, in December, the House by a vote of 149 to 154 (twenty-six Democrats joining with the majority) refused to enter upon any tariff legislation at all.

of the suspicion that a Democrat administration could not prove equal to the country's needs or worthy of the country's trust.¹ Every act or word of the President's was scrutinized to find in it a proof of the motive which his critics were pleased to attribute to him. Under the circumstances it is not strange that the only legislation passed in his term was of a strictly non-partisan nature.

Vice President Hendricks died in November, 1885. A law of 1792 provided that in the event of the death or resignation or disability of both the president and the vice president, the succession should pass to the president pro tempore of the Senate and after that to the Speaker of the House. The obviously unfair arrangement by which the place of an elected Democratic president might have been filled by an ardent Republican senator (John Sherman being the man chosen as president of the Senate) was remedied by a Presidential Succession Act (January, 1886), according to which the succession passed, after the vice-president, to the members of the cabinet in order of the creation of their offices. An Electoral Count Act of February 3, 1887, made the repetition of the crisis of 1876 impossible by providing that a single electoral return from a state should be rejected only by the concurrent action of both Houses of Congress; and that when more than one set of returns was returned, and the two houses disagreed as to which should be counted, the votes of the electors whose appointment had been certified by the executive of the state under the seal thereof should be received.

The same year Congress passed the Dawes Act, bestowing one hundred and sixty acres of land and United States citizen-

¹ John Sherman called the Democratic party "the left wing of the Confederate army." Even the high tariff, because it had been born out of the necessities of the war, seemed to have a sort of sacredness in the eyes of some of the Republicans, as the Greenbacks had in the eyes of the Western debtors. Many members of the President's own party, especially in the Senate, were hardly less hostile than the opposition. Pugh of Alabama and Beck of Kentucky did not hesitate to denounce Cleveland as an enemy of the party. Vance of North Carolina said, "The President is not of my school of Democracy." An Alabama editor wanted to "brand Cleveland traitor and kick him out of the party."

ship upon heads of Indian families who should renounce their tribal allegiance. The purpose of this act was not alone to break up the Indian tribes, whose resentment at having their reservations continually pushed westward by the advancing frontier of settlement had led to conflicts costing the government millions of dollars since the Civil War, but also to satisfy the land hunger of the Western emigrants.¹ It was one of the many signs that the days of the dream of unlimited lands beyond the verge of civilization, which could be lavished upon the railroad promoters or left open to the herds of Texas cattle driven northward over the "long trail" to Kansas and Nebraska or appropriated by squatters in defiance of the homestead laws, were over. Cleveland was the first of our presidents since the Civil War to be keenly interested in the preservation of our national domain; and in his closing message of 1888 he pointed with gratification to the fact that over 80,000,000 acres of our Western lands had been rescued from "illegal usurpations, improvident grants, and fraudulent entries and claims, to be taken for the homesteads of honest industry."

The most important piece of legislation in Cleveland's first term was the Cullom Act of 1887 for the regulation of interstate commerce. When we realize the extent to which our government is absorbed today, through various commissions and under a mass of statutes, in questions of industry, labor, trade, and transportation, it is almost unbelievable that a full century should have elapsed before any serious attempt was made to invoke the authority of the Constitution for the national control of these great economic interests. The cause lay partly in

¹ The Indian reservations at the beginning of Cleveland's term comprised over two hundred and fifty thousand square miles, an average of some three thousand acres for each warrior of the tribes. The Dawes Act was the attempt to open these lands to white settlers and to protect the Indians against "land sharks." The government had already recognized its responsibility for the education of the Indian youth by the establishment of the Carlisle School in Pennsylvania (1879) and the Chilocco Industrial School in what is now Oklahoma (1884), and by paying part of the expenses of the Indian pupils admitted to Hampton Institute, Virginia (since 1878). At the end of Cleveland's term there were over fifteen thousand Indians of both sexes attending schools supported wholly or in part by the national government.

the prevalence of the doctrine of *laissez faire*, to which we have called attention in earlier pages (see pages 84, 85), and partly to our dual system of government, which left to the states jurisdiction over practically the whole field of the social and economic activities of their citizens. But we have seen in our study of the Granger movement (see pages 87 ff.) how the rapidly consolidating transportation systems under the management of single companies like the New York Central or the Illinois Central, crossing state lines and covering sections of our country thousands of square miles in area, had grown beyond the effective control of any state legislature. The Granger laws had been actually nullified by the enormous power of the railroad corporations even before they were formally declared unconstitutional in their operation beyond the limits of the states in which they had been passed. The Wabash decision of 1886 (see page 92, note) suggested that it was the duty of Congress, not the state legislature, to initiate laws for the regulation of interstate transportation, and the authority for the action of Congress was to be found in Article I, section 8, paragraph 3, of the Constitution.

The invaluable contribution of the railroads to the prosperity of the country must not be overlooked in the just criticism of their illegal practices and arrogant attitude. They had opened up, as it were overnight, the great West, which President Johnson had thought it would take six hundred years to settle. They had carried thousands on thousands of emigrants out to cultivate the rich Western lands, which had sent back millions on millions of bushels of wheat and corn to the populous seaboard states and the countries of Europe. They had stimulated business and given employment to growing armies of labor by transporting the raw materials of industry (coal, iron ore, wool, cotton) from far-distant mines, ranges, and plantations to the great factory centers of the Eastern and Middle states. They had cut freight rates in halves since the close of the Civil War. They had attracted the investment of hundreds of millions of Europe's wealth to add to our working capital. They had become an indispensable agent for the farmer, the stock-raiser, the miner, the oil-producer, the planter, and the manufacturer.

But because the railroads were indispensable they had become arbitrary, dictatorial, and defiant. The evils for which they were held answerable in the public opinion were many and varied. In the first place, the very construction of the railroads, especially in the periods of over-hasty expansion in the late sixties and seventies, had been attended by overcapitalization, crooked manipulation, and frenzied speculation on the stock exchange, which had made the names of Union Pacific and Erie, of Oakes Ames, Jay Gould, and Daniel Drew, an offense to the ears of the American people. In the twenty years following the Civil War the growth of the railroad mileage was four times as rapid as the growth of the population; and the rivalry of competing lines—often built and managed for the purpose of mutual wreckage, rather than for the honest service of the public—led to fierce rate wars and cutthroat competition, which the roads sought to remedy by “pools” or “gentlemen’s agreements.”¹ All the roads of any importance, even those which had received large grants of public money, had funds for “lobbying” to secure legislative favors and low assessments,² or even for bribing venal legislators and judges. Public officials, members of state assemblies, jurymen, and influential politicians were furnished with free passes as a matter of course. Furthermore, much of the nominal capital of the railroads (as much, perhaps, as one third in 1885) consisted of “water”; that is, of stocks and bonds in excess of the real value of the property; and the interest on these securities had, of course, to be met out of the rates charged to the public.³

¹ Pooling generally took the form of lumping the receipts of the roads forming the pool, and dividing the profits between them according to some prearranged ratio. Or the roads might divide common territory into exclusive districts or spheres of operation assigned to each. In 1873 a certain Albert Fink had organized the Southern railroads into a pool under whose terms most of the cotton was shipped to the manufacturing centers. In the eighties two large pools controlled most of the transportation business north of the Potomac and east of the Mississippi.

² The railroads of Iowa were estimated at one fourth of the wealth of the state in 1885, but they paid only one twentieth of the taxes.

³ Mr. H. W. Poor, an eminent railroad authority, estimated that the New York Central paid 8 per cent on \$48,000,000 of “water” for fifteen years.

Most exasperating of all the abuses of the roads, however, was a discrimination in rates in favor of some localities or some shippers as against others. Freight was carried at lower rates between important centers which were served by competing lines than between much nearer points served only by a single road. For example, it was cheaper for a merchant in Rochester, New York, having goods for Cincinnati, Ohio, to ship them to New York City and from New York City to Cincinnati (back through Rochester again) than to ship them directly from Rochester to Cincinnati, although the roundabout way was seven hundred miles longer; that is, the competitive through rate from New York to Cincinnati, even with the local rate from Rochester to New York added, was less than the local rate from Rochester to Cincinnati. As there were more than 30,000 stations served only by a single line of railroad in 1887, as against 2778 stations served by two or more roads, it can readily be seen how widely the rate discrimination between the "long haul" and the "short haul" was felt. But worse still, and worst of all, was the favoritism shown to certain shippers in the way of rebates, secret rates, doctored waybills, rake-offs on competitors' business, and like irregularities and frauds. The railroads, which were supposed to be impartial servants of the public and were beholden in many instances to its generosity, were often willing to cheat and steal at the bidding of "big business."

The most flagrant example of this sinister conspiracy between the corporations and the railroads was furnished by the Standard Oil Company, which, by 1882, when it was organized into a trust, had secured a virtual monopoly of the refining and transportation of petroleum. The two Rockefellers (John D. and William), with their partners, forced the oil-carrying roads, like the Erie, the Pennsylvania, and the New York Central, to make contracts agreeing to charge their competitors rates doubly or trebly as high as those charged the Standard Oil Company, to turn the difference over to the Standard, and to keep the company informed of the details of its competitors' business. "It is agreed," reads part of a contract made by the Standard

Oil Company with five of the leading roads of the country, "that the party of the second part (the railroads) shall lower or raise the gross rates of transportation to such an extent as may be necessary to overcome competition." The following letter written to the Cleveland and Marietta Railroad illustrates the methods of the Rockefeller corporation:

The Standard Oil Company will store and afterwards pipe all oils under its control unless you make the following arrangements, viz.: You shall make a uniform rate of 35 cents a barrel for all persons except the Standard Oil Company; you shall charge them 10 cents a barrel and also pay them 25 cents a barrel out of the 35 cents collected of other shippers.¹

The Hepburn Committee of the New York Assembly for the investigation of the railroads of the state reported in 1879 that the oil-carrying roads had paid to the Standard Oil Company no less than \$10,000,000 in rebates.² Naturally, no independent refiners could live under such conditions. They had to sell out to the Standard Oil Company at its own figure, which was seldom as high as fifty cents on the dollar. The Hepburn Committee also reports the testimony of one of the victims of the rebate system, who was forced to sell out a business yielding \$40,000 a year for \$45,000: "I would not have sold out if I could have got a fair show with the railroads."

That a fair show with the railroads could not be obtained by any power short of the national government was evident to all by the middle of the eighties. The railroads themselves had grown to the proportions of a national institution, with their one hundred and thirty-three thousand miles of track weaving a network which covered (with thinning lines west of the Missouri River) every state and territory of the Union. They had nearly all adopted the standard gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in., which made through traffic and the interchange of rolling stock possible.

¹ Report of the Senate Select Committee on Interstate Commerce, in Senate Reports, 49th Congress, 1st session, No. 46, p. 199.

² The committee also found that the New York Central had made more than six thousand contracts for rebates in a single year, and that 50 per cent of its freight was carried at special rates.

They had been able to bring uniformity into their time-tables when Congress, in 1883, established standard time by dividing the country into four longitudinal zones of 15° width, each zone carrying time an even hour in advance of the time of the next zone westward. Of all the great business interests of the country the railroads were the most conspicuous in wealth and power,¹ the most insidious in their influence on legislatures, the most vital to the needs of the American public, and the most insistent upon their right to run their business as they pleased. The states had long since taken steps to control the roads within their borders. Beginning with Massachusetts in 1869, thirty of the thirty-eight states had enacted railroad codes by the year 1887, and twenty-five of the states had established railroad commissions. Almost every session of Congress for twenty years had seen resolutions or bills introduced into the House for the regulation of interstate commerce. In March, 1874, the House had passed the McCrary Bill for fixing maximum freight rates, and in December, 1878, the Reagan Bill prohibiting rate discriminations, rebates, and pools. The Senate, however, had done nothing except to listen to a report of the Windom Committee (1874), created in response to President Grant's recommendation for a consideration of "various enterprises for the more certain and cheaper transportation of the constantly increasing western and southwestern products to the Atlantic seaboard." At last, near the close of the Forty-eighth Congress, the House having passed the Reagan Bill by a greatly increased majority, the Senate created a committee of five to take testimony on the subject of the national control of interstate commerce.

Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois was the chairman. As speaker of the Illinois House in 1873 he had appointed the committee which reported the Railroad and Warehouse (Granger) Bill,

¹ Charles Francis Adams wrote of the railroad magnates as early as 1871: "Certain private individuals, responsible to no authority and subject to no supervision, but looking solely to their own interests, . . . yearly levy upon the internal movement of the American people a tax equal to about half the expenses of the United States government—army, navy, civil list, and interest on the public debt included" ("Chapters of Erie," p. 361).

and as governor of Illinois in 1877 he had recommended that the railroad commission be made the "legal arbitrator in all matters of controversy between the railroads and their patrons." He had entered the Senate in 1883 and been put on the Committee on Railroads, which till then had been a "non-working" committee. Early in 1885 he introduced the resolution creating an investigating commission for the railroads; and with his four associates (Miller of New York, Platt of Connecticut, Gorman of Maryland, and Harris of Tennessee) he spent the six months from May to December traveling through the country from Boston to New Orleans and from Omaha to Atlanta, taking testimony from railroad presidents, economists, manufacturers, and farmers, presenting a report of over two thousand pages to the Senate in January, 1886. The Cullom Report contained a mine of information about the conduct of the railroads, whose officials Senator Cullom, in his "Fifty Years of Public Service" (1911), characterized as "in those days the most arrogant set of men in the country, who have since learned that they are the servants and not the masters of the people." But it was not easy to unite the House and the Senate on a measure of railroad control. They wrangled for months before the Senate would accept the anti-pooling clause of the Reagan Bill, on which the House insisted; and when the compromise bill was finally passed, January 14, 1887, by a vote of 37 to 12, with twenty-six absentees, the roll call of the opposition contained the names of many of the most prominent members, including Cameron, Frye, Hawley, Hoar, Morrill, Sherman, Spooner, Evarts, and Morgan. A week later the House passed the bill by a vote of 219 to 41, and on February 4 President Cleveland signed it.

The Interstate Commerce Commission Act contained twenty-four sections, the most important of which provided (1) that special rates, rebates, and drawbacks should henceforth cease; (2) that there should be no discrimination between persons, places and commodities; (3) that more should not be charged for a short haul than for a long haul over the same line in the same direction; (4) that pooling should be made illegal; (5) that

schedules and rates must be open to public inspection; (6) that carriers violating the law should be subject to a fine up to \$5000 for each offense; (7) that a commission of five appointed by the president should have power to supervise the interstate railroads, receiving complaints from shippers, conducting hearings, compelling the production of papers, invoking the aid of the Federal courts for prosecuting offenders, requiring annual reports from the carriers, and prescribing a uniform system of railroad accounting. The President appointed an excellent commission with Judge Thomas M. Cooley of Michigan as chairman; but the results of the act, like those of all pieces of pioneer legislation on subjects of great importance, were disappointing.¹ The commission was overwhelmed with a mass of detail in examining the railroad schedules, which at one time were coming in at the rate of five hundred a day. It was dependent for any action against the companies upon the decisions of the courts, which often refused to accept its findings on the injustice of rates, and sometimes annulled the provisions of the act.² The railroads evaded the anti-pooling provision by the formation of "traffic associations" and "gentlemen's agreements." Rebating continued, and witnesses often refused with impunity to obey the summons of the commission. The commission itself, a decade after its establishment, declared the situation "intolerable both from the standpoint of the public and the commission." Justice Harlan in dissenting from the Alabama Midland decision called the commission "a useless body for all practical purposes."

Nevertheless the commission was not a useless body, nor was the Interstate Commerce Act a futile piece of legislation. If the Pendleton Act was "the Magna Carta of civil-service

¹ "In undertaking the regulation of interstate commerce," said the Cullom Report (p. 214), "Congress is entering upon a new and untried field. Its legislation must be based upon theory instead of experience, and human wisdom is incapable of accurately forecasting its effects upon the vast and various interests to be affected."

² For example, in the Alabama Midland case of 1897, the Supreme Court set aside the long-haul and short-haul clause where railroad traffic came into competition with water-borne traffic.

reform," the Cullom Act was the Magna Carta of the reform of unchecked individualism and *laissez faire* in the conduct of big business. It formed the basis to which, as the country grew more accustomed to governmental interference in social and economic questions,¹ amendments and corroborations were added by the Elkins Act of 1903, the Hepburn Act of 1906, the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, and the Esch-Cummins Act of 1920. "By its passage," says Louis M. Hacker, "the United States entered upon a career of social legislation whose ramifications were eventually to reach into every field of private endeavor. The statute books were soon to hold the Sherman Act of 1890, the Employers' Liability Act of 1906, the Cotton Futures Act of 1914 and 1915, the Clayton Act of 1914, the Adamson Act of 1916, the Child Labor Act of 1916, and the Federal Child Labor Tax of 1919. It was in 1887 that this movement towards social control may be said to have begun. The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act indicated that the twilight of individualism in the United States had set in."

President Cleveland had nothing to do with the act except to sign it (somewhat hesitatingly) and to appoint the commission under its terms. It was quite typical of his failure to "touch elbows with Congress," as John Sherman put it, that practically all the measures of his term—the repeal of the Tenure-of-Office Act, the Electoral Count Act, the Presidential Succession Act, the Dawes Act, the Cullom Act—were measures of the Republican Senate. If Cleveland's renomination had depended on the sentiment of Congress or of prominent Democratic politicians like Hill and Gorman, he would have been dropped by his party, as Hayes and Arthur had been; but he had commended himself to the voters of the country by his sturdy independence and unflinching courage, and he was renominated at St. Louis in June, 1888, by acclamation—an honor which had fallen to no Democratic president since Andrew Jackson. It was Cleveland's courage, too, that made the issue of the campaign of 1888. He

¹ Senator Cullom, in his "Fifty Years of Public Service" (p. 327), says, "Considering the abuses that existed, the Act of 1887 was conservative, but in Congress and among the people generally it was considered radical."

had been implored by his Independent supporters, Schurz, Curtis, E. L. Godkin, not to send in his drastic tariff message of 1887 on the eve of a presidential year; but with characteristic disregard of the effect upon his own fortunes of acts which he deemed righteous in themselves, he had replied, "It is more important to the country that this message should be delivered to Congress and the people than that I should be elected President." The Republicans seized upon the message with glee, declaring that it was a free-trade document which boded ruin to our industrial system, although Cleveland had made it clear enough to those who were not determined to misinterpret him that he was not for free trade, but for a revenue tariff.¹ The *New York Tribune* falsely asserted that Cleveland had "raised the issue of free trade boldly and distinctly." The *Philadelphia Press* gave him "a thousand thanks for the manly and unequivocal avowal of his free-trade purposes." James G. Blaine, who was traveling for his health in Europe, sent a long cable dispatch to the *New York Tribune* the day after the message was read, lauding our protective tariff as the bulwark of American prosperity against the degrading competition of the pauper labor of the Old World. "You have given us our platform for next year," wrote the enthusiastic John Hay to Blaine. But it was really Cleveland who deserved that acknowledgment.

Blaine could easily have had the nomination from the Repub-

¹In his first message to Congress, Cleveland wrote, "The question of free trade is not involved, nor is there any occasion for the general discussion of the wisdom or expediency of a protective system." In his second message he said, even more explicitly, "It has been the policy of the government to collect the principal part of its revenue by a tax on imports, and no change in this policy is desirable." And the crucial paragraph of his famous third message reads: "Our progress towards a wise conclusion will not be improved by dwelling upon the theories of protection and free trade. This savors too much of bandying epithets. It is a condition which confronts us, not a theory. Relief from this condition may involve a slight reduction of the advantages which we award our home production, but the entire withdrawal of such advantages should not be contemplated. The question of free trade is absolutely irrelevant, and the persistent claim made in certain quarters that all the efforts to relieve the people from unjust and unnecessary taxation are schemes of so-called free traders is mischievous and far removed from any consideration of the public good."

lican convention which met at Chicago on June 19, 1888, but he wrote from Florence and again from Paris declining to allow his name to be used. Of the thirteen other "favorite sons" who contested the nomination—including Sherman of Ohio, Harrison of Indiana, Gresham of Illinois, Depew of New York, Alger of Michigan, and Allison of Iowa—Sherman led on the first ballot with more than double the number of votes (229) of his nearest rival, Gresham (110). Sherman was loyally supported by his Ohio backers (Governor Foraker, Marcus A. Hanna, and William McKinley), but he lacked the support of the pivotal states of New York and Indiana. His vote never rose above 249. At the close of the week a cable was sent to Blaine, who was visiting Andrew Carnegie in Scotland, urging him to reconsider his refusal, but the message came back: "Too late, Blaine immovable. Take Harrison and Phelps.—Carnegie." The convention immediately nominated Harrison, and gave the second place not to Phelps but to Levi P. Morton of New York, ex-minister to France. The Republican platform, drawn up under the chairmanship of McKinley, declared unequivocally for protection: "We favor the entire repeal of the internal-revenue taxes rather than the surrender of any part of the protective system."

There were two labor parties in the field. The old Greenbackers had disappeared as a political factor of importance after the Greenback-Labor campaign of Benjamin Butler in 1884; but the remnants of them, together with the Grangers, the Anti-Monopolists, the Corn-Planters, the Agricultural Wheel, the Knights of Labor, and the Single-Taxers,¹ continued to form the United Labor party, while a stronger Union Labor

¹ The single tax was an economic theory advocated by Henry George, an editor of the San Francisco *Times*, in a book entitled "Progress and Poverty"—perhaps the most widely read American book since "Uncle Tom's Cabin." George's theory was that taxes should be levied on land alone, thus preventing the monopoly of unimproved land held for its advance in value (what John Stuart Mill called "the unearned increment"), and freeing industry from a taxation which was virtually an assessment on labor, since labor, he argued, was the chief factor in the production of wealth, and the laborer's wages came eventually not from capital but from the wealth which he himself created. George ran for mayor of New York in 1886 in a three-cornered contest with Abram S. Hewitt (Demo-

party confined its activities to a less complicated program. They agreed only in their common condemnation of the two great parties as strongholds of monopoly, indifferent at heart, in spite of the pious declarations of their platform, to the interests of the laboring class. The presence of these labor parties in the campaign of 1888 was a witness to the industrial unrest of the middle eighties, which Professor John R. Commons calls the period of "the Great Upheaval." In 1885, according to an article in the *North American Review* by Terence V. Powderly, Grand Master of the Knights of Labor, the army of the unemployed had reached two million men. Strikes of unprecedented extent, if less violent than those of 1877, vexed the country, increasing from 645 in 1885 to 1411 in 1886, affecting 9861 establishments and involving some 500,000 workers. An outstanding example was the strike on the Gould system of railroads in the southwest, conducted by the ruffianly Martin Irons of St. Louis, the district assistant chairman of the Knights of Labor.¹

Moreover, the enormous flood of immigration in the early years of the decade (see page 95, note) had brought to America a new element in the social conflict in the person of the desperate anarchist advocating "direct action" by violence and assassination. Herr Johann Most, a German anarchist driven out of his own country and out of England, came to New York in 1882, singing the praises of the assassins of Czar Alexander II, and was enthusiastically received by a mass meeting at Cooper Union. The next year the social revolutionists and anarchists of Chicago formed the International Working People's Associa-

crat) and Theodore Roosevelt (Republican), polling 68,110 votes to 90,552 for Hewitt and 60,435 for Roosevelt. The size of George's vote was rather a protest against "the shocking contrast between monstrous wealth and debasing want," which was attracting the attention of increasing thousands of Americans, than an indication of confidence in the particular form of relief proposed by the single-taxers. Shortly afterwards (1888) Edward Bellamy published a utopian romance entitled "Looking Backward," which portrayed the happy social and economic condition of the country in the year 2000 under a régime of state socialism.

¹ See the article by Professor F. W. Taussig in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* for January, 1887.

tion, the precursor of the present Industrial Workers of the World (the "I. W. W."). Their membership was largely recruited from the nations of continental Europe, and but one of the eight anarchist newspapers in Chicago was published in the English language.

A terrible example of the propaganda of these anarchists was furnished by the Haymarket riot in Chicago on the evening of May 4, 1886, which grew out of a strike of forty thousand laborers for the eight-hour day. On May 3 the police had used their revolvers in dispersing a crowd assembled to attack the "scab" workers as they emerged from the McCormick Reaper works. The anarchists distributed flyers headed "Revenge! Working men to arms!" They called a meeting at Haymarket Square for the next evening to protest against "the atrocious acts of the police." In the midst of a violent speech by an English anarchist a squad of one hundred and eighty policemen marched to the square, and the captain ordered the meeting to disperse. The reply was the explosion of a dynamite bomb thrown into the midst of the squad, killing patrolman Degan instantly and fatally wounding seven others. The police, with magnificent courage, closed their ranks and dispersed the rioters. Eight of the anarchists were tried for the murder of Degan, and seven of them condemned to death. The sentences of two of these were commuted to imprisonment for life. Of the five under death sentence one (Lingg) committed suicide in his cell, and the other four (Engel, Fischer, Spies, and Parsons) were hanged on November 11, 1887, while a crowd of anarchists around the scaffold sang the "Marseillaise." The strikes of 1885 and 1886, capped by the horror at Chicago, weakened the power of the Knights of Labor, who were a numerous but amorphous and ill-managed organization. Their place was taken by the American Federation of Labor, a far more conservative and orderly body, comprised of the organized unions of the more skilled trades.

The severe labor troubles induced President Cleveland to send to Congress (April 22, 1886) a special message on the subject, in which he spoke of the worth of labor, cited the



THE ANARCHIST RIOT IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. A DYNAMITE BOMB EXPLODING AMONG THE POLICE.

provision of the Constitution authorizing the national government to protect the states against domestic violence, and recommended a commission of three members to serve as a tribunal in labor disputes. Congress did not act on the matter, but several of the states (Massachusetts, New York, Iowa, Kansas) created labor boards in 1886 and 1887.

The campaign of 1888 was waged almost entirely on the tariff issue. The disgusting personal abuse of the candidates, which had disgraced the campaign of 1884, was absent. Cleveland's administration, futile as it had been from the point of view of the accomplishment of his program, had at least proved that the presence of a Democrat in the White House did not mean the rule of the Confederate brigadier general, the ruin of the country's industries, or the wreck of the national government. The Pendleton Act having stopped the flow of campaign funds from officeholders, recourse was had to the great corporations, whose liberal contributions to the party of avowed high-tariff principles were an offset to the natural advantage which the party in power possesses in the conduct of a presidential campaign. The manufacturers who had amassed fortunes under the protective tariff were, to use the expression of a Pennsylvania politician, "put under the fire to have the fat fried out of them." The Republicans also succeeded to a remarkable degree in making the tariff a patriotic issue. Helped by Blaine's cable from Paris and the persistent misrepresentation of Cleveland as a free trader, they revived Clay's doctrine of the tariff as a part of an "American system" and branded Cleveland as the "British candidate."¹ The Republicans concentrated their

¹ This contention was fortified by a clever trick played toward the end of the campaign. A certain Mr. Osgoodby of Pomona, California, wrote a letter to the British minister at Washington, Lord Sackville-West, representing himself as "Mr. Murchison," a naturalized Englishman, who was in doubt as to whether he should vote for Cleveland or for Harrison. The extraordinarily stupid minister fell into the trap, and replied in favor of Cleveland. The Republicans printed the Sackville-West letter as a campaign document and won thousands of votes by it, especially among the Irish. Secretary Bayard handed the British minister his passports for this breach of diplomatic conduct, but it was too late to repair the damage done.

efforts on the two doubtful states of Indiana and New York (which had both gone for Cleveland in 1884) and, by a liberal use of money in the former state and a combination of political circumstances in the latter,¹ were successful in carrying both. Besides the solid South, Cleveland carried only Connecticut and New Jersey. The electoral vote was 233 for Harrison to 168 for Cleveland.

General W. A. Bragg, in nominating Cleveland at the convention of 1884, had said, "We love him for the enemies he has made." Cleveland had continued to make enemies of the politicians. But the approval of his rugged honesty and indomitable courage by the rank and file of the people was shown by a popular plurality of more than 100,000 votes over Harrison in the election of 1888. Grover Cleveland was still the choice of the American voters when he left the White House to practice law in New York City.

THE REPUBLICAN LEGISLATION OF 1890

On Monday, December 2, 1889, for the first time in fifteen years, a Congress assembled which had in both Houses a clear majority in support of the administration. The majority was slim, to be sure (47 Republicans and 37 Democrats in the Senate; 166 Republicans and 159 Democrats in the House), but it assured the Republicans the Speakership of the House and the chairmanship and majority representation in the committees. It meant also a break in the deadlock which had paralyzed

¹ Governor Hill of New York was not friendly to Cleveland. As Hill carried the state in 1888 against his Republican opponent for the governorship, Senator Miller, by a majority of 18,481, while Cleveland lost the state to his Republican opponent for the presidency by a majority of 12,096, the cry was raised that by a "corrupt bargain" votes for the Harrison electors had been exchanged for gubernatorial votes for Hill. Banners inscribed "Harrison and Hill" were actually displayed in the streets of New York. But Cleveland himself in 1906 exonerated Hill from the charge of treachery to the national ticket. It is almost certain that the defeat of Miller was due to the liquor interests in the state. Hill had won the support of these interests by vetoing the high-license Crosby bill. The influence of the large manufacturers of New York was also cast against Cleveland on account of his tariff policy.

legislation since the close of the Grant administration. More laws were enacted in the first session of the Fifty-first Congress (1889-1890) than in any other Congress since the Civil War. This was not due to any conspicuous gift of leadership in the White House. Benjamin Harrison was the type of president by whom the phrase "the Chief Executive" is taken very literally. His duty as he saw it was to carry out the legislation of Congress, and not to urge action upon that body (beyond the mild formalities of the annual message on the state of the Union). He heeded the counsel which John Sherman had given him in a letter written shortly after the election: "The President should touch elbows with Congress. He should have no policy distinct from that of his party. And this is better represented in Congress than in the Executive."

Even had President Harrison been prompted by political principle to assume an aggressive leadership, he would have been thwarted by certain personal characteristics. For with all his splendid equipment for public service—legal eminence, intense patriotism, clear vision, unflagging industry, unblemished reputation—he totally lacked that power of personal appeal which conciliates opposition and kindles support into the ardor of devotion. He was dignified to the point of frigidity. His cold steel-gray eyes never lighted with humor or softened with sympathy in official intercourse. It was said that he could address an audience of ten thousand men in a stirring speech and send them all away his friends; but if the same ten thousand met him in private, they would go away every man his enemy. One could no more write the history of the administration of a Cleveland, a Roosevelt, or a Wilson without placing these men in the center of the stage than one could write a tragedy of *Hamlet* with the Prince of Denmark left out; yet one can tell the story of the years 1889-1893 with scarcely more than the incidental mention of the name of President Harrison. Blaine in the Cabinet, Sherman in the Senate, Reed and McKinley in the House, were cast for the conspicuous rôles.

The two last-mentioned men had entered Congress together in the autumn of 1877, Thomas B. Reed representing the

first (Portland) district of Maine, and William McKinley the eighteenth district of Ohio. In their twelve consecutive years of service in the House they had both gained great distinction—Reed as a skillful debater of infinite wit and resource, and McKinley as the leading authority on the tariff. They were rivals in the Republican caucus for the Speakership of the Fifty-first Congress, and Reed won the honor by a single vote.¹ He appointed McKinley chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, which carried with it leadership on the floor of the House.

Speaker Reed had a difficult problem to handle soon after the House was organized. There were several disputed seats to be decided. The House could do no business without a quorum, which was, in 1889, 165 members, or one less than the total Republican representation. Therefore, in order to prevent the seating of the Republican contestants, the Democrats, taking advantage of a long-established custom, prevented a quorum by refusing to answer the roll call. Technically there were but 163 members in the House, although there were actually visible nearly 300 in their seats. Reed ordered the clerk to record the names of a number of Democrats as "present but not voting," and instantly there was an uproar. Some Democrats disappeared into the lobbies; some surged up the aisle to the Speaker's desk with menacing cries and gestures. While the Democrats raged, pounding their desks and shouting imprecations at the Speaker, the Republicans added to the din by cheers and Homeric laughter. Through it all Reed sat imperturbable. He was a massive man, slow of movement and speech but not of wit. His ready repartees and caustic sallies were the delight of the House—except for the member on whom the bolt fell. Reed had made up his mind that the parliamentary obstruction which had characterized the House for a decade must cease.

¹ From 1885 to the close of the century Reed was uninterruptedly his party's nominee for the Speakership. He served in that capacity during the four Congresses when the Republicans were in the majority; and when the Democrats had control of the House (1885-1889, 1891-1895), he was the minority leader on the floor.

The business of the Republican majority must be carried on. "Of what use was an election," he said, "if, after all, nothing could be done without the sanction of the beaten party." He not only continued day after day, in spite of cries of "Tyrant" and "Czar," to count the necessary quorum (even if he had to find members in the barber's shop), but he also refused to entertain motions whose obvious purpose was the delay of business. His rulings were undoubtedly arbitrary, contrary to precedent, and even in conflict with his own recorded practice.¹ He fully realized that he was introducing a radical innovation into a body of men governed by prescription and jealous of precedent. He had decided, his biographer tells us, that in case he was not supported by his Republican colleagues he would resign from public life. But his colleagues did support him. On February 14, 1890, the House adopted two rules embodying Speaker Reed's principles: the first, that actual attendance and not refusal to respond to the roll call should be the basis on which a quorum was to be determined;¹ the second, that no dilatory motions should be entertained by the Speaker.

The Reed rules were of fundamental importance. They worked a revolution in our parliamentary law. Without them the legislation which we are to study in this section could not have been accomplished. The Fifty-first Congress would have been, like its immediate predecessors, a scene of filibuster, confusion, and deadlock. The House would have continued to be what Reed himself called "the most unwieldy parliamentary body in the world," where "three resolute men could stop all public business." The new rules were undoubtedly prompted by a partisan motive. Reed himself said, "The best system is

¹ On June 28, 1880, in defending the same obstructionist policy which he killed a decade later, Reed had said in the House, "It is not the visible presence of members but their judgment and votes that the Constitution calls for." He had declared that it had been the privilege of every minority since the foundation of the government to delay legislation in order to "call attention of the country to measures which a party in a moment of madness and of party feeling is endeavoring to force." But the Democrats were in control of the House in 1880!

² This famous rule was upheld two years later by a decision of the Supreme Court.

to have one party govern and the other party watch, and on general principles I think it would be better for us to govern and the Democrats to watch." The Democrats did not have to "watch" long. In the election of 1890 they regained control of the House by a majority of nearly three to one, and remained in power for four years. They showed their appreciation of the Reed rules by adopting them in the spring of 1894. Since then neither party has suggested going back to the old system.

Next to his reform of the procedure of the House, Reed's most significant act was the appointment of his rival for the Speakership, William McKinley, as chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. McKinley was of Scotch-Irish descent. His ancestors coming to this country in 1743 had passed through Pennsylvania to Ohio, where his grandfather and father had built up a prosperous iron business. William junior, the seventh of nine children, was born in Niles, Ohio, on January 29, 1843. At the age of eighteen he enlisted in the famous 23d regiment of Ohio volunteers, of which W. S. Rosecrans was colonel, and Rutherford B. Hayes major. He served with distinction through the war, and emerged as a brevet major at the age of twenty-two. Engaging in the practice of law at Canton, he became more and more interested in politics, and entered Congress the same year that his old commander was inaugurated president (1877). In the House he followed Hayes's advice to devote himself to the study of the tariff; and when James A. Garfield resigned from Congress on his election to the presidency in 1880, McKinley became the acknowledged leader of the protectionist group. With him high protection was neither an abstract economic theory nor a government favor bestowed upon the manufacturers at the expense of the consumers. It was a sacred institution, the true "American system." "I believe in it," he said, "and thus warmly advocate it, because enveloped in it are my country's highest development and greatest prosperity; and out of it come the greatest gains to the people, the greatest comforts to the masses, the widest encouragement for manly aspirations, with the largest rewards, dignifying and elevating our citizenship upon which the safety and purity and

permanence of our political system depend." The protective system was not a "Chinese wall" shutting us off from the benefits of foreign trade (which was trifling anyway in comparison with our domestic commerce) but a dike safeguarding us from the inundation of low wages, cheap prices, and debased standards of living. "It is our duty," said McKinley, "to protect as sacredly the labor and industry of the United States as we would protect her honor from taint or her territory from invasion." For many high protectionists the tariff was a matter of politics or profits; for McKinley it was a function of patriotism.

In so far as an American election, with its complexity of issues, can be a mandate for any particular piece of legislation, the Republican victory of 1888 justified the new administration in fixing the protective system upon the country. President Harrison, in his first annual message, recommended a "revision of our tariff law both in its administrative features and in the schedules." He recognized that the adjustment of the tariff was "a matter of great delicacy because of its direct effect upon the business of the country," but he believed that any temporary ill effects would be reduced to the minimum by prompt action. The protective principle, he contended, should be maintained and "fairly applied to the products of our farms as well as of our shops." In condemnation of Cleveland's method of approach to the subject, Harrison declared that the effect of the duties was not to be judged by "fixing our eyes on the public Treasury alone." "They have a direct relation to home production, to work, to wages, and to the commercial independence of our country; and the wise and patriotic legislator should enlarge the field of his vision to include all of these." The committee to which the formulation of a tariff measure embodying these recommendations was intrusted was a particularly strong one. Besides the chairman, who later became president of the United States, it contained five men who were promoted to the United States Senate, four who became governors of their states, one who was later Speaker of the House and Secretary of the Treasury, and one who was later Attorney-General and a member of the Supreme Court. Among the members also were Nelson

Dingley, Jr., of Maine and Sereno E. Payne of New York, who were to succeed to the chairmanship of the committee and give their names to the tariff bills of 1897 and 1909 respectively.

A fortnight after the President's message was read the committee responded to the first of his recommendations by reporting a Customs Administration Bill, the object of which was to eliminate fraud in the declaration and the collection of duties. It created a board of general appraisers who had authority to decide questions of the proper classification and valuation of imports. It not only saved the government millions of dollars annually, but it also protected the honest importer against his unscrupulous rival who had made huge profits by ingenious devices of fraudulent appraisement of invoices. The Customs Administration Act proved so beneficial that, with certain important amendments made by the Underwood Act of 1913, it has remained on our statute books ever since.

The second part of the President's recommendation—namely, the revision of the schedules—was a more laborious matter. The committee spent four months in hearing the testimony of manufacturers, merchants, farmers, wool-raisers, miners, shippers, low-tariff men and high-tariff men, before it reported to the House (April 16, 1890) a bill which was frankly protective. Duties sufficient "to cover the difference between the normal cost of production here, including labor, and the cost of like productions in the countries which seek our markets" were to be levied on imports competing with the products of our factories and farms. Necessary articles not competing with American products, such as tea, coffee, sugar, spices, drugs, were to be admitted free or with normal duties. The adjustment of rates was to be made not to favor some American industries at the expense of others, but to protect them all against foreign competition. The bill, as McKinley boasted, was "protective in every paragraph and American in every line and word." As for its effects on the Treasury, it was estimated that it would reduce the revenue (and hence the embarrassing surplus) by

some \$70,000,000, the remission of the duty on sugar alone cutting off \$56,000,000 of income.¹ The higher rates would also tend to discourage the importation of many articles which, under the old scale of duties, had brought in large receipts. The McKinley bill passed the House, May 21, by a vote of 164 (all Republicans) to 142 (all Democrats except two), but in the Senate it met with a delay of nearly four months.

The cause of this delay was not any hostility of the Republican majority of the Senate to the principle of protection, or (with one exception to be noted presently) to the terms of the bill itself, but was curiously connected with other legislation which we must now consider. Just before the Harrison administration was installed, Congress had passed an enabling act, looking toward the admission of the territories of North and South Dakota, Montana, and Washington as states of the Union.² The new states came in in time to send their senators and representatives to the Fifty-first Congress, and, with the exception of Montana, they sent a solid Republican delegation to the Senate. The new Republican senators, however, were very little interested in the tariff and very much interested in free silver. They were strong enough, in combination with the Democrats and the other free-silver Republicans from the West, to defeat the tariff bill unless "something were done for silver." The Secretary of the Treasury, William Windom of Minnesota, was friendly to silver, and at the beginning of the Harrison administration had proposed the plan of issuing

¹ Sugar was to be placed on the free list six months after the act went into effect, as a necessary article which was virtually noncompetitive. Nevertheless, to preserve the protective principle intact, a bounty equal to the former duty (2 cents a pound) was given to the producers of beet and cane sugar in the United States. The payment of this bounty would, it was estimated, relieve the Treasury of \$7,000,000 more.

² The Democrats had tried to prevent the entrance of these Republican states on the eve of a presidential election, though the population of South Dakota (328,000) was larger than that of any of the original thirteen states except Virginia, and the population of Washington (349,000) exceeded that of nine states of the Union. The Democratic proposition was to admit the Dakotas as a single state, with New Mexico to balance it.

Treasury certificates against silver bullion purchased in limited amounts, because, as he said, "the overwhelming preponderance of public sentiment demands that both gold and silver be utilized as currency." The President himself declared in his first annual message that he was "an advocate of the use of silver." "We are large producers of that metal," he said, "and should not discredit it." At the same time he confessed that he had been able "to give only a hasty examination" to the plan of his Secretary of the Treasury, "owing to the pressure of other matters." Without guidance from the executive the Senate wrestled with the problem of how to do something for silver without doing too much. For it soon developed that the "something" which the senators wanted done for silver was nothing less than the free and unlimited coinage of that metal at the ratio of 16 to 1. An amendment to that effect by Senator Plumb of Kansas was carried on June 17 by a vote of 43 to 24. It took the heroic efforts of Speaker Reed, applying his newly adopted rules, to defeat the proposition in the House by the narrow margin of 135 to 152. Free silver loomed on the horizon, and the tariff bill was in jeopardy. In order to defeat the first and rescue the second, and to prevent a split in the Republican majority, the Senate made a dicker with the free silverites. John Sherman proposed a bill which pledged the government to purchase 4,500,000 ounces of silver a month (practically the whole output of the country) at the market price, and to issue Treasury certificates, redeemable in gold or silver, against the bullion. Sherman himself did not believe in the policy. "I took little part in framing the legislation," he said, "until the bill got into conference. I voted for it, but the day it became law I was ready to repeal it, if repeal could be had without substituting in its place absolute free coinage." He was afraid that President Harrison would docilely sign a free-silver bill (following his own advice about the duty of the executive) if it passed both Houses of Congress. Others were afraid that if the President should veto such a bill, the party would be split and lose its chance of passing other legislation. The Republicans had committed themselves too heartily to the use of silver—largely in

the partisan opposition to Cleveland's determined stand against it—to dare to take the courageous course. There was little chance that Harrison would have signed a free-silver bill, and there was not a two-thirds silver vote in either branch of Congress to pass such a bill over his veto. The craven compromise brought only distress to the country, as we shall see later. The Sherman Silver Act was passed, July 14, 1890, and did its expected part in hastening the progress of the tariff bill through the Senate.

Another concession which the Republican senators made in order to get a vote on the McKinley bill was the abandonment of the plan to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Southern states. Ever since the return of home rule in those states the whites had kept the negroes from the polls by "persuasion," intimidation, and, if necessary, by actual force. Unwilling to stir the embers of sectional hatred and to injure the business connections which the renascent industry of the South was beginning to make profitable, the Northerners were generally becoming reconciled to allowing the South to manage its own politico-racial problem. But when the Democrats won the presidential election of 1884, and the South, in consequence, received its first full allotment of Federal patronage, the Republicans began to attack the foundations on which the "solid South" was built. A number of events in Cleveland's administration, such as the veto of the dependent pension bill, the rebel-flag order, and a speech of Jefferson Davis at Montgomery, Alabama, in April, 1886, extolling the cause for which the South fought as "one of the holiest that had ever inspired man," tended to revive the sectional animus. The Democrats had twenty-four seats in Congress and a corresponding number of votes in the electoral college (based upon the six million colored people of the South) which they would have to surrender if, in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment, the representation of any state was reduced in the proportion which the number of male citizens over twenty-one years of age who were deprived of the suffrage bore to the total population of the state. And if the Fifteenth Amendment was observed, and the negroes

were allowed to vote, the Republicans would certainly carry more than thirteen congressional districts (1890) in the eleven states of the old Confederacy.¹ "Is the white man of the South alone among mortals to have his cake and eat it too?" asked Thomas B. Reed. In the congressional election of 1886 Georgia cast 27,553 votes for ten representatives, and Oregon cast 54,954 for one representative. In 1888 Kansas and South Carolina elected the same number of representatives, but South Carolina cast only one third as many votes as Kansas.² "What are you going to do about it?" John Sherman was asked. "I do not exactly know how we are going to do it," he answered, "but with the help of God we are going to arrange that the vote of the man who followed Lee shall no longer have in national affairs three times the power of the vote of the man who followed Grant."

The capture of the presidency and both Houses of Congress in the election of 1888 gave the Republicans their opportunity. Harrison in his inaugural address expressed his gratification at the "renewed interest that is now being manifested in the reform of our electoral laws"; and in his message of the following December he wrote: "I earnestly invoke the attention of Congress to such measures as will secure to all our people a free exercise of the right of suffrage and every other civil right under the Constitution and laws of the United States. . . . The

¹ In his address as the chairman of the Ohio state convention in April, 1880, McKinley showed the thoroughness with which the disfranchisement of the negro had been accomplished in the South. In four districts of Mississippi, for example, the Republican vote of 60,000 in 1872 had dwindled to 3000 in 1878; in a single district of Georgia the Republican vote of 9616 in 1872 had been reduced to 6 in 1878. "Nobody has the temerity to assert," he continued, "that there has been any decrease of the Republican population to account for this change. No depopulation, no plague or pestilence has swept them from the face of the country. But oppressed, bullied, and terrorized, they stand mute and dumb in the exercise of citizenship, politically paralyzed."

² This discrepancy was not wholly due, as the Republicans asserted, to the suppression of the negro vote. As practically every white man in the South was a Democrat, there was no contest at the polls, and hence no incentive to bring out a full vote. Many thousand whites must have stayed away from the polls in South Carolina to bring the vote of that state down to one third of the vote of Kansas,


power to take the whole direction and control of the election of the members to the House of Representatives is clearly given to the general Government." In June, 1890, a Federal Election Bill was introduced into the House providing that on the petition of five hundred voters in any local district, a bipartisan board of Federal supervisors should be appointed, with the right to inspect and verify the votes cast in Federal elections, to decide challenges, and at their discretion deposit in the boxes ballots rejected by the local officials. Theoretically the bill was nation-wide in its application, but everybody knew that it was aimed at the South. Indeed, Henry Cabot Lodge, who championed the bill in the House, confessed as much when he said: "We have clothed the negroes with the attributes of American citizenship, we have put in their hands the emblems of American sovereignty. Whether wisely or unwisely done it is of no consequence now. . . . The Government which made the black man a citizen of the United States is bound to protect him in his rights." Though the report of the bill had been recommended to the House by a majority of only one vote in the Republican caucus, it was put through by the aid of the Reed rules (July 2) by the narrow margin of 155 to 149, twenty-four members refusing to vote. By its opponents it was promptly dubbed the Force Bill, recalling the drastic legislation of the Grant administration to enforce the reconstruction acts, and it aroused the Southerners to instant protest. They declared that the white man should rule, Federal supervisors or none. There were threats of boycotting Northern manufacturers and merchants if the bill should become a law.

In the Senate, where the practice of unlimited debate prevailed, the opponents of the Federal Election Bill determined to block any tariff legislation as long as the threat of this measure hung over them. By combining with the silver Republicans, they could make a complicated three-cornered fight on the issues of tariff, silver, and elections. It looked like a complete deadlock until the Pennsylvania senators, Matthew Quay and Don Cameron, who believed that the evils of commercial boycott and sectional ill will following the act would far outweigh

any political gains to the Republican party, led the way to a compromise. On August 12 Quay proposed that the discussion of the Federal Election Bill should be postponed till the ensuing session of Congress, and that the vote on the tariff bill should be taken not later than September 1. Though no formal vote on the Quay resolution was taken, the Senate, yielding to the rising tide of sentiment against reopening the "Southern question," agreed tacitly to sidetrack the Federal Election Bill.¹ The compromise was a bitter disappointment to men like Sherman, Hoar, and Edmunds, who had long been waiting for the opportunity for a Republican Congress to restore the party's influence in the South. "It will probably give us a tariff bill," wrote Senator Platt of the compromise, "but acquired at what a sacrifice!"

A third cause for the delay of the tariff legislation in the Senate was dissatisfaction with the terms of the McKinley bill itself. As the acknowledged leader of the party, the man whom the Republican convention at Chicago had been ready to nominate in 1888, had he consented, and whose message from Scotland had recommended Harrison for the honor, James G. Blaine was the inevitable selection of the new president for the Secretaryship of State. It will be recalled that Blaine, during his former brief tenure of that office under Garfield, had endeavored to convene a Pan-American Congress to improve the political and economic relations of the United States with the countries of Latin America (p. 151). The project came to fulfillment in October, 1889. Delegates from nineteen Latin-

¹ It turned out that the bill had not been "postponed till the ensuing session of Congress," but killed. When Congress reassembled in December, with the McKinley bill safely passed, President Harrison warmly urged the renewal of the fight for the supervision of Federal elections; but eight silver Republicans, in return for support for a free-silver resolution which passed the Senate a few days later, joined with the Democrats in a successful vote to remove the Federal Election Bill from its place on the calendar. Thus ended the futile attempt of twenty years to enforce a policy which ran counter to the convictions of a large section of the country. When in 1897 the Republicans again came into control of all the branches of the government, there was no effort made, in spite of a few voices raised here and there, to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.



BENJAMIN HARRISON

American countries came together at Washington and discussed questions of weights and measures, currency, arbitration, and trade agreements. Blaine saw in the tariff a wonderful opportunity of improving our relations with these countries. Nearly 90 per cent of their exports to the United States came in on the free list, but their market for our lumber, beef, salt, iron, shoes, machinery, and textiles was very small. The annual foreign trade of the Latin-American countries amounted to \$600,000,000, of which we enjoyed but 8 per cent in 1885. Blaine was convinced that we could have a large part of their trade if we adopted the policy of "reciprocity"; that is, of admitting the products of these countries to the United States without duty in return for a free market for our goods. He was an advocate of protection, but he would have the duty on raw sugar maintained as a sort of lever to pry open the markets of Latin-America. This policy ran counter to the principle of the McKinley bill, which, as we have seen, subordinated the interests of foreign trade to those of domestic manufacture and made noncompetition with American industries the test in compiling the free list.

It was an extraordinary thing for a cabinet officer to interfere directly with the debates of Congress, but Blaine was a man of extraordinary prestige and energy. The number of messages which Harrison sent to Congress beginning with the phrase, "I transmit herewith a communication of the Secretary of State," testify to the influence of Blaine in the administration. On April 10, 1890, he wrote to McKinley condemning the tariff bill for its blindness to our interest in the Latin-American trade, and declaring that the kind of protection which it advocated would "protect the party into speedy retirement." Unable to deter the House from passing the bill in its original form, he carried the fight to the Senate. He got President Harrison to submit his recommendation of the reciprocity policy in a message of June 19; he wrote strong letters of protest to his intimate friend, Senator Frye of Maine, a member of the finance committee; he went before the committee himself with an impassioned speech, in which he said, "Pass this bill and in 1892 there will not be a man in all the party so beggared as to accept

your nomination for the presidency." Blaine's challenge caused weeks of debate in the Senate. Reciprocity was only free trade in disguise, his opponents contended. It was the entering wedge that would destroy the protective system. It was impracticable, full of pitfalls and dangers, a surrender of our control of American industries to the mercy of foreign ministers of commerce.¹ In the end, however, Blaine virtually won his point. An amendment to the McKinley bill was adopted by the Senate and accepted by the House, authorizing the president to impose duties on sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides upon countries which levied "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" duties upon the products of the United States. Blaine was jubilant over his victory. Under his direction J. W. Foster of the State Department negotiated reciprocity agreements with Brazil, Santo Domingo, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, Honduras, Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, the British West Indies, the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Porto Rico, and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. President Harrison wrote in his last annual message (December 6, 1892): "If this policy and these trade arrangements can be continued in force and aided by the establishment of American steamship lines, I do not doubt that we shall within a short period secure fully one third of the total trade of Central and South America." But neither of the conditions mentioned by the president was fulfilled. The triumph of the Democratic party in 1892 brought the repeal of the reciprocity provision and, with it, of all the treaties or agreements concluded thereunder; and in spite of the heroic efforts of Senator Frye, Congress refused to encourage American shipping by a subsidy.²

It was well into September before the amended McKinley bill passed the Senate, and the first of October—only thirty-five days before the mid-term elections—when it came through the

¹ For an able statement of the dangers of the reciprocity experiment from the point of view of a confirmed protectionist, see the long letter of Senator O. H. Platt of Connecticut quoted in L. A. Coolidge's "An Old-fashioned Senator," pp. 235-237, note.

² For an account of the undoing of reciprocity see J. W. Foster's "Diplomatic Memoirs," Vol. II, chap. xxv.

conference stage and was signed by the President. Thirty-five days was far too short a time to show the effects of the bill upon the business of the country, but ample time for the prophets of disaster to explain what those effects must be. It was the first high tariff, at least since the days of John Quincy Adams, based upon the protective principle solely and not dictated by the need of the Treasury for increased revenue or by the necessity of compensating for high internal taxes. It was also the first tariff whose rates came home directly to every family in the country. Food and clothing, carpets and blankets, farming implements and kitchen utensils, were all on the taxed list. Only the producer seemed to have been considered; the consumer was ignored. The charge was freely made that the bill had been framed to reimburse the great manufacturing interests for their contribution to the Republican campaign fund of 1888. Prices rose sharply; and the middleman justified the increase by the plea that the producer would also raise prices to the limit allowed him by the protective duties. There was, the Republicans claimed, a conspiracy to nurse a "buyers' panic" before the election. Democratic emissaries were sent into the country regions to sell pots and pans at exorbitant prices in order to frighten the people into the belief that the cost of living was to become prohibitive.

As a matter of fact the test of a year's experience of the McKinley bill showed none of the dire results predicted by the Democrats. "Rarely, if ever before in the history of the country," said Harrison in his message of December 9, 1891, "has there been a time when the proceeds of one day's labor or the product of one farmed acre would purchase so large an amount of those things that enter into the living of the masses of the people." Our foreign trade for the year was the largest in our history up to that time, amounting to \$1,747,806,406. Our imports, so far from being discouraged by the high rates, increased by more than \$11,000,000 in the same twelve months. In spite of the fact that \$118,000,000 more of imports were admitted free of duty than in the preceding year, the receipts of the Treasury fell off only \$5,400,000. Our exports increased \$63,000,000

(from \$860,000,000 to \$923,000,000), which was nearly three times the average annual increase for the past twenty years. "There is certainly nothing in the condition of trade, foreign or domestic," said the President in the message referred to, "there is certainly nothing in the condition of our people of any class, to suggest that the existing tariff and revenue legislation bears oppressively on the people or retards the commercial development of the nation."

Nevertheless the October campaign of apprehension did its work. The election of November 6 brought one of those complete reversals of power that are known as "landslides." The Democrats returned 235 members to the House, and the Republicans but 88. Only three Republicans were elected in the 121 congressional districts of the South. The Middle West showed a complete about-face. Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska had sent 44 Republicans and 18 Democrats to the Fifty-first Congress; to the Fifty-second they sent 44 Democrats and 15 Republicans. McKinley himself, after seven consecutive terms in the House, failed of reelection in his Ohio district, though it must be said that his defeat was due rather to a "gerrymander" of the district than to any personal weakness in the candidate. In an interview given to the New York *Sun* about a month after the landslide, Speaker Reed said: "I am inclined to believe that the most important factor in the result of this election was the women of the country. It is the women who do the shopping, who keep the run of prices, who have the keenest sense for increased cost. They heard in every store the clerks behind the counter explain how this article or that would not be sold hereafter at the former price because of the McKinley bill; then they went home and told their husbands, and their stories had a tremendous effect at the ballot boxes."¹

Not that the McKinley bill, immediate as its influence was,

¹ McKinley laid the defeat to a conspiracy of fraud against the bill. "The trick has worked this time," he wrote in the *Canton Repository* of November 8; "the conspiracy has triumphed. But the people who have been duped will not forget. Nor will the friends of protection lower their flag or raise the British flag"[!]

is to be charged with the whole responsibility for the Republican overthrow of 1890. The high-handed conduct of "Czar" Reed was resented as a dangerous attack on constitutional privilege. The attempt to control Federal elections in the South was denounced by the *Springfield Republican* as "a bill to promote sectional strife." The compromise on silver, like most political bargains, satisfied neither side: for the sound-money men it was a weak surrender, and for the free silverites a poor makeshift. The reformers found little comfort in the administration. Harrison had paid lip service to the doctrine of civil-service reform in his inaugural address, but his assurance that "honorable party service" would certainly not be esteemed by him as a "disqualification for office" was taken as the significant remark on the subject. J. S. Clarkson of Iowa, the First Assistant Postmaster-General, had started out to make a clean sweep of the 55,000 fourth-class postmasterships, and by February, 1890, had succeeded in removing 31,000 of them. His cynical application of the spoils system was publicly rebuked by such good Republican partisans as McKinley and Lodge, and he was forced to resign in the early autumn of 1890. President Harrison showed no disposition until after his defeat for reelection (1892) to enlarge the classified list, and then he added comparatively few new positions—fewer than any other president, except McKinley, from Arthur to Harding. Furthermore, Harrison gave offense by appointing to office a number of his relatives and connections by marriage, and by giving important diplomatic missions to Republican newspaper editors.

Finally, the Republicans had laid themselves open to the damaging charge of extravagance in the expenditure of the public funds. Acting on the obvious suggestion of F. D. Grant that "a surplus is easier to handle than a deficit," they had proceeded to dissipate the surplus without abating taxation. On June 27 they had passed the Dependent Pension Bill, which President Cleveland had vetoed (p. 174). It was no time, said Harrison, "to be weighing the claims of the old soldiers with apothecaries' scales." As a result of the bill the pension applications jumped from 36,000 in 1889 to 363,000 in 1891. Instead of the modest

four or five additional millions which the promoters of the bill estimated that it would cost the country, the payments under it reached \$68,000,000 for the year 1893. During the four years of Harrison's administration the pension roll was doubled, and the appropriations for it increased from \$81,000,000 to \$135,000,000. Even before the Dependent Pension Bill was passed, the administration had found it advisable to dismiss its overzealous Commissioner of Pensions, Corporal James Tanner, who had started out on a policy which he said would "wring from the hearts of some the prayer, God help the surplus!"

Another large item of expense, but less than a quarter of the cost of the pensions, was the navy, for which the appropriations increased from \$21,000,000 in 1889 to \$30,000,000 in 1893, and advanced our navy from the twelfth to the fifth place in the war fleets of the world. This was not partisan legislation, nor did it meet with the disapproval which the tariff, the election bill, and the silver compromise aroused, except in certain parts of the West, which have always been unfriendly to an adequate naval program. The beginnings of our steel navy had been laid in the famous act of March 3, 1883, which authorized the construction of the armored cruisers *Chicago*, *Boston*, and *Atlanta*—the first vessels of the "White Squadron." Cleveland's energetic Secretary of the Navy, William C. Whitney, had secured appropriations for six protected and three unprotected cruisers, five gunboats, a torpedo boat, five monitors, a ram, a coast-defense vessel, and two second-class battleships (the *Texas* and the *Maine*), besides establishing a naval ordnance plant at Washington, reorganizing the government gun factories, and negotiating contracts with the Bethlehem Steel Company for the manufacture of armor plates. Still, when Benjamin Tracy of New York took over the Navy Department under Harrison, we had only three steel vessels in commission; and, as the President said in his first message, we were practically without coast defenses. Many of the structures we had "would enhance rather than diminish the perils of their garrisons if subjected to the fire of improved guns." Nine new ironclads were put into commission before the close of 1890, and ten more before the

end of Harrison's term. In addition to the extensive building program, we began the manufacture of new high explosives, smokeless powder, torpedoes, and armor-piercing shells. Our first-class battleship, the *Oregon*, was authorized in June, 1890, followed by the *Massachusetts*, the *Indiana*, and the *Iowa* before the close of the administration.

Under these mounting expenditures the surplus, which stood at \$105,344,762 at the end of the fiscal year 1889, was reduced to \$9,914,453 two years later. The appropriations of the Fifty-first Congress exceeded \$1,000,000,000. When reproached for the extravagance of a "billion-dollar Congress," Speaker Reed quietly replied, "It is a billion-dollar country." Indeed, the returns of the eleventh census (1890) were beginning to reveal the enormous gains in industry and wealth during the decade of the eighties. In seventy-five of the leading cities of the country the capital invested in manufactures had increased from \$1,232,893,670 to \$2,900,735,884, the value of the products from \$2,711,170,454 to \$4,860,286,337, and the wages paid to the workers from \$501,965,778 to \$1,221,170,454. In spite of the liberal appropriations of the Fifty-first Congress, the per-capita expense of the government in 1891 was only \$5.73 as against \$5.34 in 1880. When the Democrats came into power, they proved the truth of Reed's rejoinder (as well as paying him the compliment of retaining his rules) by spending more than the Republicans had.

One other act of the busy ten months' session of the Fifty-first Congress deserves mention, as it was the basis for some of the most important legislation of the succeeding generation. The most notable feature of the industrial growth which we have just referred to was the accelerating trend toward concentration. Enormously increased capital investment and volume of product in industry after industry was accomplished by a reduction in the number of establishments. In the period from 1870 to 1890 the capital in textile mills grew from \$300,000,000 to \$750,000,000, while the number of mills declined from 4790 to 4114. Scarcely one fourth of the leather factories of 1880 were in existence ten years later, but the product of leather had

increased by 500 per cent. There were 1943 plants engaged in the manufacture of agricultural machinery in 1880 and but 910 plants in 1890, yet the capital in this industry had been more than doubled in the interval. The energy of the American business man and promoter, the abundant natural resources of the country, the rapid expansion of the transportation system, the invention of better machinery and improved processes of production, were the main factors in this tendency, which was furthered by the traditional policy of noninterference of the government with business. There were undoubtedly great economic advantages in large-scale production: the reduction of overhead expenses, the utilization of waste products, the elimination of competitive advertising and "drumming," enlarged opportunity for men of managerial ability, stabilization of prices. But at the same time there were evils and menaces in the system. It gave big business an undue influence in politics, tended toward the monopoly of natural resources, tempted to recklessness and even fraud in the issue of securities, and generally invited to an irresponsible dictatorship in the control of industry and trade which was resented by a democratic community. The growth of the anti-monopoly sentiment was rapid in the eighties,¹ as was shown by the number of investigations, reports, political platforms, petitions to Congress, and proposed legislation on the subject. As the immediate result of an investigation by a Senate committee in 1881-1889, which revealed some very unpleasant facts in the conduct of the sugar, beef, and oil trusts, a bill was introduced at the beginning of the Fifty-first Congress by Senator Sherman to "protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies."

Naturally, the party of high protection—the party which held most of the big business men of the country and which

¹ In 1880 Henry George's "Progress and Poverty" was published in protest against the monopoly in land; in 1881 Henry D. Lloyd's "Story of a Great Monopoly" exposed the methods of the Standard Oil Company; in 1888 Bellamy's "Looking Backward" pictured the joys of a purely coöperative society. We have already noted the number of anti-monopoly parties in the field in the eighties (pp. 192, 193).

drew heavily on their wealth for campaign funds—was not overenthusiastic for “curbing the trusts.” Blaine declared in a speech at Portland, Maine, in 1888 that the management of business was a private affair with which the government had no right to meddle. Reed waxed sarcastic over the “idiotic ravings and pestiferous mouthings” on the trusts. There was no such thing as a monopoly in this country, he said, outside the Patent Office, and there never could be, for “there is no power on earth that can raise the price of any necessity above a just price and keep it there.” Nevertheless public sentiment forced the party to heed President Harrison’s recommendation in his first message: “Earnest attention should be given by Congress to a consideration of the question how far the restraint of those combinations of capital called ‘trusts’ is a matter of federal jurisdiction. When organized, as they often are, to crush out all healthy competition and to monopolize the sale of an article of commerce and general necessity, they are dangerous conspiracies against the public good and should be made the subject of prohibitive and even penal legislation.” Both prohibitive and penal clauses were incorporated in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.¹ The act followed an old principle of the English common law by declaring illegal “every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy or restraint of trade among the several states or with foreign nations.” It attached a penalty of a fine of \$5000 or a year’s imprisonment, or both, to the infraction of the law. The United States district attorneys were charged with the prosecution of individuals or corporations suspected of its violation.

For many years the Sherman Anti-Trust Law remained what

¹ Curiously enough, neither of the two measures of July, 1890, which bear Senator Sherman’s name reflected his real convictions. As we have seen (p. 204), he supported the silver compromise only because he believed that it was necessary in order to prevent absolute free coinage. The anti-trust act, said Senator Hoar, bore Sherman’s name on the principle of “*lucus a non lucendo*, because Sherman had nothing to do with it.” This is a bit of an exaggeration. The bill which Sherman presented was rewritten, to be sure, in the Judiciary Committee, of which he was not a member. Senator Edmunds had the chief part in framing it, though Hoar, Ingalls, George, and Evarts all contributed.

Justice Harlan of the Supreme Court called "a piece of useless legislation." In the first place, the Constitution did not give Congress the same explicit power to regulate business as it did to frame tariffs and legalize currency. Only "commerce" between the states and with foreign nations came within its purview. In other words, it could legislate only to control the distribution of products, but could not get at the source of monopoly, which lay in the methods of production. The futility of locking the stable door after the horse was stolen appeared a few years after the passage of the act, when the court refused to interfere with the purchase by the American Sugar Refining Company of plants giving it the monopoly of the refining business, on the ground that the monopoly of manufacture could not be proved to have the intent to monopolize commerce. Furthermore, the act itself was vague. There was no attempt in it to define "restraint of trade"; no distinction between such wholesome restraints as operated for the protection of the quality of products or the elimination of fraudulent advertising, and the wicked restraints whose object was to crush competition or raise prices. The burden of definition as well as of judgment was put upon the courts, with a resulting mass of confused and contradictory opinions. A clever lawyer could "drive a coach and four" through the act. If the government won a case now and then (and it lost seven of the eight prosecutions under Harrison), the trust found a way to reorganize after its formal dissolution and "carry on the same business in the same way under a new sign." It was not till the beginning of the twentieth century, when the monopolies had become far more powerful and menacing, that President Roosevelt's insistence on public welfare as the criterion of judgment between the good trusts and the bad trusts led to better definition of the Sherman act and roused a new interest in its enforcement. Nevertheless, the act of 1890, imperfect as it was, like the Interstate Commerce Act of three years before, deserves the credit due to pioneer legislation.

The landslide of 1890 divided the Harrison administration into sharply contrasted halves. It put an end to constructive

legislation. The huge Democratic majority in the House in the Fifty-second Congress was powerless in the face of a Republican president and Senate. It registered its disapproval of the McKinley tariff by passing a number of ineffective ("popgun") bills, placing wool, binding-twine, and cotton machinery on the free list, and reducing the duties on several other articles. The days of congressional deadlock returned. The Republican minority, led by Mr. Reed, changed their offensive strategy into defensive tactics, and renewed the very policy of obstruction which as a majority they had condemned. For the remainder of Harrison's term interest centered almost wholly in our foreign relations, and James G. Blaine occupied the central place.

Two of the controversies which claimed the attention of the State Department under Harrison were inherited from a former administration, and two were precipitated by events occurring in the spring of 1891. As far back as 1872 we had begun to show our interest in the destinies of the Pacific (which was to culminate half a century later in the four-power naval compact of President Harding's term) by securing from a Samoan chieftain a coaling station at the harbor of Pago-Pago in the island of Tutuila. A few years later the Samoan king agreed to a kind of joint protectorate of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany over the islands (1880). In a prolonged struggle between native rivals for the throne, friction developed among the three protecting powers—Germany supporting the pretender Tamasese, who was pledged to her interests; and the United States and Great Britain defending Malietoa, the reigning king. Secretary Bayard tried in vain (1887) to reach an agreement with Germany. On Christmas Eve of 1888 King Malietoa addressed a pathetic appeal to President Cleveland: "Your Excellency and the Government of the United States, have love for us and extricate me and Samoa from the anger of the Germans now and for the future. O that you would send men-of-war here with a favorable decision and with strength—then we under your rule will find peace. May you live!" When German sailors seized the American flag at Apia and trampled upon it in the street (January, 1889), the king's appeal was heeded.

The *Nipsic*, the *Vandalia*, and the *Trenton* were sent out to join the *Adams* in the harbor of Apia. A German squadron and a British cruiser were dispatched to the scene of the quarrel. On March 16, 1889, there were seven warships anchored in the harbor, ready for the conflict which a rash act might provoke at any moment, when a terrific hurricane burst upon the islands. Six of the seven ships were sunk or driven to their destruction on the beach and the coral reef. Only the British cruiser *Caliope* escaped by crowding on every pound of steam and battling her way with red-hot boilers out to the open sea. The disaster averted a possible war between Germany and the United States and led to a conference between the three powers at Berlin, held at the suggestion of the German chancellor, Prince Bismarck. Bismarck sought, in his usual domineering manner, to cow the American representative into a recognition of Germany's supremacy in Samoa; but he was obliged in the end to concede the demands of our government that Malietoa be restored to his throne, and a "condominium," or equal protectorate of the three powers, be established in the islands.¹ The Samoan incident was an important factor in speeding up our naval program under Harrison and was of great significance as our first venture into the field of distant colonial politics—"the assertion by the United States," in the words of John Bassett Moore, "not merely of a willingness but even of a right to take part in determining the fate of a remote and semi-barbarous people whose possessions lay far outside the traditional sphere of American political interests."

The other controversy which Blaine inherited was a dispute with Great Britain over the right to take seals in Bering Sea. Our claim, embodied in the regulations of the treaties of 1881 and 1886, was that Bering Sea, which was almost wholly inclosed by Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, was a "mare clau-

¹ The condominium lasted until 1899, when Great Britain, by an act little consistent with her general colonial policy, withdrew from the islands. The United States received Tutuila; and Germany took the rest of the group, to keep until, on the dissolution of her colonial empire in the World War, they, with her other Pacific islands south of the equator, became mandates of the British Empire.

sum," and as exclusively American water as Chesapeake Bay. In order to put an end to the indiscriminate slaughter of seals in this rich hunting-ground, we had forbidden foreign sealers to catch in Bering Sea, and had seized a number of British vessels there in 1886 and 1887, though they were operating far outside the statutory three-mile limit from shore. Attempts were made to settle the question by an international conference for the protection of the seals, but at the request of the Canadian government the negotiations were suspended in the spring of 1888.¹ The tension was increased on March 2, 1889, when Congress passed a bill declaring that "all the dominion of the United States in the waters of Bering Sea" was included in the limits of Alaskan territory, where the catching of seals was forbidden. This arbitrary pronouncement Blaine thought himself bound to maintain when he took over the portfolio of State two days later. He kept up a spirited correspondence with Lord Salisbury on the subject for nearly three years, trying to make the worse cause appear the better; but in the end he agreed (February 29, 1892) to submit the dispute to arbitration. The tribunal which met at Paris in 1893 rendered judgment adverse to the United States, declaring that we had no jurisdiction in Bering Sea beyond the three-mile limit and fixing damages of \$473,000 for the seizure of British vessels.

A dispute with Italy arose in the spring of 1891, when eleven Italians were taken by a mob from the city jail in New Orleans and lynched for suspected complicity in the murder of the chief of police, who had been active in suppressing the lawlessness of the "Mafia," a secret band of Italian desperadoes. Invoking its treaty rights, the Italian government demanded that the Federal authorities of the United States should punish the lynchers. Secretary Blaine explained that under our dual system of government criminal jurisdiction was lodged in the state courts, and that foreign subjects residing in our country

¹ This was, no doubt, in part a retaliation for the adverse report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on a treaty which Secretary Bayard had made with the British government for the regulation of American fishing-rights on the Canadian coast.

had the same privilege of resort to the state courts as the American citizens in the states. But the Italian foreign office was not satisfied with this explanation, regarding it as a pretext of the national government to evade its treaty obligations. Baron Fava, the Italian minister at Washington, was recalled; and our minister, Horace Porter, left his post at Rome. The rupture of diplomatic relations between large states generally leads to war—and there were, in fact, foolish rumors spread by the sensational press that an Italian squadron was on its way to New Orleans. But President Harrison adopted a conciliatory tone in his message to Congress, acknowledging that the act of the lynchers was “a most deplorable and discreditable incident,” protesting our respect and friendship for the government and people of Italy, and expressing his confidence that in spite of the rupture of diplomatic relations “a friendly conclusion” was attainable. When it turned out that only three of the murdered men had not been naturalized as American citizens, the Italian government changed its tone. King Humbert accepted with thanks the grant of 125,000 lire (\$24,330), which Congress appropriated as a “gift” for the families of the victims, and diplomatic relations were cordially reopened.¹

The most serious of all our foreign controversies in this period was with the South American republic of Chile. In January, 1891, a civil war broke out between the supporters of President Balmaceda, who was a benevolent despot, and the Chilean congress, which considered its constitutional rights violated. The Congressionalists won a comparatively easy victory, captur-

¹ This was only one of the many instances of embarrassment in our foreign relations (like the controversies over the status of the orientals on the Pacific coast) due to the peculiar blend of the federal and national elements in our Constitution. Statesmen of the centralized European countries, where local divisions are only administrative areas, find it hard to understand the limitations of the power of our national government by the rights of the states. They look to the government at Washington to protect the rights of their citizens, who are subject to the laws of the states in which they reside. It is an anomalous situation. President Harrison, who was an extremely able international lawyer, proposed, in reference to the dispute with Italy, that Congress should “make offenses against the treaty rights of foreigners resident in the United States cognizable in the federal courts.” But his suggestion was never acted upon.

ing the capital Santiago in August and arresting Balmaceda. The reasons why we were drawn into this particular Latin-American revolution were various. Blaine was unpopular in Chile because, as Secretary of State ten years before, he had espoused the cause of Peru in a war between the two countries (p. 151). Our minister to Chile, Patrick Egan, a "Blaine Irishman," was *persona non grata* to most of the influential English and German residents, who sympathized with the Congressional party. He was overzealous in his support of Balmaceda, opening the building of the United States legation as an asylum for the refugees of the president's party and demanding their safe conduct to neutral territory. Furthermore, the Chilean vessel *Itata* was detained (on the ground of violating the neutrality laws) by the United States marshal at the port of San Diego, California, where she was loading a cargo of arms and munitions for the Congressionalists. When she escaped, carrying away the United States officers, she was pursued by our cruiser *Charleston*, which had orders to sink her if she resisted capture. The Congressionalists voluntarily surrendered the *Itata* to the naval authorities of the United States when she reached port; but they were indignant at the interference of our government, especially as the Federal district court of California declared that the seizure at San Diego was unjustified in international law. Finally, the Congressionalists charged Rear Admiral Brown and other American naval officers in Chilean waters with playing the part of spies and revealing the movements of the Chilean navy (which had joined the insurgents) to the Balmacedists.

On October 16 the hostility of the Congressionalists toward the United States culminated in an ugly incident. A number of American sailors on shore-leave from the cruiser *Baltimore* were set upon by a mob in the streets of Valparaiso and viciously stoned, clubbed, and stabbed. One petty officer and one seaman were killed, eighteen were severely wounded, and thirty-six were dragged through the streets to jail. It was evident from the investigation held by Captain W. S. Schley of the *Baltimore* that the attack was unprovoked and was due wholly to the hatred which the people of Valparaiso had for the uni-

form of the United States marines. Secretary Blaine demanded an apology for the insult and an indemnity for the killed and wounded, but the Chilean government refused to discuss the matter before an investigation by its own secret tribunal. All through the late autumn the press of Valparaiso and Santiago continued to heap abuse upon Secretary Blaine, Minister Egan, and the "Yankees" in general. Two days after President Harrison's review of the situation in his message of December 9, Señor Matta, the Chilean minister of foreign affairs, sent a dispatch to all the foreign representatives of his country, including the minister at Washington, in which he used discourteous language toward Mr. Egan and Secretary Tracy, and characterized the statements of the President's message as "erroneous or deliberately inexact." After this gratuitous insult, Blaine, whose desire for the cultivation of good relations with the Latin-American states had led him to take a more patient attitude in the Chilean affair than President Harrison and our people generally, joined heartily in the policy of bringing Chile to a prompt accounting. An ultimatum was sent on January 21, 1892, demanding that Matta's offensive dispatch should be withdrawn and an apology offered, that the indemnity should be paid for the injured and slain sailors, and that a safe conduct to neutral soil should be given to the Balmacedist refugees at the American legation. Four days later President Harrison laid the whole matter before Congress in a special message (accompanied by a volume of six hundred pages containing the diplomatic and naval correspondence) "for such action as might be deemed appropriate."

It was virtually an invitation to a declaration of war against Chile, and for a few days war and peace seemed to hang in the balance. Our navy yards on both coasts were busy night and day. A squadron of eight cruisers was ready for action in the Pacific. The Chilean government then made a complete submission on every point. The apology for the offensive dispatch was made "without reservation, in order that it may receive such publicity as your government may deem suitable," the sum of \$75,000 was paid to the maltreated sailors, and the

Balmacedist refugees were allowed to depart from Valparaiso under the protection of our officers.

Secretary Blaine's conduct of these controversies with foreign nations enhanced his popularity greatly. There were some, to be sure, who complained of his dictatorial language and provocative jingoism, but the mass of the people were proud to see him defy the Iron Chancellor of Germany and twist the British lion's tail. They applauded when he declared that the extent of Bismarck's irritability was no measure of American rights; when he replied to Baron Fava's remonstrances, "I do not recognize the right of any government to tell the United States what it shall do"; when he accused Lord Salisbury of disingenuousness in his quotations from John Quincy Adams on the fisheries question. Blaine's brilliant and aggressive personality contrasted with the President's austere and phlegmatic nature. While Harrison was too dignified a gentleman to allow anything like a feud to develop, there is no doubt that his Secretary's conduct was often a thorn in his flesh.¹ As early as the midsummer of 1890 an article in the *Hartford Post* announced that Blaine's views on reciprocity and the tariff were "an indication that he was a candidate for the presidency in 1892," and that he would be elected by "a phenomenal majority." Just what Blaine's own attitude was toward the prospect of another nomination it is hard to discover. He had declined the certain honor in 1888, believing that the state of his health forbade the strain of a presidential campaign. He seemed reconciled to private life after several years of authorship and travel. But the return to a position of high responsibility and the applause of his fellow countrymen apparently revived in his responsive nature the old ambition. He declared in February, 1892, that he was not a candidate for the nomination; but on June 4, three days before the assembly of the Republican convention at Minneapolis, he

¹ Just before the Republican convention of 1892 Harrison said to Senator Cullom: "I have done the work of the State Department for a year or more. I have prepared every important official document and have the originals in my own handwriting. And yet Blaine is giving out accounts of what was being done in the State Department and taking all credit to himself" (S. M. Cullom, "Fifty Years of Public Service," p. 252).

sent the President a curt note of resignation, which was accepted in an equally curt reply, and allowed his name to go before the convention.¹ If Blaine really wished to contest the nomination with President Harrison, he acted with a shortsightedness and indecision which even failing health could hardly excuse. A candidacy frankly avowed in time to build up the support of the party might well have won him the nomination. As it was, he received only 182 votes to Harrison's 535. He retired to his home in Maine, where he died before the close of the administration.

There is something pathetic in the passing of this great figure in American history. Endowed with keen and subtle powers of intellect; equipped with an extraordinary knowledge of our history and institutions; gifted with resourcefulness, confidence, imagination, eloquence, and a compelling charm of manner which made him the adored master of the masses, who prize above everything else in their leaders that human sympathy which is called "magnetism,"—Blaine lacked yet one thing. He had not that supreme and indispensable gift of the true statesman—an undeviating moral rectitude which sets principle above every consideration of political expediency or personal ambition. Again and again the highest honor of his country, which he coveted with intense longing, seemed to be within his grasp; but as he stretched out his hand to take it, it eluded him like the shade of Creusa. The American people admired and loved him, but they could not quite trust him. There were too many incidents in his career that called for "explanation,"—railroad bonds, Mulligan letters, Peruvian claims,—and the explanations too often left the impression of ingenuity rather than ingenuousness. As he lacked that finest sense of personal ethics which would have kept him from skirting oft-times dangerously near to the edge of dishonor, so he lacked the faith to stake his party's fortune on a courageous espousal of the highest political principles. He was not shocked by the

¹ The resignation was attributed by some to Mrs. Blaine, who was on bad terms with Mrs. Harrison and was ambitious to have her husband take the coveted honor of the nomination away from his chief.

exposure of frauds like the *Crédit Mobilier* and the *Star Routes*; he was willing to make political capital out of the perpetuation of sectional animosities; he never realized the menace of the influence of unscrupulous corporations upon the government; he ridiculed the pleas for reform in the civil service as the cant of the Pharisee. There was too much of the alloy of the politician mixed with the nobler metal of the statesman in him to allow his character to ring quite true. He paid the full penalty for his shortcomings in the defeat of his life's ambition, and died a disappointed man. In spite of all this, James G. Blaine remains a cherished figure in our history. Perhaps the best testimony to his hold upon the hearts of millions of his fellow countrymen is the reluctance with which the historian is compelled to set his defects in the balance against his virtues.

CHAPTER IV

THE REVOLT OF THE WEST

That which was the body has come to be only the rich fringe of the nation's robe.—BENJAMIN HARRISON

POPULISM

Politics is the art of giving expression in legal forms to ideals of public welfare. In a democratic state, where the people are held competent to cherish their own ideals of public welfare and to choose the servants who are commissioned to carry out those ideals, politics must necessarily be popular in origin and trend. The thoughtful student realizes that it is not alone in legislative halls, courts of justice, and administrative councils that our history has been made. The activities of these institutions eventually respond and correspond to the pressure of economic and social needs, of which large sections or classes of the country have become sufficiently convinced to compel the attention of the government. Our history could be written in chapters dealing with a succession of crises originating in social needs: the need for the complete independence of a people long accustomed to self-direction, the need for the stabilization of law and credit under some adequate authority in federal system, the need for removing the embarrassing pressure of foreign nations from the borders of our young republic, the need for providing facilities for the development of our vast public domain in the West, the need for solving the momentous problem presented by two irreconcilable systems of society claiming the favor and protection of the same national government. With the settlement of this last problem through the ordeal of the Civil War and its bitter aftermath of reconstruction, another issue came into prominence; namely, the demand for a more equitable distribution of the mounting wealth of the country.

In a previous chapter (pp. 86-101) we have studied the causes of the discontent of the Western farmer and the Eastern wage-earner, have noted the organization of political parties to forward their interests, and have traced the varying fortunes of those parties down to the election of 1880. The decade of the eighties, which we have just examined from the strictly political point of view of the activities (and the inactivities) of the government at Washington, was the great epoch in the development of independent parties. Under a bewildering variety of names—Farmers Alliance, Agricultural Wheel, Corn Growers Association, Anti-Monopolists, Farmers Mutual Benefit Association, Colored Alliance, United Laborites, Tax Reformers, National Farmers Alliance, and Industrial Unions—organizations of protest against the economic conditions which oppressed the farmers and the laborers sprang up, fused, split, re-formed into a hundred kaleidoscopic combinations. Their multiplying thousands of members, though not able to agree sufficiently among themselves in their demand to make a stable and unified party, were nevertheless all in agreement on the basal points of hostility to the railroads, the great industrial corporations, and the “money lords” of Wall Street.

We can distinguish three phases in the history of this movement of protest during the decade. From the union of the Greenback and Labor parties at Toledo in 1878 to the Greenback-Labor campaign of Benjamin Butler in 1884 the principle of fusion was prominent. During the middle eighties labor took the lead in the attempt to rally the discontented elements of the country. But the reaction from the desperate series of strikes which characterized the years of the “great upheaval” (1885-1886), the murderous Haymarket riot, the tyranny of Martin Irons at St. Louis, and the disrepute into which the Knights of Labor had fallen after the Haymarket affair (p. 194) brought a temporary halt to the labor movement, after it had put two parties into the field in the presidential election of 1888. The third phase of the movement of protest, which opened with a convention held at St. Louis in 1889, was marked by the emergence of the agrarian element as the dominating factor. The

St. Louis convention, which is generally regarded as the starting point of the Populist party, was called to effect a union between the Farmers Alliance and the Knights of Labor. The demands of the St. Louis platform, however, were all in the interests of the agrarian rather than of the industrial class,¹ and the platform was signed by eighteen representatives of the Farmers Alliance and only three representatives of the Knights. "The numerical relation of these two committees," says F. E. Haynes, "roughly corresponds to the comparative strength of the two main elements composing the new radical party that was in process of formation."

The movement of protest gathered momentum rapidly in the West and the South. The year 1890, which saw Congress immersed in the debates over the tariff, silver, pensions, the trusts, and Federal elections, witnessed a different scene on the Western plains. "The country schoolhouses were packed with excited throngs. County, district, and state conventions were attended by great crowds of earnest and indignant farmers. The excitement and enthusiasm were contagious, and the Alliance men deserted their former parties by thousands."² Ridicule and denunciation heaped upon them by the Republican and the Democratic press alike only intensified their zeal to "wipe the old parties off the face of the earth and establish a people's government." Without political organization or coherence as yet, the "embattled farmers" went to the polls in the autumn of 1890 pledged to support only candidates who were avowed foes of monopoly. In several of the Southern states (Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida) the Alliance controlled the Democratic conventions and wrote its principles into the platforms. In South Carolina, Benjamin Tillman, the champion of the farmers and the wage-earners against the ruling aristocracy of the state, was elected governor by a majority of

¹ For example, the abolition of the national banks, the free coinage of silver, the resumption by the government of the unutilized lands granted to the railroads, plentiful paper currency, government ownership of the railroads, the prohibition of "futures" in grain.

² Frank B. Tracy, in the *Forum*, Vol. XVI, p. 243.

over four to one. The South sent to the Fifty-second Congress thirty representatives and one senator indorsed by the Alliance.

Because the South was a solid Democratic section, the contest between radicals and conservatives there was naturally for the control of the state conventions. The bipartisan West, on the other hand, encouraged independent political action on the part of the radicals or, in the very strong Republican states, a fusion between the radicals and the Democrats. Thus, we find the farmers (generally in combination with the Knights of Labor or other industrial organizations) launching new parties in various Western states: a People's party in Kansas, a People's Independent party in Nebraska, an Independent party in South Dakota, an Industrial party in Michigan, with fusion tickets in North Dakota, Colorado, and other states. In the elections of 1890 these independent parties secured eight congressmen and two United States senators. They returned a majority of the Senate and half the members of the lower House in Nebraska, and sent large delegations to the legislatures of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Colorado, and the Dakotas.

The remarkable showing of the agrarian malcontents in these elections made them more formidable, if not more respectable, in the eyes of the old parties. There was serious apprehension mingled with the denunciation now. Many a seasoned politician who had pursued his schemes and manipulations utterly indifferent to what he was pleased to call the "ravings" of a small group of "cranks," "calamity howlers," and "political rain-makers," found himself suddenly obliged to reckon with a new factor; for these despised people had furnished the one argument that the politician understands—votes. The partisan press began to concede, as one Democratic paper put it, that "the third-party movement might materialize into something more than talk." Another effect of the victories of the radicals in various local elections was the quickening of the movement for their fusion into a single political party to contest the presidential election of 1892.

A series of conventions, following one another in rapid suc-

cession, accomplished this result. Delegates from three of the alliances met at Ocala, Florida, in December, 1890, and issued a platform of demands practically identical with the St. Louis platform of a year before. In June, 1891, a conference of five farmers' and laborers' associations met at Washington to formulate plans for a unified party on the basis of the St. Louis platform. On May 19, 1891, nearly fifteen hundred representatives of various radical agrarian and labor alliances, in convention at Cincinnati, launched a new party under the name of the People's Party of the United States of America. They invited "all progressive organizations" to meet in conference early in 1892 and, unless some other form of coalition were effected, to call "a convention of the People's party for the nomination of a president." The conference, which met at St. Louis on February 22, selected a national committee empowered to call a national convention, which assembled on July 2 at Omaha, Nebraska.

In the rapidity with which the forces of protest coalesced in a national political organization, in the fervor of the apostles of the movement, and in the hostility which it aroused among the conservatives of the country as a menace to orderly government and the security of vested interests, if not the direct incitement to spoliation, the People's party showed points of resemblance to the nascent Republican party of thirty-five years before. But there were three important points at least in which it differed from a truly popular movement destined to win a national triumph. In the first place, the appeal was to a discontented class which was so preoccupied with its complaints that it had little comprehension or concern for the effects upon the country at large of the remedies which it proposed for its own relief. Again, the inspiration of the movement, in spite of the fervor of its apostles, was not a genuine moral indignation, like the Republican rising of the middle fifties, but an economic "inferiority complex" whose victims attributed their unfortunate condition to the deliberate, malevolent persecution of the capitalists. And finally, there were discordant elements in the party itself for which there was no single principle, like the limitation

of the spread of slavery, potent enough to act as a solvent. Free silver was a weak slogan as compared with free soil.

The largest of the farmers' associations, for example, was the Southern Alliance, which claimed a membership of three million. But delegates from seven Southern states threatened to withdraw from the St. Louis conference if an independent political party were formed. Their purpose was to capture and transform the Democratic party. The inevitable negro question made it necessary in the eyes of Southern radicals and conservatives alike to preserve the white man's party, especially at a time when the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment was being mooted in Congress. Hence, when Populism definitely broke with the old parties, it lost much of its Southern support.¹ The farmer and labor elements in the new party were no more harmonious than the Northern and Southern elements. The farmers as a class were tenacious of those ideas of sturdy independence, untrammelled opportunity, and fair reward of honest effort which, since the days of Jefferson, had been heralded as the heritage of American freemen; while labor in the great industrial centers was being recruited more and more from lands where the unequal conditions of the classes was axiomatic. The interests, the psychology, the social grouping, and the conditions of work of the farmers and the laborers were all so different that the two groups had never really "fused" in spite of fusion tickets, or had any adequate appreciation of each other's problems. The farmers had no interest in the contest for shorter

¹ At the same time the Southern states, fearing the appeal of the radical movement to the negro vote, began to take steps for the definitive annulment of the Fifteenth Amendment by revising their constitutions in such a fashion as to exclude the blacks from suffrage. Beginning with Mississippi in 1890, most of the former slave states revised the electoral clauses of their constitutions within the next twenty years, prescribing residential, educational, and tax requirements which shut out far more negroes than whites (see page 22, note 1). The famous "grandfather clause" of the Louisiana constitution of 1898 exempted from the new requirements all persons who had voted in the state before 1867 or were descended from such voters. In other words, it reëfranchised the poor and illiterate whites. It was not until 1915 that the Supreme Court disallowed this clever annulment of the Fifteenth Amendment by declaring the grandfather clause in the Oklahoma constitution to be unconstitutional (238 U. S. 347, 364).

hours and higher wages, which formed the stock in trade of labor agitation. They were not unionized, their day's work was from sunrise to sunset, and they were themselves employers of labor, favorable to the immigration which sent farm hands to the Western states. The planks of the Omaha platform, therefore, demanding an eight-hour day and the restriction of immigration were a pure concession to the labor element. On the other hand, the laborers, not being landholders, had no mortgages to stagger under, no seasonal crops to dispose of in a glutted market, no tribute to pay the railroads in the form of freight charges; consequently their attitude toward the planks of the Omaha platform which called for the prohibition of alien ownership of land, a plentiful supply of cheap money, public loans at a low rate of interest on the security of farm products, and the government ownership of the railroads was one of "benevolent neutrality."

The predominance of the agrarian demands in the Omaha platform justifies the statement that the new party was essentially a farmers' party. The farmers' grievances were genuine. The state bureau of statistics reported 291,640 mortgages in Ohio in 1888, amounting to \$330,909,000 on an assessed valuation of \$1,220,262,000. In Kansas, the storm center of the Populist movement, the Topeka *Advocate* conducted an investigation of three thousand farms. Of these 1030 were rented, 1727 were burdened with mortgages amounting to nearly \$1,500,000, and only 350 were owned free of encumbrance. Wheat was selling on the farms for between 40 and 50 cents a bushel, prime cattle were bringing from 1½ to 3 cents a pound, and corn was being burned for fuel. Interest had to be paid in a constantly appreciating currency, which meant to the farmer a constantly depreciating equivalent of produce and labor.¹

¹ "The virgin soil of the West is rapidly ceasing to be the home and possession of the sturdy American freeman. He is but a tenant at will, or dependent upon the tender mercies of corporations and absentee landlords. We have abolished monarchy and primogeniture and church establishments supported by the State, yet the universal curse of humanity, the monopoly of the earth by the wealthy few, remains" (D. R. Goodloe, "Western Farm Mortgages," in the *Forum*, Vol. X, p. 355).

These dismal facts were so patent to the farmer that, like all people in distress, he lent a willing ear to the men who explained the causes of his trouble, and hailed as leaders those who proposed a remedy for them. This gave an opportunity for demagogues, mountebanks, and fanatics of various types to exploit their hobbies at the expense of honest folks, and gave color to the Eastern interpretation of the movement as a conspiracy of wild-eyed radicals.¹ This indictment of the party as a whole was manifestly unfair. The farmer, even when aroused to a stinging sense of his ills, was not an inflammable revolutionist, nor were men like General Weaver, Ignatius Donnelly, and Senators Allen and Kyle merely "leather-lunged orators." We can concede honesty of purpose to the Populists in their crusade against what seemed to them intolerable evils, without accepting either the theories which they put forth as the causes of those evils or the measures which they advocated as the remedies.

The basic grievance of the farmer was the falling price of his grain. Between 1885 and 1890 the corn crop had shrunk over \$70,000,000 in value, though more bushels were raised in the latter than in the former year. The cause of this shrinkage was complex. It was due partly to overproduction fostered by cheap lands and abundant immigration,² partly to the increase

¹ An Eastern editor called Kansas "the drunken helot of American politics." Another said, "We want no more states until we can civilize Kansas." The new party was compared to the cave of Adullam (1 Sam. xxi, 2) to which "every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented, gathered themselves."

² The railroads, the steam plow, and the harvester were potent factors in the immigration to the West. During the period from 1870 to 1890 the population of the Dakotas increased from 14,000 to 510,000; of Nebraska, from 123,000 to 1,034,000; of Kansas, from 364,000 to 1,427,000. Seasons of exceptionally abundant rainfall in the middle eighties tempted the farmers beyond the line of sufficient average irrigation, and when the dry years came they found themselves "starved back." Thousands of them had mortgaged their farms for capital to invest in land which could not bear the charges. Professor F. J. Turner, in a single pregnant sentence, explains the crux of Populism: "The native American farmer had met his first defeat, and he turned to the national government for reinforcements" ("The Frontier in American History," p. 147).

of Russian and Argentine crops which affected our export trade, partly to a world-wide decline in commodity prices attendant upon an appreciating currency, as country after country adopted a gold basis. But the farmer had no conception of these intricate and far-reaching causes. His explanation of the cheapened price of his crops was simple. The "lords" of Wall Street had cornered the money supply of the country and put up its price until every honest farmer who needed a loan was obliged to pay fancy interest rates. The demonetization of silver by the "crime of 1873," the resumption of specie payments in 1879, the establishment of the gold reserve, the payment in gold of the interest on the government bonds, were all parts of the same nefarious plot. As the plot was clear, the remedy was easy. The government should simply issue enough money to break the corner. When Mr. Cudahy attempted to corner the pork of the country, the Populists explained, he failed because he found that there was more pork than he had ever supposed existed. The barons of Wall Street would fail, too, if money multiplied like hogs. The Omaha platform demanded the issue by the government of currency to the amount of \$50 per capita of the population. As the government's word was law, it could make an issue of \$50 or \$500 per-capita "money" by stamping on it the statement that it was money. Then the farmers would all be happy because their products would sell for a great number of dollars. What these abundant "dollars" would be worth in the eyes of the world, if enough of them were issued, may be judged from the recent history of the Russian rubles and the German marks.

While the worm-eaten money plank alone was enough to condemn the Omaha platform, it would hardly be fair to judge the whole platform by this plank. There were a dozen other planks, and that they were not all subversive of government or destructive of property is shown by the fact that about half of them have been accepted in the last decade or so as normal elements in our political and economic system. Constitutional amendments in 1913 opened the way for the levy of a graduated income tax and the direct election of United States senators by the

people. Congress has enacted laws for the establishment of postal savings banks and the drastic restriction of immigration. The eight-hour day is in legal force for government employees and prevails widely in state legislation. The initiative and referendum have been adopted by many of the states. If the government has not assumed the ownership of the railroads, it has at least established a considerable amount of control over them through the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Railway Labor Board, and the Esch-Cummins act. The Populists failed to "wipe the old parties off the face of the earth"; but, by gathering the programs of radical reformers for a score of years into a single political platform backed by more than a million votes, they brought the condition of the Western farmer and the debtor to the attention of the country with an emphasis which could not be ignored. Their demand that the national government should intervene directly to relieve their economic plight was not granted; but it was an attack on the consecrated doctrine of *laissez faire*, and doubtless contributed largely to the idea of "social politics," or the responsibility of the government for the welfare of the people as well as for their protection. Finally, the Populist element in one of the great parties succeeded in capturing the national convention (1896) and nominating the candidate for the presidency. But that is a matter for a later section.

The president, in our system of politics, is the head of his party. So effective is his control of the party machinery through the power of the patronage that unless, like Hayes, he has no ambition for a second term, or, like Arthur, he is a "president by accident," it is very difficult to prevent his renomination. Masterful presidents, like Jefferson, Jackson, and Roosevelt, have virtually appointed their successors; and the opposition of the administration has been a handicap that few aspirants for the nomination have been able to overcome, as is illustrated by Blaine's failure in 1880. Even when there is considerable hostility to the president in the ranks of his own party, as there was to Taft in 1912, it is generally overborne in the convention. Such was the case in respect to Harrison in 1892. His frigid

austerity had alienated scores of influential Republicans. Blaine, who had recommended his nomination in 1888, was his eleventh-hour rival for the nomination in 1892. Seasoned party managers, like Thomas Platt of New York and Matthew Quay of Pennsylvania, who had worked for Harrison in 1888, were now against him. J. S. Clarkson of Iowa, his erstwhile First Assistant Postmaster-General, filled the convention hall at Minneapolis with plumes and banners, hoping to stampede the delegates to Blaine. Marcus A. Hanna opened headquarters for McKinley at his own expense in a hotel close by. But all to no purpose. Harrison was nominated on the first ballot, with three times as many votes (535) as either of his nearest rivals, Blaine and McKinley (182 each). Whitelaw Reid of the *New York Tribune* was named for vice-president.

The Democratic convention met at Chicago, June 21. Grover Cleveland was far and away the leading man of his party, but he, too, had a faculty for making enemies among the politicians. His downright honesty and courageous obstinacy and, above all, his supreme indifference to the effects of his public acts upon his own political fortunes made him an impossible subject for the "deals" of the party brokers. Because he put what he believed to be the country's interest above the interests of the party, he was accused of being "no Democrat." His enemies rejoiced when he retired to private life in 1889. They declared that his public career was deservedly ended. "Marse" Henry Watterson of the Louisville *Courier Journal* compared his absorption into the crowded guild of New York lawyers to the disappearance of "a stone thrown into a pond—a plunk, a splash, and then silence." But Grover Cleveland was not the kind of man to be forgotten. He attended quietly to his legal practice, took no active part in politics, and laid no wires for a return to office. Nevertheless he was constantly invited to make addresses at banquets, dedications, and club meetings of various sorts. He responded to these calls so far as his time would allow, and whenever the occasion required he expressed his ideas on questions like the tariff and currency fearlessly and unequivocally. Early in 1891, when the West was clamoring for free silver, and

the Populists and Democrats were fusing in many states, Cleveland was invited to address a meeting of the Reform Club of New York City. His friends, who were already preparing the way by private correspondence for his candidacy in the following year, begged him to stay away from the meeting or at least to keep silent on the silver question. Cleveland was not able to attend the meeting, but he sent a letter in which he put himself squarely on record as opposed to "the dangerous and reckless experiment of free, unlimited, and independent silver coinage." He had invited and experienced defeat by his tariff message of 1887; he was now again inviting defeat by the Anderson letter of 1891. Such was the politicians' diagnosis of the case—and Cleveland was not concerned to argue about it with them. For the party at large, however, it is probable that nothing contributed so much as this letter to make Cleveland the inevitable nominee in 1892.

The hardest fight against Cleveland was made by David B. Hill. This astute and tireless politician, who had been elected governor of New York at the time of Cleveland's defeat in 1888 (p. 196, note), had gained complete control of the Democratic machine of the Empire State and had just been elected to the United States Senate. He was widely heralded as the only man who could carry New York in a national election. He called a "snap convention" at Albany as early as February 22, and secured a solid block of delegates pledged to his nomination at the national convention five months hence. He was backed by Tammany Hall (always hostile to Cleveland) and by the liquor interests, which he had favored by the veto of license legislation. But his finesse was a little too fine. The long spring and summer months staled his premature candidacy; while the friends of Cleveland, under the efficient direction of his former Secretary of the Navy, William C. Whitney, were conducting the most remarkable preconvention campaign in our history. Without noisy demonstrations, without advertisement in the press, without parading their candidate, and even without his knowledge of what they were doing, they secured the support of Democratic leaders in state after state by diligent correspondence, until, by

the middle of May, twenty-four out of thirty-five state and territorial conventions had instructed their delegates for Cleveland. A secret conference of about a score of prominent Democrats, representing a dozen states, was held at Mr. Whitney's residence in New York early in June, at which all the details of the management of the approaching convention were worked out. The combination of such able organization with Cleveland's popularity with the people was irresistible. The Hill men made a desperate fight. Bourke Cockran, the eloquent Tammany orator, pleaded in a long midnight speech for the nomination of a candidate who could carry the state "whose triumphant Democracy now asks you only for permission to win for you a Democratic victory in November." The "friends of silver" pressed the candidacy of Horace Boies, who had twice been elected governor of the normally Republican state of Iowa. And the followers of Senator Gorman of Maryland were watching with alertness for the first sign of a break in the Cleveland ranks. But the break never came. On the first ballot Cleveland received 617 votes to 114 for Hill, 103 for Boies, and 36 for Gorman. The choice of Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois for the second place on the ticket was a concession to the Democrats who found Cleveland's views on the civil service too radical and his views on the currency too conservative.

The platforms of both the great parties contained the customary laudation of their own policies and condemnation of their opponents'. The Republicans congratulated the country on its "majestic march under the banners inscribed with the principles of our platform of 1888 and vindicated by victory at the polls [1890!] and prosperity in our fields, workshops, and mines." The Democrats denied that the country was prospering under Republican administration, and pointed to the "dullness and distress, the wage reductions and strikes," as the best possible evidence of the evil effects of the McKinley tariff, which they denounced as "the culminating atrocity of class legislation." Each platform presented the usual array of vote-catching planks, from the promise of liberal pensions to the approval of temperance. But when it came down to specific

recommendations, there was little besides the tariff plank to distinguish them. Their pronouncements on the currency were tweedledum and tweedledee. Each, in slightly different phraseology, favored the use of both gold and silver and the maintenance of the parity between the two metals by "appropriate legislation"—as if any legislation could establish a parity between fluctuating values, or as if the phrase "double standard" were not in itself a contradiction in terms.

In spite of their decisive defeat on the tariff issue in 1890, the Republicans reaffirmed "the American doctrine of protection" and maintained that "the prosperous condition of our country" was due largely to the McKinley act. In the original draft of their platform the Democrats took the usual position of "straddle" on the tariff; namely, a revenue tariff with "incidental protection." The industries that had come to "rely upon legislation for successful continuance" must not be injured. But the actual policy of the Democrats since Cleveland's message of 1887 had been more radical than this; and the tariff reformers in the convention succeeded in substituting for the compromise plank, by the vote of 564 to 342, the declaration that the protective tariff was "a fraud" and "a robbery of the great majority of the American people for the benefit of the few," and that it was "a fundamental principle of the Democratic party that the Federal government has no constitutional power to impose and collect tariff duties except for the purpose of revenue only." This unequivocal declaration, following the Republican commitment to a high protection in their platform of 1888, joined the issue squarely between the two parties for the first time since the Civil War.

The Populists met at Omaha on July 2, and celebrated the Fourth by the publication of an indictment of the government of their country which must have made the man who took it literally long for the superior civilization of the Turk. "We meet," it said, "in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the legislature, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized; most of

the states have been compelled to isolate the voters at the polling places to prevent universal intimidation and bribery.¹ The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled; public opinion silenced; business prostrated; our homes covered with mortgages; labor impoverished; and the land concentrated in the hands of capitalists. The urban workmen are denied the right of organization for self-protection.² Imported pauper labor beats down their wages; a hireling standing army, unrecognized by our laws, is established to shoot them down,³ and they are rapidly degenerating into European conditions. The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the possessors of these in turn despise the republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two great classes of tramps and millionaires. . . . We have witnessed for more than a quarter of a century the struggles of the two great political parties for power and plunder, while grievous wrongs have been inflicted upon the suffering people. We charge that the controlling influences dominating both these parties have permitted the existing dreadful conditions to develop without serious effort to prevent or restrain them. Neither do they now promise us any substantial reform. They have agreed together to ignore in the campaign every issue but one. They propose to drown the outcries of a plundered people with the uproar of a sham battle over the tariff, so that capitalists, corporations, national banks, rings, trusts, watered stock, the demonetization of silver, and the oppression of the usurers may all be lost sight of. They propose to sacri-

¹ This was apparently the Populist interpretation of the introduction of the Australian ballot, or alphabetic secret ballot, which Massachusetts had adopted in 1888 and which was in use in thirty-three of the states in 1892.

² An astonishing statement in view of the rapid growth of the unions in the American Federation of Labor since 1886 and of their recognition by the legislatures of several of the states (Massachusetts, New York, Kansas, Iowa) by the creation of boards of arbitration.

³ Referring to the employment of armed Pinkerton guards by the Carnegie Steel Company in the Homestead strike, which was raging at the time the Populist convention met (see page 244).

fice our homes, lives, and children on the altar of mammon; to destroy the multitude in order to secure corruption funds from the millionaires."

After this scathing arraignment of the old parties in its preamble, the Populist platform went on to formulate those demands for reform in the currency, land legislation, the control of monopolies, and the extension of popular government which we have already noted in our study of the rise of the party. They had hopes at first that Walter Q. Gresham of Illinois would consent to be their candidate. Gresham had been a lifelong Republican. He had campaigned for Frémont in 1856; had served as colonel and brigadier general in the Civil War, until severely wounded in the engagement before Atlanta; had filled successively the positions of Postmaster-General and Secretary of the Treasury in President Arthur's administration; had been a serious contestant for the Republican nomination in 1884 and 1888 (standing at the head of the poll for a time in the latter year); and had been for the past eight years Federal judge of the United States Circuit Court at Chicago. Disapproving the policies of the Harrison administration, he had broken with the Republican party, but had not yet joined the Democrats. If the Populists could have captured him at this moment of his political transition, their cause would have been immensely strengthened; and both Republicans and Democrats felt a sense of relief when the judge refused to head the new ticket. An element representing generally the younger men of the party wished to make a fresh start with a candidate who was unembarrassed by prominent connection with any of the unsuccessful campaigns of protest of the past fifteen or twenty years. Their choice was Senator James H. Kyle of South Dakota. But the older advocates of continuity had their way in the convention, and Kyle was easily defeated (995 to 265) by General James B. Weaver, the veteran candidate of the Greenbackers in 1880.

The campaign was devoid of features of special interest. Both the leading candidates had occupied the White House for a term. Their policies and personalities were familiar to the country. Both were men of the nonspectacular, solid, conserva-

tive type. Both had made enemies by a certain brusqueness of manner and lack of accommodation, and each was supported by a considerable fraction of his party rather with the conviction of his availability than with enthusiasm for his leadership. Colonel Robert G. Ingersoll wrote to his friend Thomas B. Reed with humorous exaggeration, that each party wanted to defeat its rival without electing its own candidate. The outlook was ominous for the Republicans. They had suffered a severe defeat in the mid-term elections. They had almost emptied the Treasury. The very volume and variety of their legislation in 1890 offered opportunities for criticism from many angles. They had, to be sure, regained in the elections of 1891 a little of the ground lost in 1890, and still insisted that the protest against the McKinley act was only a temporary manifestation encouraged by deceptive propaganda. They also counted on the Democratic disaffection in New York, hoping that Cockran's prophecy in the Chicago convention would prove true.

Two factors in the campaign, one of which has been duly recognized by the historians, and the other scarcely noticed, militated against the Republicans. The first was a strike in the Carnegie steel works at Homestead, Pennsylvania, which, starting from a rather insignificant cause, had dire results. About the middle of June a reduction in wages was ordered, which affected less than 10 per cent of the men employed. When the union of American Steel and Iron Workers intervened to seek an adjustment, Henry C. Frick, the manager, shut down the works, throwing thousands of faithful employees out of work simply because they belonged to the union. Carnegie himself, who was in Scotland, would have undoubtedly composed the quarrel, but Mr. Frick despised the unions and relied on the policy of coercion. He determined to replace the strikers with non-union men, for whose protection he built a stockade around the works and conveyed about three hundred Pinkerton men up the Monongahela in armored barges. The strikers opened fire on the Pinkertons when they attempted to land on the morning of July 6, and drove them back to the barges, where they remained "huddled like sheep" all day, deserted by their tug,

and exposed to attack by cannon, rifle fire, dynamite, and burning oil. Toward evening they hoisted the white flag and were allowed to land. But they had to "run a gauntlet of infuriated men and women" before they reached the train which was to take them to Pittsburgh. Ten men were killed and about seventy wounded in the day's battle. The strike was ended only when the state National Guard, eight thousand strong, was dispatched to Homestead by the governor. A violent strike caused by a reduction of wages in a highly protected industry was an embarrassing event for the party which claimed that the McKinley act was a blessing for the American laboring man, while the behavior of a great corporation in hiring a "private army to shoot down American workmen" furnished unrivaled campaign material for the Democrats. President Harrison, in an interview with Arthur W. Dunn shortly after the election, attributed his defeat entirely to the Homestead strike, though it is probable that Senator Cullom was nearer the truth when he wrote to the President on November 11: "Any man standing on the doctrine of high protection would have been defeated. The people sat down upon the McKinley bill two years ago and they have never gotten up. They were thoroughly imbued with the idea that the party did not do right in revising the tariff up instead of down. They beat us for it in 1890, and now again."¹

Another factor in the campaign, and one that seldom enters into American politics, was religion. The government had for years intrusted the education of Indian children to the so-called contract schools maintained by the churches. All the denominations had an equal right to make these contracts, but the Roman Catholics had shown far the greatest missionary zeal, and controlled most of the schools. President Harrison had appointed as Indian commissioner an old companion in arms, Thomas J. Morgan, a zealous Baptist clergyman. Morgan, backed by the bitterly anti-Catholic organization known as the A. P. A. (American Protective Association), set to work to abolish the contract schools and had several teaching-priests summarily expelled. The Catholic prelates remonstrated with President Harrison,

¹ S. M. Cullom, "Fifty Years of Public Service," p. 259.

but he refused to remove his Indian commissioner. Thereupon an energetic and persuasive white-haired priest, Father Stephen, visited various parts of the country, armed with letters of recommendation from the prelates, and told the story of Commissioner Morgan and the contract schools, which cost the Harrison ticket thousands of Catholic votes.¹

The Democratic victory in November was complete. Cleveland carried not only the "solid South" and the "doubtful states" of the North (New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Indiana) but also California, Illinois, and Wisconsin, with five votes from Michigan² and one each from Ohio and North Dakota. The vote in the electoral college was 277 for Cleveland, 145 for Harrison, and 22 for Weaver. The popular figures were 5,556,543, 5,175,582, and 1,040,886 respectively. The Democrats retained their control of the House by a reduced but ample margin (121) and secured a majority in the Senate, which they had held but once (1879-1881) since the Civil War and which they were not to hold again until the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson in 1913. For the first time since the administration of James Buchanan the Democrats on the fourth of March, 1893, would have the executive and both branches of Congress.

The populists made a remarkable showing in the election. They carried the four states of Colorado, Kansas, Idaho, and Nevada, with one electoral vote in each of the States of Oregon and South Dakota. But the figures exaggerate the strength of the new party. In five states where the Populists were numerous (Colorado, Kansas, Idaho, North Dakota, and Wyoming) the Democrats put no ticket in the field, and in Nevada they very generally supported the Populist candidates. The tactics of the Democrats in fusing with the Populists were correct; for in case of the Republican failure to secure a majority in the

¹ The legislatures of the states of Illinois and Wisconsin had passed bills hostile to the Catholics—a fact which helps to explain why both of these strongly Republican states cast their vote for Cleveland in 1892.

² The division of Michigan's electoral vote into 9 for Harrison and 5 for Cleveland was due to a law of the state legislature in 1892 providing for the choice of electors by districts instead of on a general ticket.

electoral college, the choice of a president would devolve upon the House, where the Democrats were firmly intrenched. It is doubtful whether the Populists in a genuine three-cornered contest would have carried any states, though their minorities would have been large. At any rate, Cleveland would still have won the election handsomely, even if every one of the states carried by the Populists had gone Republican. It was a clear Democratic victory.

Nevertheless the history of the next four years was to prove that the Populists had won a victory too. In state after state of the West they had been indorsed, underwritten, and voted for by the Democrats; while in the South, where the race question prevented any actual defection from the Democrats, their strength was shown by the influence which they exerted in the primaries and the conventions. It is instructive to read in the autobiographies prepared for the Directory of the Fifty-second Congress by the Southern representatives the repeated claims of devotion to the agrarian interests of the section and of prominent connection with its granges and alliances. Instead of the lawyer and the politician, there had come up to Washington the farmer. It was this permeation of the victorious Democratic party with the leaven of radical discontent that was the real victory of the Populists. Like the woodman in the fable, the Democratic party had warmed in its bosom the viper which was to sting it. The very success of the Democrats brought their allies into a proud position where they could advance their cause by demands on the patronage and a constant propaganda in Congress. In the election of 1894, although the Democrats experienced a decisive defeat, the Populists increased their vote by over 40 per cent; and in the national convention of 1896 they captured the Democratic party, scornfully repudiated its great leader, wrote its platform, and committed it in a body to the main doctrine of Populism as the paramount issue of the campaign.

PRESERVING THE PUBLIC CREDIT

Days of reckoning overtake nations as well as individuals. The retribution for responsibilities avoided, evils tolerated, principles compromised, in the foolish "trust that somehow good will be the final goal of ill," comes sooner or later. For a dozen years or so after the recovery from the panic of 1873 the country had been prosperous. Capital had been abundant, investments had multiplied, foreign commerce had increased steadily, and the surplus in the Treasury had averaged more than \$100,000,000 annually. But during this period the government had failed to inspire confidence in the people by a disinterested and scientific system of taxation, a courageous regulation of big business, or a sound and consistent currency policy. Considerations of immediate partisan advantage had outweighed the clear claims of the public weal. Politics had usurped the place of statesmanship. At the end of the prosperous decade of the eighties there was more uneasiness, more discontent, more apprehension in the country than there had been in many a period of hard times. The causes of this discontent were complex. They are not easy to analyze, and are obscured rather than clarified by the exaggerated tirade of the Populist platform. A few figures, however, will help in the appreciation of the distressing situation of the government and the country when Grover Cleveland was inaugurated for his second term.

The plight of the Western farmer we have already noted. But the Eastern banker, the manufacturer, the railroad magnate and even the government itself were facing a situation equally appalling. The usual story of a long period of prosperity followed by the sharp revulsion of panic was about to repeat itself. Fluid capital had been too freely converted into fixed forms. The prospects of great profits had tempted to over-investment, and business success had fostered extravagant spending. Margins of reserve had been wiped out. The government itself had set the example for the country. During the four years of Harrison's administration, while the national income had remained about stationary, the expenditures had mounted steadily



GROVER CLEVELAND

to the level of the receipts. Our rich government was actually "strapped" at the beginning of 1893, living from hand to mouth and postponing its current obligations, like a reckless society spender. The bumper crops of 1891 had momentarily sent our exports up from \$872,000,000 to \$1,061,000,000 in 1892 and given a fictitious fillip of prosperity to the overcapitalized railroads; but the exports declined to \$831,000,000 the next year, and stood, for the first time in fifteen years, below our imports, leaving an adverse balance of \$35,000,000 to be met in gold.

This slump in trade was temporary, to be sure, and was not the most ominous factor in the situation. The condition of our Treasury caused an apprehension at home and abroad which played havoc with business confidence—the apprehension, namely, that the government would not meet its obligations in gold. The student will recall that Secretary Sherman in 1879 had accumulated a fund of \$140,000,000 in gold for the redemption of the United States notes (greenbacks). From that time on, it had been the policy of the government to maintain a gold reserve of at least \$100,000,000. By the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 we had added to the \$346,000,000 of outstanding greenbacks a further paper issue of Treasury notes in payment for 54,000,000 ounces of silver annually. As these notes were redeemable in "coin," it seemed to be within the discretion of the Treasury to pay them in gold or silver; but the government's declaration of its intention to maintain the two metals at a "parity" made it impossible for the Treasury to refuse to pay gold if it were demanded. By the summer of 1893 there were \$147,000,000 of these Treasury notes outstanding, which, with the \$346,000,000 of greenbacks, made a total of \$493,000,000, backed only by a gold reserve approximately one fifth as large.

Indications of waning confidence were not lacking before 1893. The tendency to hoard gold had begun. Previous to the passage of the Sherman act more than five sixths of the customs duties had been paid in gold, but from 1891 on they were paid more and more in paper. By the beginning of 1892 the gold receipts from this source had shrunk to 20 per cent, and by the

end of the year to an insignificant 4 per cent. This ominous shrinkage in gold receipts was coincident with the increase in national expenditures which was draining the surplus in the Treasury. The uncertainty in business circles as to the ability or the intention of the government to maintain a gold standard was shown by the insertion of gold clauses in contracts, as in the days of the greenback inflation after the Civil War. Moreover, a train of events abroad added to the embarrassment. The great financial house of Baring Brothers in London tottered on the verge of bankruptcy in 1890, owing to a collapse of Argentine credit, and the shock was felt throughout the British Empire. In 1892 Austria-Hungary adopted a gold basis, while France and Russia drew together in a financial pact which assured millions of French capital for the development of Russian railroads and industrial plants. All these events stimulated a European demand for gold. Foreign holders of American stocks and bonds began to liquidate their holdings here, and our commercial creditors abroad asked for the settlement of trade balances in gold instead of American securities. Our gold shipments to Europe in 1892 increased 74 per cent over those of 1890. The great Eastern bankers met the situation by calling loans and curtailing credits.

Only a trifling amount of greenbacks had been presented to the Treasury for redemption in the dozen years since the resumption of specie payment, and these had been immediately reissued (by the law of 1878). Their presence in our circulating medium, therefore, had not caused the slightest uneasiness as to the adequacy of the gold reserve. But when the Treasury notes began to add a burden of some \$50,000,000 annually to the amount of paper redeemable in gold, there was a decided change. During the three years of the operation of the Sherman act more than \$132,000,000 of gold was drawn from the Treasury, while nearly \$150,000,000 of depreciating silver was being stored in its vaults.¹ If this "run" upon the Treasury should

¹ It had been the contention of the silverites that the government's purchase of virtually the total product of the American mines would raise the price of the metal and keep it on a parity with gold at a ratio of 16 to 1. But their prediction

continue, it could have but one result—the reduction of the supply of gold to a point where it would be impossible for our government to meet its obligations in the currency which was recognized as standard by the civilized nations of the earth.¹ Already the shadow of such a calamity had loomed. The gold reserve threatened to fall below \$100,000,000 toward the end of Harrison's term, and Secretary Foster had the plates all prepared for engraving bonds to replenish the supply, when a group of New York bankers came to the rescue of the administration. Harrison was able to leave just \$100,982,410 in the gold reserve when he retired from office.

The next month (April 21, 1893) the reserve fell for the first time below the \$100,000,000 mark, and in the first week of May the sudden bankruptcy of the National Cordage Company, whose stock had sold at 147 in January, precipitated one of the worst panics in our history. During May and June nineteen national banks and a large number of trust companies and state banks, especially in the West and South, suspended, while failures of industrial and commercial houses multiplied. Anxiety was increased by the rumor that the Secretary of the Treasury, J. G. Carlisle, a theoretical bimetallist, would cease to redeem notes in gold—a rumor which President Cleveland quieted by a public statement to the contrary. On June 26 came the final blow to bimetallism, when the great Indian empire closed its mints to the coinage of silver and threw vast quantities of the depreciated metal upon a glutted world market. Four days later Cleveland sent out the call for a special session of Congress to convene on August 7,² for the purpose of repealing the Sherman Silver Purchase Act.

had not been fulfilled. The price of silver had steadily declined. The value of the silver "dollar" in the five years from 1889 to 1893 was 72, 83, 76, 67, and 60 cents respectively.

¹ A conference of twenty-two nations met at Brussels in November, 1892, on the initiative of the United States to fix the value of silver by international agreement. But the conference was satisfied to retain the gold standard.

² It was only after Cleveland's death that the reason for the postponement of the meeting of the session until nearly six weeks after the call was known. It was owing to the necessity of the President's undergoing an immediate operation for

In view of the conditions which we have outlined, it is certain that Cleveland was in the right when he declared in his message of August 8 to the special session his belief that the unfortunate plight of the country was "principally chargeable to congressional legislation touching the purchase and coinage of silver." He reviewed the situation, which was "leading directly to the entire substitution of silver for gold in the government's Treasury." "This matter rises above the plane of party politics," he said; "it vitally concerns every business and calling and enters every household of the land." He earnestly recommended the prompt repeal of the Sherman act.

It was not difficult to get the repeal through the House (August 28) by a vote of 239 to 108, with the support of more than four fifths of the Republican members. The opposition came from the President's own party, and especially from a young congressman from Nebraska who was then serving his second term in the House. Long after the older silverites had abandoned the fight William J. Byran kept it up by every device of parliamentary practice.¹ His three-hour speech of August 16 was a masterpiece of oratory, replete with eloquence, confidence—and specious logic.² The long struggle in the Senate

the removal of a cancerous growth from the roof of his mouth. The operation was performed in the strictest secrecy on board Commodore Benedict's yacht in Long Island Sound, in order to prevent the increase of panic which the knowledge of the President's condition would have caused. Vice President Stevenson was a "friend of silver," and in the event of his succession to the presidency the country might have gone on a silver basis.

¹ "Poor old Dick Bland," says the journalist A. W. Dunn, "could no longer fight when he knew that certain defeat stared him in the face. The silver banner fell from his almost nerveless hands. But it was quickly raised aloft by Bryan, who bore it forward with all the animation of one whose visions are realities. Perhaps that is why Bryan instead of Bland was the nominee in 1896" (A. W. Dunn, "From Harrison to Harding," Vol. II, p. 122).

² For example, he argued that the objection to the Treasury notes, on the ground that they were used to draw gold out of the Treasury, was "hardly important enough for consideration" in view of the \$346,000,000 of greenbacks in circulation. "If all the Treasury notes were destroyed," he said, "the greenbacks are sufficient to draw out the \$100,000,000 reserve three times over, and then they may be issued and used again. To complain of the Treasury notes while the greenbacks remained is like finding fault because the gate is wide open

was due to the fact that the silverites held the balance of power in an almost equal division of the parties. The admission of the mining states of the Northwest in 1889 and 1890 had increased the silver strength in the Senate to grotesque proportions. Seven silver states, comprising less than 2 per cent of the population of the country, elected fourteen of the eighty-eight senators. Moreover, as the rules of the Senate permitted unlimited debate, these tireless champions of silver could fill week after week with interminable speeches against repeal. Vice President Stevenson was begged to find a way to end the filibuster, but as he was content to see the measure talked to death, he did nothing. Finally the potent influence of the executive bore down the opposition. One by one the less ardent silverites were won over to the administration. A group of Southern senators who had promised help to the silverites in return for votes against the Federal Election Bill (p. 208, note) found the bargain too hard. They were being unmercifully handled by the Southern press for alienating the President, depriving their constituents of patronage, and disrupting the Democratic party, only to help a handful of Republican senators in a fight in which the South had no interest. They came over to the administration. On October 30 the repeal bill passed the Senate by a vote of 48 to 37 (including pairs). The Democrats were equally divided for and against the bill (22 each). Of the Republicans, 26 supported and 12 opposed it; and the three Populist senators voted in the negative. Cleveland signed the bill on November 1, and the government ceased its futile attempt to give an enhanced value to silver by the fiat of legislation.

when the whole fence is down." Mr. Bryan simply overlooked the fact that the greenbacks were *not* used to draw the gold out of the Treasury until the silver notes were added to the paper currency, and that while the amount of the greenbacks remained stationary, the volume of the Treasury notes increased by some \$50,000,000 annually. The greenbacks had come to be regarded as a fixed alloy in our currency system. There was no fear after 1875 that they would be used as an entering wedge for an unlimited issue of paper. But it was just the fear that the Sherman act would be the entering wedge for the free coinage of silver (which Mr. Bryan devoutly wished) that was driving gold into hiding and paralyzing the business confidence of the country.

The President had his victory, but in winning it he had widened the rift in his party. The silver Democrats went over in large numbers to the Populists. In both Houses of Congress the repeal bill had received a larger percentage of Republican than of Democratic votes, and had been actually carried in the Senate by the Republicans. If the reform of the currency had been the only issue of the administration, Cleveland would have been popular enough with the great financial and commercial interests of the country to be their candidate for the next election. But the repeal of the Sherman act was an emergency measure, forced upon the President by the threatened ruin of the national credit in the spring of 1893. The issue upon which Cleveland had been elected in 1892 was not silver but the tariff. He would have preferred to summon Congress in extra session for the reform of taxation rather than of the currency in the summer of 1893; but, as he wrote in his message of August 8, while tariff reform had "lost nothing of its immediate and permanent importance," the first duty of the country was to put an end to the purchase of depreciating millions of silver. That duty done, he turned his first annual message (December 4, 1893) to the subject of his permanent interest. A tariff bill had already been prepared by the Committee on Ways and Means, and the President urged that its success be assured "by means of unselfish counsel on the part of the friends of tariff reform and as a result of their willingness to subordinate personal desires and ambitions to the general good."

William L. Wilson of West Virginia, chairman of the committee and Cleveland's most valued supporter in the House,¹ introduced the bill on December 19 in a notable speech. The main features of the Wilson bill were (1) the substitution in large measure of *ad valorem* for specific duties;² (2) the free admis-

¹ Wilson later entered the cabinet as Postmaster-General in the place of Cleveland's old law partner, W. S. Bissell of Buffalo.

² An *ad valorem* duty is one levied on the value of the commodity imported; a specific duty, one levied on its weight or measure without regard to value. The one is qualitative, the other quantitative. Many articles in the tariff schedule are subject to both kinds of duties.

sion of important raw materials like iron ore, coal, lumber, and wool; (3) the reduction of the high duties of the McKinley bill on cotton and woolen goods, food and household articles, iron and steel manufactures, china, glass, silk, and linens; (4) the imposition of a tax of 2 per cent on incomes of \$4000 or over, to make up for the loss of revenue (estimated at \$50,000,000) caused by the reduction in duties. The McKinley bill had admitted raw sugar free (compensating the producers of sugar in this country by a bounty of two cents a pound), but had left the duty on refined sugar for the benefit of the American Sugar Refining Company (the Sugar Trust). The Wilson bill both repealed the bounty and put refined sugar on the free list. The bill was far from being a "free-trade bill," as its opponents insisted on calling it. On the whole, it was considerate of the interests of established industries, and the average of its rates was higher than that of the Republican tariff of 1883. It would have been called a high-tariff bill in the generation before the Civil War.

The Wilson bill passed the House on February 1, 1894, by a vote of 182 to 106, but, like the repeal bill of the previous summer, it ran against a snag in the Senate. The opposition to Cleveland in the upper House had grown into a habit. He had begun his presidential career with a successful defiance of the Senate's claim to interfere with his executive prerogative (p. 168), and he had not been sparing in his criticism of that body's obstruction of the administration's program or delicate in the methods by which he had broken the opposition down. Under the not altogether unjustifiable plea that the Wilson bill would fail to furnish adequate revenue at a time when revenue was sorely needed, the Senate launched a savage attack on the schedules. Cleveland, with prophetic apprehensions, had begged in his message for an exhibition of "generosity" on the part of Congress. "The local interests affected by the proposed reforms are so numerous and varied," he said, "that if they are all insisted upon the legislation embodying the reforms must inevitably fail." His plea was in vain. The senators from West Virginia, Maryland, and Alabama insisted upon the restoration of the

duties on iron ore and coal. The senators from Louisiana insisted upon the continuation of sugar bounty. Senator Brice of Ohio insisted upon the protection of the sheep-raisers. And Senator Murphy of New York insisted upon the protection of the collar industry of his native city of Troy. Murphy's colleague, Senator Hill, denounced the income tax as "paternalistic, discriminating, inquisitorial, and populistic."¹ Senator Gorman of Maryland, who, like Hill, had been a rival of Cleveland's for the nomination, marshaled the forces of the opposition and directed the fight against the bill all along the line. Thus, the Democrats of the Senate wrecked the President's program for tariff reform, while the Republican minority coöperated with ironical rejoicing.

When the bill came from the Senate (July 3, 1894), after five months of "revision," it was no more like the Wilson bill than Hamlet to Hercules. It bore six hundred and thirty-four amendments. Most of the McKinley rates had been restored. Refined sugar,² iron ore, and coal were back on the protected list. Wool and lumber alone survived in the campaign for free raw materials. The House protested in vain against the mutilation of the bill. In spite of (or, perhaps, because of) a letter from the President to Mr. Wilson, condemning the amendments as "alike a violation of Democratic principles and Democratic faith," signifying "party perfidy and party dishonor," the Senate refused to budge from its position. The House must take the bill as it was or have no bill at all. And rather than have no bill at all, the House capitulated. Thus we see from the history of the

¹ As a matter of fact, the demand for a graduated income tax was a plank of the Populist platform of Omaha, and does not appear in the Democratic platform of 1892. It was added to the Wilson bill by an amendment in January, 1894, more for the purpose of increasing the revenue than as a concession to the Populists. The latter were not particularly interested in the revenue. They wanted an income tax for the sake of tapping the swollen fortunes of the rich.

² The duty of one eighth of a cent a pound meant an annual profit of \$20,000,000 to the Sugar Trust. During the debate on the sugar schedule the rumor developed that some senators were taking advantage of their inside knowledge to speculate in sugar stocks. The Senate appointed a committee of investigation, which conducted a gentle probe into the scandal. Quay of Pennsylvania boasted rather than confessed that he had bought sugar for a rise, but asserted

Gorman bill (the first name in the title "Wilson-Gorman Bill" appears only by courtesy) that, though revenue bills must by the Constitution originate in the House, they may well eventuate in the Senate.

President Cleveland refused to sign the bill, and it became a law after the statutory ten days' lapse (August 28). He has been criticized for not interposing his veto, which would have been effective. He had not hesitated to split his party on the issue of the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. Why should he not have been equally insistent in the case of the tariff? The reason is clear. To allow the continuance of the Sherman act was to invite the collapse of the nation's credit; while to veto the Wilson-Gorman Bill would have been to leave the McKinley act in operation. Cleveland's conscience would not allow him to sign the new bill, but neither would he by a veto deprive the country of the advantage of the slight reduction (about 10 per cent) from the McKinley rates. He recognized the dilemma in which the sincere tariff reformers were placed, as expressed by Senator Mills of Texas in the course of the debate: "I will vote against the amendments, but when they are incorporated in the bill, I will vote for the bill if it has five cents of reduction in it."

It was an inauspicious moment, anyway, for the reduction of taxation as compared with the prosperous days of Cleveland's first administration. Instead of a surplus of over \$100,000,000, the Treasury was facing an estimated deficit of \$29,000,000. The acute crisis was over in the autumn of 1893, but the country was left in a state of industrial paralysis.¹ Confidence had

that this had in no way affected his vote on the schedule! A member of a brokerage firm was put in jail because he refused to disclose the evidence of purchases for senators' accounts.

¹ More than six hundred banks failed in 1893, and the losses in the bankruptcy of mercantile houses totaled nearly \$350,000,000. Great railroad systems like the Philadelphia and Reading and the Erie went into the hands of receivers. Railroad-building came almost to a standstill, and company after company passed their dividends. "As late as the middle of 1895 receivers were operating 169 roads with 37,855 miles of track—more than one fifth of the country's total railroad mileage and represented on the market by no less than \$2,400,000,000 stocks and bonds" (Alexander D. Noyes, "Forty Years of American Finance," p. 276).

not returned in financial circles. The gold reserve in the Treasury had fallen to \$70,000,000; and on January 17, 1894, Secretary Carlisle had been forced to the expedient, avoided by his predecessor, of issuing bonds to replenish the supply. To complete the dismal picture, the country was passing through one of the severest periods of labor unrest in its history.

The panic of 1893 had forced tens of thousands of men out of employment. The resentment which the victims of economic depression feel toward the "system" which has made them suffer was keener than it had been in the great panic of twenty years before, both because the menace of consolidated capital had become more conspicuous and because the programs of protest were more definite and determined. Legislation like the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act had for the first time recognized the public responsibility of the great transportation and industrial companies by bringing their conduct within the sphere of Federal control. Violent clashes like the Haymarket riot and the Homestead strike had confirmed labor unions in their belief that their capitalistic enemies were ready to employ any means to cow them into submission. And finally, the score of conferences, conventions, and alliances between the laboring and farming classes had increased the sense of their common oppression by the masters of capital.

In the straitened winter of 1893-1894 the country, especially the West and the Southwest, was seething with discontent. There were signs of political revolt. The Populist governor of Colorado, Davis H. Waite, repeating the conduct of Governor Hamilton of South Carolina sixty years before, bade defiance to the Federal government. Colorado, he said, should establish her own mints and open them to the free and unlimited coinage of silver dollars.¹ Bands of men wandered here and there, sometimes in fruitless quest of work, sometimes in mere

¹ The same defiant governor earned the title of "Bloody Bridles" Waite, because when he called out the state militia to arrest a sheriff's posse who were trying to restore order in a miners' strike at Cripple Creek (1894), he declared: "It is infinitely better that blood should flow to the horses' bridles rather than that our liberties should be destroyed."

aimless discontent—at times menacing, oftener only meandering, but always a spectacle more appropriate to the medieval days of the peasants' revolts than to industrial America at the close of the nineteenth century. One of these bands of "hoboes," the "Army of the Commonwealth of Christ," under the command of General Jacob Coxey of Ohio, gained a momentary notoriety by marching from Massillon, Ohio, to Washington in the spring of 1894 to demand that the national government issue \$500,000-000 of irredeemable paper money to set the unemployed men of the country to work on the improvement of the roads. "The crusade of squalor ended in a farce." Such remnants of Coxey's "army" as reached the capital quickly disbanded when their general and several of his lieutenants were arrested on May-Day morning for walking on the grass of the Capitol lawn.

There were no farcical elements, however, in the labor war which broke out in Chicago a few weeks later. The Pullman Palace Car Company was a prosperous concern which built parlor, dining, and sleeping cars, and leased them to the railroads. The company was a pioneer in "welfare work," having built the pleasant town of Pullman in the suburbs of Chicago, where its employees were housed in model dwellings—at a rather high rent. In May, 1894, the company, pleading a serious loss of profits on account of the panic and the distressing condition of the railroads, made a reduction of about 20 per cent in wages.¹ A committee of the workmen waited upon Mr. Pullman to ask for the restoration of the old rates, but the only response that they got for their "impertinence" was the discharge (in violation of Mr. Pullman's promise) of three of their number. Whereupon about 85 per cent of the employees struck, and the rest were promptly locked out.

Four thousand of the Pullman workers were members of the American Railway Union, an organization of some hundred and fifty thousand railway employees under the presidency of Eugene V. Debs, a shrewd, magnetic leader, with a talent for

¹ At the same time the large salaries of the officers were not reduced. An investigation of the company's condition by a commission headed by Carroll D. Wright, in July, revealed the fact that the company was highly prosperous.

political strategy, who had himself driven a locomotive in the days before he went into politics and gained a seat in the Indiana legislature. The Pullman strike was not a railroad quarrel at all; but on an account of the representation of the Pullman employees on its membership, the union decided to intervene. It invited Mr. Pullman to arbitrate the matter. Foreseeing the dangerous consequences of a general railroad strike, the Civic Federation of Chicago and the mayors of about fifty cities begged Mr. Pullman to accept the invitation. But his reply was, "We have nothing to arbitrate." Thereupon the American Railway Union forbade its men to handle any trains carrying Pullman cars (June 26). As all the important trains of the country ran Pullman cars, a complete tie-up of through traffic was threatened. Four days after the union's order only six of the twenty-three railroads centering in Chicago were operating their trains, and the strike had spread to twenty-seven states and territories, affecting twenty-five thousand miles of road. The railroad employees refrained from violence by Mr. Debs's order. Public sympathy was pretty largely with them on account of the arbitrary attitude of the Pullman Company, and it looked at the close of June as if the union would force the railroads to force Mr. Pullman to come to terms.

Then suddenly, and for reasons which are not wholly clear, the orderly strike was converted into an orgy of violence. Locomotives were ditched, cars looted and demolished, while the local police tried in vain to cope with the situation. According to the interpretation of the union the rioting was due to the Railroad Managers' Association, which, to save themselves from defeat, hired agents to foment violence, in order to get the government to intervene with armed forces to quell the strike; according to the railroads it was the work of the strikers themselves, who got out of hand and resorted to terrorism. At any rate, there was enough inflammable material in Chicago in 1894 -- the riffraff and criminal element attracted to the city by the great Columbian Exposition of the year before -- to make it certain that Debs's counsel of moderation could not long prevail.

Since the fast trains which carried the Pullman cars also

carried the United States mails, the Federal government was also drawn into the strike. A statute of 1871, originally enacted to curb the Ku-Klux Klan, empowered the president to use the land or naval forces of the United States to suppress insurrection, domestic violence, or conspiracy, whenever they obstructed or hindered the execution of the law. The Federal government is responsible for the delivery of the mail, and President Cleveland is said to have remarked that if it took every dollar in the Treasury and every soldier in the land to deliver a postal card in Chicago, that postal card should be delivered. Cleveland had in Richard Olney of Massachusetts an Attorney-General of no less dogged determination. Olney telegraphed instructions to district attorneys all through the area affected by the strike to see that the passage of trains carrying the mails was not obstructed; and to Edwin Walker, his special counsel in Chicago, he suggested the application to a Federal judge for an injunction forbidding "all and sundry persons" to interfere with the government's business. The injunction was issued on July 2 and posted on the sides of the cars. The next day it was read to the mob by a Federal marshal, but was received with hoots and jeers. That afternoon Cleveland ordered troops from Fort Sheridan to enter Chicago. On the morning of the Fourth they were encamped on the lake front. The presence of the regular soldiers quelled the rioting, as usual, but not until after it had been necessary to fire upon the mob with a fatal effect. Debs and three of his associates were arrested on July 10 for a violation of the prohibition of conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce contained in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.¹ A week later they were brought before Judge Woods on the charge of con-

¹ The act of 1890, as its name implies, was aimed at combinations of capital and not of labor. The union was not considered a "trust" before this application of the Sherman law in the Chicago strike. By the Clayton Act of 1914 labor and agricultural organizations were specifically exempted from the penalties attaching to "illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade and commerce" (sect. 6), and no injunction was to be granted "in cases involving a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property." It is an interesting fact that the indictment against Debs for violating the Sherman act was dismissed.

tempt of court for disregarding the injunction. On refusal to give bail they were sent to prison, and, in the words of Debs, "as soon as the employees found that we were arrested and taken from the scene of action they became demoralized and that ended the strike." Three days after Debs was put in prison the troops were withdrawn from Chicago.

A novel incident of the strike was a sharp passage at arms between President Cleveland and the governor of Illinois, John P. Altgeld, who had given great offense to the conservatives by pardoning the anarchists Schwab and Fielding, who had been condemned to a life term for their participation in the Haymarket affair of 1886. Governor Altgeld resented Cleveland's dispatch of troops to Chicago, asserting that "Illinois was able to take care of herself," and that the President had no constitutional right to send troops into a state except at the solicitation of the legislature or the governor thereof (Constitution, Art. IV, sect. iv). The correspondence between Cleveland and Altgeld, which is set forth in detail in the former's "Presidential Problems" (pp. 109-113), reveals Altgeld in a most unfavorable contrast to the governors who coöperated with President Hayes in quelling the great railroad strike of 1877. But a more serious incident of the strike of 1894 was the controversy which it raised (and which has never been settled to the satisfaction of the American people) as to the constitutionality and justice of "government by injunction." For a judge to define and forbid an illegal act and to punish with fine or imprisonment for contempt of court a man who commits that act, seems to the opponents of the injunction a denial of the fundamental right of the American citizen to be held for crime only on a regular indictment, to be tried by a jury of his peers, and to be sentenced by the judge only if pronounced guilty. By the injunction procedure the judge both brings the accusation and pronounces the sentence. In answer to the critics of "judge-made law," the advocates of the injunction maintain that in cases where grave damage to property would result from an act, it is both wise and just to prevent that act by a legal order. Better to lock the stable door before the horse is stolen. It is at bottom a ques-

tion between strict legality and high expediency, and such questions are settled morally only before the tribunal of conscience. Meanwhile, the highest tribunal of the land has pronounced in favor of the injunction. The Supreme Court, by a unanimous decision of May 27, 1895, upheld the sentence of six months' imprisonment imposed upon Debs by Judge Woods the previous December, and the president of the American Railway Union served his term in jail.

The writer who tells the story of the "luckless years"¹ of President Cleveland's second administration must necessarily relate the events seriatim, but the reader will appreciate the seriousness of their cumulative effects only as he realizes that they were simultaneous. While mobs were wrecking trains in Chicago, and legislators were wrecking the Wilson tariff bill in the Senate, the deficit in the government's finances was nearing the \$70,000,000 mark; the gold reserve in the Treasury had sunk to a figure (\$64,873,025) lower even than it had stood when Secretary Carlisle had issued \$50,000,000 of bonds for its replenishment; the Democratic party was hopelessly split, and its leader was being denounced by the silverites as the "tool" of Wall Street, by the protectionists as the "dupe" of free-trade Britain, by the labor unions as a slave of the capitalists, by civil-service reformers as a renegade, and by patriotic societies as a man who had dishonored his country by hauling down its flag at Honolulu.² It is safe to say that the only thoroughly

¹ The expression is one that Cleveland used himself to characterize the years 1894-1895 ("Presidential Problems," p. 80).

² In January, 1893, a revolt in the Hawaiian Islands overthrew the despotic Queen Liliuokalani and established a provisional government under the protection of American marines landed from the cruiser *Boston* at the request of J. L. Stevens, our minister to Hawaii. The provisional government forthwith negotiated a treaty of annexation with the United States, which President Harrison submitted to the Senate on February 15. When Cleveland became president a few days later, he withdrew the treaty from the Senate "for the purpose of reëxamination," and sent a special envoy, James H. Blount of Georgia, to Hawaii "with paramount authority." Under Blount's orders the American flag was immediately lowered from the government building at Honolulu, and the American marines ordered to leave the city. Cleveland further attempted to restore the queen to her throne, but desisted when she refused to promise amnesty to the revolu-

popular act of President Cleveland's in these two "luckless years" was pushing the electric button which opened the World's Fair at Chicago on May Day, 1893.

The Republicans won a complete triumph in the congressional elections of 1894. They carried the House by the enormous majority of 248 to 104 and recovered the control of the Senate which they had lost in 1892. Hardly a dozen Democratic representatives were returned from the populous states of the North and the West. Only the rock-ribbed South remained unshaken. The mortality in the ranks of prominent Democrats in Congress was high. Wilson, Springer, Bland, Champ Clark, Bourke Cockran, and Tom Johnson lost their seats. Bryan, who was a candidate for the United States Senate, was defeated by a Republican legislature in Nebraska. After this cataclysm President Cleveland had not even the cold comfort of a split majority in the House and a recalcitrant majority in the Senate. Both branches were against him, and his influence with Congress ceased. For the remaining half of his administration he went his own way with his financial and foreign policies, while the Republicans left him to struggle with the difficulties which they claimed his own mistaken tariff policy had brought upon the country, and the Democrats of the West and the South drew closer to the radical doctrines of the Populists. The undaunted President, who had been the most popular figure in the country two years before, was rapidly becoming a man without a party.

The repeal of the Sherman act had stopped the accumulation of depreciating silver in the vaults of the United States. It was like turning off the tap that was flooding the kitchen floor, but it left the mopping up still to be done. As we have seen (p. 258),

tionists. The provisional government remained in power, and the United States gave it formal recognition, and eventually (1898) annexed the islands. Cleveland gave much offense by his efforts to weaken the provisional government and to restore the impossible queen. As H. T. Peck remarks: "The American people were not strongly in favor of annexing Hawaii. Apart from a few speculators in sugar, there was no great interest in the matter. The desire for territory had not yet stirred the popular imagination. Had Mr. Cleveland simply put the treaty in the fire and kept his hands off Hawaii altogether, the whole affair would have been speedily forgotten" ("Twenty Years of the Republic," p. 331).

the gold reserve stood at only \$70,000,000 in January, 1894. According to a law of 1875 there were three types of bond which the Secretary of the Treasury was allowed to sell for the purpose of redeeming United States notes; namely, a 5 per cent bond redeemable in ten years, a $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent bond redeemable in fifteen years, and a 4 per cent bond redeemable in thirty years. The first type was chosen now both because the government could exercise its option of retiring the bonds earlier and because the high rate of interest (a reflection of war-time finance) made it possible to demand a premium on the bonds. The price was fixed at a trifle above 117, and the sale netted \$58,660,917 in gold.¹ Less than three months after the Treasury had been replenished by this loan, the reserve was down to \$78,693,267 and was sinking rapidly. When it reached \$61,878,374, on the fourteenth of November, another \$50,000,000 issue of the same type of bonds was sold, adding another \$58,000,000 to the reserve. But instead of checking the run on the Treasury, these reinforcements of gold only served to accelerate it. While \$117,000,000 had been added to the gold reserve by the two bond sales, more than \$172,000,000 had been withdrawn during the year to be shipped abroad or hoarded at home. The process was simple. As soon as the subscribers paid their gold into the Treasury and received their bonds, they immediately presented notes to the Treasury to draw out the gold which they had paid in; and since by law the notes had to be reissued and kept in circulation, they served as a constant magnet to draw out the gold. The government was forced, in Cleveland's phrase, "to redeem without redemption and to pay without acquittance." On January 28, 1895, the President sent a special message to the new and hostile Congress, asking for relief from the intolerable situation. He called attention to the fact that although more than \$300,000,000 had been paid in gold for the redemption of the notes, these notes were still all outstanding, and that a bonded indebtedness of \$100,000,000, involving an annual interest charge of \$5,000,000, had been incurred during the

¹ The bids had come in so slowly that Secretary Carlisle had been obliged to appeal to the New York bankers in a personal conference.

year for the futile purpose of redemption. He expressed his unwillingness to issue more bonds of the antiquated and unattractive type of 1875 and recommended the authorization by Congress of the issue of fifty-year bonds at a low rate of interest, which should be used not merely for redeeming the notes but also for canceling and retiring them when redeemed. But Congress refused to heed his plea.

Then, with the reserve down to the "frightfully low sum of \$41,340,181," he took a step for which he was reviled as a crook in the pay of the money lenders, the victim of a "bunco game," and a traitor to the interests of the American people. He called J. Pierpont Morgan, the colossus of Wall Street, to the White House on the evening of February 7, 1895, to ask his advice on the feasibility of a new issue of bonds. During the interview, at which Secretary Carlisle and Attorney-General Olney were present, Mr. Morgan suggested that the government buy gold outright, paying for it in bonds.¹ Thereupon Cleveland entered into a contract with the Morgan-Belmont-Rothschild syndicate, by which the bankers agreed to furnish the Treasury with 3,500,000 ounces of gold coin, to be paid for in 4 per cent bonds running thirty years. The gold delivered to the government under this contract amounted to \$65,116,244, and the bonds delivered to the syndicate to \$62,315,400, making the price of the bonds to Morgan and his associates 104½ and the net interest 3¾ per cent.² As the 4 per cent bonds with twelve years to run were selling at 112 and over in the open market at the time of the contract, and as Mr. Morgan easily resold his new 4 per cents for about 118 to the public, President Cleveland was

¹ This was lawful, as Mr. Morgan pointed out, according to section 3700 of the Revised Statutes, which reads: "The Secretary of the Treasury may purchase coin with any of the bonds or notes of the United States authorized by law, at such rates and upon such conditions as he may deem most advantageous to the public interest."

² Morgan was willing and even anxious to accept 3 per cent bonds payable in "gold" instead of 4 per cent bonds payable in "coin," which would have saved the government eventually some \$16,000,000 in interest. But Congress by a vote of 120 to 167 refused to comply with Cleveland's request to authorize the gold bonds. The President had made his bed and he must lie in it.

roundly abused for the private "bank-parlor negotiations" which put \$7,500,000 profit into the pockets of the "Wall Street thimblerriggers" at the expense of the government and the people.

In his apology for the bond issues written nine years later President Cleveland admitted that Mr. Morgan drove a hard bargain, but justified the transaction on several counts. The bankers had furnished the gold promptly at a time when a popular loan might have failed; they brought half the supply from abroad, thus stopping the "endless chain" of gold withdrawals from the Treasury for the very purpose of buying the bonds for the gold replenishment; for several months they sold foreign bills of exchange at a loss to prevent gold from being shipped abroad; and they actually furnished more than \$15,000,000 of gold to the Treasury over and above their contract, in exchange for notes. During the six months or more of the operation of the contract no gold had been withdrawn from the Treasury; and although the process of depletion had begun again after the expiration of the contract, necessitating a final issue (January 6, 1896) of \$100,000,000 in 4 per cent bonds, which were taken by the public at 111 or better, the President believed that the very success of this last loan was due in great measure to the restoration of confidence in the Treasury through the Morgan contract. He never had "the slightest misgiving concerning the wisdom or propriety" of the Morgan transaction. "Without shame and without repentance," he wrote at the end of his essay on *The Bond Issues*, with that touch of irony which so irritated his enemies, "I confess my share of the guilt. . . . But though Mr. Morgan and Mr. Belmont and scores of other bankers and financiers who were accessories in these transactions may be steeped in destructive propensities and may be constantly busy in sinful schemes, I shall always recall with satisfaction and self-congratulation my association with them at a time when our country sorely needed their aid."¹

Whether or not the student is convinced by Cleveland's apol-

¹ Grover Cleveland, "Presidential Problems," p. 170.

ogy of the wisdom of the Morgan-Belmont contract,¹ the fact remains that the President, by his courageous adherence to what he believed to be our national and international obligations, without help from Congress, and in the face of the bitter opposition of a large section of his party, almost single-handed kept the government from going to what the advocates of silver called a bimetallic basis, but what would have resulted inevitably in silver monometallism. During the hectic period the Secretary of the Treasury had issued \$262,000,000 in bonds, increasing its annual interest obligations by more than \$11,500,000, in order to safeguard a gold reserve of \$100,000,000. After the spring of 1896 there was no further danger. The presidential campaign was approaching, and the financial interests were alert to thwart the hopes of the free silverites, who were aiming at the capture of the Democratic party. In a single week of July, 1896, the bankers of the country contributed \$25,000,000 to the gold reserve in exchange for notes. After the victory of McKinley in November the hoarded gold came out of hiding.

THE FREE-SILVER CAMPAIGN

Though the people at large felt the ultimate effects of the hard times of the first half of President Cleveland's administration, in unemployment, high rents, unprofitable crops, and uncertain investments, not one in a hundred had the least quali-

¹ The writer confesses that he is not. It seems to him that a wide appeal to public subscription by competitive bids, which was so successful in January, 1896, would have met with a favorable response a year earlier. Conditions were already improving at the beginning of 1895. Business was picking up. Exports were increasing. The Treasury surplus for the ordinary expenses of the government (not to be confused with the gold reserve), which had been but \$18,000,000 at the time of the first bond issue in February, 1894, was over \$100,000,000 a year later, when the Morgan contract was made. The government could probably have sold its 4 per cent bonds to the public in 1895 on terms almost as advantageous as Mr. Morgan did. Mr. Rhodes does not agree with this opinion. He believes that "the government was within a few days of bankruptcy, and only men who had control of the money market could save it." The student of the contemporary documents, he says, "can have no hesitation in justifying the contract which saved our country from dishonoring its obligations" (Rhodes, "From Hayes to McKinley," pp. 436, 437).



WILLIAM MCKINLEY

fication to judge intelligently the causes of the distressing situation. As environment, political leanings, or inherited party tradition dictated, they fell in behind the Republicans, who attributed it to Democratic tinkering with the tariff, or the Democrats, who charged it to the Republican nurture of the trusts. The protagonists spoke the parts in Congress, conventions, and editorial columns, and the people echoed their sentiments like a Greek chorus. About midway in the administration, however, there came an event which sent a shock through the American people, stirring elemental passions and revealing how perilously near the edge of the precipice of war the path of national honor runs.

For more than half a century the South American republic of Venezuela and the adjacent British colony of Guiana had been engaged in a boundary dispute. The utter disparity of strength between the British Empire and Venezuela made it impossible for the latter to bring more "pressure" to bear upon Downing Street than repeated requests to have the whole matter submitted to arbitration. As early as 1870 Venezuela, in notable contrast to the usual attitude of the Latin-American states toward their powerful northern neighbor since the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, appealed to the United States to interest itself in having "due justice" done in the case. But it was not until Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain in 1887 that we offered our mediation, which Lord Salisbury declined. Meanwhile, the uncovering of large deposits of gold and other mineral wealth in Venezuela had attracted British settlers far to the north of the "Schomburgk line" of 1841, which England had for a generation insisted on as the proper boundary. Lord Salisbury spoke of this expanding area of occupation as the "possession" of the British crown. It is true that the extreme claim of Venezuela extended farther into the territory of British Guiana than the British claim extended into Venezuela;¹ but the important point is that Vene-

¹ On this score and on the fact that the final settlement of the dispute practically conceded the Schomburgk line as the true boundary, Mr. Rhodes justifies Great Britain's position and condemns our government for entering into a dispute

zuela had no remotest prospect of enforcing her exaggerated claims, while Great Britain was steadily extending and making effective her own. Nevertheless, it is probably true, as Peck states, that when President Cleveland referred in a brief paragraph in his message of December, 1894, to his intent to renew the effort to bring the Venezuelan dispute to arbitration, "not one American in a million took any notice" of his words.¹

Before the next year was out, however, the Venezuelan controversy had roused the country to a high pitch of excitement. On July 20 Richard Olney (who had succeeded Gresham as Secretary of State) sent to Lord Salisbury a dispatch declaring that it was the business of the United States to intervene in a controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela to see that the integrity of the latter's territory was not "impaired by the pretensions of its powerful antagonist," and that the United States was "entitled to resent and resist any sequestration of Venezuelan soil by Great Britain." "The United States," he wrote, "is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law on those subjects to which it confines its interposition. . . . Its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against any or all other powers." Aside from the rather rash boast of the last sentence and in view of the fact that we had not a single first-class battleship completed at the time it was written, Secretary Olney's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as public law was an innovation. The doctrine was actually a pronouncement of President Monroe in a message of general "recommendations" to Congress in December, 1823. It had not even received the legislative indorsement of Congress.² Although it

which did not involve the Monroe Doctrine (see "From Hayes to McKinley," pp. 443-456). He overlooks the crucial point that Great Britain had long since refused to be confined by the Schomburgk line and was offering protection to tens of thousands of settlers who were penetrating the rich mining lands of Venezuela, as "her Majesty's subjects" in a colony which "could not be severed from the Queen's dominions"—the words of Lord Granville, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

¹ H. T. Peck, "Twenty Years of the Republic," p. 413.

² Henry Clay had attempted to have Congress incorporate the Monroe Doctrine as law in 1824, but without success.

had been generally respected by foreign nations, it had never been specifically recognized as international law—nor was it, indeed, until it was incorporated in 1919 into the covenant of the League of Nations, to which the United States has not become a party! Lord Salisbury's reply (which was delayed for more than four months) denied the right of the United States to take over Venezuela's case and rejected the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine contained in Olney's note. "No statesman, however eminent," said his lordship, "and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into the code of international law a novel principle which was never recognized before, and which has not since been accepted by the Government of any other country."

Thereupon President Cleveland, on December 17, 1895, submitted the correspondence to Congress with the declaration that although the Monroe Doctrine "may not have been admitted in so many words to the code of international law," if its enforcement was a thing we might justly claim as a right, it had its place in the code "as certainly as if it were specifically mentioned." The President's logic verged on the fallacy of the *petitio principii*, but he was not concerned with logic. He was convinced that Great Britain was deliberately encroaching upon the territory of a weak neighbor, and was determined that the encroachment should cease. This continent was closed to further colonization by European powers. Cleveland therefore asked Congress for an adequate appropriation for the expenses of a commission to determine, upon careful investigation, "the true boundary line between the Republic of Venezuela and British Guiana"; and expressed the opinion that when such a line had been determined, it would be "the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power" the violation of that line by Great Britain. "In making these recommendations," he said, "I am fully aware of the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the

onward march of civilization, . . . there is no calamity . . . which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice." Congress immediately and unanimously appropriated \$100,000, and the President appointed an able commission to investigate the boundary.¹

The holiday season was clouded with apprehension on both sides of the Atlantic. The American president had issued an ultimatum, couched in language which, coming from any European chancellery, would have meant war. The British foreign office had taken a firm position, from which retreat without humiliation seemed impossible. The English people and press had been in the habit of taking American foreign dispatches with a large grain of salt, as the crude communications of a young and rather "bumptious" nation; but when they realized the seriousness of President Cleveland's message and the significance of the immediate response of Congress, they began almost with one accord to work for peace. The public protest against the "unthinkable horror" of a war between England and the United States over a boundary line in the South American tropics had something of the force of a general-election issue. Lord Salisbury found himself unsupported in his position of finality. On the very day that Cleveland appointed the commission, more than three hundred and fifty members of Parliament sent a petition to the President and Congress asking that henceforth all matters of dispute between the two nations be settled by arbitration. Two days later an event occurred which made it easy for the British foreign office to execute a graceful retreat. A certain Dr. Jameson had conducted a raid into the territory of the Boer republic in South Africa and had been defeated and captured by the redoubtable old president, Paul Kruger. On January 3 the German Kaiser sent a telegram to Kruger con-

¹ The commission, appointed on New Year's Day, 1896, comprised Justice David Brewer of the Supreme Court; Judge Alvey of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals; Andrew D. White, former representative of the United States at the courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin; Frederick R. Coudert, a noted New York lawyer; and D. C. Gilman, president of Johns Hopkins University. Professors J. Franklin Jameson and George L. Burr served the commission as historical experts.

gratulating him upon thwarting the aggression of a hostile power. The Kaiser's gratuitous telegram was resented as an insult by the English, and such belligerent sentiment as there was in the island was turned from America to Germany. Therefore, when our commissioners asked the British foreign office for documents to help in determining the boundary line, Lord Salisbury not only promptly and courteously complied with the request, but even empowered the British ambassador at Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote, "to discuss the question with either the representative of Venezuela or with the government of the United States acting as the friend of Venezuela." In view of this concession of all that we had asked, the commission was dismissed, and a treaty was signed at Washington on February 2, 1897, providing for a tribunal of arbitration to settle the disputed boundary.¹

Several years after the Venezuelan incident Mr. George F. Parker, the intimate friend and biographer of Cleveland, told the ex-president, somewhat to his dismay, that he was the father of the imperialism which had grown up in the country since the Spanish War. The measure of truth in Parker's half-serious, half-bantering remark is apparent when we compare the almost total lack of interest in America's place among the nations in the thirty years which elapsed between Seward's dismissal of the French troops from Mexico (p. 49) and the controversy over the Venezuelan boundary line with the colonial expansion of the United States and the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean region during the almost equal period of years since Secretary Olney wrote his famous Venezuelan note. Cleveland himself, in his account of the controversy, written five years after the Paris award, recognized the epoch-making significance of that incident. "It has established the Monroe Doctrine on lasting foundations before the eyes of the world," he wrote; "it

¹ The tribunal met at Paris in January, 1899. Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Brewer of the Supreme Court represented the United States (or Venezuela). After examining fourteen large volumes of material amassed by the American commission, the tribunal fixed the boundary very near the Schomburgk line—a substantial victory for Great Britain (October 3, 1899).

has given us a better place in the respect and consideration of the people of all nations."¹ The foreign press, especially in England and Germany, contained prophetic and generally apprehensive comment on the heightened prestige of the United States. Our own people, with less prevision of the consequences of Cleveland's policy (which Woodrow Wilson called "the perilous indiscretion of a frank nature incapable of disguises"),² approved the President's firm stand and rejoiced in his swift victory.

However important the Cleveland-Olney interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine appears in our later history, it played apparently no part in the presidential campaign of 1896. Congress might cheer the President's "war message" and vote unanimously the appropriation for the commission; but three days later they refused to heed his plea to remedy the nation's finances before the Christmas holidays, and his New Year's reception was conspicuous for the absence of senators and representatives from the White House. Far from healing the breach in the Democratic party, the Venezuelan incident tended if anything to widen it. The Western and Southern malcontents rejoiced that Wall Street prices fell sharply in response to the president's bold message. Not that it rehabilitated Grover Cleveland in their eyes. They had done with him long since. They held him responsible for the overwhelming defeat of the party in 1894. Why should they any longer regard as their "leader" a man who had betrayed them? What gratitude should they feel toward him? The gratitude, answered Mr. Bryan, of the orphan whose rich inheritance has been squandered by a faithless guardian, the gratitude of the passengers toward the trainman who has opened the switch and precipitated a wreck; the gratitude of a patient who has been inoculated with a virus that has brought on blood-poisoning.³

¹ "Presidential Problems," p. 280.

² *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. LXXIX, p. 300.

³ These sentiments, with many more of like tenor, are to be found in a speech of Bryan's in the House against the resolution for the issue of \$65,000,000 of 3 per cent bonds to pay the Morgan syndicate. This speech, together with the one on the repeal of the Sherman act, made Bryan the acknowledged leader of the silver forces (see W. J. Bryan's "The First Battle," pp. 135-146).

The Democratic victory of 1892 had strengthened the radical movement of the West by carrying into office a number of fusionist candidates, or Democrats imbued with populist doctrines, and they had been assiduous in using the share of the patronage which they could obtain in organizing opposition to all that President Cleveland stood for. Daniel Lamont, the Secretary of War, said that "Bryan haunted the White House and the departments in the search for patronage." The defeat of 1894 had thrown free silverites like Bland and Bryan, as well as Cleveland men like Wilson and Springer, back into private life. The sting of defeat did not certainly abate the ardor with which the radicals now set out to capture the party and purge it of the "blood-poisoning" of the virus of Wall Street. Toward the close of the Fifty-third Congress an address was sent out, signed by thirty-one Democrats from Western and Southern states, declaring that the money question would be the paramount issue of the campaign of the next year, that a great majority of the party favored bimetallism, and that it was "the duty of the majority and within their power to take charge of the party organization and make the Democratic party an instrument in the accomplishment of needed reform." One of the signers and the chief author of this appeal was Mr. Bryan, who nearly a year earlier had secured the first official adoption of the 16 to 1 plank by the Democratic convention of his state. Though other advocates of free silver, like Bland of Missouri and Jones of Arkansas, had the advantage of longer experience in public office, none of them equaled Bryan in intensity of devotion to the cause. Young, eloquent, sincere, courageous, and, above all, unfaltering in the confidence of success, Bryan threw himself into the battle for free silver with the ardor of a crusader. It was for him not a political manœuvre, but a holy war. Upon the armor of his faith the well-directed shafts of logic, like the poisoned arrows of ridicule and abuse, fell in vain. Misgiving never clouded his brow nor contracted the broad smile of his level lips. Long before the Democratic convention met, when gold and silver men alike were divided between hope and fear, he was confident not only that the convention would adopt his

Nebraska plank in its platform, but that it would also nominate him for the presidency.¹

The address of the Democratic congressmen in the spring of 1895, calling upon the free silverites to "associate themselves together and impress their views upon the party organization," was followed by a number of conferences for that purpose, which culminated in a meeting of delegates from thirty-seven states and territories in Washington on August 15, 1895. A National Bimetallic Committee was organized, with Senator I. G. Harris of Tennessee as chairman, to coördinate the various silver "leagues" and "unions" with a view to the capture of the national convention of the following summer. Before the year was over Democratic conventions in thirty of the forty-four states had declared for free silver. Only Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota held with the states of the northeast to the administration's policy of "sound money."

Meanwhile a movement no less significant was taking place among the Republicans, who looked with satisfaction on the disintegration of the Democrats as the sure harbinger of Republican success in 1896. The chief actor in the pre-convention campaign of the Republicans was Marcus A. Hanna, a wealthy business man of Ohio. Hanna and Bryan were a complete antithesis—not only in their political views, but in their characters and personalities as well. They were alike only in the intense single-mindedness with which they pursued their ends, and in the measure of unmerited abuse which they endured from their enemies. Hanna was a thoroughgoing pragmatist in politics. He believed that the country's welfare was committed to the hands of the successful business men, and that prosperity would trickle down from them to bless the poor and lowly, for whom

¹ See a conversation of Mr. Bryan with Champ Clark of Missouri and Charles A. Towne of Minnesota, reported by A. W. Dunn, in his "From Harrison to Harding," Vol. I, p. 164. For obvious reasons the Republican publicity organs represented Bryan as a kind of freakish impostor who was unknown to most of the people of the East. In view, however, of his prominence in Congress in the years 1893-1895, it is difficult to see how he could have been "unknown" except to the deliberately uninformed.

he had a sincere paternalistic sympathy. His political ethics, like his business ethics, were frankly appetitive. When he wanted a legislature or a convention of delegates, he set out to "acquire" them, just as he acquired coal mines, street railways, newspapers, and theaters. It was a business proposition. Hanna was not a student of history, economics, or political science. He was too busy to read, and he wasted no time in orations on the Republic of the Fathers. He was attracted to "practical politics" because he saw that the success of big business depended upon its close alliance with the government.

Hanna did not seek political preferment for himself. There are few parallels in our history to the unstinted devotion which he gave to the support of candidates whose superior political education and training he recognized and in whose success he saw the triumph of his program. John Sherman was the man for whom he worked and spent for years, until he became reluctantly convinced by Sherman's third failure to secure the nomination (1888) that he was a hopeless candidate. His devotion was then transferred to a rising politician whose conduct in the convention of 1888 had appealed to one of his strongest traits of character—personal loyalty. William McKinley, Jr., as chairman of the Ohio delegation pledged to the support of Sherman, had positively refused, in contrast to Garfield's behavior eight years before, to allow the convention to be stampered to himself. Admiration for McKinley's noble character, complete approval of his zeal in behalf of high protection, and an almost romantic response to his winning personality made Hanna his faithful Achates for life. "I love McKinley," he cried once in a burst of uncontrollable enthusiasm, "he is the best man I have ever known." When McKinley lost his seat in Congress in the landslide of 1890, Hanna worked for his election to the governorship of Ohio. When he was plunged into financial ruin in 1893 by the failure of a friend whose notes he had indorsed, Hanna was the prime mover in a group of men who raised more than \$100,000 by private subscription to save him from bankruptcy. In the winter of 1894-1895 Hanna retired

from business to devote his entire time and large amounts of his private fortune to "grooming" his candidate for the presidential nomination. He hired a large winter residence in Thomasville, Georgia, where he entertained McKinley and introduced him to the party managers in the South. He made a vigorous McKinley propaganda in the Republican committees and conventions of all the states, detaching even the strong state of Illinois from the support of its favorite son, Senator Cullom. He did not wait, as had been customary, until the delegates reached the convention city before he secured their support. Long before the convention met he had more of the delegates pledged to McKinley than Bryan had pledged to the silver plan. Hanna was working for a man; Bryan, for a platform.

Therefore, when the Republicans met at St. Louis, June 16, McKinley's nomination was a foregone conclusion. He received 661 of the 906 votes on the first ballot. His nearest competitor, Thomas B. Reed of Maine, the choice of the New England states, got only 84 votes; and favorite sons, like Morton of New York, Quay of Pennsylvania, and Allison of Iowa, could muster but 150 votes all told. The only doubtful thing about the convention was the position which its platform would take on the currency question. The majority of the Republican party, Hanna among them, favored the gold standard. But McKinley's record on the subject was embarrassing. He had voted for the Bland-Allison Bill in his first term in Congress and helped to pass it over President Hayes's veto. He had supported the Sherman Silver Bill in 1890. His speeches and letters for more than a dozen years had committed him to the cause of bimetallism. Hanna's task was to keep the sound-money men of the East quietly assured of McKinley's "conversion" to gold, without letting it become known to the silver Republicans of the West before the nomination was secured. Wyoming, for example, had instructed her delegates for McKinley, with the free and unlimited coinage of silver. Therefore, although Hanna had in his pocket a "gold plank" (accepted by McKinley) ready to produce when it should be safe to do so, he kept the discussion of the currency within the

Committee on Resolutions until the third day of the convention.¹ When the platform containing the explicit declaration for gold was published, it was too late for the silverites to prevent McKinley's nomination or make more than an ineffective fight on the floor of the convention. Senator H. M. Teller of Colorado did protest in a touching speech, in which he recalled the fact that he had been a member of the Republican party since its formation, and had "shared in all its honors and its few defeats." He begged the convention not to commit the party to a gold standard, to which he believed 90 per cent of the American people were opposed, but his plea fell upon deaf ears. The convention rejected the resolution for the free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the ratio of 16 to 1, and Senator Teller, with thirty-three other delegates, left the hall. They did not organize an opposition party, like the bolters at Charleston in 1860, but for the most part drifted into the ranks of the Democrats.²

¹ There has been considerable controversy over the authorship of the "gold plank" and the credit for its insertion into the St. Louis platform of 1896. It was the joint production of a group of men, including Mark Hanna, Myron T. Herrick of Ohio, Henry C. Payne of Wisconsin, Melville E. Stone, general manager of the Associated Press, ex-Governor W. R. Merriam of Minnesota, Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont (the only Eastern man), and H. H. Kohlsaat of the Chicago *Times-Herald*. The latter was undoubtedly the man most responsible for the insertion of the word "gold" in the phrase "The existing gold standard must be preserved." Senator H. C. Lodge claimed that he "forced Hanna's hand" and made him declare for the gold standard. But the gold plank had already been accepted by the McKinley managers two days before Senator Lodge arrived at St. Louis and had his brief and stormy interview with Hanna. That same evening (June 14) Mr. Kohlsaat showed a copy of the gold plank to Senator Lodge. As late as 1912 the latter denied that he had ever received a copy of the plank from Mr. Kohlsaat, but the evidence of participants in the event seems conclusive that Senator Lodge was mistaken (see T. C. Platt's "Autobiography," p. 325; Melville E. Stone's "Fifty Years a Journalist," p. 221; a letter of Mr. Kohlsaat to Horace White of the New York *Evening Post* of July 1, 1896, printed in H. H. Kohlsaat's "From McKinley to Harding," pp. 45-48; and editorials in the files of the *Evening Post* for the summer and autumn of 1896).

² Teller was even considered for the Democratic nomination at Chicago three weeks later, and received eight votes on the first two ballots. William J. Bryan was at the St. Louis convention, reporting the proceedings for the Omaha *World-Herald*. He watched the silver bolters leave the hall amid cries of "Go to Chicago!" "Take the Democratic train!" A fellow reporter noted "a gleam of joy in his eye" and a smile of satisfaction on his lips.

It was evident before the Democrats met at Chicago, July 7, that the silverites were in command of the situation. Many prominent administration men were in favor of boycotting the convention, but President Cleveland would not listen to such a cowardly surrender. "If a cause is worth fighting for," he said, "it is worth fighting for to the end." He would not yield in courage to Bryan, whom he called "a Populist pure and simple, without the remotest notions of the principles of Democracy." The convention rejected Senator David B. Hill, the national committee's nominee for the temporary chairmanship, by a vote of 556 to 349 in favor of Senator John W. Daniel of Virginia, a leader of the free-silver movement. It seated the contesting silver delegates from Nebraska (with Bryan at their head) and Michigan. Senator Hill of New York, Senator Vilas of Wisconsin, and Governor Russell of Massachusetts tried in vain to defend the administration. Their words were lost in the tumult of fifteen thousand men howling like wild Indians. Then Mr. Bryan mounted the platform, and seemed by his very presence to calm the storm, like a Neptune rising from the tossing waves. With his compelling oratory he captivated the convention. His speech was one which he had rehearsed many times over during his two years of missionary work in the cause of free silver; but as he poured forth the impassioned periods, they sounded like the prophecies of a present inspiration. Turning to the conservative delegates he cried: "When you come before us and tell us that we are about to disturb your business interests, we reply that you have disturbed our business interests by your course. We say to you that you have made the definition of the business man too limited in its application. The man who is employed for wages is as much a business man as his employer; the attorney in a country town is as much a business man as the corporation counsel in a great metropolis; the merchant at the crossroads store is as much a business man as the merchant of New York; the farmer who goes forth in the morning and toils all day—who begins in the spring and toils all summer—and who by the application of brain and muscle to the natural resources of the country creates wealth, is as much a business man as the man



W. J. Bryan

WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

who goes upon the board of trade and bets on the price of grain; the miners who go down a thousand feet into the earth or climb two thousand feet upon the cliffs, and bring forth from their hiding places the precious metals to be poured into the channels of trade, are as much business men as the few financial magnates who, in a back room, corner the money of the world. We come to speak for this broader class of business men. . . . We are fighting in the defense of our homes, our families, and posterity. We have petitioned, and our petitions have been scorned. We have entreated, and our entreaties have been disregarded. We have begged, and they have mocked when our calamity came. We beg no longer; we entreat no more; we petition no more. We defy them!

“You come to us and tell us that the great cities are in favor of the gold standard. We reply that the great cities rest upon the broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic. But destroy our farms, and grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country. . . . We declare that this nation is able to legislate for its own people on every question, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation on the earth, and upon that issue we expect to carry every state in the Union. It is the issue of 1776 over again. Our ancestors, when but 3,000,000 in number, had the courage to declare their independence of every other nation. Shall we, their descendants, when we have grown to 70,000,000, declare that we are less independent than our forefathers? No, my friends, that will never be the verdict of our people. Therefore we care not on what lines the battle is fought. If they say Bimetallism is good but that we cannot have it until other nations help us, we reply that, instead of having a gold standard because England has, we will restore bimetallism and let England have bimetallism because the United States has it. If they dare to come out in the open field and defend the gold standard, we will fight them to the uttermost. Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will

answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: 'You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns—you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold!'"

The applause which had interrupted the orator at nearly every sentence burst into a frenzy before the ring of the last defiant challenge had died. In the overwrought vision of how many of the men and women in the hall did that lurid cross of gold stand out, waiting to bear the bleeding body of their buffeted class! But now the deliverer had come. When a semblance of order was restored, the convention proceeded to business. The platform containing Bryan's Nebraska free-silver plank and condemning every major measure of the Democratic administration was adopted by a vote of 628 to 391. And as a crowning insult to the man who had for twelve years been the leader of the party and its standard bearer in three presidential campaigns, the convention by a vote of 357 to 564 rejected a resolution commending "the honesty, economy, courage, and fidelity" of Grover Cleveland. The next day the balloting for the candidate began with the veteran silverite Richard P. Bland in the lead (235) and Mr. Bryan second (119) in a field of fourteen contestants. Bryan's strength increased steadily until on the fifth ballot he received 500 votes, only twelve short of the necessary two thirds. Immediately seventy-eight delegates transferred their votes to Bryan, and without further roll call his nomination was made unanimous. For vice-president the convention chose Arthur Sewall of Maine, a wealthy shipowner and bank president, who was nevertheless an ardent advocate of free silver and the income tax.

The convention of the People's party which met at St. Louis on July 22 in the same hall that the Republicans had used a month before was in a quandary. The Democrats, in the words of Marion Butler, the temporary chairman, had "committed petty and grand larceny" at Chicago "by stealing the People's platform almost entirely."¹ He hoped and believed that the

¹ Important demands of the Populists which the Democrats had not put into their platform were the government ownership of railways and telegraph lines, the reclamation by the government of all lands held for speculative purposes

convention would not "turn itself into a Democratic annex." The dilemma was plain. If the Populists should nominate Bryan and Sewall, it would mean the sacrifice of their political independence, and their absorption into the Democratic party. If, on the other hand, they should put a separate ticket into the field, it would split the strength of the radicals and invite the defeat of the reforms embodied in the Chicago platform. The "middle-of-the-road" Populists were for holding fast to their whole program. They were not content to regard Populism as a mere leaven in the Democratic party, nor did they believe that that party was converted to Populism. If the People's party should disappear now, they said, the powers of reaction would soon regain control of the Democrats. In the next presidential convention neither William J. Bryan nor even Thomas Jefferson himself, were he alive, would have the slightest chance of a nomination. The sentiment for Bryan and victory was too strong, however, for the middle-of-the-roaders. They gained the empty advantage of replacing Sewall by Thomas E. Watson of Georgia, a simon-pure Populist, but Bryan was put at the head of their ticket by a vote of 1042 to 321.¹ The national Silver convention, which met at St. Louis at the same time as the Populists, also nominated Bryan, with Sewall.

The gold Democrats, unable to accept Bryan, held a convention at Indianapolis on September 2 and nominated General John M. Palmer of Illinois and General Simon B. Buckner of Kentucky (old adversaries at Fort Donelson). President Cleveland and all his cabinet except the Secretary of the Interior, Hoke Smith of Georgia, supported the Indianapolis ticket, which polled only 134,645 votes on election day. Besides the four

by the railroads and other corporations, direct legislation through the initiative and referendum, and the election of president, vice president, and United States senators by the direct vote of the people.

¹ Bryan telegraphed Senator Jones in the Populist convention before the nominations were made, that he would not accept the nomination unless Sewall were named for his running mate. But Senator Allen of Nebraska, permanent chairman of the convention and a strong Bryan man, refused to allow the telegram to be read. When Sewall wrote to Bryan three days later that he should not be considered, Bryan accepted the nomination.

tickets named, there were candidates of the Prohibition, National, and Socialist Labor parties in the field.

The campaign was one of intense vigor, bringing out the unprecedented vote of 13,937,527, as against 12,050,384 in 1892. McKinley and Hanna would have liked to fight it on the issue of the tariff. The former remarked to a group of friends, "After thirty days you won't hear anything about silver"; to which William R. Day, a better prophet, replied, "After thirty days you won't hear of anything else." The Republicans had boasted the year before, when the Democratic party seemed shattered beyond repair, that they could elect a rag baby in 1896. At first they were inclined to take Bryan's nomination as a joke; but when the Populists and Silverites fell in behind his banner, they realized that the Populist-Democratic coalition (abbreviated to "Popocrats") would give them a hard fight. In his management of the Republican campaign Mark Hanna spared neither labor nor money. He spent \$100,000 of his own, and raised between \$3,500,000 and \$4,000,000 in campaign funds. Great industrial corporations, railroads, commercial houses, banks, were assessed their respective quotas. It was a campaign for the insurance of big business, and business must be willing to pay the necessary premium. It was a campaign of education, too. The Republicans spent \$600,000 for tracts, pamphlets, and speeches printed in ten languages. They sent out 2,000,000 copies of Alexander D. Noyes's "Free Coinage Catechism" and 1,500,000 copies of Carl Schurz's pithy sound-money speeches. Altogether it was said that 250,000,000 pieces of printed matter were distributed from the New York and Chicago headquarters. One of the most effective of these was a five-color poster representing McKinley as "the advance agent of prosperity." Contracts were made subject to fulfillment only in case of a Republican victory. The attempt was made to detach the Western farmers from the free-silver party by promising them a five-year extension of mortgages at easy rates. Wage-earners in many of the factories were paid off on the Saturday before the election, with the warning that they would not be needed further in the case of Bryan's success.

Though the financial heresy of a depreciated dollar was the chief count in the indictment of Bryan, it was by no means the only one. He was accused of being a demagogue attempting to stir class and sectional strife. His constant harping on the contrast between the poor and virtuous farmers of the West and the rich and rascally financiers of the East; his call to the former to assert their "independence" as their forefathers had done in 1776; his impassioned ultimatum, "We beg no longer, we entreat no more, we petition no more; we defy them!"—were they not all incitements to a war of the classes? When he went to New York early in August to deliver his notification speech in Madison Square Garden, he spoke of "invading the enemy's country," and Mr. Little of Kansas called him "the champion of Lazarus at the gates of Dives." As the campaign progressed and the possibility of Bryan's election was realized, the Republican attack went far beyond the limits of justifiable condemnation of his political doctrines to the most bitter personal denunciation. "Rattlepated idiot," "hoax," "anarchist," "blasphemer" (for the "cross of gold"), and "lunatic" were some of the epithets bestowed upon him. The Reverend Thomas Dixon evoked an outburst of applause from a large audience in the Academy of Music, New York, when he called Bryan "a mouthing, slobbering demagogue, whose patriotism is all in his jawbone." All of which is a better indication of the fear which the prospect of Mr. Bryan's election inspired than of either his character or purpose. He may have advocated the government's "going into the counterfeiting business by manufacturing a dollar worth 50 cents," but he never dreamed of "overturning the government" or leading a peasants' revolt.¹

¹ Goldwin Smith, an English publicist, writing in the *Saturday Evening Post* in the summer of 1896, declared that he had never seen our republic in such serious peril, with the Democratic party captured by anarchism and repudiation, and with the "uprising of disorder in all its forms and grades against the institutions of the American Republic." "In November," he added, "the Republic of the Fathers will be fighting for its life." These sentiments are quoted with apparent concurrence by Rhodes in "McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations," p. 28. The *New York Nation* remarked at the close of the campaign. "Probably no man in civil life has succeeded in inspiring so much terror, without taking life, as Bryan."

In addition to the charges of wishing to wreck our finances and array the poor against the rich, Bryan was accused of an outrageous attack on the palladium of our liberties, the Supreme Court. Two decisions of the court in the spring of 1895 were condemned in the Chicago platform. One of these, the unanimous decision upholding the blanket injunction and the imprisonment of Debs in the railroad strike of 1894, we have already noticed (p. 263). The other, which preceded the injunction by a single week, was the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the income-tax provision of the Wilson-Gorman tariff act (p. 255). When the income-tax case (*Pollock vs. Farmers Loan and Trust Company*) was first argued, the court divided 4 to 4, Justice Jackson being absent on account of illness. When the case was reargued before a full bench, Justice Jackson voted in favor of the constitutionality of the law, but meanwhile Justice Shiras had changed his mind and voted against it. Thus by a vote of 5 to 4, and by the vacillation of a single judge, the Treasury was deprived of an estimated income of from \$40,000,000 to \$50,000,000. "But for this decision of the Supreme Court," said the Democratic platform of 1896, "there would be no deficit in the revenue under the law passed by a Democratic Congress in strict pursuance of the uniform decisions of that court for nearly a hundred years.¹ . . . We declare that it is the duty of Congress to use all the constitutional power which remains after that decision, or which may come from its reversal by the court as it may hereafter be constituted, so that the burden of taxation may be equally and impartially laid, to the end that wealth may bear its due proportion of the expenses of the government." The critic who can find in this statement any "attack" upon the Supreme Court or incitement to its "overthrow" must be gifted with a rare flair for "treason to our institutions." It was a simple truth that the court had reversed its former position by the decision of 1895, and that a recon-

¹ In 1870 a unanimous decision of the court upheld the constitutionality of the income taxes levied in the Civil War, which were dropped in the curtailment of the revenue in 1872.


stitution of the court might lead to another reversal, as it had done, for example, in the greenback cases (p. 21, note). That was all that the platform advocated. And as for inflammatory language, there is nothing in Bryan's campaign utterances on the income-tax decision to compare with the opinions of the dissenting judges themselves, all but one of whom were appointees of Republican presidents.¹

Whether or not the dire social and political consequences which the Republican managers predicted would have followed on the election of Mr. Bryan, nobody can say. At any rate, the only easily discoverable "revolutionary" plank in the Chicago platform was the demand for the free and unlimited coinage of silver. Compliance with that demand would certainly have brought dire economic consequences. If to avert such a calamity the big business interests introduced into the campaign a somewhat more lurid element of prophecy, which would appeal to the average voter, who had but a feeble grasp on theories of currency and finance, they were, after all, only using the same methods as were the free-silver propagandists. Panicky apprehension on the one side was matched by unmitigated claptrap on the other. A fair sample of the latter was a little book called "Coin's Financial School," written by a dabbler in economics named Harvey and published in Chicago in 1894. This book, circulated in more than one hundred and twenty-five thousand copies, was the chief campaign document of the Popocrats, the "Bible of Free Silver." It was cast in the form of a series of lectures, or "classes," held in the Art Institute of Chicago, and

¹ Justice White (Democrat, appointed by Cleveland) said, "It overthrows a long and consistent line of decisions and denies the legislative department of the government possession of a power conceded to it by universal consensus for a hundred years." Justice Harlan (Republican, appointed by Hayes) said, "It gives certain kinds of property a position of favoritism and advantage inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our social organism." Justice Brewer (Republican, appointed by Harrison) said, "I fear that it is the first step toward the submergence of the liberties of the people in a sordid despotism of wealth." Justice Jackson (Democrat, appointed by Harrison) said, "No free and enlightened people can ever possibly sanction or approve it."

a large part of its readers believed that the classes had been actually held. Coin, "a smooth little financier," was represented as meeting all comers in a kind of open forum on the silver question, and triumphantly refuting the arguments of lawyers, merchants, bankers, and professors. However, when the creator of the invincible Socrates-Coin attempted himself to match argument with Professor Laughlin of The University of Chicago, in the columns of Mr. Kohlsaat's *Times-Herald*, he quickly retired from the field. The specious text of Harvey's book was enlivened by pictorial argument calculated to make a more immediate appeal to the mind of the rural reader than the logic of the catechism. Crude woodcuts represented a truculent John Sherman cutting off the head of a beautiful maiden (the "Assassination of Silver"); or a farmer stuffing a cow with hay, while financiers and stock-jobbers milked her; or Uncle Sam firing a gun at John Bull ("Our Answer to England"), with Coin himself gleefully doffing his silk [!] hat in a more pacific salute. Cleveland and Sherman were depicted as desperate burglars plying their trade in the somewhat novel fashion of digging out the (silver) foundations of a mansion; while the proof of the necessity for bimetallism was furnished by the pathetic picture of a one-legged man hobbling along on a crutch. In like manner an early Church father had argued that there must be no more or no less than four canonical gospels because there were four cardinal points of the compass and a beast had four legs. Mr. Bryan spoke in high commendation of Harvey's book.

McKinley conducted his campaign as a continuous reception. He remained at home in Canton, Ohio, where he was visited daily by delegations of business men, teachers, clergymen, laborers, bankers, farmers, and representatives of various social organizations, whom he addressed from his front porch in carefully prepared speeches which were published broadcast by his managers. The campaign chest furnished plentiful provision for securing the best traveling speakers. An "old soldiers' touring special" carried a group of officers and privates of the Civil War through the states of the Middle West to work for "com-



THE ELECTION OF 1896

rade McKinley."¹ Bryan, on the other hand, carried his message in person to the people. He traveled eighteen thousand miles, from New York City to Aberdeen, South Dakota, and from Maine to Tennessee (during the latter part of the campaign in a Pullman car most inappropriately called *Idler*), addressing some five million people in twenty-nine states and making over six hundred speeches.

In August it looked dubious for the Republicans. But the campaign of education won for them in the end. At least, the majority of the American voters, confronted with the choice between the triumph of big business in politics and the theory of free silver, decided in favor of what they believed the lesser of two evils. McKinley carried all the states north of Mason and Dixon's line and east of the Mississippi, together with the border states of Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, and Kentucky and the Western states of North Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Oregon, and California, giving him 271 votes in the electoral college. Bryan's 176 votes came from the solid South and the mining states of the West (Washington, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, South Dakota, Nevada, Colorado, and Utah), together with Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri. The popular vote was 7,111,607 to 6,509,052. It was a decisive victory for McKinley, who went into the White House with a more generous indorsement by the American voter than any presidential candidate had received since General Grant.²

¹ An amusing incident of the campaign is told by G. F. Parker in his "Recollections of Grover Cleveland," p. 401. A Republican candidate in a Southern mountain district was making speeches in favor of silver. When Hanna heard of this, he sent word to the man to stop it and to respect the party platform, which the offending orator had probably never seen. He made his apologies, stating that he hadn't much interest in the currency question himself, but had been using passages from the speech of a certain William McKinley to the Farmers' Alliance of Ohio. He would drop the advocacy of bimetallism, of course, but, he added, he "would like to be informed by telegraph if William changes his mind again."

² Curious statisticians of the "might have beens" figured out that a change of 34,000 votes in Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky, if rightly distributed, would have given Bryan the 51 electoral votes of these states and a consequent majority of 5 in the electoral college. But the results of almost every election in our history could be reversed by the juggling of a few thousands of votes in this fashion.

The election of 1896, both in its negative and its positive aspects, was the most important in our history since the Civil War. In the first place, it marked the end of the organized political effort of more than twenty years to commit the Federal government to a policy of currency inflation and paternalistic legislation in favor of the debtor classes. Mr. Bryan, with characteristic optimism, entitled his circumstantial account of the campaign of 1896 "The First Battle," as if it were only the preliminary test in the struggle between the farmer and the financier, the plow-holder and the bond-holder, the debtor and the creditor, the West and the East. But in fact it was the last battle. For although the explicit legislation establishing the gold standard was postponed for certain political reasons until the spring of 1900, and although the existence of the "farm bloc" in Congress today testifies to the unsatisfied demands of the agrarian West and the perennial political antagonism between the creditor interests of a capitalistic community and the debtor interests of a frontier community,¹ classes and sections have not been arrayed against each other in any major political contest in our country since Bryan's first defeat.

The campaign also furnished a striking testimony to the firmness of the Union. Though a few scare-heads and sensation mongers talked of the secession of the West and civil war, there was no such remotest idea in the mind of the free-silver leader. When accused of anarchism, Bryan replied with sincerity and

¹ "The relations between established settlements and their outlying frontiers seem everywhere and in all periods to follow certain simple and well-defined lines. In the first place, the older settlement has accumulated capital seeking investment, whereas the frontier, in spite of its natural resources, needs for their exploitation capital in the form of money or credit. The frontier, therefore, is always and everywhere in debt to the old settlement, and this relation breeds all those feelings a debtor seems by nature to entertain toward his creditor. As contrasted with one another, the older settlement is always conservative, the frontier always radical. . . . The East has therefore always feared and sought to check the political growth of the West. . . . It has trembled for its investments in the too rapid expansion that the frontier always breeds. It has distrusted radical thought and has feared above all else that economic expansion might increase political power and transfer control to a section whose philosophy and outlook have seemed revolutionary" (James Truslow Adams, "Revolutionary New England," p. 12).

truth, "There is no man in the country more deeply attached to our republican institutions than the candidate of the Democratic party." When the fiery Ben Tillman of South Carolina began to make an ominous comparison between the situation in 1896 and that of his own state in 1860, he was hissed down by the Chicago convention. The crusade of the Popocrats, in spite of their violent language, had little of the grimness of the crusade of the abolitionists. There was no "irrepressible conflict" precipitated by the race question. There were no Calhouns and Davises with their unyielding dogma of states' rights. The malcontents of 1896 were asking for an extension and not a limitation of the powers of the Federal government. Moreover, the people of the West were bound to the East by social ties which never existed between the old states of the North and the South. Decade after decade emigrants from New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and the eastern states of the Mississippi basin had moved out to the prairies and mining camps of the West, carrying with them the family names, the customs, the political and religious faith of the communities from which they had sprung. These bands were as strong as steel compared with the academic arguments of even a matchless Webster for the supreme authority of a Constitution which had been the subject of conflicting interpretation in its power over the states ever since its adoption. The legal bond of a common Constitution had snapped like a thread under the strain of distrahent social and economic interests. The grievances of the Western farmer in 1896 were no less real than those of the Southern planter in 1860, but the Western farmer had no thought of remedying those grievances by any other appeal than to the government to which he and his fathers had given their undivided allegiance.

Finally, the election of 1896 was the triumph of the business man in politics. It may be that McKinley would have been nominated at St. Louis without Hanna's aid. He always mildly resented any hint that he was "discovered" by Hanna.¹ But

¹ McKinley told the Washington representative of the Associated Press that he believed that in view of his prominence as an officer in the army, a member of Congress for fourteen years, the author of the McKinley bill, the governor of Ohio

whether he could have been elected without Hanna's aid is more doubtful. His decisive victory at the polls was made possible by the unstinted use of the funds which the corporations poured into the Republican campaign chest under Hanna's relentless assessment.¹ The Republican victory meant the vindication of Hanna's fundamental doctrine of the identity of the political and economic interests of the country and the dependence of the stability of the government upon the prosperity of big business. No one need look for any legislation to hector the railroads, hamper the bankers, or curb the trusts in President McKinley's administration.

On the fourth of March, 1897, Grover Cleveland willingly turned the responsibilities of State over to his successor and retired to a modest home in Princeton, New Jersey, to spend the decade of life that was left to him and to find some recompense for the bitter trials of his official career in the devotion of his growing family, the high respect of the faculty and students of the university, and the increasing esteem of his fellow countrymen. No president since Abraham Lincoln had had burdens as heavy as his to bear; and he had borne them with uncomplaining Spartan courage. He had not always been right, but he had always been righteous. If he had often failed in tact, he had never failed in truth. In all his career he had kept unswervingly faithful to the ideal which he had confessed in the letter to his brother, written on the evening of his election to the governorship of New York: "To perform the duties assigned me with an eye single to the interest of my employers."

for two terms, and the recipient of 180 votes in the convention of 1892, he was "sufficiently well known to receive the nomination" (A. W. Dunn, "From Harrison to Harding," Vol. I, p. 227).

¹ This is not to imply that the money was used improperly. It was spent mostly for speakers, printing, postage, and traveling expenses. Hanna was a man of frank and honest dealing. He was a big-hearted man, too. The coarse cartoons of Davenport and Opper depicting him as a bloated lummoX, covered with dollar marks and crushing men, women, and children under his huge foot, were a cruel slander which he felt keenly. Everyone who knew Mark Hanna, from his humblest employee to his colleagues in the United States Senate, respected and loved him. "Hanna has not a small trait in his nature," said Theodore Roosevelt.

In November, 1886, President Cleveland was the guest of honor at the celebration of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Harvard College. He was felicitously greeted by James Russell Lowell as the hero of Horace's immortal ode

The just man holding firm his purpose
Against the evil bidding of the crowd.

The tribute was doubly deserved when the doors of the White House closed upon him for a second time.

CHAPTER V

"DOMINION OVER PALM AND PINE"

We have not the choice as to whether or not this country will play a great part in the world. All we can decide is whether we will play it well or ill.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

OUR WAR WITH SPAIN

"I am deeply sorry, Mr. President," said Cleveland to McKinley on returning from the inauguration exercises to the White House, "to pass on to you a war with Spain. It will come within two years. Nothing can stop it." The war came in little more than a year; and it came because the American people decided, after many months of patient remonstrance, that they would no longer tolerate a nuisance at their very door. The island of Cuba, a possession of Spain since the days of Columbus, had long been restive under the corrupt and crushing colonial administration of the Spanish officials. The Ten Years' War of 1868-1878, which had for a moment threatened to involve the United States on account of the *Virginius* affair (p. 68, note 1), had ended with promises from Madrid of fiscal reform and political autonomy. But the promises had never been fulfilled. In 1895 the smoldering embers of revolt again broke out in flaming revolution. The war was waged with intense cruelty on both sides. The insurgent Cubans, under the leadership of General Máximo Gómez, too few and ill-armed to meet the Spaniards in open battle, reverted to guerrilla warfare, ambush, assassination, and devastation. They cut the cane and burned the mills of the sugar plantations, and carried destruction through the eastern part of the island. To meet terror with terror, the Spanish government early in 1896 sent a fiendish governor-general to Cuba in the person of Valeriano Weyler, who set about to end the revolution by exterminating the peas-

antry which gave it support. He drove tens of thousands of families from their farms into concentration camps near the fortified towns, where, deprived of the barest necessities of life and herded like beasts in the slaughter pen, they perished of starvation and disease.

It was not alone moral indignation at the fate of these wretched “reconcentrados” that aroused the United States to protest. Our citizens had some \$50,000,000 invested in the mines, railroads, and sugar and tobacco plantations of the island, which were being ruined by the guerrillas, who roamed at will over three fourths of the inland country. Our trade with Cuba had grown to nearly \$100,000,000 in the year before the insurrection broke out. Many Cubans had been naturalized in the United States, and either returned to their native country or remained here to work for the insurgent cause. American citizens of Cuban birth in the island were often cast into prison, and even native Americans in Cuba were subjected to insults by Spanish officials. The sympathy of our people for the insurgents was so strong that it was possible for the Cuban junta established in New York to collect large sums of money for food, arms, and munitions to aid the revolutionists. Nevertheless our government observed the rules of neutrality with the utmost care. President Cleveland issued a proclamation on January 12, 1895, warning all citizens of the United States against “setting on foot or providing or preparing the means for military enterprises to be carried on from the United States against the territory of the government of Spain.” So efficient was the work of our officials charged with policing three thousand miles of seacoast from Maine to Texas that President McKinley could truthfully say in his message of December, 1897, that not a single military expedition or armed vessel had been permitted to leave our shores in violation of the neutrality laws.

The platforms of both the great parties of 1896 contained resolutions on Cuba. The Democrats merely “extended their sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic struggle for liberty and independence”; but the Republicans, declaring that Spain had “lost control of Cuba” and was “unable to protect

the property or lives of resident American citizens," recommended that "the government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the island."¹ The Republican Congress in the spring of 1896 tried to force President Cleveland's hand (or to embarrass him) by passing resolutions in favor of recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents and offering the mediation of the United States. Cleveland did, indeed, make an offer of mediation to the Spanish court in April, only to be met with the frigid suggestion that we should exercise more diligence to prevent filibustering to the island. In his final message to Congress (December 7, 1896) Cleveland devoted six pages to the Cuban situation, and departed so far from his previous non-committal position as to say that there might be "a limit to our patient waiting for Spain to end the contest either alone and in her own way or with our friendly coöperation." "When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest," he continued, "and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty in Cuba is extinct for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligation to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by a higher obligation, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge."

Such a situation was already presented when Cleveland sorrowfully bequeathed a war with Spain to his successor. President McKinley's Secretary of State, John Sherman, who had been "promoted" to a cabinet position chiefly for the purpose of creating a vacant seat in the United States Senate to which Mark Hanna should fall heir,² sent a note to the Spanish gov-

¹ The Populists at St. Louis went farther still in declaring that "the time has come when the United States, the great republic of the world, should recognize that Cuba is and of right ought to be a free and independent state." This was the language used by Congress in its war resolution of April 19, 1898.

² McKinley had urged Hanna to enter his cabinet, and had kept the position of postmaster-general open for him until the last moment. But Hanna preferred the

ernment on June 27, 1897, protesting against General Weyler's inhuman conduct; but the only reply that he received (six weeks later) was a general disclaimer of unusual severity in Weyler's behavior, and a general complaint of the aid furnished by citizens of the United States to the rebellious subjects of Spain. With malicious historical impartiality the Spanish foreign minister spoke of the essential likeness between General Weyler's conduct of the war in Cuba and General Sherman's (Secretary Sherman's brother's!) conduct of the war in Georgia. Again, in September, advances were made through our minister to Madrid, General Stewart Woodford, offering the coöperation of the United States in the settlement of the Cuban anarchy. Before a reply was made, an important change took place in the government of Spain. The conservative premier, Señor Canovas, was assassinated, and a liberal ministry with Señor Sagasta at its head came into power. Sagasta assured General Woodford that Spain would grant the Cubans autonomy, and as an earnest of his pacific intentions he recalled the intolerable Weyler and annulled the most cruel provisions of the reconcentrado order. The grant of autonomy was published late in November, and its substance was cabled to Washington. In view of these conciliatory measures President McKinley took an optimistic tone in his annual message of December. In all fairness, he said, the new Spanish ministry should be given its chance. However, Weyler's successor, General Blanco, was powerless to effect a reconciliation. The Cuban insurgents would accept nothing but unqualified independence of the hated Spanish power. Neither did the plan of autonomy find favor in the eyes of the Cuban Tories. Rioting broke out in Havana in January, 1898. Mobs "marched through the streets cheering for Weyler and cursing President McKinley and the United States." It was evident that the authority of Spain was not

senatorial honor. His appointment to Sherman's seat was in doubt for a while because the governor of Ohio, Asa Bushnell, belonged to the anti-Hanna faction in the state. But Hanna's prestige and the influence of the administration were arguments which could not be ignored. The governor tendered him the appointment to fill Sherman's unexpired term, and he was elected by the legislature in 1898 for the ensuing six years. He died in February, 1904.

strong enough to restore order in the island. The time had come for the United States to act.

Dispatches were sent to our naval commanders abroad (Admiral Selfridge in the Mediterranean, Captain Chester in the South Atlantic, Commodore Dewey at Yokohama) to retain the members of their crews whose term of enlistment had expired, and to be ready, "in view of the very disturbed affairs in Cuba," for further sailing orders. General Fitzhugh Lee, our consul general at Havana, advised our government that the presence of a warship in Cuban waters might soon be necessary for the protection of American citizens in the island. The first-class battleships *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, and *Indiana*, all completed since 1895, together with the second-class battleships *Texas* and *Maine* and the armored cruiser *New York*, assembled at Key West, Florida, on January 23. The next evening the *Maine* was ordered to proceed to Havana. It was a friendly visit. The port authorities welcomed the vessel courteously. The governor-general entertained her captain, Charles D. Sigsbee, as a guest of honor. The Spanish government decided to reciprocate the visit by sending the armored cruiser *Vizcaya* to New York harbor, where she arrived on February 20, after ominous events had occurred.

In spite of these official courtesies it was evident that the interference of the United States was deeply resented by the Cubans. A paper that was thrust into Captain Sigsbee's hand one day in the streets of Havana spoke of "these Yankee pigs who meddle with our affairs . . . and send us a man-of-war of their rotten squadron." More serious was a letter written by Señor Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister at Washington, to a friend in Havana, implying that the grant of autonomy was only a ruse to deceive the United States, and characterizing President McKinley as a weakling bidding for the support of the populace (*populachero*), and withal a "fake politician (*politicastró*) who wants to leave the door open behind him and still keep on good terms with the jingoes of his party." The letter was stolen from the Havana post office by a spy and acquired by a war-mad "yellow" newspaper of New York, where

it was published in translation on February 9, 1898. Though Señor de Lome protested his right to communicate his sentiments to a friend in a private letter, his retention as a member of the diplomatic corps in Washington was impossible. The demand for his recall was anticipated by his prompt resignation.

Indignation was still high over the De Lome letter when an event happened which put an end to all hope of peace between Spain and the United States. At 9.40 on the evening of February 15 the *Maine* was sunk by an explosion in Havana harbor, carrying to the bottom two hundred and sixty sailors and officers. The Spanish government immediately expressed its regret and horror for the accident. Captain Sigsbee and Consul General Lee advised a calm suspension of judgment until the cause of the catastrophe could be investigated. But the people of our country were convinced from the first that it was the work of a Spanish mine. A board of naval experts examined the hull of the sunken vessel and reported on March 28 that the condition of the armor plates and the keel clearly indicated that the explosion was external.¹ A Spanish board examined the floor of the harbor and reported that the *Maine* was destroyed by an explosion in the forward magazine of the vessel. Naturally, the report of our experts was accepted by the American people. The slogan "Remember the *Maine*!" became the war cry of the hour. But our government had not waited for the report on the *Maine* before beginning active preparation for the impending war. The cables were kept busy directing the movements of our naval commanders abroad. Work was speeded up on our unfinished warships, and an agent was sent to Europe to purchase vessels. The fast steamers of the American line—the *St. Louis*, the *St. Paul*, the *New York*, and the *Paris*—were taken over by

¹ Captain (later Admiral) F. E. Chadwick, the commander of the cruiser *New York*, was a member of the board. His valuable work entitled "The Relations of the United States and Spain" (Vol. I, "Diplomacy," 1909; Vols. II and III, "The Spanish War," 1911), written from documentary sources, contains the best account of the subject of this section. Admiral Chadwick's own opinion on the destruction of the *Maine* may be found in Vol. I, pp. 559-563. At his solicitation the wreck of the *Maine* was raised in 1911, and a complete examination of her hull confirmed the findings of the board thirteen years before.

the government and armed. On March 8 Congress unanimously voted the President \$50,000,000 as "an emergency fund for national defense."

President McKinley was most anxious to avert war; and it is the belief of many historians, including Mr. Rhodes,¹ that he could have brought about a peaceful settlement with Spain if he had had the courage to resist the jingoes, who were "spoiling for a fight." The criticism of the President's course is based upon the events which took place during the fortnight following the report on the *Maine*. McKinley sent an ultimatum to Spain on March 29 demanding the immediate recall of the reconcentrado order and the proclamation of an armistice in Cuba until the first of the ensuing October. The Spanish ministry, as anxious as our President to avert the war, complied at once with the first demand, but insisted that the armistice could not be offered by Spain. It was their conviction that such an offer would mean the overthrow of the ministry and perhaps a revolution in Spain. "I believe that the ministers are ready to go as far and as fast as they can," Woodford cabled on the last day of March, "and still save the dynasty. . . . Public opinion in Spain has moved steadily toward peace." The Pope intervened, sending Archbishop Ireland to Washington to work for peace, and appealing directly to the queen regent not to "allow the Easter tide to be desecrated by the strife of two great Christian nations." On April 7 the diplomatic representatives of six of the European powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia) called on the President to present their "earnest hopes" that further negotiations would lead to the maintenance of peace and the reestablishment of order in Cuba. Two days later the queen regent ordered Governor-General Blanco to grant an immediate armistice to the insurgents for such a period as he should deem advisable.

¹ Rhodes speaks of "this unnecessary war." He says that "McKinley feared a rupture in the party, and on account of that fear, had not the nerve and power to resist the pressure for war. We may rest assured that if Mark Hanna had been president, there would have been no war with Spain" [!] ("The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations," pp. 64, 67).

These facts present a strong argument for the theory of accommodation. But Spain had not gone far enough toward peace, and President McKinley had gone too far toward war. The reports from Lee in Cuba showed that there was no abatement of the reconcentrado horror. The discretion given to General Blanco to terminate the proposed armistice at his pleasure seemed to render the grant nugatory. On the other hand, McKinley had decided, after the rejection of his ultimatum at the end of March, to throw the responsibility for peace or war upon Congress. He intended to send in his message on April 6, but delayed because Lee asked for more time to place the Americans in Havana in safety. Meanwhile, the pressure from the war party was growing stronger day by day.¹ On April 11 the President sent his message advocating forcible interference as the only means of bringing to an end the inhuman war in Cuba. "The issue is now with Congress," he wrote; "I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action." At the end of his message he took the following cursory notice of the latest effort of Spain to escape a war which her rulers knew would be a vain sacrifice of life and treasure: "Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and formulate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me."²

Both Houses by large majorities (324 to 19 and 67 to 21) passed resolutions directing the President to employ the military and naval forces of the United States to compel Spain to relin-

¹ Congressman Boutelle of Maine said on March 30, "Every congressman has two or three newspapers in his district, most of them printed in red ink and shouting for blood."

² For a bitter criticism of McKinley for dismissing this communication of the Spanish ministry in such cavalier fashion and surrendering to the warlike Congress, instead of tearing up his message and rewriting it in the light of Spain's offer, see the *New York Nation*, Vol. LXXIII, p. 4.

quish her authority in Cuba. Because the Senate resolution embodied the report of the minority of the Committee on Foreign Relations, recognizing the actual insurgent government of Cuba as "the true and lawful government of that island," to which the House disagreed, there was some delay before the final vote was reached. But the Senate receded from its position; and on April 19, the anniversary of Lexington and Concord, Congress voted its virtual declaration of war against the ancient monarchy of Spain. The resolution contained four paragraphs: (1) the declaration of the independence of Cuba, (2) the demand for Spain's withdrawal from the island, (3) the authorization of the employment of the land and naval forces of the United States to enforce this demand, and (4) the declaration that the United States would assert "no sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof," and that when that end was accomplished she would "leave the government and control of the island to its people."¹ The Spanish minister at Washington, Señor Polo, was handed his passports, and the next day General Woodford was dismissed from Madrid. On the twenty-fourth of April, Spain formally declared war on the United States.

At the outbreak of the war the Atlantic fleet was composed of three units. A northern patrol squadron, consisting of the protected cruiser *San Francisco* and four auxiliary cruisers, under the command of Commodore John A. Howard, guarded the coasts of New England and New York, where there was considerable fear of the bombardment of the large cities by the Spanish fleet. The people of New York had seen the formidable-looking cruiser *Vizcaya* in the harbor, but they did not know that her bottom was foul, her boilers weak, her guns defective, and her general condition such as to cause the Spanish admiral to call her "a boil on the body of the fleet." At Hampton Roads, Virginia, Commodore W. S. Schley was stationed with a "flying squadron," consisting of the fast armored cruiser *Brooklyn* (his flagship), the battleships *Massachusetts* and *Texas*, and three protected cruisers, ready to coöperate in the attack or the block-

¹ The last point was the so-called Teller Resolution


ade as his orders should direct. The main unit of the fleet, composed of the armored ships *Iowa*, *Indiana*, and *New York*, with about twenty-five cruisers, monitors, gunboats, torpedo boats, and armed tugs, was gathered at Key West, our naval base and coaling station. On April 21 dispatches came from the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, to Captain W. T. Sampson of the *Iowa*, promoting him over the heads of seventeen ranking officers to the command of the entire Atlantic fleet, with the rank of rear admiral, and ordering him to blockade the coast of Cuba from Cárdenas to Bahia Honda, eighty-five miles east and fifty-five miles west of Havana respectively. Sampson, who, as senior member of the board of investigation on the destruction of the *Maine*, was familiar with the defenses of Havana, favored a bombardment of the city, and he was supported by Captains Taylor of the *Indiana*, Evans of the *Iowa*, and Chadwick of the *New York*. But the Navy Department discountenanced the plan, first, because we should have no troops ready to occupy Havana or any other captured stronghold for six months and, second, because it was deemed unwise to expose our ships to the fire of the land batteries "before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable vessels." Aside, therefore, from a few shots fired to break up the work on new fortifications on the heights above the city, there was no attack made upon Havana or any other port of the northern shore of Cuba.

The first blow in the war which was destined to shatter the colonial power of Spain was not delivered in the West Indies, where the trouble arose, but in the distant islands of the Pacific. Commodore George Dewey was at Hongkong when the war resolution was passed, in command of the Asiatic squadron, which consisted of the protected cruisers *Olympia* (flagship), *Boston*, and *Raleigh*, the unprotected cruisers *Concord* and *Petrel*, and the revenue cutter *McCulloch*. On April 22 he was joined by the protected cruiser *Baltimore* from Honolulu, carrying a large cargo of ammunition, which, with the foresight characteristic of the Navy Department, had been shipped from San Francisco early in March. Upon the declaration of war by Spain, Dewey was informed by the British authorities at Hong-

kong that he must leave the neutral port within twenty-four hours. He proceeded to Mirs Bay, thirty miles up the Chinese coast, where on the next day he received the following dispatch from Secretary Long: "War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavor." On the twenty-seventh Dewey's squadron set out on the six-hundred-and-twenty-eight-mile voyage from Mirs Bay to the harbor of Manila in Luzon, the chief island of the Philippine group, which had for more than three centuries been a colonial possession of the crown of Spain.¹

The entrance to the harbor of Manila, twenty miles below the city, was guarded by forts and reported to be sown with mines. But Dewey had served with Admiral Farragut in the Civil War, and had learned his tactics from the old hero who had run the forts below New Orleans and "damned" the torpedoes in Mobile Bay. Arriving at the narrows late on the evening of April 30, he steamed through the Boca Grande ("Large Mouth") uninjured by the fitful fire from the shore batteries, and during the early morning hours proceeded slowly up the bay to within three miles of the sea walls of Manila. The governor-general, preferring disaster to the Spanish fleet to danger to the inhabitants of the city, had refused to allow Admiral Montojo to take a position near Manila, where he could be aided by the fire of the

¹ As the fleet set out to sea the crews were heartened (and entertained) by the reading of a bombastic proclamation by the governor-general of the Philippines, which contained the following sentences: "The North American people, constituted of all the social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and have provoked war with their perfidious machinations, with their acts of treachery, with their outrages against the law of nations. The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of Victory will give us one as brilliant and complete as the righteousness of our cause demands. . . . A squadron manned by foreigners possessing neither instruction nor discipline is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of life and liberty. . . . Vain imaginings! Ridiculous boastings! The aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers, they shall not gratify their lustful passions at the cost of your wives' and daughters' honor, or appropriate the property your industry has acquired as a provision for your old age."



CUBA AND PORTO RICO

two hundred and twenty-six guns mounted on the city fortifications. Montojo therefore stationed his seven fighting vessels near the arsenal of Cavité, ten miles to the south of Manila. His squadron was inferior to Dewey's in every respect. Its gross tonnage was 11,600 to Dewey's 19,000. Its largest cruiser, the *Reina Cristina*, was of 3520 tons as compared with the 4413 of the *Baltimore* and the 5870 of the *Olympia*. Dewey's ships carried ten 8-inch and twenty-three 6-inch guns, while the Spaniards had but seven 6-inch guns and none larger. Moreover, some of the Spanish vessels' guns had been removed to strengthen the shore batteries. Admiral Montojo himself had confided to the governor-general that his "poor squadron would not be able to withstand the onslaught of the American ships."

At daylight of May 1 the Spaniards began an ineffectual fire from the fleet and shore batteries. Dewey ran south until he was about six thousand yards from the Spanish fleet, when he gave the order to the captain of the *Olympia*, "You may fire when ready, Gridley." For two hours Dewey led his ships back and forth five times before the Spanish squadron, each time closer in, pouring a deadly fire from port and starboard batteries alternately. Then he drew out of range at 7.30 to give his hungry crews their well-earned breakfast and to take stock of his ammunition. He did not know that the battle was already won. The Spanish ships, at anchor or moving in a narrow radius close to shore, partly hidden by the point of land which stretches between Cavité and the bay, had been able to conceal their distress, although the two largest of them had been seen in flames. A careful inspection of our ships showed that though all of them but the *Concord* had been hit, no serious damage had been done. The ammunition was plentiful enough to warrant the continuation of the battle. Shortly before 11 o'clock the American squadron returned to complete the work of destruction. The crippled Spanish vessels made such resistance as they could, but their wild and scattering volleys were useless in the face of the deadly, accurate fire of the American ships. By noon every one of the Spanish vessels was destroyed. The admiral had abandoned his burning flagship and fled to Manila, where

he was destined to languish in a foul prison and eventually to be cashiered for cowardice by a court in Spain. The shore batteries were soon silenced by Dewey's guns. The arsenal at Cavité and the forts at the mouth of the harbor were surrendered. Manila lay at the mercy of the American fleet. The Spanish casualties in the battle were 381. On the American ships not a man was killed and but 7 were wounded.

The first news of the battle to reach the world was a morning cable from Manila to Madrid announcing a glorious Spanish victory. There was riotous rejoicing in Spain and general satisfaction in the capitals of continental Europe, where the espousal of the Spanish cause had been outspoken from the beginning. The press of Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Rome, both from sympathy with an ancient monarchy striving to repress rebellion in its colonies and from jealousy of the commercial prosperity of the American Republic, had freely predicted the failure of our new and undisciplined fleet to stand up before the superb Spanish ships christened with the imposing names of rulers and princely dons. England alone was on our side; but even the British sailors who cheered Dewey's ships as they left the harbor of Hongkong feared that they were going to destruction. Therefore, when the true story of May-Day morning in Manila harbor was known, Spain's joy was turned to all the more bitter mourning, and the European capitals reluctantly realized that the United States had made its dramatic entrance into the family of world powers. Dewey had cut the cable on the governor-general's refusal to allow him to use it, severing Manila from communication with the world. His own report of the battle, therefore, had to be sent by a dispatch boat to Hongkong and thence cabled to Washington. Its publication on May 7 roused the country to a high pitch of enthusiasm. Commodore Dewey's name was on everyone's lips, and his portrait in everyone's eyes. President McKinley cabled him the thanks of the American people for his "splendid achievement and overwhelming victory," raised him to the rank of rear admiral, and, with hundreds of thousands of his fellow citizens, proceeded to look up the exact location of the Philippines on the map.

In spite of his victory Dewey's position in Manila Bay for the next four weeks was fraught with difficulties and dangers. He controlled the bay, and "could take the city at any time," as he reported on May 4; but he had no troops to hold the city and no means of procuring the fresh vegetables, meat, and fruits necessary for the health of his crews. Moreover, the warships of the great powers were gathering in the harbor. On May 13 Dewey cabled the Navy Department asking for five thousand troops, fresh supplies of ammunition, and naval reënforcements. He pointed out that a British gunboat, a French and a Japanese cruiser, and two German warships had arrived. The Germans, obviously hostile to the American control of the harbor, augmented their fleet of observation until at the end of June it consisted of five powerful ships, superior to Dewey's force. Two years earlier the Germans had compelled the cession of the Chinese port of Kiao-chau with part of the Shantung hinterland. They were intent on the scheme of building up a power in the Far East. They resented this "intrusion" of the United States. Admiral Von Diedrichs, in command of the German Asiatic squadron, brazenly violated the rules of blockade which Dewey had established in Manila harbor. He moved his ships about at will by day and night, assuming threatening attitudes toward the American fleet, tried to persuade the British commander Chichester to join him in his defiance of Dewey's orders (for which he received a curt rebuff), and even landed provisions for the Spaniards at Manila. Finally Dewey's patience was exhausted. He sent his flag lieutenant, Brumby, to Admiral Von Diedrichs with a sharp protest against his "extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse," adding the ultimatum, "And you may tell the Admiral that if he wants a fight he can have it now." The German commander apologized for "his subordinates'" breach of the rules of the blockade, but he did not cease to hamper and annoy Dewey in every way short of the actual provocation of war, until the American reënforcements in the harbor and on the shore were sufficient to insure the capture and control of Manila.


The reënforcements were slow in coming. It was not till the

twenty-fifth of May that the first detachment of 2500 men with artillery was ready to sail from San Francisco on five transports. They reached Manila on June 30, convoyed from Honolulu by the cruiser *Charleston*.¹ General F. V. Greene arrived with 3600 more troops on July 17; 4600 more followed on July 31. Early in August, therefore, General Wesley Merritt, who was intrusted with the command, found himself at the head of a respectable force of 10,700 men and officers. They occupied the shore from Cavité to the outer defenses of Manila. Unfortunately the Americans were not the only armed forces in front of the city. Two years before the war broke out a certain Emilio Aguinaldo, the Filipino leader of one of the chronic revolts which the misrule of Spain provoked in the islands, had been bought off by the Spanish authorities with the promise of \$800,000, half of which he had received, and had retired to Hongkong. After the battle of Manila Bay, he worked upon our consul at Hongkong, Mr. Wildman, to get Dewey to take him back to the Philippines to renew the rebellion. Dewey, in his precarious position in the middle of May, with commendable strategy but, as it proved, with disastrous results, brought Aguinaldo and his "staff" to Manila on board the *McCulloch*, taking care to give him no promise of the recognition of an insurgent government in the islands. However, the vain Aguinaldo proceeded on the assumption that the American expedition to the Philippines had been undertaken with the object of putting him in the seat of the governor-general. On June 20, the day when Captain Glass entered the harbor of Guam, he proclaimed the independence of the Philippines and issued a proclamation as dictator-president, which patronizingly recognized the Americans as his allies. When our troops moved upon Manila on the

¹ Captain Glass of the *Charleston* had orders to stop on the way and seize the island of Guam in the Ladrones, fifteen hundred miles east of the Philippines. When he entered the harbor of Guam on June 20 and opened fire on the fort, the Spanish commander sent his apologies that on account of lack of ammunition he was not able "to return the salute." He had not heard anything of a war between his country and the United States. Of course he surrendered promptly. Captain Glass raised the Stars and Stripes above the fort and took formal possession of the island (June 21).

morning of August 13, after a bombardment of the forts by Dewey's fleet, they found the Filipino insurgents between them and the city. General Merritt, like Admiral Dewey, was determined to give no recognition to Aguinaldo's republic. The Filipino leader was with some difficulty persuaded to move his forces sufficiently to the west to permit the Americans to pass. However, when our troops entered the city, the Filipinos followed, and looked on in sullen acquiescence while their "allies" raised the American flag in the plaza. They were allowed neither a share in the ceremonies of the surrender nor any gratification of their desire for loot and massacre. They were promptly forced to retire again to their lines outside the city walls. It was an ugly situation, which in due time brought its dire consequences.

We must now turn to the events of the main theater of the war—the West Indies. While Dewey was steaming from Mirs Bay to Manila, Admiral Pascual Cervera left the Cape Verde Islands with the second-class battleship *Cristóbal Colón*, the armored cruisers *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Almirante Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, and the three torpedo-boat destroyers, *Terror*, *Furor*, and *Plutón*. His departure caused something of a panic in the cities of our Atlantic coast, but the naval authorities, convinced of his necessity for recoaling and overhauling his fleet after crossing the ocean, were sure that his destination was the West Indies. His sailing orders, in fact, were to protect Porto Rico and relieve the blockaded port of Havana. The dispositions made by Admiral Sampson and the Navy Department to intercept the Spanish fleet were thorough. Sampson himself, with rare divination of Cervera's plans, sailed for Porto Rico with the *New York*, the *Iowa*, the *Indiana*, and four other vessels detached from the Havana squadron. The scout ships *Harvard* and *St. Louis* were ordered to cruise north and south on a line about one hundred miles east of Guadaloupe and Martinique until the tenth of May, on the lookout for the Spanish fleet. Unfortunately the sluggish speed of Cervera's squadron, which took thirteen days to cover the 2349 miles between the Cape Verde Islands and the West Indies (a speed of seven and a half knots an hour), could not be divined. Sampson arrived off San Juan,



THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Porto Rico, on May 12, but, finding no Spanish ships there, returned westward after a futile bombardment of the forts of the port. The captains of the *Harvard* and the *St. Louis* abandoned their patrol on the tenth as ordered. The next day the Spanish fleet slowly approached the island of Martinique, and, hearing of Sampson's expedition, abandoned the voyage to Porto Rico and turned to the Dutch island of Curaçao for coal. On the thirteenth the Navy Department, hearing of the arrival of the Spaniards at Martinique, ordered Commodore Schley to leave Hampton Roads for Charleston, there to await instructions for the movements of the flying squadron in coöperation with Sampson's operations against Cervera. On the fifteenth Sampson, on his way back from Porto Rico to the Havana station, was informed that the Spanish fleet was at Curaçao and that Schley had been ordered to Key West. He immediately proceeded himself to Key West to plan the strategy of the campaign against Cervera.¹

It was believed that Havana or Cienfuegos (on the southern shore of Cuba with rail connections with Havana, a hundred miles distant) would be Cervera's objective. Therefore Schley was ordered on May 19 to blockade Cienfuegos with a strong fleet composed of the cruiser *Brooklyn* and the battleships *Masachusetts*, *Texas*, and *Iowa*. Cervera had actually slipped into the harbor of Santiago, more than three hundred miles to the eastward of Cienfuegos, on the same morning, but his movements had not been observed by any American vessel. Rumors of his true location, however, came from the Cuban insurgents, and Sampson ordered Schley to transfer his blockade to Santiago "if satisfied that the enemy is not at Cienfuegos." Without

¹ A dramatic incident of the concentration of the American fleet was furnished by the voyage of the battleship *Oregon* (Captain Clark), which was at Bremerton, Washington, when the war became imminent. She left San Francisco on March 19 for her trip of fourteen thousand miles around Cape Horn to Jupiter Inlet, Florida, where she arrived on May 24 in perfect condition for immediate service. "Her performance," says Chadwick, "was one unprecedented in battleship history, and was one which will probably long preserve its unique distinction" ("The Relations of the United States and Spain," Vol. II, p. 16). The voyage of the *Oregon* was a potent argument for the construction of the Panama Canal.

taking pains to ascertain positively whether the Spanish fleet was at Cienfuegos, Schley was "satisfied" by smoke in the harbor that it was. Definite orders came to him the next day to sail eastward, but he stopped within twenty-seven miles of Santiago and began a "retrograde movement" toward Key West on the plea that his bunkers were low and that he could not coal from the colliers in the heavy sea. It was not until the twenty-ninth that Schley arrived before the harbor of Santiago.¹ On June 1 he was joined by Admiral Sampson with the *New York* (flagship), the *Oregon*, and several supporting vessels. The eleven American warships now gathered off Santiago formed a semicircle of six miles' radius from the mouth of the harbor as a center and maintained a vigorous blockade night and day for more than a month.

As soon as Cervera's fleet was securely bottled up in Santiago harbor,² preparations were made to send land forces to Cuba. President McKinley had called for 125,000 volunteers on April 25 and for 75,000 more a month later. But the work of mobilization was slow. May was more than half over before the regular troops were gathered at Tampa, Florida, and but three regiments of volunteers were ready to take part in the expedition to Cuba in June. A navy, if it is kept in existence at all, must necessarily be kept in fair condition; but an army in

¹ On the very day that Schley started his retrograde movement (May 25) Cervera decided to leave the harbor of Santiago and make for San Juan in Porto Rico. He reconsidered, however, on the report of a pilot that there was doubt whether the *Colón* could clear a flat rock near the entrance of the harbor. His two ablest captains urged him to take out the fleet even at the risk of the injury or loss of one of the ships, since to remain in the harbor would mean the eventual destruction of them all. But Cervera held to his counsel of prudence. Had he gone out he would have found no American ships to hinder him.

² Sampson planned to make a sortie impossible by sinking the collier *Merrimac* in the narrowest part of the channel. A young naval constructor, Lieutenant Richmond P. Hobson, was intrusted with the daring mission. With a crew of seven volunteers he ran the *Merrimac* into the harbor's mouth on the night of June 3; but shots from the batteries disabled her steering-gear, and before she could be exploded she had drifted to a broader and deeper part of the channel where her sunken hull offered no obstacle. Hobson and his men escaped death only by miracle. They were found clinging to a raft and picked up by the knightly Cervera, who sent word of their rescue to the American commander.

time of long-continued peace may become practically useless by the dry rot of futile routine and the fussy punctiliousness of superannuated officers. The delays, cross-purposes, neglects, and blunders attendant on getting an army of seventeen thousand men embarked for Cuba were unpardonable. The single-track railroad to Tampa was crowded with trainloads of men, clothing, food, and ammunition in higgledy-piggledy fashion. Cars of meat were spoiling at one point because cars of ice were melting at another point perhaps only a few miles away. Heavy woolen clothing, fit for a winter's campaign in Montana, was sent to men going to fight in a tropical island in midsummer. Officers seized what they could, where they could, for their men to eat and wear. Men broke into the waiting cars, which were sealed with red tape, and helped themselves. No regiment knew to what transport it had been assigned, and some were divided in their scramble to get aboard. When the transports were finally loaded and crowded to suffocation, they were held for six days in Tampa harbor under a withering tropical sun because of a false report that two Spanish warships had been seen in the neighborhood. The blame for all these true charges of inefficiency, as well as for many false accusations (such as furnishing the soldiers with "embalmed beef," or canned meat preserved with harmful chemicals), was visited upon the head of the Secretary of War, General Russell A. Alger, ex-governor of Michigan. Alger was said to be more interested in distributing the patronage of his office than in administering its duties. The popular censure which he incurred for his poor management of the department forced the President to ask for his resignation the following summer. Yet Alger was rather the victim than the author of the demoralization of the department. His fault lay in the fact that his amiable nature lacked the vigor to cope with the evils and remedy them.

The troops were landed at Daiquirí, some fifteen miles to the east of Santiago, on the twenty-second of June. They found themselves in a totally unaccustomed country, amid dense growths of chaparral and underbrush, where the roads were scarcely more than trails. Proceeding a few miles westward

to the village of Siboney as his base, General W. R. Shafter, who was in command of the expedition, made his plans for the advance on Santiago. A desperate fight at Las Guásimas on June 24 proved the valor of the American regulars and volunteers alike to drive the enemy from a superior position on high ground, and brought our army to the foot of the fortified hills of El Caney and San Juan, which protect the city of Santiago on the east. On June 30 General Shafter notified Admiral Sampson that he would attack the Spanish positions on the morrow, asking the American fleet to coöperate by a bombardment of the city.

The story of the magnificent assaults of the American troops on the first of July cannot be told in detail.¹ There were three separate actions. On the right Generals Lawton, Chaffee, and Ludlow carried the heights crowned by the village of El Caney, after a desperate engagement in which they lost a tenth of their men. Hawkins, Kent, Sumner, and Wikoff (who was slain) stormed the still more important hill of San Juan to the left. Between the two assaulting columns of regulars, the First Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, popularly known as the "Rough Riders," led by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt,² charged on foot, in the

¹ For the best account see Chadwick's "The Relations of the United States and Spain," Vol. II, pp. 48-113.

² Roosevelt, after serving six years (1889-1895) as Civil Service Commissioner under Harrison and Cleveland and two years (1895-1897) as president of the New York police board, had been appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy by McKinley. He had been from the beginning an ardent advocate of the forcible ejection of Spain from Cuba. It was he who secured the appointment of Dewey to the command of the Asiatic squadron. Ten days after the destruction of the *Maine* he had sent Dewey the famous cable to make ready for war. When the war broke out, Roosevelt resigned his position in the Navy Department and secured from his friend Secretary Alger permission to raise a volunteer regiment of cavalry, insisting, however, on account of his inexperience in commanding troops in the field, upon taking the subordinate commission of lieutenant-colonel under the superior command of Leonard Wood. The regiment, recruited at San Antonio, Texas, was unique in the history of the United States army. It consisted for the most part of cow-punchers, hunters, and mining prospectors from our territory in the southwest, "tall and sinewy men with resolute, weather-beaten faces, and eyes that looked a man straight in the face without flinching." Mingled with these were crack athletes from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, and Cherokees and Chick-

face of a hail of bullets from the Spanish mausers, up Kettle Hill and on to join the assault on San Juan. When darkness fell, the American troops, after more than twelve hours of battle without food or rest, were in possession of the heights above the city. About 12,500 men and officers had taken part in our triple offensive. The losses were 114 officers and 1500 men. Conflicting statements make it impossible to tell the real losses of the Spaniards. They were certainly heavier than the American casualties at Las Guásimas and El Caney; and as for San Juan, Colonel Roosevelt's opinion seems reasonable: "I think we suffered more heavily than the Spaniards did in killed and wounded. It would have been very extraordinary if the reverse was the case, for we did the charging; and to carry earthworks on foot with dismounted cavalry, when those earthworks are held by unbroken infantry armed with the best modern rifles, is a serious task" ("The Rough Riders," p. 156).

The victorious American army, however, was in a precarious position on the heights above Santiago. Our lines of investment were thin, and there were no reserves available. Transportation facilities were lacking, food was hard to get, the deadly malarial fever was spreading among our men, and the more deadly yellow fever was feared as the refugees from the crowded and dirty city began to pour into our lines. General Shafter, himself sick with fever and gout at Siboney, was inclined to withdraw the army from the positions which it had so laboriously gained; but he was dissuaded by the remonstrances of indomitable fighters like Sumner and Hawkins and "little Joe" Wheeler of Alabama, the commander of the cavalry. Shafter put up a bold front and sent a demand to General Toral for the immediate surrender of Santiago. His dispatches home, however, were filled with dismal forebodings. Sunday, July 3, was a day of gloom and apprehension for the American people. But

asaws from the Indian Territory. Colonel Wood having been advanced to the rank of brigadier general after the battle of Las Guásimas, Roosevelt was in actual command of the Rough Riders in their brilliant charge up Kettle and San Juan hills. The story of the fight is graphically told by Colonel Roosevelt himself in "The Rough Riders," pp. 112-156.



THE CAPTURE OF EL CANEY

if they had known what was taking place that morning in the waters outside of Santiago harbor their apprehension would have been changed to thanksgiving.

About half-past nine, as the crews of the blockading squadron were mustering for Sunday inspection, lookouts on the *Iowa* descried a line of smoke in the harbor and quickly made the signal "Enemy escaping." A few minutes later the Spanish fleet, led by the flagship *Maria Teresa*, was seen heading under full steam for the open sea. Believing that a large American army was about to draw its lines around the doomed city, Governor-General Blanco had ordered Cervera to make a dash for safety, in the hope that some of his ships at least might break through the blockade and reach Havana. Cervera knew that he was a doomed man, and, indeed, he had known it before he set sail from Cape Verde. There is nothing more pathetic than the letters of this gentleman-admiral, the soul of honor and chivalry, remonstrating in calm, sensible dignity with the naval ministry of Spain against the criminal neglect of every necessity for his fleet. The heavy guns were still unfinished, boilers were defective, bottoms were foul, cartridge cases were bad, coal and biscuits were short, charts of the American seas were lacking and even the very ropes were rotten. "I beg your Excellency," wrote the admiral on the eve of his final sailing orders, "to permit me to insist that the result of our voyage to America must be disastrous to the future of our country. That is the opinion of all men of honor. I beg your Excellency to read this telegram and all my correspondence to the President of the Council, in order to ease my conscience."¹ With such forebodings did the admiral sail from Cape Verde, and with no less forlorn hopes did he lead his ships out of Santiago harbor and turn their prows toward the west.

Admiral Sampson had left the squadron in his flagship *New York* only about half an hour before Cervera's sortie, to go to Siboney for a conference with General Shafter. The *Massachusetts* also was away, coaling at Guantánamo. The other ships

¹ The correspondence is printed in Chadwick's "The Relations of the United States and Spain," Vol. I, pp. 96-126.

of the squadron closed in upon the Spaniards in accord with Sampson's standing orders. Only the *Brooklyn*, under Commodore Schley's orders, turned to the south away from the Cuban shore, and, executing a "loop," again returned to the westward course parallel to the Spanish fleet, but considerably farther out than the other ships of our squadron. Whatever the tactical fault or virtue of this manœuvre at Santiago, it is ridiculous to attribute it to "cowardice" on Schley's part, as some of his critics have done. The *Brooklyn* was in the thick of the fight. She was struck by more than twenty-five shots, and her crew suffered the only American casualties of the day (one killed and one wounded).¹

The destruction of the Spanish fleet under the merciless fire of the American ships was rapid and complete. At 10.15 the *Maria Teresa*, exploded by a 13-inch shell from the *Indiana*, headed for the shore six miles west of Santiago, a mass of flames. A few minutes later the *Oquendo* followed, blowing up like a huge mine in a pyrotechnic display and scattering a shower of steel and splinters around her. The *Viscaya* labored on, under

¹ Admiral Schley's conduct at Santiago and Cienfuegos, together with his "retrograde movement" of May 25, were the subject of an exhaustive investigation by a court of inquiry appointed in 1901 and presided over by Admiral Dewey. The investigation was the result of a three years' controversy between the champions of Schley, who claimed that he was in command at Santiago in the absence of Admiral Sampson and should therefore have had the credit for the victory and at least equal advancement with Sampson (who was promoted 8-points to Schley's 6), and the supporters of Sampson, who accused Schley of insubordination at Cienfuegos and cowardice at Santiago. Dewey pronounced for Schley, but the rest of the court decided for Sampson, with Secretary Long's approval. Schley appealed to President Roosevelt, who published a declaration on February 18, 1902, in which he approved the finding of the court and said that full justice had been done to Commodore (then Rear Admiral) Schley. Schley's own statements are not easily reconciled. At the time of the battle he said that he executed the loop in order to avoid being rammed by the Spanish ships, but later he gave as his reason the fear of blanketing the fire of the American ships. Neither did he claim at the time of the battle that the credit for the victory was his. He wrote in his report to Sampson (July 6): "I congratulate you most sincerely on this great victory of the squadron under your command." In his autobiography, entitled "Forty-five Years under the Flag" (pp. 281, 290), he categorically asserts that the command at Santiago was his in Sampson's absence, and that the victory was his also.

terrible punishment from the guns of the *Oregon*, the *Iowa*, and the *Texas*, for another forty minutes, then turned to the beach fifteen miles west of Santiago, "a shattered, blazing hulk." The *Colón* alone remained, clinging close to the shore and tearing along at topmost speed. She had a lead of six miles, but the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon* gained on her steadily. At 1 o'clock they began to find her range. As a 13-inch shell from the huge *Oregon* struck the water near her, the *Colón* gave up the game, hauled down her flag, and ran upon the shore, where her crew opened her sea cocks and sank her in shallow water. The torpedo destroyers *Plutón* and *Furor*, which emerged from the harbor at 10 o'clock, were raked by the batteries of the *New York*, as she was steaming back from Siboney at full speed in the hope of getting into the main battle. Lieutenant Commander Wainwright of the unarmored *Gloucester* (J. P. Morgan's converted yacht *Corsair*) then dashed in upon them in the face of a brisk fire from the shore batteries, and within twenty minutes sank the *Plutón* and drove the *Furor* on the beach.

More than 350 Spaniards were killed on the decks or drowned in the tangled mass of wreckage, 160 were wounded, and more than 1750 officers and sailors were taken prisoners. The crews of the American vessels heroically rescued hundreds of Spaniards from the blistering decks of their wrecked ships and from the waters around—among them Admiral Cervera, who had leaped from the burning *Teresa* into the sea. He was picked up and brought on board the *Gloucester*, clad from Commander Wainwright's wardrobe, and treated with all the courtesy that his gallant conduct merited.¹

When the proud *Cristóbal Colón* struck her colors and ran upon the shore which the admiral whose name she bore had discovered "for Castile and Aragon" four hundred years before,

¹ Admiral Cervera's gratitude was expressed in a noble letter to Sampson (July 5) in the name of all the men and officers of the Spanish fleet. In his report to the Spanish ministry of marine he praised the "chivalry and courtesy of the enemy," who "clothed the naked," who "suppressed their shouts of joy in order not to increase the sufferings of the defeated," and who "vied in making our captivity as easy as possible" (Chadwick, "The Relations of the United States and Spain," Vol. II, p. 190).

the power of Spain in the New World was at an end. General Toral at first repelled the new demand for surrender; but when shells from Sampson's squadron began to drop in the city, he reconsidered. On July 13 he met Generals Shafter, Wheeler, and Miles (the latter on his way to Porto Rico with an advance army of thirty-three hundred men) and arranged for the surrender of the city. The troops were to be sent back to Spain at the expense of the United States. There was still brave boasting of resistance in Havana, but it was only the indulgence of that quixotic kind of "honor" which ignores facts. A Spanish fleet had started for the Philippines; but the counter proposal of Commodore Watson to sail to the Spanish coast with the *Oregon*, the *Iowa*, and a few cruisers, combined with the news of Cervera's defeat, caused the hasty return of the Philippine fleet to Spain—after it had enriched the treasury of the Suez Canal by \$280,000, which it had been compelled to pay in tolls. The stock market of Madrid had gone to pieces. There was trepidation in the cities of the coast over the anticipated arrival of Watson's fleet. And the governments of Europe had lost their enthusiasm for the Spanish cause.

On July 22 Madrid asked for terms of peace through M. Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington. Secretary Day's¹ answer contained the President's three demands: (1) that Spain should relinquish all claim to Cuba and evacuate the island immediately; (2) that in lieu of an indemnity Spain should cede to the United States Porto Rico and any other of the islands of the West Indies under her sovereignty, together with an island in the Ladroneas to be selected by the United States; (3) that the United States should "occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines." On August 12, Cambon,

¹ On the outbreak of the war the aged John Sherman had resigned the portfolio of State under pressure (April 25) and had been succeeded by the Assistant Secretary, Judge William R. Day of Ohio, who in turn resigned in September to serve on the peace commission. John Hay, our ambassador to England, was then made Secretary of State, with Professor John B. Moore of Columbia as first assistant.

by authorization of the Spanish court, signed a protocol containing these conditions and the further provision for a peace commission to meet at Paris not later than October 1. A cessation of hostilities was immediately proclaimed. General Miles was halted in the midst of his victorious Porto Rican campaign. The operations of our fleet against the ports of Cuba were suspended. Preparations for the dispatch of Commodore Watson's squadron to Spain were stopped. Only Dewey and Merritt in the Far East, cut off from direct communication with Washington, were without news of the armistice. On the day after the protocol was signed they captured the city of Manila and raised the American flag above the palace (see page 310).

The American delegates to the peace conference were Judge Day, Senators Cushman K. Davis of Minnesota, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, William P. Frye of Maine, George Gray of Delaware, and Whitelaw Reid, the owner of the *New York Tribune*. It took them more than two months to bring the Spanish negotiators to accept our terms, and it looked at times as if the commissioners would have to return home without a treaty. The Spaniards made a futile attempt to saddle the Cuban debt upon the United States; but the serious hitch in the proceedings came on the question of the Philippines. The Spaniards claimed that since their flag waved over Manila and their sovereignty in the islands was unimpaired on the day when the protocol was signed, the Philippines should remain in their possession. They asked, therefore, that Dewey's "occupation" should cease forthwith. Our demands in regard to the Philippines, on the other hand, underwent considerable modification during the peace conference. President McKinley's original instructions to the American delegates declared that "the luster and the moral strength of our cause" should not, "under any illusion of the hour, be dimmed by ulterior designs, which might tempt us into excessive demands or into an adventurous departure on untried paths." Nevertheless the President continued: "We cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on

whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization." These two irreconcilable positions were reconciled for the moment in the President's mind by the compromise of demanding the cession of the island of Luzon to the United States and the concession of equal commercial rights with Spain in the rest of the Philippine archipelago. But as the weeks passed, McKinley abandoned this untenable position and moved steadily toward the "adventurous departure on untried paths." He talked with General Greene and became convinced that to leave the Philippines to Aguinaldo would mean to abandon them to anarchy, and that to return them to Spain would mean to condemn them to further oppression. He found all the members of his cabinet but two in favor of keeping the islands, and Senator Gray the only one of the peace commissioners who favored unconditional withdrawal. He felt the pressure of the commercial interests, eager to open new markets for our surplus production, and to share in the imminent parceling of the Far East among the great powers. He traveled across the continent in his visit to the Trans-Mississippi Exposition (October 10-22), keeping his ear "very close to the ground," and caught the ground-swell of approval for every reference in his speeches to the fulfillment of our responsibility to the people of the Philippines. Above all, and by his own solemn testimony, he received "guidance" in answer to his prayers, bidding him to take the whole archipelago, "to educate the Filipinos and uplift and civilize and Christianize them."¹

So the fateful ultimatum went from Secretary Hay to the commissioners at Paris, October 26: "The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule or to be the subject of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole

¹ This confession was made in an interview with a delegation of the missionary committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Washington, November 21, 1899. It is quoted in C. S. Olcott's "Life of William McKinley," Vol. II, pp. 109-111.

archipelago or none.”¹ The Spanish commissioners made a stubborn resistance; but when President McKinley threw into the scales an offer of \$20,000,000 to reimburse Spain for her “public works of a pacific character in the Philippines,” they agreed to the “sale” of the islands to the United States. The treaty was signed on December 10, 1898. It embodied the terms of the protocol.²

The treaty of peace was sent to the Senate by President McKinley on January 4 and was fiercely debated for more than a month. Its opponents, led by Vest of Missouri and Gorman of Maryland (Democrats), Hoar of Massachusetts and Hale of Maine (Republicans), attacked the annexation of the Philippines as the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine and a violation of the Declaration of Independence. As the Senate was constituted, the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification could be secured only by Democratic support. It was not till Mr. Bryan came to Washington to persuade the Democratic senators that it was better to ratify the treaty now and end the war, leaving the disposition of the Philippines to the decision of the people in the presidential campaign of the following year, that enough Democratic votes were won. The treaty was ratified on February 6 by the narrowest margin possible (57 to 27). Ten of the thirty-four Democrats voted in the affirmative; three of the forty-six Republicans, in the negative. The Spanish Cortes accepted the treaty, and the formal exchange of ratifications ending the war took place on April 11—a year to a day from the transmission of President McKinley’s war message to Congress.

¹ Ambassador Hay had written to the President from London on August 2, before he was called home to join the cabinet: “We are watching with great interest the progress of your negotiations for peace. If we give up the Philippines, it will be a considerable disappointment to our English friends, but of course we can consider nothing but our own interests. I have no doubt that Germany has been intriguing both with Aguinaldo and with Spain. They are most anxious to get a foothold there. But if they do, there will be grave complications with other European powers.” Germany did actually purchase the Pacific islands (the Carolines, the Ladrões, and the Pelew group) which remained to Spain after the war.

² The island of the Ladrões selected by the United States was Guam. Our position in the Pacific was further strengthened during the war by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands (July 7) by a joint resolution of Congress.

The United States had taken up "the white man's burden." We had assumed the responsibility for restoring orderly rule in the devastated island of Cuba. We had acquired nearly a million subjects of Spanish and negro blood in Porto Rico. We had planted our flag in the islands of the Pacific. We had become the masters and protectors of seven and a half millions of people in the Philippines, ranging from the cultured Tagalogs of Manila to the naked Negrito dwarfs, the savage head-hunting Igorrotes, and the brutish Moros of the Sulu peninsula. We had, indeed, entered "on untried paths," and only time could show how we should walk therein.

THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

A brief review of the economic condition of the country on the threshold of the twentieth century is necessary to an understanding of the policies which our leaders adopted and our people supported in dealing with the new problems of American expansion. For while the economic motive is rarely put forward by our statesmen as the ground of public action, it is nevertheless substantially directive. At the close of the nineteenth century the glamour of a foreign war, with its unprecedented victories, obscured to a certain extent the economic issues at home. The country at large, after the bitter sectional and class struggle of the early nineties, felt a relief in turning to other things. Nature and good fortune came to grace McKinley's triumph. The stars in their courses fought for the Republicans. Bounteous crops brought prosperity to the West. The discovery of enormous quantities of gold in the Kiondike region of the Yukon and near Cape Nome, Alaska, coinciding with a vastly increased output from the mines of South Africa, took the heart out of the argument of a currency stringency, on which the complaints of the free silverites were based. The "cross of gold" was lowered. In the five years from 1896 to 1902 inclusive, \$437,000,000 of gold was coined in the United States, as against an average five-year output of \$258,000,000 since 1873. This, with the additional bank-note circulation made possible

by the legislation of March, 1900 (see page 333), raised the circulating medium from \$23.85 per capita in 1893 to over \$30 per capita in 1900. As the value of money fell, prices rose. The farmers no longer had to sell their wheat at 50 cents a bushel. Prosperity assuaged their discontent. They began to pay off their mortgages, paint their barns, and accumulate balances in the banks.

However, it was not the farmers but the great industrialists who were the chief beneficiaries of the renaissance of prosperity which followed the hard times of the middle nineties. The census of 1900 still showed, to be sure, that a larger number of our people were engaged in farming than in any other kind of work. Of the 29,000,000 of our population of 76,000,000 who were engaged in gainful occupations, 10,400,000 were found in agriculture, as against 7,000,000 in manufacturing, mining, and the industrial arts; 4,800,000 in trade and transportation; and 6,800,000 in personal and professional services. Yet, other figures of the census showed the steady growth of manufacture and commerce over agriculture. The population of the cities had increased at a much more rapid rate than that of the rural districts or of the country at large.¹ In 1890 it had reached 33.1 per cent of the total population as against 29.2 per cent a decade before. The farm acreage of the entire country had increased from 4,500,000 to 5,700,000 in the period from 1890 to 1900, and the value of the farms from \$14,000,000,000 to \$20,500,000,000; but at the latter date only 49.4 per cent of the farm land was improved, as against 57 per cent in 1890. The acreage of improved farm land fell steadily during the last twenty years of the century in every New England state and in New York and New Jersey, while in Pennsylvania and Maryland it just about held its own. The value of the farms fell, too, in all these states, except Massachusetts. For the first century of our national existence we had not done enough manufacturing to supply our own wants. In 1890 our exports of manufactured

¹ One hundred and sixty cities of 25,000 inhabitants or over increased in population from 14,880,000 in 1890 to 19,718,000 in 1900—a gain of 32.15 per cent as compared with a gain of 20.7 per cent in the country at large.

goods were but 17.8 per cent of our total exports; but by 1900, manufactured goods (\$435,000,000) formed 32 per cent of our exports, while our exports of agricultural products had declined from 83.2 (1880) to 60 per cent of the total. The value of our farm products in 1900 was \$4,700,000,000, while that of our factories, foundries, and mills had reached the imposing figure of \$13,014,000,000. In the light of these statistics it is not difficult to see why Mr. Hanna and his like regarded the prosperity of our country as synonymous with the success of big business or why the agricultural classes of the West, in spite of the absolute improvement in their condition, still felt (as they do to this day) that they were the victims of legislative discrimination in favor of the manufacturer.

The basal cause for the relative decline of agriculture was the progressive exhaustion of free lands for the farmer and free ranges for the stockman. Already the census of 1890 had acknowledged the disappearance of a "frontier"—a fact whose social and economic significance has been strikingly shown in the writings of Professor F. J. Turner. In the first decade of the twentieth century the increase of the farm area of the country, which for fifty years had been more rapid than the increase of population, fell behind in the ratio of 4.8 to 21 per cent. The available lands outside the reserves had been of constantly diminishing agricultural value, "located on half-barren mountain masses or in desert tracts with a vegetation too sparse to support live stock." The coincidence of a falling farm economy and a rising industrialism, with its consequent acceleration of city growth, made a most important change in our political outlook, just at the time when the Spanish War brought us possessions in the far parts of the earth. As a predominantly agricultural people, exporting a surplus of foodstuffs in exchange for manufactured goods, we had been in a position of relative isolation from the competition of the great industrial nations. Now, with the emergence of an industrial supremacy at home, we found ourselves in increasing need of new markets and of access to raw materials in various parts of the earth awaiting exploitation.

But the emergence of industrialism to a position of supremacy over agriculture is only half the story—and perhaps not the more important half: it was the *form* that the new industrialism took which was the significant thing. In the older days of modest production for local markets, when a relatively small capital was enough to start a business, competition had been free; but with the extension of our transportation system, the rapid exploitation of our natural resources, and the advantages secured to the manufacturer by the high tariff, a process of consolidation had begun, which tended more and more to eliminate the smaller competitors and concentrate industry in the hands of groups of great capitalists. This movement reached colossal proportions in the period immediately following the Spanish War. It was the day of the great business promoter ("entrepreneur") and organizer, who, by negotiating purchases, mergers, and holding companies, built up combinations with capital rising into the hundreds of millions. The railroads had already been consolidated into large systems, so that by 1900 more than two thirds of the mileage (193,325) was in control of half a dozen groups, represented by Vanderbilt, Hill, Morgan, Harriman, Gould, and Rockefeller. These groups were at one time attempting to fight each other into bankruptcy, and at another time effecting, by interlocking directorates and "community of interests," that combination of forces which they were forbidden to make openly by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Already, too, a number of industrial concerns, like the Standard Oil and the American Sugar Refinery Companies, had grown by the absorption of their competitors into huge monopolies, controlling from 95 to 98 per cent of the business in their respective fields. But it was not until the new era of prosperity at the close of the century that the orgy of consolidation set in. The Commercial Year Book for 1900 (Vol. V, p. 564) lists only 18 trusts with an aggregate capital of \$288,000,000 for the decade closing with 1890, while the figures for the next decade are 157 trusts with a capital of \$3,150,000,000. Mr. G. H. Montague, in his "Trusts of Today" (1904, p. 101), estimates that the additions to industrial capital in these hectic years

at the turn of the century exceeded the total capitalization of all the industries established in the thirty years following the Civil War.

In the year 1899 alone ninety-two new trusts were formed. The number of shares traded in Wall Street in the first three months of that year exceeded by 15,000,000 the number traded in the corresponding three months of the year preceding. The effect of the \$6,000,000,000 (nominal value) of new securities listed on the exchange during the five years or so preceding the "rich man's panic" of 1903, which squeezed about \$1,700,000,000 of "water" out of a hundred active industrial stocks, was to encourage a perfect frenzy of speculation. Men and women of all sorts and conditions, dazzled by the feats of the promoters who by some sort of financial legerdemain converted dead securities into speculative stock promising 10 per cent, brought their savings to Wall Street to invest, expecting to become rich over night. Two and even three million shares were bought and sold daily on the exchange, whereas before the Spanish War half a million had been considered a very large day's trading. John Hay spoke to Henry Adams of "the insolent prosperity of the United States."

The most conspicuous case of consolidation, illustrating on a mammoth scale what was taking place in scores of other industries, was the creation of the United States Steel Corporation by the absorption of eleven great concerns. J. P. Morgan engineered this transaction in the spring of 1901. On a working cash basis of but \$25,000,000 he launched a corporation with a capitalization of \$1,100,000,000 in preferred and common stock and \$304,000,000 in 5 per cent bonds. The investigation of the corporation by the United States authorities a decade later revealed the fact that the actual value of the properties behind this capitalization of \$1,404,000,000 was no more than \$682,000,000, and that \$400,000,000 had been added as water to the capital of the companies merged, and more than \$150,000,000 issued for mere promotion or underwriting services, of which Mr. Morgan's share was \$62,500,000. In the panic of "undigested securities" (as Mr. Morgan called it) two years later, the preferred

stock, which had sold above par a month after it was put on the market, fell below 50; and the common stock, which had sold for 55, touched the low figure of $8\frac{3}{4}$, to the ruin of thousands of buyers who had relied upon the name of Morgan as a guaranty of safety.

The organization of the United States Steel Corporation also illustrated the methods which the big capitalists used in trying to outmanœuvre one another. Andrew Carnegie, who had been brought to this country as a child from a lowly cottage in Dumferline, Scotland, was working in a cotton mill in Allegheny City, Pennsylvania, at the age of twelve for a wage of twenty cents a day. Two years later (1849) he became a messenger in a telegraph office, where he taught himself in spare moments how to use the operating code. His diligence and brightness recommended him to his boss, Thomas A. Scott, who made him his private clerk and helped him to invest his savings to advantage. When Mr. Scott was made vice president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, he put young Carnegie in charge of the Pittsburgh division. In 1865 Carnegie had amassed capital enough to resign his position as division superintendent and begin the manufacture of pig iron and steel on his own account. He gradually gathered around him the most remarkable group of men in any single industry in this or any other country,—Will Jones, Henry C. Frick, Henry M. Phipps, and Charles M. Schwab among them,—and by the close of the century he had become the greatest steel manufacturer in the world. The profits of the Carnegie Company were \$3,000,000 in 1893. In spite of the business depression of the succeeding years, when other companies were going to the wall, the Carnegie plants continued to increase their profits steadily by about a million a year, until 1898. In that year their profits jumped to \$11,500,000, in 1899 they were \$25,000,000, and in 1900 (the last year of the independent existence of the company) they reached \$40,000,000. Protected by the high tariff,¹ in control of the finest ore beds on the Great Lakes, and equipped with the best furnaces and mills

¹ By the Dingley tariff of 1897, to be noticed presently, the duty on pig iron was \$4 a ton, and on steel rails \$7.84 a ton.

in existence, the Carnegie Steel Company was proudly conscious that it had the world at its feet.¹

While Morgan was amalgamating various steel-producing concerns in his great combination, the Carnegie press agents suddenly announced the project of constructing a \$12,000,000 tube plant at Conneaut on Lake Erie (which would have crushed the National Tube Company, already in Morgan's pool) and of reorganizing its transportation agreements so as to boycott the Pennsylvania Railroad. Unable to compete with Carnegie, Morgan had to buy him out at his own figure. For every \$1000 share of the Carnegie stock the United States Steel Corporation was obliged to pay \$1535.58 in preferred and \$1410.61 in common stock at par. The \$160,000,000 of Carnegie bonds were assumed by an equal issue of United States steel 5 per cent bonds, and in addition the wily Scotsman demanded for his personal holdings of Carnegie Company's stock United States steel bonds at an exchange of 150 to 100. The \$144,000,000 additional bonds thus demanded, plus the \$143,416,640 in preferred and common stock issued in exchange for the Carnegie stock, made the total price paid for the Carnegie business \$447,416,640. The little ironmaster retired with a fortune of \$250,000,000 to devote himself to the promotion of education, health, and peace.

Before the Civil War, wealth had been fairly evenly distributed, but by the end of the century the process of polarization into the little group of fabulously rich and the large group of embarrassingly poor had progressed to a degree which threatened serious social consequences. It was estimated that less than 10 per cent of the families of the country owned more than 80 per cent of its wealth. The enormous profits of the com-

¹ Mr. Schwab, the president of the company, wrote to Mr. Frick, the chairman of the executive committee, on May 15, 1899, estimating the profits for the coming year at \$3,600,000 a month. England could not make steel rails for less than \$19 a ton, but the Carnegie works at Braddock were turning them out at \$12 a ton. Moreover, ore was growing dearer in England and cheaper here. "What is true of rails," wrote Schwab, "is equally true of other steel products. As a result of this we are going to control the steel business of the world" (J. H. Bridge, "The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company," p. 295).

panies which controlled our oil, steel, meat-packing, sugar, and distilling industries sought investment in various fields of business hitherto open to more modest individual capitalists. The Morgan and Rockefeller interests absorbed mines, steamship lines, chains of banks, trust companies, insurance companies, drug stores, and theaters into their voracious maw, until, as Mr. Moody said ("The Truth about the Trusts," p. 493), "these two mammoth groups constitute the heart of the business and commercial life of the nation." America as the land of opportunity for industrious and ambitious millions of men seemed to have become an America for the exploitation of the millions by a few hundreds who had gathered its abundant resources into their own hands. "No nation," said Mr. Bryan, in an article on the issues of the campaign of 1900, "has ever traveled so far in the same space of time from democracy to plutocracy as this nation during the last ten years."¹ Labor, confronted with the powerful trusts which controlled prices and wages throughout the land, grew more class conscious and more grimly determined to secure its human rights in conditions of employment and its fair share of the products of its hands. In the year 1900 there were 1839 strikes and lockouts in the United States, the largest number in our history with the single exception of 1897 in the year 1890. Over 11,500 establishments with 567,710 employees were involved in these strikes, and the losses in wages and profits totaled nearly \$50,000,000. So intrenched was the power of capital that only 29 per cent of these strikes were successful, as compared with 54.5 per cent and 43.6 per cent respectively in the two preceding years. The hopelessness of coping with the trusts by the peaceful methods of negotiation, arbitration, and collective bargaining induced the more extreme labor agitators to form in 1905 the I. W. W. (Industrial Workers of the World), an organization pledged to "direct action" by violence and sabotage.

A single example, though perhaps an extreme one, will illustrate the power which the great corporations exercised over the government. The Senate in the summer of 1900 was debating

¹ *North American Review*, Vol. CLXX, p. 770.

the price to be paid to the Carnegie and Bethlehem Steel Companies for armor plate for our warships. Against the proposition that no more than a stipulated sum should be paid, Mr. Hanna used his immense influence to have the whole matter left in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy. And when the steel companies refused to give the government officials any information to help them determine whether the price asked was exorbitant, Hanna defended them on the ground that their prices were nobody's business but their own, and that "if they chose not to give the information to the public that was their business too." "In short," says Professor Beard, "Hanna took the position that the government should provide ample protection to the steel interests against foreign competition, and pay them substantially whatever the steel companies might charge for armor plate . . . and then ask them no questions whatever" ("Contemporary American History," p. 246).

It is true that from the purely business point of view the great trusts could show advantages of economy and efficiency. They eliminated competitive advertising, cross-freights, the unnecessary duplication of factories and mills, and the multiplication of overhead charges. They were able to locate their plants at strategic points, to provide direct transportation of raw and finished materials, to afford the best modern machinery, and to utilize waste products. In some instances they lowered prices to the consumer, but in others they advanced them beyond the point of possible competition. On the whole, according to the report of the Industrial Commission,¹ "the combinations in practically all cases increased the margin between raw materials and finished products." As against the benefits rendered by the trusts, however, there may be set a strong list of grievances. To dictate to the producers of raw material the price at which they must sell to the trusts or be starved out; to freeze out competitors by temporarily and locally reducing prices below the

¹ This government report in nineteen volumes (Washington, 1900-1902) contains a mine of information on the economic conditions in the country at the close of the nineteenth century. It covers agriculture, mining, manufacture, transportation, labor, etc.

cost of production; to close promising fields of activity to men who could not raise the capital needed to start a business in which the trusts had standardized production; to condemn labor to the monotonous work which the highly specialized and minutely divided processes of manufacture on a great scale had introduced; to secure virtual immunity, through the lax incorporation laws of some of the states, from the penalties of stock-watering, financial "thimblerrigging," and deliberate wrecking after unloading upon a trustful public; to maintain lobbies in legislative capitals for securing undue favors,—these were some of the sinister powers of the great corporations.

The campaign of 1896 had been fought on the issue of the currency, but for several reasons the Republicans could take no immediate steps toward the legal declaration of the "gold standard" which appeared in their platform. In the first place, the Senate still contained enough silverites to defeat such a law. Furthermore, in spite of the phrase in their platform, the Republican leaders were really pledged to bimetallism. Lodge and Reed had even favored tariff discrimination against Great Britain in 1893 in order to force her to the adoption of this policy. After three previous attempts to secure the double standard of currency by international agreement, at congresses held at Paris and London (1878, 1881, 1892), the United States now made a final effort in 1897 by trying to persuade Great Britain to reopen the mints of India to silver. But when this attempt also failed, and the elections of 1898 eliminated eight of the silverites from the Senate, Congress passed the Gold Standard Act, which became law on March 14, 1900. It declared the gold dollar to be the unit of value in the United States; provided for the redemption of the greenbacks and Treasury notes of 1890 in gold coin; set apart for that purpose a reserve of \$150,000,000 in gold, which was to be replenished by the issue of 3 per cent bonds whenever it fell below the \$100,000,000 mark; and encouraged the issue of bank notes by allowing national banks to be organized with a capital of \$25,000 instead of \$50,000 and to issue notes up to the full value (instead of 90 per cent of the value) of bonds deposited with the Comptroller of the Currency.

Just when and how the inevitable currency legislation would come was a matter of comparative indifference to the new administration. What it was really interested in was the upward revision of the tariff. Less than two weeks after his inauguration President McKinley called Congress together in a special session to repair the slight damages done to the protective schedules by the Wilson-Gorman Bill. The Republicans, who, it will be remembered, controlled both Houses of Congress in the last half of Cleveland's term, had already prepared the bill, which bore the name of Nelson Dingley, Jr., of Maine, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means. The Dingley bill was put through the House in less than two weeks with the help of the Reed rules, only twenty-two of its one hundred and sixty-three pages being discussed on the floor. In the Senate, where the "interests" were more conspicuous and where debate was unlimited, it met the usual fate of tariff bills. Before the sheep-raisers and fruit-growers of the West were as well satisfied as the manufacturers of the East and the new industrial leaders of the South, the bill had undergone 872 amendments—more even than the Wilson bill of 1894. But the Republican House was not seriously opposed to the enhanced schedules, as the Democratic House had been three years before. The amended bill was passed in both Houses by votes fairly representative of the Republican majorities (187 to 116, and 40 to 30) and was signed by President McKinley on July 24, 1897.¹

The Dingley bill carried the highest tariff rates in our history. Even at the lowest estimate of its average duties (49½ per cent) it more than restored the McKinley rates. It was, in the words of Professor Taussig, "the outcome of an aggressive spirit of protection." Need of revenue was pleaded as its justification, but in view of the fact that the customs receipts in the very month that the bill was passed were larger (with two exceptions) than they had been in any month for the previous forty years, it seemed clear that the Wilson-Gorman Bill would have

¹ The President regarded the bill as a faithful fulfillment of the party platform, which read: "To all our products—to those of the mines and the fields as well as to those of the shop and factory . . . we promise the most ample protection."

continued to provide ample revenue. The real explanation of the Dingley rates is the triumph of big business in politics. The doctrine professed by the Republican leaders of a generation before—namely, of a tariff for revenue, with "incidental protection"—had already been repudiated in the Republican platform of 1888. It was now definitely abandoned. To be sure, the Dingley bill contained provisions for reciprocity agreements which would reduce the rates by about 25 per cent. But when Mr. J. A. Kasson, the special commissioner of the State Department, had negotiated several of such agreements, the Senate refused to ratify them—a course which can hardly be characterized as other than a breach of faith, since many of the congressmen had voted for the bill because of this prospective reduction of rates. The Dingley act has the distinction of having remained in force longer than any other tariff act in our history (1897-1909). The period was one of almost uninterrupted prosperity, for which the Dingley act was perhaps no less responsible than is the fly on the wheel for the progress of the coach.

A spirited foreign policy was probably the last thing in the mind of either McKinley, "the advance agent of prosperity," or Mark Hanna, the advance agent of McKinley. Both of them deplored the approach of the war with Spain as a nuisance interfering with the program of business expansion. McKinley's cabinet, too, as originally constituted of rather elderly men interested in finance, banking, and business, was not designed to cope with international questions of diplomacy and war. Yet it turned out that these questions assumed the leading place in the administration; and the reorganization of the cabinet brought into office two men in the persons of John Hay and Elihu Root, who were exceptionally qualified to deal with them. In his inaugural address McKinley made no reference to foreign affairs, except the perfunctory commendation of the "policy of noninterference . . . wisely inaugurated by Washington"; but exactly two thirds of the pages of his annual messages to Congress (one hundred and four out of one hundred and fifty-six pages in Richardson's "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. X) are devoted to the discussion of the

problems arising out of our relations to foreign powers and of our new acquisitions in the Far East and the West Indies. The combination of an astonishingly successful foreign war and a wave of prosperity which sent our exports for 1899 above the \$1,000,000,000 mark could not fail to enhance the prestige of the United States abroad. Since our virtual separation from the Old World, following our second war for independence in 1812-1815, we had from time to time been involved in controversies with foreign powers as they affected the Monroe Doctrine or the determination of our boundaries or our fishing-rights under old treaties; but with the turn of the century we became a world power in earnest, in the sense that our interests and influence had continuous and increasing weight in the counsels of Europe.

Many instances of this could be cited, but two must suffice. In the spring of 1899, Nicholas II of Russia, deeply affected, it is said, by M. de Bloch's writings on modern warfare, sent invitations through his foreign minister, Count Muravev, to all the nations in diplomatic relations with Russia to meet in a conference at the Hague to discuss measures for easing the economic burdens which the maintenance of huge armies and fleets imposed upon Europe. Following our traditional policy, we should have courteously acknowledged the Czar's invitation and declined it on the ground that we were not among the nations burdened with armaments, and that Europe's wars were no concern of ours. But President McKinley's immediate response to Secretary Hay upon the receipt of the invitation was, "Of course we will accept." Not only did we send a strong delegation to the Hague in May, under the presidency of Andrew D. White, our ambassador to Berlin, but the American delegation was the only one that came to the conference with a definite and detailed plan for an international court of arbitration.¹ The German emperor was opposed to any scheme of arbitration, as "deroga-

¹ The other members of the delegation were Seth Low, president of Columbia University; Stanford Newel, our minister to the Netherlands; Captain A. T. Mahan of the navy; Captain William Crozier of the army; and Frederick W. Holls as secretary.

tory to his sovereignty"; and Count Münster, the head of the German delegation, translated his master's sentiments into more specific language by declaring that since Germany had the best-prepared army in Europe, she could not give the other nations the precious time needed for mobilization which an appeal to an arbitral tribunal would afford. Ambassador White labored long with the recalcitrant German delegates, arguing with Count Münster, writing to Prince von Bülow, and even sending Mr. Holls to Berlin to carry his personal appeal to the emperor. He won his point; and on June 23 instructions came from Prince Hohenlohe, the German chancellor, indorsing the tribunal of arbitration.

It was a great diplomatic victory for the United States when the final act of the Hague Conference contained, along with conventions for the amelioration of the laws of war on land and the extension of the Geneva rules of 1864 to maritime warfare, also the provision for a permanent court of arbitration. The first case submitted to the Hague Court (September 15, 1902) was a long-standing dispute between the United States and Mexico over the so-called pious fund (a trust fund established by the Jesuits in the seventeenth century for the conversion of the Indians in California), the income of which the Mexican government had refused to pay since the transfer of California to the United States. The decision of the five judges impaneled condemned Mexico to pay to the bishoprics of San Francisco and Monterey the accrued interest on the fund and an annual sum of \$43,000 for the future. Within five years after the establishment of the court, the European nations which had ratified the Hague Convention had made thirty-three treaties providing for the voluntary submission to arbitration of disputes of a justiciable (legal) character, in so far as they did not affect "the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting states."¹

¹ The facts that resort to the arbitration of the court was voluntary and not compulsory, that the judges were a large panel (four from each of the seventeen signatory states) from which a jury was selected *ad hoc*, and that the reservation of questions of "national honor" was broad enough to exclude almost any mat-

Six weeks after the adjournment of the Hague Conference, Secretary Hay opened another brilliant chapter in the history of American diplomacy by the dispatch of an identical note to the courts of London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg (followed shortly by a like communication to the governments of France, Italy, and Japan) pleading for the "open door" in China. After the decisive defeat by Japan in the war of 1894-1895 the huge Chinese Empire lay "like a stranded whale" at the mercy of the great powers, who threatened to cut up its territory into spheres of influence. The Germans seized Kiao-chau and a large part of the Shantung hinterland at the close of 1897 as an alleged reparation for the murder of two missionaries. The Russians then forced China to agree to a twenty-five-year lease of Port Arthur, Talienwan, and the adjacent waters, with the right to extend the Manchurian railroad to Port Arthur as a terminus. England enlarged her sphere of influence about Hongkong and compelled China to lease her Wei-hai-wei in Shantung for so long a period as Russia should remain at Port Arthur. France secured a ninety-nine-year lease on Kwangchow Bay at the southern extremity of the empire. During the year 1898 the "battle of the concessions," as Lord Salisbury called it, went on merrily. The exploiting powers took valuable railroad and mining rights and even extinguished China's political sovereignty in the spheres of influence. Russia and England agreed to respect each other's interests in the regions north and south of the Great Wall of China respectively, but nothing was said about respecting China's rights. The Spanish War had brought us in close proximity to the Asiatic coast. Our prospective commercial interests in the Chinese Empire were obvious. Conse-

ter of controversy at the will of one of the contesting parties, led many to regard the arbitration tribunal as a futile institution. Nevertheless its history shows a remarkable record of serious disputes amicably settled. President McKinley's appointees to the tribunal were ex-President Harrison, Chief Justice Fuller, Attorney-General Griggs, and Judge Gray of Delaware. The tribunal was supplemented by the stronger World Court established at the Hague in 1920 under the provisions of the League of Nations. The best account of the Hague Conference of 1899 is the diary of Andrew D. White published in his "Autobiography," Vol. II, chaps. xlv-xlix.

quently Secretary Hay, in a spirit which contrasted sharply with the designs of the exploiting powers, asked the latter in his note of September 6, 1899, not to interfere with the privileges of any of the twenty-two treaty ports in China, nor to disturb the regular collection of Chinese duties, nor to discriminate within their spheres of influence against other foreigners in the matter of railroad rates or harbor dues. As none of the powers addressed wished to appear more grasping than the rest, each replied accepting the terms of the note provided the others did so. Secretary Hay eliminated the provisos and announced to each of the powers that all had accepted the proposals.

Meanwhile the Chinese themselves, who were wedded to their ancient oriental customs and had no relish for the forcible introduction of Western railroads, telegraphs, and factory products, had begun to turn against the "foreign devils." A society named "the Patriotic Harmony Fists" (abbreviated to "Boxers"), whose motto was "to uphold righteousness by force," quickly spread over the northern provinces of China, carrying terror and destruction in its train. The Boxers stirred the ignorant and superstitious masses to attack the property and lives of the foreigners and the native Christians.¹ Although officially condemned by imperial proclamation, they were secretly encouraged by the dowager empress. Prince Tuan, the father of the heir to the throne and the most violent hater of the foreigners, was made head of the Tsung-li Yamen, or Chinese foreign office. The situation of the diplomatic corps at Peking, one hundred miles from the shore of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, was one of great danger. On May 29, 1900, our minister, E. H. Conger, cabled to Hay: "Boxers increasing. Nine Methodist converts brutally murdered at Pachow. The movement has developed into open rebellion. Chinese government is trying [?]; but is apparently unable to suppress it. . . . Legations have ordered guards." On June 4 he cabled that foreigners were

¹ When crops failed in the drought of 1899, they posted placards stating that the Christian priests and ministers had "irritated heaven," so that no rain would fall until the foreigners had been swept out of the country.

fleeing from the city and that the Chinese government troops refused to attack the Boxers. And again the next day: "Situation worse. It is possible that we may be besieged in Peking with railway and telegraph cut. In that case I ask, as my colleagues are doing, that necessary instructions be given to Admiral to concert with other chiefs of squadrons at Taku to . . . deliver Peking." On the eighteenth the foreign ships gathered in the gulf reduced the forts of Taku, which had fired upon them, and landed marines. But it was a month before there were sufficient men to take the city of Tientsin, and another three weeks before enough reinforcements came to begin the march into the interior for the relief of Peking. Meanwhile the imperial city had been cut off from communication with the outside world. The foreign diplomats had been ordered to leave (which meant to go out to certain death), and the German minister, Baron von Ketteler, while on his way from his legation to the foreign office, had been foully murdered in the street. Thereupon the entire diplomatic corps, with their families and many native Christians, in all about four hundred persons, had taken refuge within the inclosure of the British legation, which they fortified by trenches and barricades to stand siege from a horde of fanatics who poured an incessant rain of artillery and rifle fire upon them. By the middle of July all the European nations had abandoned hope for the lives of the besieged. The London *Times* published obituaries of the British minister and other high officials in the imperial city.

At Washington the Chinese minister Wu Ting Fang insisted that the legations were safe, and President McKinley and Secretary Hay refused to give up hope until they should hear definitely of the worst. Great was their relief, therefore, when they received a message from Mr. Conger on July 20: "For a month we have been besieged in the British legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops. Quick relief only can prevent a massacre." The European courts were skeptical of the authenticity of the dispatch; but in the faint hope of rescuing the living instead of avenging the dead, they decided to send up to Peking at once such forces as they had at Tientsin. Some

19,000 troops, including 8000 Japanese, 3000 British, 800 French, and 2500 Americans (an infantry regiment brought from Manila under Colonel E. H. Liscum, who was killed in the attack on Tientsin), began the march on August 4. Ten days later they reached the capital. After a brief battle at the walls, they entered the city and saved the legations. The besieged had lost 65 killed and 135 wounded. Seven of the children had died of disease. The imperial court had fled. The city was in a state of anarchy, and many of its wealthiest quarters were in ashes. To the shame of the nations it must be said that the soldiers, with the exception of the American and the British, indulged in an orgy of brutality and plunder.¹

As our government had assumed the initiative in securing the open door in China, so it took the lead in determining the policy of retribution and reparation for the Boxer outrages. On July 1 Secretary Hay wrote to all our representatives at foreign courts that in view of the "virtual anarchy" at Peking, we regarded the local provincial authorities who were endeavoring to protect foreign life and property as the true representatives of the Chinese people, "with whom we seek to remain in peace and friendship"; that our purpose in joining with the other powers in the Peking expedition had been to rescue our citizens who were in danger and to prevent "a spread of the disorder to the other provinces of the Empire"; and that in the means employed to accomplish this purpose we wished "to insure the permanent safety and peace of China and to preserve her territorial and administrative entity." In other words, we

¹ Adjutant General Corbin cabled the American commander before the march began: "Reports here of extensive looting in Tientsin. Report immediately whether American troops took part. If so, punish severely. Repress sternly. Absolute regard for the life and property of noncombatants enjoined by order of the Secretary of War." Compare this message with the instructions given by the German emperor to Field Marshal Count von Waldersee, who arrived in Peking with twenty thousand troops early in September to take supreme command of the allied forces: "Give no quarter and take no prisoners; but, imitating the example of Attila and the Huns, excite a terror in Eastern Asia which will last for a thousand years. . . . May the blessing of God attend your flags, and may this war have the blessed results that Christianity shall make its way into China." It was the emperor himself who baptized his troops with the name of Huns.

regarded the Boxer rebellion as an attack on the Chinese government itself, and repudiated the idea, which was welcome to several of the powers, of dismembering the empire. Indemnity and punishment must be exacted. But the indemnity must be paid in money and not in the surrender of territory, and the punishment should be meted out by the Chinese government and not by foreign tribunals. This policy won the consent of the powers (grudgingly in the case of Russia and France) and was presented to the Chinese government in a note of December 22, 1900. Three of the leading culprits were "graciously permitted to commit suicide"; three (including Prince Tuan) were degraded and banished; while dismissal and imprisonment were visited upon a number of officials whose names were furnished in lists of offenders drawn up by the foreign representatives. The indemnity was finally fixed, through the moderating influence of President McKinley, at \$334,000,000, secured on the customs revenues and the salt tax.¹ That China was not ruined by an exorbitant fine, that her markets remained open to the commercial nations without discrimination, that her territory remained intact and her sovereignty unimpaired, that her people were given the opportunity in the twentieth century to work out their destiny as a united nation, was due in the first instance to the wisdom with which Secretary Hay formulated the disinterested policy of the United States in the Orient.

The Republicans went before the country in the presidential campaign of 1900 with a record of success unparalleled by any administration since the Civil War. They had conducted a foreign war which had carried our flag across the Pacific. They had established our finances on a gold basis and refilled the depleted Treasury. They could "point with pride" to the pres-

¹ The share of the United States was fixed at \$24,000,000: but when it was found that less than half this sum would cover the losses sustained by our citizens and the cost of our troops in China, President Roosevelt, in 1907, asked Congress to release China from the payment of the balance. This graceful act strengthened the friendly relations between the two countries, and China showed her appreciation of it by using the money to send hundreds of her young men to be educated in our colleges and universities.

tige of our diplomacy abroad and the prosperity of our industries at home. The new markets opened by the war had added \$46,000,000 to our trade with Asia and \$30,000,000 to our trade with the West Indies in the year 1899. In all the nineteenth century down to the inauguration of McKinley the excess of our exports over our imports had totaled less than \$380,000,000; but in the three years of McKinley's term it had mounted to over \$1,480,000,000. Ever since the landslide of 1874 the mid-term elections had returned a House of Representatives hostile to the administration, but the Republicans in 1898 had maintained their control of both branches of Congress essentially unimpaired. In their gratification at the victory over Spain the American people had forgotten to rebuke the administration for the Dingley act. Moreover, there was complete harmony within the Republican party. The tactful, conciliatory President had preserved a remarkable accord with Congress—neither yielding to it like Grant, nor expostulating with it like Hayes, nor defying it like Cleveland. Congress, the cabinet, the committees (state and national), were all satisfied with McKinley. There was no thought of nominating any other man for the presidency when the Republican convention met at Philadelphia on the nineteenth of June.

Mr. Hobart's death in the previous November had left the vice-presidency vacant. The whole interest of the convention centered in the manœuvres of the men who wished to put Theodore Roosevelt into that office and those who wished to keep him out of it. Roosevelt had returned from Cuba, "the one permanent hero of the Spanish War." So great was his popularity that Thomas C. Platt, the "easy boss" of New York State politics, had deemed it wise to offer him the nomination for the governorship. But from the day Roosevelt entered the executive mansion at Albany (January 1, 1899) he was a thorn in Platt's flesh. Outwardly he maintained cordial relations with the senator and consulted him freely, as he had promised to do, on matters of policy and appointments; but he retained complete freedom of decision and action. His insistence on the passage of a law taxing the franchises of public-service corpora-

tions¹ and his dismissal of an "old guard" politician from the office of Superintendent of Insurance so offended Platt that he pushed Roosevelt for the vice-presidency in order to keep him from reelection to the governorship. Senator Quay of Pennsylvania, from even less honorable motives, joined forces with Platt.² Behind these scheming politicians of the East was the enthusiastic and almost unanimous demand of the West that "Teddy" should have the honor of the second place on the ticket. Neither McKinley nor Hanna wanted Roosevelt, although the President refused to interfere with the freedom of the convention by suggesting any other candidate. Hanna believed that Roosevelt was too radical in his views on the control of business, and knew that he was not ardent in his admiration of McKinley³—either of which faults was sufficient to disqualify him. And finally, Roosevelt himself positively declared that he would not exchange the opportunity of a second term as governor of the Empire State for the sinecure of the vice-presidency. "I will not accept under any circumstances," he wrote to General F. V. Greene a week before the convention met, "and that is all there is about it." When he got to Philadelphia, however, either the irresistible demand of the people of the West or the desire to show Mr. Hanna that he could have the nomination if he wanted it, prevented him from withdrawing his name. He was nominated on the first ballot by every vote in the hall except his own.

The feature of the Democratic convention, which met at Kansas City on July 4, was the undisputed leadership of Mr. Bryan.

¹ The interests fought the franchise tax in the courts, carrying the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, which on May 29, 1905, handed down a unanimous decision upholding the law. The corporations paid over \$25,000,000 of taxes into the state treasury.

² Mark Hanna had been influential in keeping Quay out of his seat in the Senate temporarily, when a deadlock in the Pennsylvania legislature prevented his reelection in time to take his seat. Knowing that Hanna was opposed to Roosevelt's candidacy, Quay sought his revenge by forcing Roosevelt upon him.

³ Roosevelt had been an enthusiastic Reed man in 1896. "Lord! what would I not give if you were only the candidate," he had written to Reed in the midst of the campaign. He had also been very impatient with the President (and Hanna) for the reluctance of the administration to declare war on Spain, and had remarked to friends, "McKinley has no more backbone than a chocolate éclair."

In spite of his defeat four years before, he was still (and was to continue for a dozen years more to be) the virtual dictator of the Democratic party. He was nominated by acclamation. He insisted on writing into the platform the free-silver plank of 1896, though the issue was dead, and the "gold Democrats" were returning to the party. He again bore the brunt of the campaign, repeating his strenuous program of speech-making. But his utterances lacked the apostolic fervor which the single-minded devotion to a holy cause had given them in the previous campaign. He knew that even he could not revive the crusade for free silver; and he divided his energies between attacks on the Dingley tariff, denunciation of the trusts, appeals to the labor vote, and prophecies of the dire evils which militarism and imperialism were about to bring upon the country. It was "the burning issue of imperialism growing out of the Spanish War" and threatening "the very existence of the Republic and the destruction of our free institutions," which the Democratic platform declared to be the "paramount issue of the campaign." The convention hall was decked with banners on which were inscribed such sentiments as "The war for the liberation of Cuba ended with the enslavement of the Philippines," or, "Lincoln abolished slavery; McKinley restored it." The American emblem was displayed bordered with black; and an enormous flag was hung from the girders of the roof, bearing the motto "The flag of a Republic forever, of an Empire never."

A dozen conventions were held in the year 1900, and eight presidential tickets were in the field; but the whole contest came down to the question whether the American people would give a vote of confidence to the administration which had assumed the responsibility of extending the authority of the United States over distant alien peoples and of pledging the power and resources of the United States to protect those peoples against external foes and internal anarchy. The Democrats condemned the forcible assertion of our authority in the Philippines as a war of "criminal aggression" and "greedy commercialism," camouflaged under the pious pretext of "benevolent assimilation." They held that a government not based

on the consent of the governed was a denial of the Declaration of Independence; that our flag could not float where our Constitution was not in force; and that neither the executive nor Congress, which derived their just powers from the Constitution, could exercise an authority beyond or contrary to its provisions. The Republicans met these objections with a plea for the observance of the spirit rather than the letter of the law. New occasions had taught new duties. The islands had come to us as the result of a righteous war (in which the Democratic leader had held a colonel's commission) and a just treaty (which had been ratified largely by the efforts of that same leader). Thus had devolved upon the United States the solemn obligation of adequate protection for the natives of the islands after the authority of Spain had been extinguished. There was no remotest dream of "imperialism" in the counsels of the Republicans, but there must be no "policy of scuttle." We were liberators and not oppressors, and the self-governed American Republic of seventy-five million would never permit despotism in any government which they fostered and defended.¹ "The Republican party," said McKinley in his speech of acceptance, "broke the shackles of 4,000,000 slaves and made them free, and to the party of Lincoln has come another supreme opportunity, which it has bravely met in the liberation of 10,000,000 of the human family from the yoke of imperialism."

Nevertheless the majority of the Americans who indorsed McKinley's policy in the Philippines were influenced less by his argument for our religious duty than they were by the proud confidence in our "manifest destiny." Since the foundation of the Republic, expansion had been the keynote of its policies. The planting of our flag in new territory had never failed to arouse the enthusiasm of our people, especially in the pioneer regions of the West. "The popular passion for territorial aggrandizement," said William H. Seward, half a century before the Spanish War, "is irresistible." Against this inveterate pas-

¹ This passage is a paraphrase of a speech of President McKinley's before the Ohio Society of New York on March 3, 1900 (C. S. Olcott, "The Life of William McKinley," Vol. II, 291).

sion a group of men, mostly "intellectuals" in the East, now labored in vain. An Anti-Imperialist League was organized in Boston in November, 1898, under the presidency of the venerable George S. Boutwell, who had been Secretary of the Treasury in Grant's administration. A flood of pamphlets, written by scholars like W. G. Sumner, Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz, Moorfield Storey, Felix Adler, Edwin Atkinson, and Herbert Welch, condemned our acquisition of foreign dependencies as a policy of political dishonor, economic folly, and moral delinquency. William James was "nauseated by the cold pot-grease of McKinley's eloquence," and disgusted to "see a country like the United States, lucky enough to be born outside of it, feverishly rushing to wallow in the mire of imperialism."¹ The opposition was not confined to the old Mugwump group. Prominent administration Republicans like George F. Hoar and Thomas B. Reed, though not going over to the support of Bryan, broke with McKinley. Reed, who sarcastically spoke of the payment of the \$20,000,000 to Spain as "the purchase of Malays at two dollars a head," announced his retirement from the Speakership. The progress made by the anti-imperialist propaganda in the Eastern states in the summer of 1900 caused considerable alarm in the ranks of the Republicans, and events abroad and at home increased the uneasiness. England was in the midst of her struggle to subjugate the Boers of South Africa. The obvious parallelism between the Boer war and our own operations against the insurgent Filipinos gave point to the charges that we were following Great Britain in the path of imperialism.²

¹ "Letters of William James," Vol. II, pp. 94, 141.

² Secretary Hay, who had been ambassador to Great Britain, was a pronounced advocate of an Anglo-American entente. He had signed a treaty with Lord Pauncefote on February 5, 1900, providing for a revision of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, and had offered his resignation to President McKinley when the Senate had rejected his treaty as too careless of American rights in the Isthmus of Panama. A few weeks before the election he wrote to Assistant Secretary Adee on the situation in China: "If it were not for our domestic politics we could and should join with England, whose interests are identical with ours, and make our ideas prevail. But in the present morbid state of the public mind toward England, that is not to be thought of" (C. S. Olcott, "The Life of William McKinley," Vol. II, 259).

A threatened coal strike in the anthracite fields of Pennsylvania in the spring of 1900 was quickly patched up by Hanna (who remembered the disastrous effect of the Homestead strike of 1892 on the Republican campaign) before it should "cost the administration 100,000 votes."

The election in November was a generous indorsement of McKinley. His vote fell below the figures of 1896 in all the New England states (where the anti-imperialists were strongest), in Pennsylvania, and eight states of the South. But his popular vote surpassed Bryan's by more than 860,000. He carried all the states of the West except Idaho, Montana, Colorado, and Nevada. He lost Kentucky to Bryan, but in return he gained the states of Washington, Wyoming, Utah, South Dakota, Kansas, and Nebraska, which Bryan had carried in 1896. The electoral vote was 292 to 155, and the popular vote 7,219,525 to 6,358,737. It was in obedience to the largest vote of confidence given by the American people to any presidential candidate since Grant that William McKinley, on the fourth of March, 1901, for a second time solemnly swore to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." And Senator Platt came down from New York in high spirits "to see Theodore Roosevelt take the veil."

DISTANT DEPENDENCIES¹

The disparity between the comparatively modest military operations of the Spanish War and the magnitude of their results is remarkable. The war lasted only a few weeks, but it entailed consequences which will last as long as our republic. From whatever point of view we consider our new departure as a colonial power, its epochal significance is apparent. The annexation of Porto Rico and the establishment of a protectorate over Cuba marked the beginnings of a policy in the West Indies which has resulted in the conversion of the Caribbean into an American lake. The acquisition of groups of islands (Hawaii,

¹ For the sake of unity the relations of the United States to the foreign dependencies are brought down to recent days in this section.

Guam, the Philippines) which form stepping-stones across the Pacific made us partners or rivals with the powers established in the islands or on the shores of the great ocean, and led directly to the agreements of the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 for the preservation of the balance of power in the Pacific. Until the Spanish War we had no outlying possessions (if we except the unprovocative territory of Alaska) subject to the attack of hostile fleets; but now, with the assets of coaling-stations, new markets, and strategic positions in undeveloped quarters of the globe, we had also acquired the liabilities for policing them against attacks from without and disorder within. Our navy must henceforth be the mobile guaranty of our sovereignty in regions thousands of miles from home.

Our new adventure as a world power was accompanied by an economic revolution as significant as the political one. It was no accident that the urge to overseas expansion came at the close of the decade which marked the official disappearance of the American frontier, or at the moment when our manufactures gained the ascendancy over our agricultural products, or when we passed our nearest competitor, Great Britain, in iron and steel (1897), coal (1899), and the volume of export trade (1901). Just a week before the meeting of the Republican nominating convention of 1896 Joseph Chamberlain had proposed a British customs union, with preferential tariffs for the colonies, in order to bind the empire into a closer economic unit. And the annexation of the island of Madagascar by France in the same year had furnished a convincing demonstration of the truth that "trade follows the flag." Within three years after the annexation our exports to the island had sunk from \$500,000 to a little over \$1100. The trend of the times was toward the formation of spheres of influence in the undeveloped regions of the earth, where the respective nations, under the protection of their flags and the concessions to their capitalists, could exploit natural resources and develop populous markets for their industrial products. Was the United States, just at the moment when her need for new markets began to be acute, to be left out in the

cold? Could she hope permanently to preserve the open door in Asia, Africa, and the islands of the sea, especially when she had closed her own door tightly by the Dingley tariff? If it was vain to expect to maintain the inconsistency of high protection at home with free access to world markets, was not the alternative that we should join in the rivalry for new territories under the national flag?

Furthermore, the aftermath of the Spanish War brought the nation face to face with its first great moral problem since the abolition of slavery. Whether or not it was advantageous to establish our rule over millions of people in the distant parts of the earth was one question; whether or not it was right was another. The opponents of imperialism, like the opponents of slavery, went back again to the ideals on which the Republic was founded, and asked the nation to search its conscience to see whether it was faithful to the Declaration of Independence. If liberty, like life, was, in truth, an "unalienable natural right," then it belonged to the brown Filipino as well as to the black African or the white American. If the only just government was derived from the consent of the governed, then our rule over several millions of unconsenting orientals was an injustice. We had lost our moral greatness, said the anti-imperialists, and sacrificed our unique opportunity to be a light to the nations on the path of democracy in order to join them in a race for selfish power. We had sold our birthright of liberty for a mess of economic pottage. As Emerson had declared that the other end of the chain which bound the slave was around his master's neck, so Bryan quoted the lines of Edgerton:

Would we tread the paths of tyranny
And reck the tyrant's cost?
Who taketh another's liberty,
His freedom is also lost.

We have seen how these arguments were met by the expansionists. There was no "imperialism," they contended: only the courageous assumption of the burden of civilization. If the Declaration of Independence spoke of the "consent of the gov-

erned," it also spoke of the time when it behooved a people "to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them." That time had come for our country. We must not and could not abandon the people who had come under our flag to the exploitation of the powers or the anarchy of civil strife. We must take up "the white man's burden."

Whichever side of the argument a man might take, the very fact of the argument itself could not but have a profound influence on American political psychology. Principles and doctrines which had been accepted as axiomatic were now tested in the light of our new opportunities. The Declaration of Independence, the warnings of Washington and Jefferson against foreign alliances, the compensating admonitions and renunciations of the Monroe Doctrine, were all reëxamined by a people which had suddenly become aware of its very close proximity to the other great powers. The habit of isolation, which had seemed so natural to us for many decades, wore off. Our politics in the first twenty years of the twentieth century were shaped in a more constant and conscious atmosphere of European affairs than they had been since the close of our "second war for independence" in 1815. "I have seen two Americas," said a diplomat at Washington in 1901, "the America before the Spanish War and the America since."

Finally, the entrance of the United States upon the field of world politics involved constitutional questions of new and serious import. The argument advanced by many of the "imperialists" that our expansion after the Spanish War was but a normal continuation of our expansion through the century, and that as the frontier at home disappeared it was natural that the energies of our people should flow into lands beyond the seas, was a specious argument. There was a fundamental difference between the two processes. Every addition to the national domain that had come to us by conquest or purchase since the inauguration of George Washington had been contiguous territory, sparsely populated (except for the lower portion of Louisiana), and therefore open to settlement by American citizens and dedi-

cated to eventual admission into the family of states.¹ Though these regions had come to us without the formal consent of their inhabitants (mostly Indians or half-breeds), the guaranties of our Constitution had been extended to them and provision had been made for their organization as soon as possible into territories on the plan laid down in the Northwest Ordinance. From the moment of their organization as territories they had been regarded as embryo states. Up to the close of the nineteenth century all but three of them—Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona²—had taken their places in the Union. But our new overseas possessions were already densely populated with races alien in speech, customs, and laws. Situated in the tropics, they were not well adapted to settlement by Americans, even if there had been room. There was no question, therefore, of *creating* territories in them, as we had done in Louisiana and Oregon, or of admitting them to statehood in the Union. Moreover, in spite of the fervid disclaimers of President McKinley, there was inevitably a certain amount of imperialism in our new possessions, however it might be mitigated by the benevolent introduction of education, sanitation, economic development, security for life and property, and other blessings of civilization.

For what are the marks of the "imperium" as illustrated on its grandest scale in the Roman Empire? First of all, as the derivation of the word indicates (*impero*, "I command"), it was a military domain; and the corollary of military rule was permanent political subordination. Geographically, the imperium was a distant province, situated beyond the "pomoe-rium," or sacred boundary of the city, within which the im-

¹ We may omit Alaska as a remote region too thinly settled to present any difficult problems of government, and the concession of a harbor in the Samoan Islands of the South Pacific, where our full sovereignty was not established until the Paris award of 1899 (see page 220, note 1).

² Oklahoma, the last remnant of our old Indian Territory, had been opened to settlement by proclamation of President Harrison on April 22, 1889. On the sound of the bugle at noon the white citizens of the neighboring states had swarmed over the border to stake their claims. The city of Guthrie grew up almost overnight. Oklahoma was admitted to the Union in 1907. Arizona and New Mexico became states in 1912.

perator was not allowed in arms; economically, it was a field for Roman exploitation; strategically, it was a point of vantage for the extension of Roman power. It is impossible to deny obvious elements of parallelism between this picture and the relation of the United States to its distant possessions at the close of the Spanish War. Of course the spirit and temper of the United States were as far removed from those of imperial Rome as the East is from the West. But the stubborn fact was there: remote, inferior, and alien peoples brought into subjection and held to order by the army and fleet of the United States. Our Constitution had no provisions for such a situation. The fathers had not envisaged conquests. Nor was President McKinley a Cæsar to overthrow the Constitution and put by the crown thrice with the back of his hand. The problem of how to apply a venerated Constitution to an unconstitutional situation seemed almost as insoluble as squaring the circle. After so scrupulous an adherence to tradition as had prevented us from purchasing the little island of St. Thomas (1867) or annexing the willing republic of Hawaii (1893), we had suddenly thrown tradition to the winds and taken under our protection ten millions of people in the Pacific islands and the West Indies. The Constitution had followed the flag in its steady march across the North American continent. Could it, or should it, or any part of it, and, if so, what part of it, cross the seas to our new possessions, where the flag had gone at the head of conquering armies? It was evident that we had come to the parting of the ways.

The simplest problem in our new situation, though by no means easy of solution, was the treatment of Cuba. We had incorporated into our declaration of war against Spain the so-called Teller Resolution, which pledged us to exercise no sovereignty over the island, except to establish peace, and to leave the island when this task should be accomplished. And to the incredulous amazement of most of the European powers, we fulfilled this pledge, with such reservations as will presently be noticed. On January 1, 1899, Spain turned the 1,500,000 inhabitants of Cuba over to the trusteeship of the United States. The conditions in the island were deplorable. Faction and

famine were rampant, farms and plantations in ruins, commerce dead, civil government in abeyance, and disease spreading. The first task of General Brooke was to distribute five million rations to the starving population. Major General Leonard Wood, who assumed the burden of the government shortly afterward and kept it till May, 1902, performed a marvelous work of colonial administration. He held faction in check, restored municipal and provincial governments, organized a system of public education,¹ converted Havana from a pest hole into one of the healthiest cities in the world, stamped out yellow fever in the island,² and started the new government with a balance of \$700,000 in its treasury. Meanwhile we moved as rapidly as circumstances would permit in redeeming our pledge to Cuba. On July 25, 1900, General Wood ordered an election to choose delegates to a convention to frame a constitution for the island. While the convention was in session Secretary Root sent instructions to the governor (February 9, 1901) that certain provisions must appear in the constitution, as a recognition of our special interests and responsibilities in the island. The most important of these demands were (1) that the government of Cuba should make no treaties impairing its independence or granting any rights or concessions to foreign powers without the consent of the United States, (2) that it should not contract any debts whose interest could not be met out of the current revenues, (3) that it should consent to the intervention of the United States if necessary to preserve the independence or the stability of the government, and (4) that it should grant the United

¹ Ex-President Eliot of Harvard raised a fund of \$70,000 to bring over twelve hundred Cuban school-teachers to this country in the summer of 1900 to study methods of pedagogy at the Harvard Summer School and to inspect various industrial institutions. After a visit to New York and Washington the teachers returned to Cuba to cope with the task of educating a people of whom 66 per cent were illiterates.

² Majors Walter Reed and W. C. Gorgas are highly commended by Secretary Root in his report of December 1, 1902, for their service in ridding the island of yellow fever. "The name of Dr. Jesse W. Lazear," the report continues, "who voluntarily permitted himself to be inoculated with the yellow-fever germ in order to furnish a necessary experimentation test, and died of the disease, deserves to be written in the list of the martyrs who have died in the cause of humanity."

States the right to establish two naval stations on the Cuban coast. The convention, not relishing the idea of an American protectorate, drew up a constitution patterned on that of the United States, but with no mention of special political relations between the two countries. Whereupon Senator O. H. Platt of Connecticut, chairman of the Committee on Cuban Relations, embodied the suggestions of Secretary Root in an amendment to the army appropriation bill which was signed by President McKinley; and the Cuban convention was obliged, in spite of a protesting delegation sent to Washington, to add the Platt Amendment as an appendix to its constitution (June 12). On December 31, 1901, elections were held for provincial governors, members of the House of Representatives, and senatorial and presidential electors. The latter group met the following February and chose Tomás Estrada Palma as first president of the Cuban republic. On May 20, 1902, General Wood handed the government over to the newly inaugurated president, and the American troops were withdrawn from the island.

Having thus fulfilled our political promise to Cuba, it remained for us to give our economic aid. Secretary Root, in his report of November 27, 1901, recommended that commercial arrangement be made to further the recovery of the Cuban sugar and tobacco interests; and six days later President Roosevelt, in his annual message, asked Congress for "a substantial reduction in the tariff duties on Cuban imports into the United States." Our beet-sugar growers, however, were successful in blocking reciprocity with Cuba for two years. It was not until December, 1903, that the convention was proclaimed granting Cuba reductions ranging from 20 to 40 per cent of the Dingley rates on sugar, tobacco, and other agricultural products. The first full year of the convention showed an increase of 12 per cent in the exports of Cuba to the United States.¹

¹ The following figures show the marvelous growth of Cuban exports to us as the economic rehabilitation of the island proceeded: \$86,304,209 in 1905; \$122,528,037 in 1910; \$721,693,880 in 1920. In the latter year our exports to Cuba were \$515,298,731, making the total trade between the United States and the island more than \$1,250,000,000.

From time to time we have found it necessary to invoke the third article of the Platt Amendment and intervene to preserve order in the Cuban republic. When a revolution broke out in 1906 on the reelection of President Palma, and the president insisted on resigning, we administered the country under the provisional government of Charles E. Magoon for three years, until General Gomez was peacefully chosen president under new election laws. Again, in 1912 and 1917 the United States was obliged to land marines on the island to prevent civil war; and as late as the spring of 1921, General Gomez appealed to President Harding to reestablish the provisional rule of the United States in order to prevent his successful rival, Dr. Zayas, from being inaugurated. Latin America generally, and the Caribbean states particularly, have not looked with favor on the interference of the United States in Cuba. But they have found little cause for anxiety. There has not been the slightest attempt at exploitation on our part or of political dictation in our interests. We have used our power under the provisional governments to further the sanitation and education of the island and to improve the laws and safeguard order. The wonderful development of Cuba's prosperity in the twentieth century is due in no small measure to the elimination, through the warning intervention of the United States, of that bane of the tropical Latin-American countries—revolutions precipitated by political factions defeated at the polls.

The island of Porto Rico, fourth in size in the West Indies, with about three fourths the area of Connecticut and a population of 953,243 (589,426 whites), came willingly under the control of the United States. Such embarrassments as we have had in its administration have come rather from its overanxiety to be assimilated into our political and economic system than from its reluctance to take such a step. Obviously it was impossible to give statehood or even the customary territorial rights to a people containing but 17 per cent of literates, wholly alien in blood and speech, and without the least experience in self-government. During all its centuries of dependence on the Spanish crown its laws had been made in Madrid, and its gov-

ernors and judges had been sent out from Madrid. "At the time of my arrival," wrote our last military governor, General Davis, in 1900, "not a page of the voluminous laws of the island, all of Spanish origin, had been translated." To keep the Porto Ricans under military rule would have been repugnant to our institutions and a confession of the "imperialism" which the McKinley administration repudiated. But how to transfer the island to a civil status without at the same time admitting its people to the privileges and immunities of the Constitution was the problem. It was solved by the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900, which, in the words of W. F. Willoughby,¹ "may be said to stand in our insular possessions in much the same relation as the Northwest Ordinance did to our dependent territory on the mainland."

By the Foraker Act the island was given a status midway between that of a territory and a colony. Its people were described as "citizens of Porto Rico and as such entitled to the protection of the United States." Its government was established on a novel compromise basis. The organic law of 1900 provided for a governor to serve four years, with a council consisting of six heads of departments (Americans) and five Porto Ricans, all to be appointed by the president of the United States. The Council, which had a counterpart in some of the American colonies before the Revolution, served as an upper legislative house as well as an administrative body. A House of Delegates, consisting of thirty-five natives of the island, was to be elected biennially by a somewhat restricted popular suffrage. The Spanish courts were entirely swept away and replaced by a judiciary system like that of the United States.

The economic plight of Porto Rico was serious. The collapse of the Spanish colonial empire had cut the island off from the privilege of free trade with the mother country and the sister island of Cuba. Without mineral resources or modern manu-

¹ Mr. Willoughby was treasurer of Porto Rico from 1901 to 1907. His description of the government of the island in chapters iv and v of his "Territories and Dependencies of the United States" (1905) is complete and, naturally, of the highest authority.

factures, the dense rural population of the island was dependent upon an outside market for its coffee, sugar, tobacco, and fruits. A terrible hurricane visited Porto Rico in August, 1899, destroying the coffee bushes, which require seven or eight years to grow to maturity. Under these conditions President McKinley advised Congress (December, 1899) that it was "our plain duty to abolish all customs tariffs between the United States and Porto Rico, and give her products free access to our markets." Congress, however, more protectionist than the arch-apostle of protection himself, resisted the entrance of the thin edge of the wedge of free trade;¹ and McKinley was forced, in order to preserve party harmony on the more important question of his Philippine policy, to agree to a compromise. Only 15 per cent of the Dingley rates were to be levied on goods imported from Porto Rico, and all duties collected on the Porto Rican imports were to be turned over to the treasury of the island until the revenues from local taxation should be sufficient to pay the running expenses of the government. The latter condition was fulfilled by the midsummer of 1901, and since that date there has been free trade between the island and the United States.

The economic prosperity of Porto Rico has been most gratifying. Her exports to the United States grew from \$5,600,000 in 1901 to \$150,800,000 in 1920, and her imports from the United States from \$6,900,000 to \$73,100,000. Before the Spanish War we took from her but one sixth of her exports and sent to her but one fifth of her imports. Now these fractions have grown to five sixths and nine tenths respectively. Her export of sugar alone has grown from less than \$5,000,000 to more than \$100,000,000 in the last twenty years, and in place of the

¹ An interesting side light on the situation is furnished by Mr. Kohlsaatz in his book "From McKinley to Harding" (p. 71). Kohlsaatz had tried in vain to get his friend Senator Hanna to support free trade with Porto Rico. "After the passage of the Foraker Bill," he says, "I asked Senator Hanna to tell me frankly why he took the position he did. He laughed and said: 'I'll tell you exactly. We received notice from 250,000 Union cigar rollers that if we admitted Porto Rican cigars free of duty, each of the 250,000 would get three other Union men to vote against the Republican party in November, 1900, making 1,000,000 votes against McKinley.'"

old mills run by mule power or wind have appeared the modern factories equipped with steam power and the vacuum pan. Social conditions, too, have improved rapidly under the rule of the United States. Governor Yager's report of 1919 on "Twenty Years of Progress in Porto Rico" give the remarkable statistics of road-building, irrigation projects, sanitary and hospital establishments, educational equipment, and other like works of civilization. For all this the Porto Ricans have been duly grateful, but they have not been satisfied with their political status. The two points of persistent grievance have been the denial of United States citizenship and the legislative power of the appointive Council. Both these grievances were remedied by the Jones Act of 1917, by which full citizenship was given to the Porto Ricans, and the Council was replaced in its legislative functions by an elected Senate of nineteen members. Still there are causes of discontent, as the recent opposition to President Harding's governor, E. Mont Reily, attests.¹ The Jones act requires all the laws passed by the legislature of Porto Rico to be reported to Congress, which reserves the right to annul them, and even a law passed by a two-thirds vote over the veto of the governor must still have the sanction of the president of the United States to be valid. The Porto Ricans want to be as free from political leading strings as an English self-governing colony. And most of all, they want governors who understand their language, their traditions, and their cultural ideas, not political appointees who might as well be rewarded with a postmastership.

The Pacific islands of Guam in the Ladrones and Tutuila in the Samoan group are mere naval bases, like Guantanamo in Cuba, and as such offer no problems of government. The Hawaiian islands in the mid-Pacific afford the first instance (if we except Texas) of the annexation of an independent people. During most of the nineteenth century the United States had been interested in Hawaii, first through the missionaries and

¹ For the charges of arbitrary and inefficient government preferred against Reily, who resigned his post under fire, February 6, 1923, see the speech of March 25, 1922, by the Porto Rican delegate to Congress, Mr. F. C. Davila (*Congressional Record*, 67th Congress, 2d session, pp. 3301-3306).

then through the merchants and planters, who settled in the islands as early as 1851. We had assumed a quasi protectorate over Hawaii; and our Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, had given orders to keep our naval establishment in the Pacific strong enough to "defend the honor and dignity of the United States and the safety of the government of the Hawaiian Islands." We had repeatedly landed troops to prevent civil disorder. The last such action had resulted, as we have seen (p. 263, note 2), in the overthrow of the queen's government, the proclamation of a republic under the leadership of Sanford B. Dole, and the negotiation of a treaty of annexation with the United States. In the midst of the Spanish War we had quietly annexed the islands (July 7, 1898), which were making no pretense of neutrality, but openly supplying our fleet with provisions and coal. It was a willing people, therefore, long accustomed to our "peaceful penetration," which came under our flag in the summer of 1898. By an act of April 30, 1900, Hawaii was made a full-fledged territory, and United States citizenship was conferred on all the citizens of the Hawaiian republic. Mr. Dole was appointed first American governor of the territory. The qualifications for voting for the legislature were a year's residence in the territory and the ability to read, write, or speak either the English or the Hawaiian language. This excluded from political rights the Chinese and Japanese, who together comprised nearly 60 per cent of the population of one hundred and fifty-four thousand. Governed by an oligarchy enjoying the full rights of American citizens, admitted within our customs limits, too remote in situation and oriental in population to think of statehood, the territory of Hawaii has raised no such political objections to our rule as has Porto Rico. The advantages of the union are mutual. Hawaii furnishes us with a valuable naval base at the crossways of the Pacific, and we furnish the market for practically the whole Hawaiian export trade.¹

It is in the Philippines that the real test both of the principles

¹ In 1920 Hawaii's exports were \$146,000,000, of which \$142,000,000 were sent to the United States. Sugar (\$119,000,000) and pineapples (\$19,000,000) made up 97 per cent of the exports.

of our colonial policy and the efficiency of our colonial administration has been, and is still being, made. This group of some three thousand islands, seven thousand miles from our nearest shores, with an area approximately equal to that of Italy and a population (in 1900) of 7,500,000—ranging from the state of lowest barbarism to that of highest civilization—was suddenly revealed to the ken of the American people by the flash of Dewey's guns at Manila. On January 20, 1899, before the treaty of peace was ratified, McKinley had appointed President Jacob G. Schurman of Cornell University, Edwin Denby, our former minister to China, and Professor Dean C. Worcester of the University of Michigan to join Admiral Dewey and General Otis (who had succeeded General Merritt) at Manila to gather such information concerning the physical, social, and political conditions of the islands as would help the administration in the determination of its policy toward them. When the American commissioners arrived at Manila, they found war being waged. Aguinaldo's insurgent troops, who for months had been encamped in sullen hostility close to the American outposts (see page 310), had fired upon a Nebraska regiment in the evening of February 4, 1899. The clash was inevitable after the proclamation of the Filipino republic and the orders from Washington forbidding any recognition of Aguinaldo as ruler or ally. The wonder is that the conflict was so long delayed.

As the Filipinos were no match for the American troops in the open field, organized resistance was soon broken; but the natives took to the jungle in a guerrilla warfare of ambush, treachery, and torture, in which American soldiers, driven to fight fire with fire, resorted to methods of terrorism which, although greatly exaggerated by the anti-imperialists, were found upon a searching investigation by the Senate in 1902 to have cast a regrettable stigma on the fair reputation of our army.¹

¹ The commonest form of torture practiced by the Americans was the "water cure," painful but not permanently injurious. A bamboo reed was inserted into the mouth of the Filipino victim and he was "pumped" full of water until he was distended in agony. If the first application failed to elicit the information demanded (such as the betrayal of the whereabouts of his confederates), the "cure" was repeated.

The guerrilla resistance to our authority was continued with considerable vigor for about two years after the dispersion of Aguinaldo's government and army at the close of 1899, encouraged to some extent by the hope of Filipino recognition in the case of a Democratic victory in the election of 1900. The capture of Aguinaldo in March, 1901, by a clever stratagem of General Frederick Funston,¹ however, made any hope of eventual success vain. It cost the American government \$170,000,000 to pacify the Philippines. The expense of money, however, was of trifling importance compared to the cost of life. According to General McArthur's report of July 4, 1901, there had been over a thousand conflicts between the Americans and the Filipinos during the preceding fourteen months with a loss to the Americans of 735 killed and wounded, and of 5047 to the Filipinos. And this was before the "breakfast massacre" of Balaugiga, which provoked the harsh reprisals of General "Hell-Roaring Jake" Smith in Samar and the adoption of the Spanish "reconcentrado" policy by General Bell in several provinces of Luzon.

Meanwhile President McKinley and Secretary Root had been feeling their way to a suitable form of government for the Philippines. The report of the Schurman commission declared that "the lack of political and educational experience" among the Filipinos, "combined with their social and linguistic diversities," disqualified them from the task of undertaking at once the government of the archipelago. "The most that can be expected of them," it continued, "is to coöperate with the Americans in the administration of general affairs from Manila as a center, and to undertake, subject to American control and guidance, the administration of provincial and municipal af-

¹ Funston with five ex-insurgent and American officers and a band of Macabebe scouts loyal to the Americans tracked Aguinaldo to his lair at Palaman, in the interior wilderness of the province of Isabela. The scouts, disguised as insurgents coming to join Aguinaldo, with the American officers as their prisoners, were hospitably welcomed and the officers admitted to Aguinaldo's presence. Then at a signal the guards and attendants were overpowered, and the Filipino leader was delivered into General Funston's hands. In April, 1901, he took the oath of allegiance to the United States. But it was not until a year later that the last embers of the insurrection were extinguished.

fairs." This program was followed to the letter. In March, 1900, President McKinley appointed another Philippine commission of five members, with Judge William H. Taft of Ohio as president and Professor Worcester, Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, Henry C. Ide of Vermont, and Professor Bernard Moses of California as associate members. The instructions given to this commission by Secretary Root on April 7, 1900, were an original and ingenious contribution to colonial government, thoroughly in line with the democratic traditions of our country. By virtue of his position as commander in chief of the army and navy, President McKinley, in the absence of any restrictive legislation by Congress, exercised full executive, legislative, and judicial power over the Philippines. He now proceeded to delegate the legislative power to the commission, which was instructed after September 1, 1900, "to make rules and orders having the effect of law, for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs, and imposts; the appropriations and expenditures of the public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system; the establishment of an efficient civil service; the organization and establishment of courts; the institution of municipal and departmental governments; and all other matters of a civil nature for which the military governor is now competent to provide." The provisions of the Bill of Rights (except trial by jury and the right to bear arms) were extended to the islands. The commission was to notify the Secretary as soon as in its opinion the conditions of the islands were such that the control of administration might be safely transferred from military to civil authority. Meanwhile it was to give to natives of the islands, wherever they could be found "competent and willing to perform the duties" and of "absolute and unconditional loyalty to the United States," preference over the Americans in the selection for provincial and municipal offices. In the distribution of powers the presumption was always to be in favor of these local authorities over the central government, so that the latter, "following the distribution of powers between the states and the national government of the United States," should have no direct administration except in matters of purely

general concern. This program of decentralization and native participation in government presents a striking contrast to the highly centralized and autocratic rule to which the colonies of Spain had been accustomed or that which prevails, for example, in the Dutch colonies of the East Indies or a British crown colony. It has undoubtedly embarrassed our government in the Philippines from the point of view of pure efficiency,¹ but no other course would have been consistent with our political and constitutional traditions.

The commission created a government partly American and partly Filipino, giving the Americans ultimate control "for some time to come." How long that time would be it was impossible, they thought, to tell—"certainly a generation, perhaps two." At any rate they coöperated with the Filipinos from the first, providing public hearings "for criticism of proposed legislation," printing the laws in Spanish and English in the press of Manila, holding sessions in the various capitals of the provinces for the discussions of the bills organizing their respective governments, and giving to qualified natives a generous share in the manifold appointments to public service (education, police, customs and revenues, transportation, agriculture, etc.). In the organization of the judiciary, for example, the chief justice and two of the six associate justices of the supreme court were Filipino lawyers. Filipinos also held the offices of solicitor-general and assistant attorney-general. The judge-ships of the courts of the first instance throughout the provinces were shared fairly equally between Americans and Filipinos, but the latter had all the positions of justices of the peace and virtually all those of prosecuting attorney (or "fiscal").

It was not until March 2, 1901, that Congress intervened in

¹ James Bryce wrote to Colonel Roosevelt on September 12, 1898, congratulating him on his safe return from Cuba and giving the following advice on the treatment of the Malays and aborigines of Luzon: "What I hope you will do is to have a healthy despotism governing these tropical semi-savages and even the Spanish creoles. No talk of suffrage or any such constitutional privileges for them, but steady government by the firmest, most honest men you can find, and no interference if possible by Congress when the firm and honest men have been found" (J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," Vol. I, p. 107).

the government of the Philippines by the adoption of Senator Spooner's amendment to an appropriation act, which vested "all military, civil and judicial power necessary to governing the Philippine Islands" in such persons as the president of the United States should direct. By virtue of this unprecedented grant of authority by Congress, President McKinley could now make the commission, which had been exercising civil functions in the islands as a detached and delegated part of the President's military command, into a true civil government. On June 21 he issued an order appointing Taft civil governor of the Philippines and relieving General McArthur of all civil authority except in sixteen of the forty-nine provinces in which the insurrection had not been suppressed. Thus, thanks especially to Secretary Root's wise foresight, the transition from military to civil authority in the islands was easily and naturally made. Subsequent orders added three Filipino members to the commission, which continued to be the controlling legislative body of the islands, and made each of the associate commissioners the head of an executive department: interior, under Worcester; commerce and police, under Wright; finance and justice, under Ide; public instruction, under Moses. The suffrage was given to all males of twenty-three years of age or over who had held municipal office, or who possessed property or paid taxes of a certain amount, or who could read, speak, or write the English or Spanish language. Separate forms of government were organized for the Christian and the non-Christian provinces, and a special type of municipal government was devised for Manila.

A year after the establishment of civil government Congress relieved the President from responsibility for the rule of the islands by the passage of the Philippine act of July 1, 1902. This important measure provided for the taking of a census as soon as the commission should inform the President that the insurrection was at an end, and directed that two years after the publication of the census the commission should hold elections in the Christian provinces for a Philippine assembly, which should be added to the commission as the lower house of

a Philippine legislature. On March 27, 1905, Secretary Taft, who had succeeded Mr. Root in the War Department, announced to President Roosevelt that the census had been completed. On July 30, 1907, elections were held, which resulted in the choice of an assembly of eighty-one members, about three fourths of whom were Nationalists or Independents. Secretary Taft, who had won great popularity in the islands by his conciliatory and progressive administration, went out to Manila in person to open the first session of the new assembly.¹

The Republican platform of 1900 promised the Filipinos the "largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties." Beyond this vague pledge the Republicans have never gone. The Democrats, on the other hand, have always advocated the independence of the islands. It was natural, therefore, when Woodrow Wilson came into power in 1913, on a platform favoring "the immediate declaration of the Nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as stable government can be established," and with a Democratic majority in both branches of Congress, that the hopes of the Filipinos should be raised. President Wilson gave them the majority on the commission. On October 14, 1914, the House passed by a vote of 212 to 60 the Jones bill, replacing the commission by an elective Filipino senate, extending the suffrage to all male adults who could speak and write a native dialect, and declaring the intention of the United States to withdraw from the islands as soon as a stable government should be established. It was not until February, 1916, that the Jones bill reached a vote in the Senate, which in-

¹ Although Taft desired more than anything else a seat on the Supreme Court of the United States, he had declined when Roosevelt begged and almost commanded him to come home to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Justice Shiras at the beginning of 1903. Taft pleaded that he could not leave his work in the Philippines half done, when serious political and religious questions still needed his attention. The religious matter related to the extinguishment of the claims of the orders of the Dominicans, Franciscans, and Augustinians to some 425,000 acres of land, mostly in the neighborhood of Manila. Taft went to Rome in 1903 and skillfully negotiated with the Vatican for the purchase of the friars' lands for \$7,239,000. They were resold on easy terms to the Filipinos.

incorporated in it the radical amendment of Senator Clarke of Arkansas, granting the Filipinos independence in two or, at most, four years. The House rejected the amendment, and the Senate concurred in the original Jones bill, August 16, 1916. When Wilson's governor, Burton Harrison, who had been generous in his promises to the Filipinos, was withdrawn on the return of the Republicans to power in 1921, the disappointed natives, with their greatly increased powers of government, redoubled their efforts for independence.¹ President Harding's new governor, General Leonard Wood, met with decided opposition from the day of his appointment. He reported, "Under no circumstances should the American government permit to be established in the Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority." In October, 1923, the party demanding immediate independence got control of both houses of the Philippine legislature. With business suffering from a political deadlock and with insurrection threatening in parts of the archipelago, the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila petitioned Congress (November 15, 1923) to repeal the Jones act and establish a regular territorial government in the islands; while the recalcitrant legislature passed a bill over the governor's veto (for the first time) remitting penalties for delinquent taxpayers. Revolts occurred in the southern provinces of the islands. General Wood's recall was demanded. A Filipino delegation headed by the ardent nationalist Roxas came to Washington to complain to President Coolidge of the arbitrary government of the Americans in the Philippines; but the President in an interview of March, 1924, supported his governor and made it clear to the petitioners that there would be no immediate relaxation of American authority in the islands.

¹ Partly as a result of the Democratic policy of proximate independence and partly because many American political employees had withdrawn from the islands to enter the World War, the American officials declined from 2623 in 1913 to 760 in 1920, while the number of Filipinos increased from 6263 to 12,147 in the same period. The suffrage law of 1916 meanwhile had increased the Filipino electorate from about 225,000 to over 800,000. Under these circumstances it can be readily seen how much more difficult the task of American control in the Philippines had become.

Meanwhile, in spite of continued political unrest, the social and economic progress of the Philippines under American rule has been remarkable. Not only have we not sought to exploit the Filipinos, but we have gone to enormous expense to build roads and schoolhouses, to provide sanitation and health service, to encourage agriculture and commerce. The value of the agricultural output of the islands increased from \$87,750,000 in 1910 to \$183,479,000 in 1918. In the latter year there were over ten thousand factories and seven hundred and seventy-five miles of railroad in the archipelago, while three million tons of shipping were loaded or unloaded at the piers and warehouses of Manila and other ports. By an act of March 2, 1902, Congress permitted Philippine exports to enter the United States at a 25 per cent reduction from the Dingley rates (although the commission had asked for a 50 per cent reduction, and Governor Taft for a 75 per cent reduction). The Payne-Aldrich tariff of 1909 admitted all Philippine products free of duty (except sugar and tobacco beyond certain specified amounts). The Underwood tariff of 1913 established complete free trade with the islands. The export trade of the Philippines in 1920 amounted to \$151,000,000, of which \$105,000,000 was with the United States. The imports for the same year were \$149,000,000, of which we furnished \$92,200,000. Probably the greatest monument to American disinterestedness in the Philippines is the system of education, with its primary, provincial, high, and trade schools, its agricultural and farm-settlement schools, and its University of the Philippines, with thirty-one permanent buildings and an enrollment of 3427 students in 1919-1920. The Department of Education reported 7641 public schools in the archipelago in May, 1923, with over 1,000,000 children in attendance and about 25,000 teachers—all natives but 341. Furthermore, there are between 9000 and 10,000 Filipino students enrolled in the schools and colleges of the United States.¹

¹ For the educational work in the Philippines during the early years of our occupation see the concluding chapter of Fred W. Atkinson's interesting book, "The Philippine Islands" (1905). For the work of the decade 1910-1920 a good summary may be found in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (12th edition), pp. 91-92.

The practical work of pacification, political organization, economic rehabilitation, and social amelioration in the new territories and dependencies proceeded under the authority of the President and Congress. But the important question of the constitutional relations of these islands to the United States could be settled only by the decisions of the Supreme Court. If Porto Rico and the Philippines had become parts of the United States when they came under our flag, then did not the Constitution of the United States extend to them *ex proprio vigore*? If so, did not their inhabitants enjoy forthwith the privileges of citizens of the United States as enumerated in the first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights), and could they not trade freely with us under the provisions of the Constitution (Art. I, sect. 2, par. 6) that no preference should be given to the ports of one state over those of another, nor any vessels bound to or from one state be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.

Before the court spoke on this matter, both the executive and Congress had proceeded on the assumption that the Constitution does not "follow the flag"; for by the Root instructions of April 7, 1900, to the Philippine commission most of the privileges of the Bill of Rights had been extended to the islands by executive order, and by the Foraker act of five days later Congress had defined the inhabitants of Porto Rico as "citizens of Porto Rico and as such entitled to the protection of the United States." The Foraker act had also imposed a tariff equal to 15 per cent of the Dingley rates upon imports from the island into the United States. Therefore, when the so-called Insular Cases came before the Supreme Court to test the right of the United States to collect duties from Porto Rico (*De Lima vs. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 1) or from the Philippines (the "Fourteen Diamond Rings," 183 U.S. 176) under the Dingley act, or from Porto Rico (*Downes vs. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244) under the Foraker act, the court was in a quandary. If it declared that the Constitution in its full vigor extended to the unasimilable population of the islands, it would, as Justice White phrased it, make the United States "helpless in the family of

nations," "impotent to prevent the incorporation of alien races," and deprived by the treaty-making power of its authority to "regulate commerce, raise revenues, or prescribe uniform naturalization laws." On the other hand, if it should exclude the Constitution from the new possessions, it would sanction a doctrine heretofore abhorrent to the American people; namely, that the authority of the United States could go where its guaranties might not follow. As Justice Harlan said, in words which recall Lincoln's reply to Douglas, "I confess that I cannot grasp the thought that Congress, which lives and moves and has its being in the Constitution, and is consequently the mere creature of that instrument, can, at its pleasure, legislate or exclude its creator from the territories which were acquired only by authority of the Constitution."

Faced by this dilemma, the court wavered. In the case of *De Lima vs. Bidwell* it decided by a vote of five to four that Porto Rico was a part of the United States because our flag flew there, and that consequently duties could not be collected on her exports under the Dingley act. But in the same term (May 27, 1901) it also decided by a vote of five to four that Porto Rico was "a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution." Consequently duties could be collected on her exports under the Foraker act. Not only is it impossible to reconcile these conflicting decisions, but it is impossible also to harmonize the opinions of the majority of the court. Not one of the four associates who voted with Justice Brown in favor of upholding the Foraker act agreed with his argument.¹ The plain fact is that the court, confronted by an unprecedented condition, sacrificed consistency to expediency. As Professor Latané clearly sums up the matter: "The status of the new annexations was practically settled on commercial

¹ Justice Brown rested his argument wholly on the word "States" in Article I, section 9, of the Constitution, an interpretation which, if carried to its logical conclusion, would have excluded the benefits of the Constitution from the domestic territories of the United States. The arguments on the Insular Cases are printed in House Documents 509, 56th Congress, 2d session.

and political grounds before the constitutional questions involved came up for adjudication. The dominant business interests of the country were opposed to the full incorporation of the new possessions, and public opinion decided the question that way. . . . The Supreme Court could not have reversed the decision of the American people where such far-reaching acts of the President and Congress were involved, without creating serious confusion. Consequently they bowed their heads before *un fait accompli*."¹ Or, in the concise witticism of Mr. Dooley, "Whether or not the flag followed the Constitution, the Supreme Court followed the election returns."²

It was with the proud consciousness of having served the people well that President McKinley took the oath of office for the second time on March 4, 1901. The country had given his administration a remarkable indorsement in the election of 1900, and only two days before the inauguration Congress had shown its absolute confidence in his policy in the Philippines by granting him the "powers of a Roman proconsul" under the terms of the Spooner Amendment. We were enjoying an unprecedented prosperity at home and prestige abroad.³ The President, according to his biographer, Olcott, was contemplating "a forward movement" in his second term. He intended to emphasize the policies of trust regulation and enlarged commerce through reciprocity agreements. Reciprocity treaties were already negotiated or in process of negotiation with France, Italy, Portugal, Germany, and several of the Latin-American powers. Secretary Hay, who had won the praise of the German chancellor, Prince von Bülow, for his diplomatic skill, was already busy

¹ J. H. Latané, "America as a World Power," pp. 151, 152.

² The next year the court denied that the Hawaiian Islands were not entitled to the right of jury trial, before the passage of the organic act of April 30, 1900, making the novel distinction between the "fundamental" and the "formal" portions of the Constitution, and holding that only the former were binding on the executive and Congress in the government of dependencies.

³ A symbol of our prestige might be found in the prominent position which we had at the Paris International Exposition of the summer of 1900. Not only did the United States have more space and a larger exhibit than any other foreign nation, but it carried off the largest number of grand prizes and medals—in all, over twelve hundred.

in the negotiation of a treaty with Great Britain, which should secure to us a free hand in the construction and control of an Isthmian canal. At the end of April, 1901, President McKinley left Washington with the members of his cabinet and several invited guests for a grand tour of the country. His reception at every stopping-place out to the Pacific coast (Memphis, New Orleans, Houston, El Paso) demonstrated both his firm hold on the affections of the people and the popularity of his official program. The almost fatal illness of his wife at San Francisco obliged him to interrupt his tour and hasten back to Washington in the early summer. On the fifth of September he attended the Pan-American Exposition at Buffalo and made his last speech—in the opinion of many the noblest speech of his life. His subject was coöperation with the powers of the world not only in friendly rivalry for commerce and trade but also in “relations of mutual respect and confidence.” He had already shown by his advocacy of free trade with Porto Rico and by the numerous reciprocity treaties that he was outgrowing the doctrine of an exclusive tariff, and now he confessed his conversion openly. “We must not repose in fancied security that we can forever sell everything and buy little or nothing. . . . The period of exclusion is past. The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. . . . Reciprocity treaties are in harmony with the spirit of the times, measures of retaliation are not. If perchance some of our tariffs are no longer needed for revenue or to encourage and foster our industries at home, why should they not be employed to extend and promote our markets abroad? . . . Let us ever remember that our interest is in concord, not conflict, and that our real eminence rests on the victories of peace and not those of war.”

The next day, when the press of the country and of foreign lands was ringing with praise for his speech, the President held a public reception in the Temple of Music. A young Pole, with a handkerchief wrapped about his hand as if to cover an injury, advanced in the line, and, as the President stretched out his hand to greet him, fired two shots from a revolver hid in the

bandage. One bullet glanced from the President's breast and arm, the other penetrated his stomach. As he sank into the arms of Secretary Cortelyou, his first words were to "tell Mrs. McKinley gently," his second not to allow the assassin to be hurt. He survived the operation of sewing up the perforation of the walls of the stomach and gained strength so steadily that a few days after the assault his physicians announced that his recovery was practically certain. Most of the friends and officials who had hastened to Buffalo on the news of the tragedy (Hanna, Herrick, Dawes, Judge Day, Theodore Roosevelt) returned to their business or vacations rejoicing. But on Thursday, September 12, a sudden change for the worse came, and early Saturday morning the President died.¹

Vice President Roosevelt was in camp near the top of Mount Marcy in the Adirondacks, more than twenty miles from the nearest railroad station, when he heard that the President was dying. After a perilous midnight drive down the mountain in the rain and blackness, he reached the station at daybreak to learn that McKinley was dead. He arrived at Buffalo to find the members of the cabinet, except Secretaries Hay and Shaw, gathered at the house of Mr. Ansley Wilcox, where he immediately took the oath of office, adding, "In this hour of deep and terrible bereavement, I wish to state that it shall be my intention and endeavor to continue, absolutely unbroken, the policy of President McKinley, for the peace and prosperity and honor of our beloved country."

William McKinley's high qualities as a gentleman and a friend are universally recognized. He had the faculty, through his unflinching courtesy, sympathy, and patience, of attaching men to him in lifelong devotion. Judgments have varied, however, in the estimate of McKinley as a public official. Because his relations with Congress were exceptionally harmonious, he has been charged with subserviency to the "men at the other end

¹ An autopsy revealed a diseased condition of the viscera which made it impossible for the President to rally from a wound which for a man in normal health would not have proved fatal. The medical authorities thought that at any rate he probably would not have lived more than two years.

of the avenue," against whom Cleveland had warned him to be on his guard. Because he abandoned his advocacy of bimetallism at the beginning of his administration, and was apparently ready to abandon his advocacy of high protection at the end of it, he has been accused of lack of political conviction. It is true that his whole disposition, in contrast to Cleveland's, inclined him to accommodation, conciliation, and compromise with political adversaries. Yet he was doubtless as honest and perhaps as wise in this course as the more belligerent are in theirs. To call a man "weak" because he does not quarrel may well be to miss some of the finer qualities of human nature. At any rate, those closest to McKinley, and therefore best able to judge him, have testified almost unanimously to his strength of will and character. Hay and Root—men of exceptional power—said that he was at all times the master. Jules Cambon, the French ambassador, said to him, in the course of the negotiation of the protocol with Spain, "Mr. President, you are like adamant." Mark Hanna is popularly supposed to have "dominated" McKinley, but the opposite was the truth. Hanna's attitude toward the President was, as one writer humorously put it, "like that of a bashful lover toward his sweetheart." That McKinley was always right in his decisions on the momentous questions with which he was confronted in the critical years of our "adventurous departure on untried paths" we need not contend;¹ but we must agree with the tribute paid to the President by Benjamin Ide Wheeler of the University of California, in conferring upon him the degree of Doctor of Laws in the spring of 1901, in the words now engraved on the McKinley Memorial at Canton, Ohio: "A statesman singularly gifted to unite the discordant forces of government and mold the diverse purposes of men towards progressive and salutary action."

¹ The unrelieved eulogy of McKinley's biographer, Charles S. Olcott ("The Life of William McKinley," Vol. II, pp. 334-375), should be corrected by H. T. Peck's far more discriminating estimate in "Twenty Years of the Republic," pp. 657-665. Indeed, these pages of Peck's are among the finest in a book of unusually sustained excellence.

CHAPTER VI

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

The two things in America which seem to me most extraordinary are Niagara Falls and Theodore Roosevelt.—JOHN MORLEY

THE ANNUS MIRABILIS—1902

"About certain persons," wrote Percival Lowell, "there exists a subtle something which leaves its impression upon the consciousness of all who come in contact with them, as if we had suddenly been placed in the field of a magnetic force." That quality of unique personality belonged to Theodore Roosevelt in the highest degree. If it is true, as Emerson says, that "the great man is one who does not remind us of anybody else," then Roosevelt was among the truly great. He conforms to no type, falls into no class. He is *sui generis*. So intensely and uninterruptedly directive was the influence of his character upon public affairs that the biographers could not wait for his death, or even his retirement from office, before beginning their work; and the historians have been tempted to lapse into biography on reaching his administration. "After all," said Secretary Root to him on the occasion of his renomination in 1904, "your personality has been the administration."

Unquenchable energy was the master trait of Roosevelt's character. His mind was a magnetic coil which intensified the currents of thought and action that flowed through it. Because he arrived at decisions quickly, he was often accused of arriving at them hastily; and those who could not keep pace with his rapid intellectual processes believed that caprice was running away with his judgment. Where other men were content to hold views or opinions, he had convictions, which he urged with the persistency of the reformer who cannot brook delay

between the perception of a right idea and its realization in a righteous act. His old friend Thomas B. Reed, with playful sarcasm, congratulated him on his "original discovery of the Ten Commandments." With no training in law and with but little interest in political or constitutional theory, he regarded government as an instrument in the hands of zealous administrators for securing justice between man and man. Although unsurpassed by the most astute managers in the art of politics, he never became absorbed in the game for its own sake or used the vast power which he commanded for purely partisan ends. He rather used his party as a means to secure the larger ends of social justice, and even temporarily wrecked his party when it seemed to him to be recreant to the duty of seeking those ends.

The range of Roosevelt's interests and activities, curiosities and acquisitions, was enormous. No president of such varied knowledge and accomplishments had come to the White House since the days of Thomas Jefferson. We can hardly imagine Benjamin Harrison reading Herodotus in his spare moments, or Grover Cleveland discussing art with Saint Gaudens, or William McKinley arguing on the relative merits of the Italian historians with Sir George Otto Trevelyan. Yet Roosevelt did all this and much more. He was an omnivorous reader. Even in the midst of his incessant public duties he sent to the Congressional Library for armfuls of books on the greatest variety of subjects. His published works on history, public ethics, and personal experiences in politics, war and sport fill thirty volumes. It is estimated that he wrote one hundred and fifty thousand letters, which, distributed over a period of forty years from his majority to his death, would make an average of more than ten a day. Though born to comparative wealth and brought up in an atmosphere conducive to social exclusiveness, he was a man of the most catholic tastes in his friendships. Rank, money, occupation, or social status meant little to him. Cowboys, ambassadors, labor leaders, senators, prize-fighters, and clergymen were likely to meet each other in the reception room of the White House or sit down to his table together. The grimy engineer of the presidential train

always got a cheery word and a cordial handshake as he leaned out of his cab at the end of the run.

Temperament and training both combined to make Roosevelt's conception of office dynamic. He had never sat in a legislative or deliberative body, except for his brief and youthful membership in the New York Assembly (1882-1884); and even there it was noted that his interest was not in shaping policy by debate, but in direct attack upon evildoers—the tax dodgers, the tenement sweaters, and the men who held high office through corruption. His public honors for the dozen years before he reached the presidency had been an uninterrupted succession of administrative and executive positions (see page 315, note 2), and even when these positions were subordinate ones, he had magnified them by his conspicuous activity. He was not chairman of the Civil Service Commission, yet he was so constantly the defender of its policies and the compiler of its reports that it is doubtful whether one American in a thousand could tell the name of any of his colleagues on the board. He was only Assistant Secretary of the Navy, yet he will probably continue to receive the largest share of the credit for the superb condition of our fleet at the outbreak of the Spanish War. Roosevelt was accustomed, therefore, to wielding authority, and he loved it. He belonged to what he called “the Lincoln-Jackson school” of executives, as contrasted with “the Buchanan-Taft school,” holding that large powers of initiative and discretion are lodged with the president as the elected representative of the whole American people. It was the part of Congress to give legal sanction to the president's policies. He read the Constitution not to find specific clauses permitting him to act, but only to heed the definite limitations which it put upon his authority. “Under this interpretation of executive power,” he says in his “Autobiography” (p. 389), “I did and caused to be done many things not previously done by the President and the heads of the executive departments. I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of the executive power. In other words, I acted for the common well-being of all our people, whenever and in whatever manner was neces-

sary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition. I did not care a rap for the mere form and show of power; I cared immensely for the use which could be made of the substance." It was this dominant executive disposition in Roosevelt which elicited the famous characterization by his friend Henry Adams: "Power when wielded by abnormal energy is the most serious of facts. . . . Roosevelt more than any other living man within the range of notoriety showed the singular primitive quality that belongs to ultimate matter—the quality that medieval theologians assigned to God—he was pure act" ("The Education of Henry Adams," p. 417).

Where the light is intense the shadows are deep. Roosevelt exhibited "the defects of his qualities" to a degree that often amused his friends and exasperated his enemies. The totality of conviction that the judgment to which he had made up his mind was right made him impatient of dissenting opinions, and even tempted him to attribute insincerity of motive or misrepresentation of fact to the men who differed from him. Yet he was vehement and prompt in his denunciation of the least hint that his own conduct could be susceptible of any interpretation but the one that he offered. His unabashed satisfaction in the exercise of power led him frequently to speak of the measures of his administration to callers at home and correspondents abroad as remarkable achievements, and to use the first person singular so frequently in his messages that it was jocosely remarked that a new font of capital I's had to be cast for the government printing office. His enthusiastic commitment to a policy in hand or a conviction of the moment left no margin for qualification or reconciliation when future circumstances might alter his views. Therefore, being deprived of that protective "caution" which is so dear to the heart of the politician,¹ he was often open to the charge of inconsistency, especially in his change of attitude toward erstwhile associates in public office.

¹ An amusing instance of this is a story told of Senator Allison of Iowa. Once when he was walking with a friend, a flock of newly shorn sheep passed by. The friend made the obvious idle remark that the sheep were shorn. "Yes," replied the senator, "they seem to be—at least on this side."

He got the reputation in some quarters of making the acceptance of his own point of view the test of a man's serviceability. It is said that he once remarked to a member of his cabinet that he wished that he had a first-class lawyer in the Senate to consult, and then being reminded that Senator Spooner had no superior, he replied, "Yes, I know; but Spooner never agrees with me!" In spite of the defects of his qualities, however, we may return to the estimate of Roosevelt by one who had been both his bosom friend and his bitter political enemy. William H. Taft said of him at the time of his death, "Theodore Roosevelt was the most commanding, the most original, the most interesting, and the most brilliant personality in American public life since Lincoln."

The "elder statesmen" of the Republican party were not enthusiastic over the accession of Roosevelt to the presidency, notwithstanding his pledge to carry out the policies of his lamented predecessor and his invitation to all the members of McKinley's cabinet to retain their portfolios.¹ They were vaguely apprehensive that so vigorous, enterprising, and independent a "young man" might get out of hand; might disturb the industrial and financial order which had been so satisfactorily stabilized under the "safe" administration of McKinley. Their apprehensions were not unfounded. Already something like a "counter-reformation" had begun to set in against the prosperity of the fat years immediately following the Spanish War. Labor was uneasy. The prevention of the anthracite coal strike in the summer of 1900, and the prompt suppression of the

¹ As his administration progressed, however, Roosevelt developed a novel theory of the cabinet. He treated the members more like a council of state after the fashion of Napoleon's council, and changed the personnel frequently, without much regard to the particular department to which a man was assigned. For example, when he wanted the advice on railroad matters of Paul Morton, president of the Santa Fé, he invited him into the cabinet for a few months as Secretary of the Navy! He made twenty-three cabinet changes during his administration. He constantly moved men from one post to another. He had six different secretaries of the navy and four postmasters-general. Secretary Wilson of the Department of Agriculture was the only cabinet member to retain his post throughout the administration. Wilson served under McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft (1897-1913)—the longest record in the history of the cabinet.

steel strike of 1901 by the heroic efforts of Hanna and Morgan, had not so much removed the causes of conflict as revealed the immense power at the behest of the new masters of capital. Populism, though signally defeated on the issue upon which it had rashly staked its fortunes in the campaign of 1896, was not driven from the field. There were other points in the program of protest: the lawlessness of the trusts, the tyranny of the railroads, the monopoly of the land, the oppression of labor, the influence of corporate wealth on the sources of law and justice. In Wisconsin, Robert M. La Follette, the champion of the direct primary and the effective taxation of railroads and corporations, was elected governor in 1900, after a long struggle. He advertised the "Wisconsin idea" widely by his spectacular fight against the vested interests of the state and their venal press. Roosevelt followed the work of the new governor with sympathetic interest.¹ Did he perchance think of introducing at Washington the policy which La Follette was pursuing at Madison?

Roosevelt's first message to Congress (December 3, 1901) was an encyclopædic document of over twenty thousand words, giving his views on every conceivable question of public concern and containing a program which would have kept Congress busy during the rest of the administration. As Professor Beard remarks, "None of Mr. Roosevelt's later messages added anything new by way of economic doctrine or moral principles" ("Contemporary American History," p. 258). It may be that the President was partly moved to make this elaborate declaration of policy at the beginning of his term by the desire to dispel any fear of a disturbing radicalism. Nevertheless it is significant that the first subject to which he turned, after a warning against the anarchy that had cost his predecessor his life, was the attitude of the government toward "the great industrial combinations which are popularly, although with technical in-

¹ He later remarked that "La Follette was responsible for the victory of a genuinely democratic, popular government in Wisconsin," and that the state had become "a laboratory for wise experimental legislation aiming to secure the social and political betterment of the people as a whole."

accuracy, known as trusts." His words were meant to be both reassuring and admonitory. He complimented the "captains of industry" who had driven the railroads across the continent, built up our commerce, developed our manufactures, and, "on the whole, done great good to our people." Rich and poor alike shared in the blessings of prosperity. Nothing should be done "in a spirit of rashness or ignorance" to interfere with "the delicate mechanism of modern business," nor should any "crude and ill-considered legislation" attempt to check the inevitable consolidation of industry. Still, there was "a widespread conviction in the minds of the American people that the great corporations were in certain of their features and tendencies harmful to the general welfare." They should be "not prohibited, but supervised and within reasonable limits controlled." They had received their privileges and protection from public authority, and they incurred in return the obligation to the people of a strictly legal and honest conduct of their business. The government, he averred, had the constitutional right to regulate interstate commerce. In order that it might do so with wisdom and justice it was necessary that those corporations engaged in interstate commerce should willingly submit to a full and free investigation, such as that which the banks, for example, accepted as a matter of course. There should be created a new cabinet officer, to be known as the Secretary of Commerce and Industries, to deal, among other things, with those interests of government which concerned labor, the great business corporations, and our merchant marine.

The country was not left for many weeks to speculate on whether this passage meant anything more than the general perfunctory recommendation of a presidential message. On February 20, 1902, the financial world was startled and the stock market thrown into a panic by the announcement in the papers that the President had directed his Attorney-General, P.C. Knox of Pennsylvania, to bring suit against the Northern Securities Company for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.

No feature of the recovery of the country from the depression following the panic of 1893 is more notable than the rescue and

reorganization of thousands of miles of bankrupt railroads by the financial magnates of Wall Street. E. H. Harriman took hold of the Union Pacific, which had been wrecked by the speculators, and rebuilt the line for heavy traffic, adding dependent properties and absorbing the Southern Pacific, until he had a network of more than fifteen thousand miles of railroad in the West and Southwest. It was said that he aimed at the control of the entire transportation system west of the Missouri River. J. P. Morgan, in addition to rehabilitating many roads in the East, undertook the reorganization of the bankrupt Northern Pacific, and in 1901 had an exciting battle with Harriman, who engineered a "raid" on the Northern Pacific stock. The one great railroad king who attended strictly to building and left the manipulations of Wall Street alone was James J. Hill, a man of incomparable energy and foresight in his constructive plans and of scrupulous honesty in his business relations. Hill had come to the little town of St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1856, from his Canadian village, as a boy of eighteen, without a dollar or a friend. At the end of thirty years he had amassed a fortune in the development of farming, mining, and transportation projects. In 1889 he organized the Great Northern Railway to run from the head of the Lakes to the Pacific, there to connect with a fleet of steamers which should carry the grain and provisions of our rapidly developing Northwest to the shores of Asia.¹ The Great Northern was honestly built and soundly financed. It paid its dividends regularly, even in the hard times of the early nineties, and accumulated a surplus. On June 30, 1894, when 192 railroads, with a mileage of 40,818 and a capitalization of \$2,500,000,000, were in the hands of receivers, the Great Northern was solvent and prosperous.

It was to protect this magnificent property from such dangers as the Harriman raid, and to secure connections with the great central metropolis of Chicago, that Hill entered into an

¹ The reader will recall that the same year (1889) saw the admission to the Union of the new states of North and South Dakota, Montana, and Washington, followed the next year by Idaho and Wyoming. North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Washington were eventually traversed by Hill's road.

agreement with Morgan in the autumn of 1901 to merge the parallel lines of the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific and to combine with the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy. A holding company was organized under the laws of New Jersey, to which the stockholders of the three railroads surrendered their securities in exchange for certificates guaranteed by the joint earnings of the roads. The Northern Securities Company met with instant protest in the states of the Northwest, as a threat to bring the entire transportation system of the region under the control of a giant monopoly. Thereupon President Roosevelt consulted his Attorney-General on the legality of the merger, and, having received the opinion that it was illegal, without consulting any other member of his cabinet or giving any warning to Wall Street, made the sudden announcement of the purpose of the government to dissolve the company. Suit was brought in the circuit court of St. Paul on March 10, 1902. On April 9, 1903, the court handed down a decision in favor of the government, and this decision was confirmed the next year by the Supreme Court of the United States, voting, as in so many important cases, five to four. The Northern Securities Company was accordingly dissolved, and the securities of the competing roads were returned to the investors. It was a deep disappointment to Mr. Hill, who believed to the end of his life that the merger was in the interests of sound finance, conservative railroad management, and the general prosperity of the people of the Northwest. He "bowed his head to the law"; but he wrote rather bitterly to a friend, "It seems hard when we look back on what we have done and know we have led all the Western companies in opening the country and carrying at the lowest rates, that we should be compelled to fight for our lives against the political adventurers who have never done anything but pose and draw a salary."¹

The corporations were entirely right in the importance they attached to Roosevelt's attack on the Northern Securities Company. It was the launching of a new policy. For more than a decade the Sherman law had been on the statute books, and

¹ Joseph G. Pyle, "The Life of James J. Hill," Vol. II, p. 171.

although the government had instituted a score or so of cases under it, there had not been a single instance of a successful attack on a great corporation. On the contrary, the failure of the government in 1895 to stop the combination of the sugar refineries in the Knight case (see page 218) had seemed to open the way clear for the continuance of mergers and monopolies. The Sherman law was commonly spoken of as a "dead letter." There had been, of course, little occasion for its application in the period of economic distress, and McKinley had shown no disposition to apply it in the years of economic prosperity which had followed. Now an aggressive executive—not hostile to the trusts as such, but determined that the laws should be enforced—had seized the Sherman act as a weapon of justice. Mr. Morgan hastened to Washington on the news of the attack on the Northern Securities Company to ask the President why, if there was anything irregular in the merger, it might not be "fixed up quietly" between his lawyers and the Attorney-General. And when Roosevelt replied that it was not his purpose to fix it up, but to put a stop to it, Morgan wanted to know if the President intended to attack his other interests, like the newly organized United States Steel Corporation. The fat was in the fire. Wall Street's apprehensions of the dangerous character of the new President were confirmed, and it never gave him its confidence thereafter.

On the other hand, Roosevelt, having chosen his course, defended it with characteristic vigor before the people. He made a long tour of New England and the states of the Middle West in the summer and autumn of 1902, reiterating before enthusiastic audiences his determination to enforce the anti-trust law, no matter whose interests were injured. Business which had anything to fear from the law was condemned *ipso facto*. "The immediate necessity in dealing with the trusts," he said, "is to place them under the real and not the nominal control of some sovereignty to which they shall owe allegiance." That sovereignty was the law, and the great capitalist himself was short-sighted if he did not see that "when we make him obey the law, we insure for him the absolute protection of the law." But whether or not he saw his advantage in keeping the law, keep it

he must. "The biggest corporation, like the humblest private citizen," should be held to "strict compliance with the will of the people as expressed in the fundamental law." Such announcements gave "predatory wealth" an uneasy feeling and won for President Roosevelt immense popularity as the "trust buster." Followed, as they were, by the Expedition Act (February 11, 1903) giving precedence on the court dockets to Federal suits dealing with the trusts, by the creation of the new cabinet Department of Commerce and Labor (February 14, 1903), by the Elkins act (February 19, 1903) punishing the receiver as well as the giver of rebates, by the successful suit of the government against the beef trust (May 26, 1903), and by the institution of several other suits of less importance, they proved to be more than mere campaign oratory, though they doubtless contributed much to the election of a fifth consecutive Republican Congress in November, 1902.

In the autumn of 1902 President Roosevelt performed an unofficial act which brought relief from suffering and discomfort to thousands of American families. For years the grievances of the miners in the anthracite coal fields of Pennsylvania had been cumulative and unredressed. The men were shamefully exploited by the operators, who, contrary to the law of Pennsylvania, combined the ownership of the mines and of the coal-carrying railroads. The men were forced to produce over three thousand pounds to a "ton," to "top" the cars nine inches above the rails, to buy from the company at \$2.75 a can blasting powder which cost \$1.10, to live in houses rented to them by the company, and at many collieries to accept their wages in certificates good only for the purchase of supplies at the company's stores.¹ In the late summer of 1900 the miners, to the number of one hundred and twenty-five thousand, were out to secure the reform of these intolerable conditions. The truce patched up

¹ John Mitchell, the president of the United Mine Workers of America, which had some eight thousand members in the anthracite regions in 1900, says in his book on "Organized Labor" (p. 358), "Often a man, together with his children, would work for months without receiving a dollar of money; and not infrequently he would find at the end of the month nothing in his envelope but a statement that his indebtedness to the company had increased by so many dollars."

by Mr. Hanna to prevent the defeat of McKinley in the impending election (see page 348) granted the miners a 10 per cent increase in wages, reduced the price of powder, and made several other minor concessions. But it was only an armed truce. The operators refused any hearing to the miners or recognition of the union. Docking of pay on the slightest provocation, espionage, the truck system, and other abuses continued. On February 14, 1902, Mr. Mitchell on behalf of the union asked for a conference with the operators. They repelled him with the answer that there could not be two masters in the management of their business. Then the miners formulated their grievances, including the demands for a 20 per cent increase in wages and an eight-hour day. On May 8 they offered to submit their case to arbitration by the industrial branch of the National Civic Forum or by a board on which should sit Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul and Bishop Potter of New York. Mr. Baer, the president of the Reading Coal and Iron Company and the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, replied that anthracite mining was "a business and not a religious, sentimental, or academic proposition." Thereupon a committee of the miners' union voted an immediate strike. Nearly one hundred and fifty thousand men quit work on the morning of May 15.

In June the price of anthracite began to rise. By the first of September it had reached more than double the normal retail price of \$5 a ton, and before the end of the month it was selling as high as from \$25 to \$30 a ton. Coal yards which had generally a supply of two thousand tons in the early autumn were reduced to a few hundreds of tons at most. Yet there were huge piles and long trainloads of anthracite coal near the railroad terminal in New Jersey which the operators would not release to the market. They had vowed that they would never again allow the politicians to wheedle or bully them into making concessions to the miners. They had declared in the spring that there would be no strike; and when it came, they had predicted that it would be over in a few days. Now that it had continued into the autumn, they declared that there was really no shortage of coal, and that the strike would collapse immediately if the

governor of Pennsylvania would only perform his duty of sending, or calling upon the national government to send, a sufficient military force to the mine fields to protect the non-union workers, whom the companies were ready to employ. As anthracite coal was almost the only fuel used in the eastern part of the country, the threatened famine as the cold weather approached portended widespread suffering and perhaps rioting and bloodshed. Appeals began to pour in upon the President to do something to relieve the situation. Of course the government had no responsibility for the strike and no power to compel the miners to produce coal or the operators to sell it. Its legal duty was limited to preserving order in the fields on appeal from the executive or the legislature of the state of Pennsylvania. Yet President Roosevelt, with rare courage, laid off his official mantle and, in his capacity as first citizen rather than chief magistrate of the land, invited Mr. Mitchell and the mine owners to meet in a conference at the White House on October 3, 1902.

He opened the conference with a brief address of welcome and warning. "I appeal to your patriotism," he said; "to the spirit that sinks personal considerations and makes individual sacrifices for the common good." He would not have any discussion of the demands or defiances on either side. He only asked that an agreement be made under which the mining of coal should be resumed. Mr. Mitchell sprang to his feet at once and offered to submit the dispute to arbitration, pending which the miners would go to work. But the operators flatly refused. They said that they had nothing to arbitrate, and with some insolence they called upon the President to do his duty by suppressing the strike by force and bringing suit against the miners' union for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Their "belligerent and uncompromising attitude," as the President called it, was thoroughly in keeping with their persistent misrepresentation of the facts of the case. They maintained that the strike was kept up only by the efforts of a few agitators, whereas the miners had voted unanimously to continue the strike, and were supported by the almost unanimous public opinion of the country. They were helped by funds reaching into the millions, contributed by the

bituminous miners, by "merchants, lawyers, doctors, clergymen, and even Wall Street bankers—who requested that their names be kept secret."

Although the intransigent attitude of the operators had brought the White House conference to nought, it had only confirmed the President's determination to secure the relief of the public. He had appealed in vain to the spirit of voluntary concession; he would now take the matter into his own hands. He wrote to ex-President Cleveland, asking him to serve on a commission with Carroll D. Wright and a third member to investigate the conditions in the anthracite fields and report a plan of adjustment. Furthermore, he made arrangements, known only to three or four men besides himself, to have the work of coal mining resumed during the investigation of the commission. The governor of Pennsylvania was to telegraph him at a moment which he should indicate, and at the governor's request he was to send Major General Schofield to the anthracite field with a sufficient force of United States troops to put down resistance and to take charge of the mines as receivers for the government, operating them in spite of any protest from the owners. Whether they had heard rumors of this plan or whether on sober second thought they realized that their position was untenable, the operators began to back down. Secretary Root went to New York on October 12 and spent most of the day with Mr. Morgan on board his yacht *Corsair* in the Hudson. He returned to Washington with the draft of a plan of arbitration to which every one of the operators had pledged his signature. The arbiters were to be appointed by the President and were to include "an army engineer, a business man familiar with the mining and selling of coal, a judge of the locality, and an eminent sociologist." The President wanted to appoint Mr. Cleveland in lieu of the army engineer, but the operators refused to abandon their categories. They raised no objection, however, when Roosevelt satisfied the miners' desire for a labor man on the commission by naming E. E. Clark of the Order of Railway Conductors as the "eminent sociologist."

On October 23 the miners resumed work; and on the next day

the commission, under the presidency of Circuit Judge George Gray of Delaware, met at the White House for instructions from President Roosevelt. After four months of investigation, during which more than five hundred and fifty witnesses were examined, the commission made its report (March 21, 1903), which, as the *New York Tribune* remarked, was a victory not so much for the miners or the operators as for "that third party whose interests are permanent though too often overlooked by both the others and their hot partisans—the public." The main findings of the commission, however, were distinctly favorable to the miners. A wage increase of 10 per cent was granted, the union was recognized as a party to the contract, and there was to be no discrimination between union and non-union men at the mines. The checking system for weighing and dockage was adopted, and the "coal and iron police" disbanded. All future disputes were to be submitted to a board of conciliation consisting of three members chosen by the operators, three chosen by the mine workers, with reference to the circuit judge of the district for final decision in case of a disagreement. The terms of the commission were to be binding on both parties for a period of three years. As a matter of fact this wise settlement of the strike, which had lasted one hundred and sixty-three days and cost the railroads and the miners together probably \$100,000,000, and, in the words of the President, had brought the nation "within measurable distance of a great calamity," lasted more than five times three years. Under its terms peace reigned in the anthracite fields until the days of general economic dislocation and upheaval following the great World War.

President Roosevelt in a letter to Judge Gray (March 24, 1903) thanked the commission for "performing a great and lasting service to the nation." But in reality the great and lasting service was his. He was the one man in the country whose influence was powerful enough to break the deadlock. He dared to assume the responsibility in the face of denunciation for unconstitutional and meddlesome behavior, and even the threats of impeachment. He was under the fire of criticism for the conduct of our officers and soldiers in the Philippines. He was

pleading with Congress for tariff concessions to Cuba as she "struggled upward along the painful and difficult road of self-government." He was, as he wrote to Governor Taft, having "a regular stand-up fight" with Hanna and Aldrich in the Senate to get them to accept any trust regulation. He was opposing the Canadian claim to a boundary line between British Columbia and Alaska which in his opinion was as indefensible as a claim to the island of Nantucket. He was pressing the negotiation of a treaty with the republic of Colombia, in order that he might get the right to build a canal across the Isthmus of Panama before the expiration of the "reasonable time" granted to him for this purpose by the act of Congress signed on June 28, 1902. In addition to these concerns of public interest, he had a personal misfortune to bear in the autumn of 1902. The open carriage in which he was riding with his private secretary, Cortelyou, and Governor Crane of Massachusetts was struck by a trolley car at Pittsfield, Massachusetts, on September 3 and demolished. A secret-service man sitting on the box with the driver was instantly killed, and the occupants were thrown violently into the street. Roosevelt returned to his home at Oyster Bay the same evening, with severe bruises on his face and his right leg. He insisted on starting on his Western speaking tour in spite of his injuries, but he was forced to return to Washington (September 24) by the development of an abscess on his leg, which the doctors feared might affect the bone. The limp and the twinges of pain had not wholly disappeared when he entered the conference room at the White House to meet the representatives of the miners and the mine owners.

The eventful year 1902 was not to close without another incident to illustrate President Roosevelt's initiative and to add to his waxing popularity. The republic of Venezuela, like most of the undeveloped countries with rich natural resources, had attracted considerable foreign capital and incurred obligations for certain payments which it could not meet. The public revenues were pledged for the dividends on a railroad which German capital had built at a cost of some \$20,000,000. In 1900 a revolution broke out in Venezuela which not only ruined the prospect

of the payment of the dividends, but increased the obligations of Venezuela by the claims of foreigners for damages suffered in the civil war. Germany induced England and Italy to join with her in coercing the Venezuelan government. Joint fleets of the powers shelled some of the ports and sank some of the harmless ships of the Venezuelan navy. On December 8, 1902, the two chief powers of Germany and England broke off diplomatic relations with the republic. Germany, the leader in the policy, protested to our State Department that she had no intention of violating the Monroe Doctrine by the seizure of territory in Venezuela, describing her procedure as "a pacific blockade."

During the first year of the intermittent chastisement of Venezuela, President Roosevelt held aloof from the quarrel. Though his private sentiments were strongly in favor of the total elimination of European powers from this continent,¹ he took the position in his message of December, 1901, that we should not interfere with the commercial relations of any American power. The Monroe Doctrine, he said, "is in no wise intended as hostile to any nation in the Old World. We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power." However, toward the close of 1902, Roosevelt became convinced "that Germany intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor and turn it into a strongly fortified place of arms, on the model of Kiao-chau, with a view to exercising some control over the future Isthmian canal and over South America."² Germany had been for some time

¹ On February 9, 1898, he had written to Mr. H. C. Moore: "I should myself like to shape our foreign policy with the purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every European power. I would begin with Spain, and in the end would take all the other European nations, including England. It is even more important to prevent any new nation from getting a foothold. Germany as a republic would very possibly be a friendly nation, but under the present despotism she is much more bitterly and outspokenly hostile to us than England" (J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," Vol. I, p. 79). As a matter of fact, England, as the events of the summer proved, was anything but "hostile" to us in 1898.

² See a long letter to Mr. W. R. Thayer (August 21, 1916), confirming the latter's account of the Venezuelan incident, in the chapter entitled "The German Menace Looms Up" in his second volume of the "Life and Letters of John Hay" (1915).

advancing on the path of colonial ambition. There was a report that her warships had been inspecting the Santa Margarita Islands off the Venezuelan coast in search for a suitable naval base. To end a situation which he was almost certain would result in a defiance of the Monroe Doctrine, President Roosevelt demanded that the claims on Venezuela be submitted to arbitration. The British ministry, having little support from the people in its policy of drawing Germany's chestnuts out of the fire, agreed willingly. But Germany declined to arbitrate. When the President explained to Dr. von Holleben, the German ambassador at Washington, that the presence of the Kaiser's warships on the Venezuelan coast would no longer be tolerated, the ambassador replied that his government had no intention of taking "permanent" possession of Venezuelan territory. Whereupon the President informed him that unless acceptance of the proposition of arbitration came from the German government within ten days, he should order Admiral Dewey to the coast of Venezuela with a strong fleet.

It is most probable that Von Holleben, if he troubled his imperial master at all with this message, accompanied it with the opinion that President Roosevelt was merely "bluffing." When he called at the White House about a week later on some routine business and was about to leave without any mention of Venezuela, Roosevelt reminded him of it. The ambassador had no news to report. "Very well," said Roosevelt in effect; "unless I have such news within forty-eight hours, I shall order Dewey to sail a day earlier." This time the ambassador took the warning more seriously. He consulted Dr. Buenz, the German consul-general at New York, who told him that the President undoubtedly meant what he said. Within thirty-six hours word came from the German embassy that his imperial majesty was willing to arbitrate. Just what went on in Wilhelmstrasse we do not know. But Von Holleben immediately left Washington on the plea of "chronic ill health" and appeared no more in the German diplomatic service. Roosevelt, with an ironic touch of humor, gave the Kaiser generous praise for "proposing" arbitration. By negotiation between the claimant powers

and Venezuela (represented by our minister to the republic, H. W. Bowen) ten mixed commissions sitting at Caracas in the summer of 1903 pronounced on the claims of as many nations. Venezuela agreed to set apart 30 per cent of her customs receipts for the satisfaction of the claims.

Aside from the dramatic note given to it by President Roosevelt's threat, the Venezuelan incident is interesting from two points of view; first, as an illustration of the protean forms which the Monroe Doctrine has taken under the various interpretations of a century. Originally a protest against European aggression in the specific matters of new colonization in this hemisphere or interference with the forms of government established by the new republics here, it has been extended, under the interpretation of "manifest destiny" or the "paramount interest" of the United States on this continent, to something like a general protectorate over our Latin-American neighbors. Secretary Olney's application of the doctrine in the Venezuelan boundary dispute with Great Britain in 1895 rested on far different grounds and claims from those of Secretary Seward in the expulsion of the French troops from Mexico thirty years earlier. And now, for the first time, there was introduced what might be called a "precautionary interpretation" of the Monroe Doctrine. President Roosevelt, in a speech at Chicago on April 2, 1903, explained his part in the Venezuelan incident in the following words: "The concern of our government was . . . to keep an attitude of watchful vigilance and see that there was no infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, no acquisition of territorial rights by a European power at the expense of a weaker sister republic—whether this acquisition might take the shape of an outright and avowed seizure of territory or the exercise of the control which would in effect be equivalent to such seizure. . . . Both powers assured us in explicit terms that there was not the slightest intention on their part to violate the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. . . . At the same time the existence of hostilities in a region so near to our borders [!] was fraught with such possibilities of danger in the future that it was obviously no less a duty to ourselves than our duty to humanity to en-

deavor to put an end to that." These words contain much food for reflection. Unless the newly acquired island of Porto Rico was to be reckoned a part of the "borders" of the United States, the nearest point of our territory—the tip of the peninsula of Florida—was over thirteen hundred miles distant from the Venezuelan port of Caracas. The Venezuelan coast lay along the southern shore of the Caribbean. The Venezuelan republic was the neighbor of Colombia, with whom we were negotiating the treaty for the canal rights on the Isthmus of Panama. The whole significance, practically, of the Monroe Doctrine in the twentieth century is to be found not in the danger of the extension of European influences to the Western Hemisphere, but in the extension of American interests to the great tropical sea locked and guarded by the Antilles.

The Venezuelan incident is of interest, in the second place, for the prominence it gave to a new doctrine of international law, set forth in a work by Señor Calvo, a prominent Argentine jurist; namely, that a state has no right to make the pecuniary claims of its citizens against another state a subject of public action. Luis Drago, the Argentine minister for foreign affairs, adopted this doctrine (limiting it, however, to military intervention for the collection of debts) and, in a note of December 27, 1902, protested against the coercive blockade of Venezuela in the name of the "sacred right of self-protection." "The collection of loans by military means," he wrote, "implies territorial occupation to make it effective, and territorial occupation signifies the suppression or subordination of the governments of the countries on which it is imposed." At the second Pan-American conference, held at Mexico City in 1901, delegates of seventeen American nations had signed a treaty, which six of them (including the United States) had ratified, agreeing to submit to arbitration "all claims for pecuniary loss or damage which may be presented by their respective citizens and which cannot be amicably adjusted through diplomatic channels." Five years later Secretary Root, who had succeeded John Hay in the State Department, took advantage of his visit to South America in connection with the third Pan-American conference at Rio de

Janeiro, to emphasize our hearty approval of the Drago Doctrine. The American delegation to the Second Hague Conference the next year (1907) introduced the subject; and the forty-four nations represented adopted a resolution to the effect that there should be no resort to armed force to recover the debts due their citizens "unless the debtor nation refused arbitration, or, having accepted arbitration, failed to submit to the award."

Though not all the Latin-American countries have accepted this principle, the United States has held it to be consistent with the Monroe Doctrine to intervene for their protection from coercion by European creditor nations. When a case somewhat similar to the Venezuelan one arose two years later, President Roosevelt acted with promptness. The estimated revenues of Santo Domingo in the autumn of 1904 showed a surplus above current expenses equal to less than one third of the interest charges on the large debt of \$32,000,000, of which \$22,000,000 was held by Europeans. Successive revolutionary governments had heaped up the debt by reckless bond sales, until the arrears of interest, to say nothing of the current obligations, were almost double the funds in the treasury. The country was bankrupt, and several of the European governments (France, Italy, Belgium) announced toward the close of 1904 that they would proceed to the forcible collection of the debts of their citizens unless the United States should take in charge the finances of the island and administer them honestly. President Roosevelt, in his message of December 6, 1904, declared that while no nation which "acted with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters," keeping order and paying its debts, need fear any interference from the United States, nevertheless "chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society might ultimately require the intervention of some civilized nation." The adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine might in such a case force this country, "however reluctantly," to "the exercise of an international police power." Secretary Hay instructed our minister to Santo Domingo, T. C. Dawson, to ask President Morales to invite the United States to take over the collection of the Domini-

can customs, and Morales complied. A treaty was signed on February 4, 1905, constituting the United States the receiver for the bankrupt republic. Fifty-five per cent of the Dominican customs were to be applied to the liquidation of the debt, and the other 45 per cent to be used for current expenses. The Senate refused to ratify the Dominican treaty; but Roosevelt went ahead with the plan under an executive agreement with the island, appointing a confidential agent to investigate the finances of Santo Domingo and authorizing Secretary Taft to nominate the officer to collect the revenues. The President announced to Congress that such arrangement would continue until the Senate should take action on the treaty. He was roundly abused in the Senate for this piece of "executive usurpation," but the success of his policy was so complete that the Senate eventually ratified the treaty in slightly altered form (February 25, 1907). Under the American receivership the Dominican treasury received more from the 45 per cent of the customs receipts turned over to it by our collector than it had received from its own corrupt officials who had handled the entire revenues. The claims of the creditor countries were scaled down to \$17,000,000, and the interest obligations were promptly met. The convention of 1907 is still in force; and while we have intervened at times of threatened revolution, under the permissive clauses of the treaty, to protect our officials in the performance of their duty, there has been "no intention to destroy Dominican sovereignty." This policy of "the exercise of an international police power" for the collection of the revenues or the preservation of the stability of a Latin-American neighbor has been called "the Roosevelt corollary of the Monroe Doctrine." It is fraught with the gravest consequences for the relations of the United States with the other countries of this hemisphere.¹

Just as Roosevelt's first message contained practically the whole program of his administration, so the major measures of the first full year of his presidency, the "marvelous year" of 1902, introduced most of the activities of the six years which

¹ Some of the effects of this policy will be noticed in our treatment of the relations of the United States and the Caribbean countries in a later chapter.

followed. The prosecution of the Northern Securities Company announced the policy, pursued in some forty indictments brought later by his Attorneys-General, of making the big corporations, whose inevitability he always recognized, conform to the law of the land. The intervention in the anthracite-coal strike revealed his endeavor to secure an impartial treatment for the interests of both capital and labor, based on a frank and open presentation of their claims, and his dominant concern for the public welfare when threatened by the selfish obstinacy of either of the contending parties. The frustration of Germany's designs in Venezuela by the threat of Dewey's powerful squadron in the West Indies illustrated his conception of the Monroe Doctrine. "Speak softly and carry a big stick" was his own picturesque phrasing of the doctrine of our responsibility for the preservation of order in the Caribbean region. Panama, Santo Domingo, Portsmouth, Algeciras, the Hague, are all names which exemplify the Rooseveltian policy of American prestige, which culminated in the impressive voyage of a powerful fleet of American battleships around the world during the last eighteen months of his administration.

Most fruitful of all the measures of the "marvelous year," however, and the one most dear to the heart of the President himself, was the inauguration of the policy of the reclamation and irrigation of the arid lands of the West on a national scale. It was estimated by the Department of the Interior that over four hundred million acres of Western land suitable for agriculture were lying useless for want of sufficient rainfall. Projects for irrigation by private or state capital had made little progress when Roosevelt came into the presidency. In his first message he defined the forest and water problems as "perhaps the most vital internal problems of the United States." He was largely instrumental in securing the passage of the Newlands act by Congress (June 17, 1902), by which 95 per cent of the money received from the sale of public lands in sixteen "cowboy states" of the West and Southwest was set apart as a special reclamation fund for the construction of irrigation works. The money paid by the users of the water, plus the proceeds from the sale of the

newly irrigated lands, was to be added to the revolving fund. Under its beneficent operation huge reservoirs, dams, viaducts, and canals have been built, and millions of acres that were formerly sandy wastes covered with sagebrush have been converted into fertile fields and gardens. "An annual harvest valued at not less than \$250,000,000," writes a member of the reclamation service, "is the desert's response to the intelligent application of water to her sunburned valleys. Practically all of this stupendous miracle has been wrought within the last quarter of a century. . . . The 'Great American Desert' no longer calls up a vision of desolation and horrors. With the westward march of settlers its boundaries have shrunk. Railroads have thrust its barriers aside. Its flowing streams and underground waters are being measured and studied, and we are beginning to grasp faintly a little of its potential greatness."

The reclamation act was the beginning of a policy of the conservation of our natural resources, including the preservation of our forests, the defense of our public lands against fraud and theft, the protection of our game and birds, the creation of national parks, the improvement of our internal waterways, which President Roosevelt pursued with unflagging zeal, supported by men like F. H. Newell, Francis J. Heney, Charles D. Walcott, George H. Maxwell, and, above all, Gifford Pinchot. The month that Roosevelt left the presidency (March, 1909) Senator La Follette wrote in his magazine: "When the historian of the future shall speak of Theodore Roosevelt, he is likely to say that he did many notable things . . . but that his greatest work was inspiring and actually beginning a world movement for staying territorial waste and saving for the human race the things on which and on which alone a peaceful, progressive, and happy race life can be founded."

PANAMA, PARKER, AND PORTSMOUTH

No other act of President Roosevelt's administration was the cause of greater satisfaction to himself or offense to his critics than the acquisition of the Panama Canal in the late autumn of

1903. The political controversy arising from this act was finally settled on March 1, 1922, by the exchange of ratifications of a treaty by which the United States agreed to pay the republic of Colombia the sum of \$25,000,000 in five annual installments, in order to "restore the cordial friendship which characterized the relations between the two countries" before the secession of Panama and its recognition and protection by the United States. The historical controversy, however, as to the ethics of our behavior in securing the canal strip is still unsettled, and will probably continue to be so indefinitely. It would lead us far beyond the limits of a single chapter to discuss this great question adequately. We must be content here with a brief outline.

The desirability of an Isthmian canal under American ownership grew steadily upon our statesmen during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. When De Lesseps, the builder of the Suez Canal, organized his Panama Company early in 1880, securing from the Colombian government a right of way across the Isthmus, President Hayes called the attention of Congress to the importance for "our commerce, defense, unity, peace, and safety" of the control of "the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and Pacific shores," which would be "virtually a part of the coast line of the United States." The scandalous collapse of the French company nine years later opened the way for American initiative. But it was not until nine years later still that the 13,400-mile voyage of the *Oregon* around Cape Horn from San Francisco to join Sampson's fleet in the West Indies furnished Americans the convincing object lesson. The Spanish War made us a Pacific power, and naval strategy demanded the short cut through the Isthmus which would bring Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines thousands of miles nearer our Atlantic coast. On March 3, 1899, Congress created the Walker commission, with an appropriation of \$1,000,000 to investigate the relative merits of the Panama and Nicaraguan routes for a canal.

The obvious preliminary for a canal under exclusive American control was the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which had established a joint guaranty by Great

Britain and the United States. When this treaty was made, there being no immediate prospect of the construction of a canal by American capital, the United States thought that it had the better of the bargain in preventing Great Britain from securing an exclusive control of a possible waterway. Now that the boot was on the other leg, we found the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty an embarrassment. We have already seen (p. 150) how cavalierly Secretary Blaine tried to sweep the treaty aside. His specious arguments were easily refuted by Lord Granville, and the only result of his policy was to make it harder for his successors in the State Department to make any headway with Great Britain. But the most favorable moment for the resumption of our negotiations with the court of St. James coincided with the moment of our most conscious need for the canal. Great Britain's cordial friendship for us in the Spanish War, her own rather isolated position in Europe on the eve of her struggle with the Boers in South Africa, and the presence in our State Department of John Hay, who had recently been a most acceptable ambassador to the British court, all combined to smooth the path for a revision of the treaty of 1850. The first treaty that Hay negotiated with Lord Pauncefote at Washington (February 5, 1900) was rejected by the Senate because, while securing to the United States the sole right to build the canal, it still left the joint guaranty of neutrality and forbade the fortification of the canal by the United States. Hay, whose relations with the Senate were never cordial, was so offended that he offered his resignation to President McKinley. But the tactful President persuaded him to renew negotiations with Great Britain, and the result was a second Hay-Pauncefote treaty, concluded a few weeks after the accession of Roosevelt (November 18, 1901), which specifically abrogated the treaty of 1850 and contained no prohibition of fortification. The United States should build the canal and have "the exclusive management and policing" of it. This treaty the Senate promptly ratified (December 16) by a vote of 72 to 6.

Just a month earlier the Walker commission had submitted

its report. It estimated that the cost of a canal built through Nicaragua would be approximately \$190,000,000, as against \$144,000,000 by way of the Isthmus of Panama. But as the French Panama Company charged \$109,000,000 for its rights and property (which the commission thought worth not more than \$40,000,000), the Nicaraguan route was recommended. Representative Hepburn immediately introduced a bill for the construction of the canal through Nicaragua, at a cost not to exceed \$180,000,000, and the bill was passed on January 20, 1902, by the enormous majority of 308 to 2. Meanwhile the Panama Company, in something of a panic over the prospect of the total loss of its property, cabled its willingness to accept the commission's estimate of \$40,000,000. This changed the aspect of affairs; and when the commission in a supplementary report advocated the adoption of the Panama route, it found strong support in the Senate, especially from Marcus A. Hanna, who had risen to a position of great influence in the upper House.¹ The upshot of the Senate debate was the adoption of the Spooner amendment to the Hepburn bill, authorizing the President to buy out the Panama Company's rights at \$40,000,000 and to secure from Colombia the perpetual control and jurisdiction over a strip of land at least six miles wide across the Isthmus. In case of failure to secure this "within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms" the President was instructed to turn to the Nicaraguan route. The Spooner substitute was accepted by the House and signed by the President on June 28, 1902.

Having secured from Great Britain a free hand in the construction of the canal, having made satisfactory terms with the French company, and having decided on the Panama route, we had only to negotiate with Colombia for the acquisition of the

¹ Undoubtedly Hanna was thoroughly convinced of the superiority of the Panama route, as the fervor of his speeches and his very telling arguments show. But he may have favorably inclined thereto by the persuasion of William Nelson Cromwell, the counsel for the Panama Company, and by that gentleman's contribution of \$60,000 to the Republican campaign fund of 1900.

strip of land. This seemed the least of our problems, as the Colombian government had shown the greatest anxiety lest the Nicaraguan route should be chosen, and had urged its minister at Washington to further the Panama project. But after Secretary Hay had negotiated with Dr. Herran, the Colombian *chargé d'affaires*, a generous treaty, by which we agreed to pay Colombia \$10,000,000 in gold and an annual subsidy of \$250,000, beginning nine years after the ratification of the treaty, for the control, but not the sovereignty, of a strip of land six miles wide across the Isthmus, the senators of the Colombian congress unanimously rejected the treaty (August 12, 1903). Both the motive and the method of this astonishing act, the Pandora's box from which emerged all the trouble over Panama, need to be noticed. Undoubtedly the Colombian senators had a perfect right to reject the treaty. But in this case it was not the representatives of the Colombian people who were imposing their constitutional check upon the executive. The Colombian government was in the hands of a usurper (Maroquin) who had kidnapped and imprisoned the President three years before and had ruled without a congress until he summoned a number of his puppets on June 20, 1903, for the express purpose of rejecting the Hay-Herran treaty. The dictator Maroquin took this hostile attitude toward the treaty, as he frankly admitted, for the sake of getting more money from the United States. He asked \$10,000,000 of the sum to be paid to the French company (a "graft" of 25 per cent) and an additional \$5,000,000 from us. He was informed by Secretary Hay that no increase would be made in the price, which had been so acceptable to his agents a few months before. The "special session" of the Colombian congress adjourned at the end of October without receding from its position.

President Roosevelt's reaction to the situation was characteristic. The canal must be dug. Moreover, it must go through Panama. It was practically certain that not only a "reasonable time" but an unreasonable time would elapse before the Colombian government, in its present hands, would accept the Hay-Herran treaty. It was waiting until the original Panama

Company's concession should expire in the summer of 1904,¹ so that it might appropriate the whole \$40,000,000 which we were ready to pay for the French rights. Therefore President Roosevelt believed, as he wrote to Hay on September 15, that we "should secure the Panama route without further dealing with the foolish and homicidal corruptionists at Bogotá." He prepared the rough draft of a message to Congress at the end of October, in which he recommended that "without any further parley with Colombia, we enter upon the completion of the canal which the French company has begun. . . . Obviously, it is Colombia's duty to help towards . . . such completion. We are most anxious to come to an agreement with her in which the most scrupulous care should be taken to guard her interests and ours. But we cannot consent to permit her to block the performance of the work which it is so greatly to our interest immediately to begin and carry through." A month before the meeting of Congress, however, an event occurred in Panama which secured us the opportunity to begin the work on the canal immediately, but which involved us in "parleys with Colombia" for nearly twenty years to come.

Panama had joined the United States of Colombia in 1863 with certain guaranties of autonomy, which had been broken in 1886. Again and again the Isthmian province, which was ruled despotically from Bogotá, had fought for its confiscated liberties. The last revolution had been put down less than a year before the usurper Maroquin had summoned the Colombian congress for the rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty. There were open threats from Panama that the rejection of the treaty would be met with a new revolution; and the governor of the province, Señor Obaldia, told the American minister at Bogota that "in case the Department [of Panama] found it necessary to revolt in order to secure the canal, he would stand by Panama." The former chief engineer of the French Panama Company, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, predicted a revolution in Panama

¹ The French company's concession had actually been extended to 1910, but it would be easy for the usurping Colombian government to declare this extension illegal and void.

in an article in the *Paris Matin* of September 2. Indeed, it was a common rumor during the autumn months of 1903 that the Panamanians would not submit to the ruin of their hopes by the selfish politicians at Bogota. Two American army officers returning from South America by way of the Isthmus in October told President Roosevelt that there would "unquestionably be a revolution there as soon as the Colombian Congress adjourned." "Accordingly," says Roosevelt in his "Autobiography" (p. 564), "I directed the Navy Department to station various ships within easy reach of the isthmus, to be ready to act in the event of need arising." The action which the President referred to was the guaranty of free transit across the Isthmus, a police duty which had been given to the United States by treaty with the republic of New Granada (now Colombia) in 1846, and which had been exercised repeatedly by us. Marines had been landed from United States warships as recently as 1901 and 1902 to protect life and property during revolutionary disturbances and to keep the line of the trans-Isthmian railroad open.

After the rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty Dr. Amador Guerrero came from Panama to this country to see whether he could get aid and comfort from Washington for a revolution on the Isthmus. He met with no encouragement and was about to return, despondent, when Bunau-Varilla, who had come from Paris to foment a revolution in Panama, ran across his path. Bunau-Varilla had learned from Roosevelt that he favored the Panama route and from Hay that the United States would intervene under the treaty of 1846 to keep order on the Isthmus in case of a revolution. He also found out that the gunboat *Nashville* was sailing from Kingston with sealed orders. On the basis of this general information he made some very specific promises to Dr. Guerrero. The two men met in a room at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York and concocted the Panama revolution. Bunau-Varilla pledged \$100,000 and the help of the American navy. Assuming that the *Nashville* was going to the Isthmus, he calculated that she would arrive at Colon on November 3, and he therefore set the revolution for the next

day. The *Nashville* actually arrived off Colon at 5.30 of the afternoon of November 2. The same day a cable was sent to our commander, J. F. Hubbard, in care of the American consul at Colon: "Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed force occupy the line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed forces with hostile intent either government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other point. . . . Government forces reported approaching Isthmus. Prevent their landing if in your judgment this would precipitate a conflict."

Commander Hubbard did not receive this dispatch until after 10:30 next morning. Meanwhile the Colombian troops, about five hundred in number, destined for a garrison at Panama, had been landed at Colon. Their generals, Amaya and Tovar, with four other officers, proceeded by rail to Panama, where they were immediately seized and imprisoned. At 6 o'clock in the evening (November 3) the "bloodless revolution" occurred. The city authorities of Panama organized a provisional government and raised a force of fifteen hundred men, the regular soldiers going over to the insurgents. Two of the three Colombian gunboats in the harbor joined the revolutionists; and the other one, after firing a few shells into the town, killing a Chinaman and a dog, sailed away. Colonel Torres, who had been left in command of the Colombian forces at Colon, heard of the revolution the next morning and sent word to the American consul that if the Colombian generals at Panama were not released before 2 P. M. he would "open fire on the town of Colon and kill every American in the place." Whereupon Commander Hubbard advised the American citizens to gather in the stone building of the Panama Railroad Company, sent a landing party of forty-two men from the *Nashville* to defend the building, had the women and children removed to two steamers at the docks, and ran the *Nashville* "along the water front, close in and ready to use either small arm or shrapnel fire." He had to repeat the operation the next day when Colonel Torres broke his promise to withdraw his troops to a hill a safe distance from the town. During the afternoon of November 5 Torres

was persuaded by emissaries from the insurgent government at Panama that it was hopeless for him to attempt to reestablish Colombian sovereignty in the Isthmus; and on the promise that the officers at Panama would be released, he embarked his troops on the mail steamer *Orinoco* and returned to Cartagena. Commander Hubbard's part had been one of strict neutrality. He had nothing to do with the interview between Torres and the representatives of the Panama government. He simply refused to allow the troops of either party to be transported across the Isthmus. He landed armed men only when it seemed necessary to protect American lives against the threats of Colonel Torres and withdrew them as soon as the danger was over. The *Dixie*, *Atlanta*, and *Maine* arrived at Colon only after the Colombian troops had departed. No American vessel reached Panama until November 7.

Two days after the revolutionary government was established at Panama it was recognized by the United States (November 6, 1903). Bunau-Varilla was appointed its minister at Washington. He presented his credentials in a fulsome speech in which he thanked America for "admitting into the family of nations the weakest and last born of the republics of the new world." The same day our minister at Bogota cabled to Secretary Hay that General Reyes had offered to reassemble the Colombian congress and ratify the Hay-Herran treaty if the United States would restore the authority of Colombia on the Isthmus. General Reyes asked what would be our attitude if the Colombian government should attempt to land troops on the Isthmus. Our government refused either to withdraw its recognition of the new republic or to allow hostilities to be conducted against it. As we had a fleet of eight warships distributed on both sides of the Isthmus, Colombia could do no more than lodge a protest through General Reyes, her special envoy to Washington, who put into Secretary Hay's hands a long memorandum of complaints and grievances written in the Spanish language and couched in terms of Spanish courtesy, requesting at the end that the whole matter be referred to the Hague tribunal. Meanwhile the republic of Panama had been recognized

by fifteen other powers, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, and Austria. We had concluded with her the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty of November 18, 1903, which was a duplication of the Hay-Herran treaty, except that it gave us a strip ten miles wide across the Isthmus, with sovereign rights thereover, except in the terminal cities of Colon and Panama. The treaty was ratified by Panama on December 2, and by the United States Senate on the twenty-third of the following February. Thus the diplomatic preliminaries were completed, and the strenuous President was ready to "make the dirt fly."¹

Such are the main facts in the Panama case. From them it seems well established that President Roosevelt's reiterated and emphatic denial (heartily supported by the testimony of the two leading members of his cabinet, Hay and Root) that he in any way "fomented" the revolution in Panama is true. He did not need to foment revolution in Panama. That was done by men like Guerrero, Cromwell, and, above all, Bunau-Varilla. That Roosevelt knew that the revolution was imminent is true, but so did everybody else. In his special message to Congress (January 4, 1904), recounting in great detail the whole course of the Panama affair, he said: "No one connected with this government had any part in preparing, inciting or encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of Panama, and, save from the reports of our military and naval officers given above, no one connected with this government had any previous knowledge of the revolution, except such as was accessible to any person of ordinary intelligence who reads the newspapers." If

¹ Of course serious problems of construction remained: whether the canal should be of the sea level or the lock type; whether it should be built by government engineers or by private contract. After a careful examination the President decided on a lock canal (February 19, 1906), and after some experimentation the work was intrusted to a government commission. But President Roosevelt, by an executive order of January 6, 1908, made the authority of Colonel George W. Goethals, the chairman of the commission, so complete that the building of the canal was practically "a one-man job." Dr. William C. Gorgas, chief of the medical staff, deserves to rank with Colonel Goethals for his magnificent work in making the sanitary conditions of the Canal Zone as wholesome as those of an American city.

the revolution occurred at the moment that the *Nashville* reached Colon, it is no proof that Roosevelt sent the *Nashville* to Colon to encourage the revolution. He sent her there, as presidents before him for half a century had sent warships to the Isthmus, for the preservation of order and free transit, which we were pledged to protect by the treaty of 1846. The crucial point is whether that treaty gave us the right to prevent Colombia herself from exercising her authority in putting down a rebellion in her own province. Heretofore we had intervened, generally at the request of Colombia, to preserve her authority. Now we had intervened, from manifest interest in the success of the Panama revolution, to keep Colombia from attempting to regain her authority. It is true that Commander Hubbard was "neutral" in not allowing either party to transport troops across the Isthmus; but the neutral preservation of order, in this case, was equivalent to an alliance with the insurgents. This was Colombia's grievance.

President Roosevelt rested his case legally on the ground of the police power granted to us in the treaty of 1846. But his insistence on the strict letter of the treaty at the expense of Colombia's sovereignty on the Isthmus was due to other than legal reasons. It was again, like his action in the anthracite-coal strike, an illustration of his dominant interest in the "square deal," to use a favorite expression of his own. He believed that Colombia had allowed herself to be bullied by a group of "bandits." We had offered her fair terms, which her own president had approved of until it had occurred to him that he could profit by repudiating the agreement. What was to prevent another repudiation and another blackmailing hold-up, if we had given in and paid the additional \$5,000,000?¹ Or what likelihood was there that France would sit calmly by and see her citizens deprived of the extension privilege which they had

¹ "You can no more make an agreement with those bandits," said Roosevelt, "than you can nail currant jelly to a wall." Secretary Hay's estimate of the Colombian politicians was expressed in an equally amusing simile: "Talking with those fellows down there is like holding a squirrel in your lap and trying to keep up the conversation" (J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," Vol. I, p. 279).

purchased for \$1,000,000? The Monroe Doctrine could not tolerate the intervention of the French government in Panama which the action of Colombia was inviting. It was to the interest of Colombia herself as well as of the United States, Panama, and the world at large that the canal should be built. We were the only country that could build it. The selfish, petty interests of the "homicidal obstructionists" in Bogotá should no more be allowed to stand in the way of our obligations to humanity at large than the operations of a group of highwaymen should be allowed to block the construction of a great railroad. Roosevelt never spoke a word of apology or repentance for his action in Panama. On the contrary, with a sort of Dantesque defiance, he boasted of it. "I took the Canal Zone," he said in a speech at Berkeley, California, in March, 1911, "and let Congress debate." And in an address before the National Press Club at Washington, less than a year before his death, he said: "I might have taken the matter under advisement and put it before the Senate, in which case we should have had a number of most able speeches on the subject. . . . They would have been going on now, and the Panama Canal would be in the dim future yet. We would have had a half century of discussion, and perhaps the Panama Canal. I preferred that we should have the Panama Canal first and the half a century of discussion afterward—a discussion which I regard with benign interest" (J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," Vol. I, p. 308). It was the attitude of the man of "pure act," the man who was so sure that his way was right that any other way must be impossible. "In the actual fact," he says in his "Autobiography" (p. 569), "the canal would not have been built at all save for the action which I took." How could he know so much of the future?

It was the same consciousness of the rectitude of his behavior (*mens conscia recti*) that led him to denounce fiercely any later accommodation with Colombia which contained an expression of "regret" for our part in the Panama revolution. When Secretary Bryan negotiated a treaty with Colombia in April, 1914, in which we agreed to pay the republic \$25,000,000

and declared our "sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations," Roosevelt wrote a scathing article in the *Metropolitan Magazine* (August, 1915) characterizing the treaty as a "crime against the United States and an attack on its honor which would convict us of infamy." Yet, at the last, it appears that he was not opposed to our making a payment to Colombia for the recognition of the independence of Panama and for the restoration of good feeling between the two countries. When the Bryan treaty, amended to exclude the expression of "sincere regret," was finally ratified by the Senate in April, 1921, Mr. Lodge secured several Republican votes for it by the statement that Roosevelt had assured him that the treaty in this form was not obnoxious to him.

A few days before the Panama revolution the administration had won a substantial diplomatic victory by the decision of a tribunal in London (October 20, 1903) on the Alaskan boundary line. Ever since our purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, the line had been disputed; but it was not until the discovery of gold in the Alaskan regions toward the close of the nineteenth century that Canada had insisted on her claim to a line running ten leagues inland from the coast, following the headlands of all the inlets and channels, so as to give her the important Lynn Canal and access to the sea by several bays and estuaries. President Roosevelt interpreted the word "sinuosities" in the treaty as meaning the indentations of the coast, an interpretation which kept the Alaskan boundary well inland all the way. In June, 1903, Secretary Hay arranged with the British ambassador, Sir Michael Herbert, for the reference of the dispute to a board of arbitration consisting of three American and three British commissioners. The tribunal, comprising Secretary of War Root, Senator Lodge, and ex-Senator Turner of Washington on the American side, and Lord Alverstone, Chief Justice of England, and two Canadian members on the British side, met at London early in September. Their decision the next month upheld the American claims by a vote of four to two, the Lord Chief Justice voting with the Americans, much

to the chagrin of his colleagues. In his message to Congress (December 7) President Roosevelt congratulated the country on the satisfactory settlement which had "removed from the field of discussion and possible danger a question liable to become more acutely accentuated with each passing year."

In spite of his oft-professed indifference to the effects of his public acts upon his political fortunes, Roosevelt was extremely anxious for the indorsement of the American people by a reelection in 1904. For three and a half years he had been president by accident. He wanted to be president in his own right. Yet a policy as strenuous as his had necessarily made him many political enemies. The "bosses" resented his independence. Wall Street was nervously apprehensive as to how far his crusade would go to bring the great corporations to the heel of the law. Capitalists complained of his "meddlesomeness" in descending from the calm heights of constitutional propriety to mix in a quarrel between them and their "men." The American Federation of Labor passed a resolution of censure against him (September, 1903) because he had reinstated in the Government Printing Office an assistant foreman, W. A. Miller, who had been removed by his chief simply because he had been expelled from a labor union. And from all quarters the President was receiving protests against "the rape of Panama." Even Mr. Cleveland, who had been heart and soul with him in the anthracite crisis, wrote during the campaign of 1904 of the need to "rid the country of Rooseveltism and its entire brood of dangers and humiliations."¹

It was understood that the "interests" intended to substitute Mark Hanna for Roosevelt in the convention of 1904, and the President did not hesitate to call upon Hanna to show his hand. Several state conventions had declared for Roosevelt in 1902; and just before the Ohio convention met (June 3, 1903), Senator Foraker, who was not on the best of terms with his junior colleague, asserted that the convention would indorse Roosevelt. Hanna thereupon announced his determination to oppose such

¹ Robert McElroy, "Grover Cleveland, the Man and the Statesman," Vol. II, p. 344.

an indorsement, on the ground that it was the business of the national convention, which was to meet a year later, to select its candidate freely.¹ He telegraphed his intention of opposing the resolution to Roosevelt, who was on a speaking tour in the Far West. Roosevelt replied from Seattle, May 25: "Your telegram received. I have not asked any man for his support. I have had nothing whatever to do with raising this issue. Inasmuch as it has been raised, of course, those who favor my administration and my nomination will favor indorsing both, and those who do not will oppose." The motive of this rather curt message Roosevelt explained in a letter to Lodge a few days later: "I decided that the time had come to stop shilly-shallying and let Hanna know definitely that I did not intend to assume the position, at least passively, of a suppliant to whom he might give the nomination as a boon." He "rather expected Hanna to make a fight." But the Ohio senator, now in his sixty-sixth year and far from a well man, had really no wish to contest the nomination. He immediately replied to Roosevelt's telegram: "I shall not oppose the indorsement of your administration and candidacy by our state convention. I have given the substance of this to the Associated Press." Hanna's death on February 15, 1904, shattered any plans that his supporters may have entertained of forcing the nomination upon him at the eleventh hour. The way was open clear for Roosevelt, who was nominated by acclamation at the convention at Chicago, June 21-23. Senator Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana was named for the vice presidency.

The Democrats were in a quandary. Bryan had been twice defeated, but he had not abated a jot of his convictions on free silver (though the party as a whole regarded the issue as dead), and many of the leading Democrats in the East and South, who had supported him in 1896 and 1900, were thoroughly sick of "Bryanism." There was a decided movement toward Grover Cleveland, who had been living in retirement at Princeton for seven years, and whose solid merits were beginning to be more

¹ Compare this sudden solicitude for the untrammelled independence of the convention with Hanna's pre-convention campaign for McKinley in 1896 (pp. 277-278).

appreciated by his fellow countrymen. The ovation which he received at the opening of the Louisiana Purchase Centennial Exposition at St. Louis on April 30, 1904, was a testimony to his strength. Roosevelt wrote to Lodge from Seattle, on the very day that he received Hanna's first telegram: "Most of the people out here believe that Cleveland will be nominated on the Democratic ticket and that he will be a very formidable man to beat. . . . Pierpont Morgan and other Wall Street men have been announcing publicly within the past fortnight that they should support Mr. Cleveland against me with all their power." And Bryan at the same time published in his *Commoner* a long editorial denouncing Cleveland as "the office boy in a Wall Street institution, the logical candidate in case the Democratic party returns to its wallow in the mire." But in spite of appeals from his old friends like Olney and Dickinson, and even of his old enemy Tammany Hall, to enter the campaign, Cleveland relieved the anxiety of both Roosevelt and Bryan by a positive refusal to allow his name to be used. He was ready to give his loyal support to any conservative Democrat, though his own choice was Judge Gray of Delaware. The Democrats, however, had no possible conservative candidate besides himself who had any chance of beating Roosevelt. Moreover, the leading radical candidate for the nomination, the man on whose shoulders the mantle of Bryan seemed to fall, was William R. Hearst of New York, the millionaire owner of a chain of sensational newspapers. Hearst had been elected to Congress in 1902, but he was rarely in his seat at the Capitol, preferring to spend his time and money scheming for delegates to the national convention. He had a reputation as a demagogue rather than as a statesman. To escape from Bryan to Hearst was like jumping from the frying-pan into the fire.

An early trial of strength between the radicals and the conservatives in the convention was made when Bryan was defeated in his attempt to seat a contesting Hearst delegation from Illinois. The "peerless leader" was not able to force the silver plank on the convention as he had done four years earlier at Kansas City. The platform remained silent on the currency

issue, while arraigning the whole policy, foreign and domestic, of the Republican administration as "spasmodic, erratic, sensational, spectacular, and arbitrary." The man to whom the Democrats turned in their plight was Judge Alton B. Parker of the New York Court of Appeals. He received 658 votes on the first ballot, to 200 for Hearst, and 139 distributed among eleven other names. Parker's chief qualifications for the nomination were rather negative. It was said that he was nominated chiefly with the purpose of heading off Hearst. As a conservative Eastern Democrat he had not bolted the ticket when it was led by Bryan; and as a New Yorker he might carry Roosevelt's state, on which the hopes of Democratic success depended, and from which the Democrats had chosen all their presidential candidates save one (Hancock of Pennsylvania, in 1880) from the close of the Civil War to the advent of Bryan.

Immediately after the nomination Judge Parker threw a bombshell into the convention in the shape of a telegram to Senator Sheehan of the New York delegation, stating that he regarded the gold standard "as firmly and irrevocably established" and should act accordingly if elected. He requested that in case his views on this subject proved unsatisfactory to the majority of the convention, his name be withdrawn and another candidate chosen. After a heated discussion, in which the Bryanites demanded a revision of the platform and the nomination of a new candidate, the conservatives won again by securing a vote of 794 to 191 for the approval of the following reply to Judge Parker's telegram: "The platform adopted by this convention is silent on the question of a monetary standard, because it is not regarded by us as a possible issue in this campaign. . . . Therefore there is nothing in the views expressed by you in the telegram just received which would preclude a man entertaining them from accepting a nomination on the said platform." Judge Parker's telegram was praised as an act of courage by his supporters like Cleveland; but the Republicans declared that he sent it in a "blue funk" because several influential New York papers attacked the platform for rejecting a gold plank, while Bryan asserted that if the candidate had had the courage to

announce his views before his nomination, the convention would never have chosen him. Bryan repeated his charge made in April, in a speech against the "reorganizers," that Judge Parker was "utterly unfit" to lead the Democratic party.

It is practically certain, as Champ Clark, the permanent chairman of the St. Louis convention, remarked many years later, that "Colonel Roosevelt would have been elected, no matter what the Democratic platform was or who was the Democratic candidate, for the tide was running strong in his favor."¹ At any rate, Judge Parker proved to be a veritable man of straw against his popular fellow New Yorker. His sterling qualities as a judge and a gentleman were a poor offset to his lack of political qualifications. He was almost unknown beyond the limits of his own state. He had no political record, no gifts of oratorical appeal to the voters, no program of leadership on the subjects of the trusts, finance, labor, and foreign policy, in which the public was interested. A Republican campaign orator remarked that the Democratic ticket was composed of "an enigma from New York and a ruin from West Virginia"—the latter epithet referring to Henry G. Davis, the octogenarian nominee for the vice-presidency. The strange spectacle was presented of a conservative successor to Bryan pitted against a radical successor to McKinley. For Roosevelt in his attack on privilege, had, to paraphrase the witty remark of an English statesman, "caught the Democrats in bathing and stolen their clothes." The only exciting incident in the campaign came toward its close, when Judge Parker accused the Republican manager, George B. Cortelyou, of using the information about the business of the big corporations which he had gained as Secretary of Commerce in Roosevelt's cabinet (1903-1904) for the purpose of extracting from them large campaign contributions. Three days before the election the President issued a public denial of Parker's "slandorous accusations," declaring them to be "unqualifiedly and atrociously false." As the Democratic candidate had neither the facts at hand to substantiate his serious charges nor the time, had he had the facts, to make them

¹ "My Quarter Century of American Politics" (1920), p. 151.

into a campaign issue, the only effect of his accusations was to diminish his meager chances of success.¹

Roosevelt's victory was overwhelming. He carried every state in the Union outside the solid South, and in addition won Missouri, which had not voted for a Republican president since 1868. He received 336 electoral votes to 140 for Parker. His popular vote (7,624,489) and his popular majority (2,540,067) were the largest that had ever been given to a presidential candidate. He gained 400,000 over the McKinley vote of 1900, while Parker lost 1,200,000 of Bryan's vote. In the Eastern states, where the sound-money men had returned to the party, the Democrats held their own; but the defection in the Western and Southern groups of states ranged from 17 to 38 per cent of the vote of 1900, showing that Judge Parker's loss among the radicals far outweighed his gain among the conservatives. That much comfort Mr. Bryan might have from the results of the election. A part of the diminished Democratic vote is accounted for by the abstention of half a million men from the polls, a part by the increase of the Socialist vote for Eugene V. Debs from 95,000 in 1900 to 403,000 in 1904, and a part by the radical support won by Roosevelt for his economic policies. As an aftermath of the election Judge Parker issued a supererogatory

¹ Later investigations of the life-insurance companies by the Armstrong committee in New York (1905) and of the Standard Oil Company by the Clapp committee of the Senate (1912) revealed the fact that both Roosevelt's campaign and Parker's had been underwritten by large sums of money contributed by the corporations. It was a case of the pot calling the kettle black, said the independent newspapers. In April, 1907, a letter of E. H. Harriman's, stolen from his files by a discharged stenographer, was given to the press. In the letter the great railroad magnate told of being called to Washington a week before the election and asked by President Roosevelt to raise \$250,000 to help carry New York State. Roosevelt vehemently denied the story as "a deliberate and willful untruth," and protested that he had never asked Harriman to raise a cent for the *presidential* campaign of 1904. He did not, however, deny that Mr. Harriman had visited him or that he had been asked to raise money for the *state* campaign. And he drew this rather fine distinction again in 1912, when the Clapp investigation revealed the heavy contributions which the Standard Oil had made to the Republican chest in 1904. Professor Beard ironically remarks, "It would appear from his testimony that Mr. Roosevelt was unaware of the economic forces which carried him to victory in 1904" ("Contemporary American History," p. 271).

statement to the effect that he had not expected to win, but was glad to have made the attempt; and President Roosevelt published, together with an acknowledgment of the great honor which the American people had done him, a declaration which later caused him no little embarrassment: "On the 4th of March next I shall have served three and a half years, and that three and a half years constitutes my first term. The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form, and under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination."

The year 1904 saw important changes in the cabinet. Cortelyou resigned to manage the Republican campaign and was succeeded by Victor Metcalf as Secretary of Commerce. Knox resigned the attorney-generalship to enter the Senate, and to take his place W. H. Moody was transferred from the Navy Department, which was given to Paul Morton. Elihu Root resigned as Secretary of War, and Mr. Taft was summoned from the Philippines to replace him. Root's services for nearly five years in the War Department cannot be overestimated. He had left a law practice worth over \$100,000 a year to devote himself, at the modest salary of a cabinet officer, to the management of the department at perhaps the most critical moment of its history. The whole burden of the administration of our new possessions fell within his sphere, and in addition to managing this novel and delicate task abroad he laid the foundations for a scientific administration of the department at home. He reorganized the militia system, established the War College, enlarged West Point, and created the General Staff. His labor was ceaseless. Even the busy President could not induce him to leave his office for a ride or a walk. "He performed a mass of work," said Roosevelt, "such as has been performed by no other minister of any civilized nation during the same period of time." And after eighteen months, on the death of the brilliant John Hay, Mr. Root returned to the cabinet to perform equally wonderful work for nearly four years more as head of the Department of State.

In the very month of Secretary Root's resignation (February,

1904) Japan declared war against Russia. Ever since the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 Russia had been encroaching on what Japan considered her "sphere of influence" in the Far East. To get an ice-free terminus for her trans-Siberian railroad she had seized Port Arthur and extended the line through Manchuria—territory which Japan had conquered from China and returned to her by the treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. After the Boxer rebellion Russia had agreed to evacuate Manchuria (which was separated from the Japanese peninsula of Korea only by the Yalu River), but she had failed to keep her promise and had strengthened the fortifications of Port Arthur. The rejection of Japan's ultimatum to St. Petersburg, that Russia respect China's sovereignty in Manchuria and keep her hands off Korea, was followed by the declaration of war. Secretary Hay got the consent of both the belligerent powers to treat Chinese territory outside of Manchuria as neutral. From the beginning of the war the Japanese demonstrated the superiority of their military and naval forces. They defeated the Russians at the Yalu (May 2) and at Liaoyang (September 2) and drove them from the key city of Mukden (March 10, 1905). They reduced Port Arthur by siege from land and sea (January 2) and completely annihilated Rozhdestvensky's fleet, sent from the Baltic, in the battle of Tsushima or the Sea of Japan (May 27). But in spite of their efficiency and of the superb tactics of Togo and Nogi, which contrasted sharply with the inert, blundering, and shamefully corrupt management of the Russians, Japan was almost exhausted by her titanic struggle. The reserves at the other end of the trans-Siberian railroad were well-nigh inexhaustible. The losses on both sides were appalling. But Russia could eventually put more than a million men in the field. It was from Japan, four days after her glorious victory of Tsushima, that the suggestion came to President Roosevelt to use his influence to put an end to the terrible war.

A clause of the Hague Convention of 1899 declared that the move of a neutral power "to offer its good offices or mediation" in war should never be considered by the belligerents as an un-

friendly act. Therefore, when President Roosevelt was convinced that both Japan and Russia wanted peace, though neither was willing to sue for it, he took the initiative by sending an identical note to both governments on June 8, 1905, urging them, "not only for their own sakes, but in the interests of the whole civilized world, to open direct negotiations for peace with one another." Both nations agreed; but so deeply seated was their distrust of each other that the President was occupied throughout the hot summer in the almost insurmountable task of bringing the two powers together. In the early part of the negotiations he was without the help of Secretary Hay, who, after a vain attempt to regain his failing health at the hands of specialists at Nauheim, had retired to his summer home in New Hampshire to die on July 1, 1905. Secretary Taft was absent during the latter part of the summer on a visit to the Philippines. The whole burden of the work fell on the President. The Japanese were secretive and justly suspicious of the good faith of Russia. The Russian ambassador at Washington, Count Cassini, resented the manifest sympathy of the American people with Japan, and complained that our government was prejudicing the Russian cause by hinting at further disaster and trying to force a premature peace. Indeed, Cassini was so obstructive and unreliable a medium of communication that President Roosevelt was obliged to deal directly with the Czar through instructions to our ambassador at St. Petersburg, George von L. Meyer. England was allied to Japan by the defensive treaty of 1902, while France and Russia had been bound together for more than a decade in a close political and financial alliance. However, neither England nor France would help to end the war—the former because she hoped that the continued victories of Japan would result in the total annihilation of her own great rival on the Bosphorus and the borders of Afghanistan and India, and the latter because her millions invested in Russian industries and the trans-Siberian railroad buoyed up her confidence in the ultimate success of the Czar's armies. On the other hand, President Roosevelt's efforts for peace had the hearty and grate-

fully acknowledged support of the German ambassador, Speck-Sternberg, and his imperial master at Berlin.¹

After adjusting endless diplomatic difficulties over such trivial points as the place of meeting and the rank of the delegates, Roosevelt finally got the two powers to appoint their envoys. For Japan they were Baron Komura, the minister of foreign affairs, and Mr. Takahira, the ambassador at Washington; for Russia, Serge de Witte, president of the Czar's council, and Baron Rosen. By the President's invitation the four commissioners met on August 4 on board the *Mayflower* off Oyster Bay, where they were tactfully introduced to each other at an informal luncheon, and were then taken on war vessels, as guests of the American government, to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the seat of the negotiations. "I have led the horses to water," was the President's humorous summary of his long efforts, "but whether they will drink or start kicking each other beside the trough heaven alone knows." Again and again it looked as if the conference would break up. The Japanese envoys felt justified in imposing a victor's peace. They demanded an indemnity and the cession of the island of Sakhalin. The Russians would not for a moment concede terms fit for a vanquished nation. President Roosevelt was in constant touch with the negotiations at Portsmouth, acting as mediator and moderator. He pointed out to the Japanese that they must not expect to enforce such demands as the Prussians had made upon France in 1871, for they had neither invaded the enemy's soil nor seized

¹ It is a question, however, to what extent the Kaiser shared Roosevelt's disinterested motive in his advocacy of peace. Early in June, 1905, our ambassador in Berlin informed Roosevelt that the Kaiser had told him that in his opinion the situation in Russia was so serious that when the truth of the Russian defeat was fully known at St. Petersburg revolution would break out, and the Czar's throne and life be endangered; and that he had written to the Czar advising him to appeal to Roosevelt as the person who would be most likely "to bring the Japanese to reasonable proposals." It was the safety of his fellow autocrat at St. Petersburg, rather than the sacrifice of life and treasure, that was troubling the Kaiser. It was not so much the vision of the angel of peace as of the specter of the social democracy that came before his eyes. The Kaiser's letter of June 3, 1905, to the Czar was found with a number of others in the archives of Petrograd and published by the Lenin government in 1920.

his capital. On the other hand, he warned the Russians that they could not expect, after their consistent record of defeat on land and sea, to escape paying Japan in some form for the expenses of the war. He labored incessantly, and at times almost alone, to bring the conference to a successful termination, using persuasion, rebuke, conciliation, and pressure with masterly effect. An example of his activity is shown by his work on the single day of August 23, when he wrote letters to Baron Kaneko, the Japanese agent in New York; to the Mikado; to Count Witte at Portsmouth; to the British ambassador Durand at Lenox, Massachusetts; to Henry White, our ambassador at Rome; and to the Czar at St. Petersburg. It seemed hopeless. Five days later the plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth had given up the game and arranged for a farewell meeting on the morrow. The Czar had written "no further consideration" across the Japanese ultimatum.¹ But Roosevelt's persistence turned the meeting of August 29 into a victory for peace. Word came that day that the Mikado had accepted the President's compromise and yielded the point of a money indemnity.

On September 5 the envoys signed the treaty of Portsmouth. Russia recognized Japan's sphere of influence in Korea, surrendered the lease of Port Arthur (which she had wrung from China in 1898), evacuated Manchuria (redeeming her promise of 1900), and ceded to Japan the southern half of the island of Sakhalin in lieu of an indemnity. The revolution at St. Petersburg, which the Kaiser had foreseen, followed closely upon Russia's humiliation, and opened the train of events which led to the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty and the tragic end of the Czar and his family a dozen years later. Russia was eliminated, at least for a period, as a danger in the Far East. But the substitution of Japan for Russia as the aggressive power in northern China has been a cause of no little embarrassment to

¹ Roosevelt had written to Hay on April 2, 1905: "Did you ever know anything more pitiable than the condition of the Russian despotism in this year of grace? The Czar is a preposterous little creature as the absolute autocrat of 150,000,000 people. He has been unable to make war, and now he is unable to make peace."

the United States in the twentieth century, in its determination to maintain its traditional policy of the "open door" in China and the territorial integrity of the Celestial Empire.

For his service to humanity in bringing about the peace of Portsmouth, President Roosevelt received the thanks of the entire world. The Czar, the Mikado, the German emperor, sent personal messages of congratulation and gratitude. King Edward of England told Ambassador Reid that he was "simply lost in admiration for the President." Baron Kaneko assured Roosevelt that his name would be "remembered with the peace and prosperity of Asia." And Frederic de Martens, the distinguished counselor of the Russian delegation, wrote: "The treaty would never have been concluded had it been negotiated anywhere else than at Portsmouth, and if the influence of President Roosevelt had not been exercised all along in the cause of peace, with a persistence which commanded the admiration of us all. The man who had been represented to us as impetuous to the point of rudeness displayed a gentleness, a kindness, and a tactfulness, mixed with self-control, that only a truly great man can command." The crowning recognition of Roosevelt's service was the award of the Nobel peace prize in January, 1907. He kept the medal and the diploma, and turned over the money (\$36,734) in trust to a foundation for the promotion of industrial peace, which was authorized by Congress and administered by nine trustees, including Archbishop Ireland, Samuel Gompers, Seth Low, and the Secretaries of Agriculture and of Commerce and Labor, James Wilson and Oscar S. Straus.¹

The President's efforts in behalf of international peace were not limited to mediation between warring nations. In January, 1905, he sent to the Senate seven identical arbitration treaties with Great Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. But the Senate, ever jealous of its prerogative,

¹ Shortly after the United States entered the World War in 1917 Mr. Roosevelt asked Congress to repeal the incorporation bill and return the money to him for distribution among the various charitable societies for war relief. The request was promptly granted; and the fund, which had increased to nearly \$45,500, was used for this purpose.

refused to ratify them in the form in which they were submitted. It substituted the word "treaties" for "agreements" in the text, thus taking out of the hands of the executive the final action, and making any arrangements with the foreign powers again referable to the Senate as a "treaty." Even stanch supporters of the administration, like Lodge and Spooner, joined the Senate majority in this amendment. When the amendment was reported, Roosevelt protested to Senator Cullom, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, that he regarded the treaties in their altered form as a hindrance rather than a help to arbitration, and that he should not be able to urge their ratification by the other powers. His remonstrances had no effect, however. Secretary Hay, who had labored for several months to conclude the treaties, was bitter in his condemnation of the obstructionist policy of the upper House. He had not forgotten its rejection of the first canal treaty with Lord Pauncefoot five years before. He now spoke of the Senate as "the Clan-na-Gael." "A treaty entering the Senate," he wrote, "is like a bull going into the arena. No one can say just how or when the final blow will fall, but one thing is certain—it will never leave the arena alive." Henry Adams, in a less truculent simile, spoke of Hay's treaties "hanging in the Senate like lambs in a butcher's shop." When Root succeeded Hay in the Senate Department, he had the treaties ratified as amended by the Senate, but they proved as ineffectual as the President had predicted.

Finally, during the busy year 1905, President Roosevelt rendered the cause of international peace another service, which Mr. Root later declared was "of far greater importance to the world than the Portsmouth settlement." France, under the lead of her imperious foreign minister, Delcassé, was rapidly converting Morocco into a French protectorate. Early in March, 1905, the German ambassador at Washington brought a request to Roosevelt from the German emperor that he would join Germany in support of the complete independence of the Sultan of Morocco and the preservation of the "open door" in his country. At the close of the month the Kaiser himself appeared at Tangier in the war vessel *Panther*, with the announcement that he was

there to safeguard German interests in Morocco. It was an ugly situation. France resented interference in what she regarded her legitimate "sphere of influence," and Germany was determined henceforth to have her "place in the sun." "In May and June the relations between the two countries were so strained," said Ambassador Jusserand a year later, "that war was imminent." Our own interests in Morocco were not important enough to make intervention necessary from a selfish point of view, but the President devoted himself diligently to smoothing out the relations between Germany and France. He prevailed upon the latter country (which was supported by England) to agree to a conference for the discussion of the status of Morocco. The conference met at Algeciras in Spain, January 16, 1906, with Henry White and Mr. Gummeré, our consul general at Morocco, as the representatives of the United States. The treaty, concluded April 6, regulated the matters of policing, banking, and commerce in Morocco in general conformity with a plan submitted by Secretary Root. On the whole, France and Spain were left in a position of dominant influence, and the schemes of Germany for establishing her power on the North African coast were frustrated. Only Austria stood by the Kaiser in his claims. But as the conference had been called at his own solicitation, he could not but yield as gracefully as possible. A war arising from this relatively unimportant quarrel over Morocco might well have precipitated the conflict which overwhelmed Europe nine years later.

President Roosevelt's full part in the settlement of the Moroccan dispute was not known until the publication of his official biography by J. Bucklin Bishop in 1920. The chapter entitled "Secret History of the Algeciras Conference" (Vol. I, pp. 467-505) contains Roosevelt's own story of the negotiations in a long letter to Whitelaw Reid, our ambassador to England. The letter contains the whole correspondence between Roosevelt and the German and French ambassadors at Washington. It was shown only to Secretary Root and Ambassadors White and Meyer. "None of the documents," said Roosevelt at its close, "are to be put in the Blue Book; and I need hardly say

that it is to be considered of the most strictly confidential character."¹ Reading the letter today, we can see why Secretary Root should have spoken of the President's negotiations in the Moroccan crisis as his greatest contribution to international peace, and why the French ambassador Jusserand should have written to Roosevelt a few days after the treaty was signed: "It is a simple and literal truth to say that in my judgment we owe it more to you than to any other man that the year which has closed has not seen a war between France and Germany, which, had it begun, would have probably extended to take in a considerable portion of the world."

PRESIDENT IN HIS OWN RIGHT

Whether President Roosevelt in his three and a half years of the completion of McKinley's term had carried out the policies of his predecessor or, as his critics grimly remarked, had "carried them out and buried them," it was only his own policies that concerned him after his triumphant election in 1904. The message which he sent to Congress a few weeks after the election reiterated his views on the control of the great corporations, the subordination of the selfish interests of both capital and labor to the public welfare, and the sufficiency of the organs of the government for the enforcement of "even-handed justice." "We do not intend," he said in a speech before the Union League Club of Philadelphia in January, 1905, "that this Republic shall ever fail as those republics of ancient times failed in which there finally came to be a government by classes, which resulted either in the poor plundering the rich or in the rich

¹ How well the secret was kept until after Roosevelt's death is shown by the scant notice of the Moroccan incident in the American histories of recent years. Neither Algeciras nor Morocco is indexed in Beard's "Contemporary American History" (1914) or in Haworth's "The United States in our Own Times" (1920). Latané ("America as a World Power," 1907), Coolidge ("The United States as a World Power," 1908), Moore ("Principles of American Diplomacy," 1918), Lingley ("Since the Civil War," 1920), and Paxson ("Recent History of the United States," 1921) mention the Algeciras conference, but do not connect President Roosevelt's name with it. Of course Roosevelt himself does not refer to it in his "Autobiography" (1913).

exploiting and in some form or other enslaving the poor. For either event means the destruction of free institutions and of individual liberty." If the constant repetition of these moral truisms in messages, letters, and speeches became a bit tiresome to certain of his fellow citizens, they never became tiresome to President Roosevelt. So long as they were acknowledged in theory but violated in practice, the battle had for him all the freshness and consecration of a newly launched crusade. The "impatience" of which he was accused was neither the rashness nor the precipitancy which are commonly thought of as synonymous with the word, but the literal "lack of sufferance" of what seemed to him iniquitous conditions.

It was clear at the outset of the new term that the President would have trouble with those men in Congress and in the circles of high finance who, at every step in reform, believed that enough and more than enough had been accomplished, and that the time had come to give the business world a "rest." Accordingly, when Roosevelt returned in his message of December, 1904, to his "attack" on the railroads, demanding that the persistent illegal practice of rebating be done away with and that the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission be greatly increased (even to the right to name a reasonable rate which should bind the railroads pending a judicial review of the shipper's complaint), there was instant opposition. On February 9, 1905, the House passed a bill proposed by William P. Hepburn of Iowa, giving the Commission power to fix railroad rates definitively. The Hepburn bill was not reported by the Senate committee before the expiration of the Fifty-eighth Congress. Again, on February 8, 1906, the House passed the bill, this time by the huge majority of 346 to 7. The leader of the Senate, Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island, was opposed to any further "meddling" of the Commission with the railroads. Warm supporters of the President, like Lodge and Knox, disapproved the absolute rate-making clause of the bill. The Senate committee craftily tried to block legislation on the bill by turning its management over to Benjamin R. Tillman of South Caro-

lina, with whom the President was at "outs" socially.¹ But to their chagrin Roosevelt coöperated heartily with Tillman. He continued his pressure on the Senate until it passed the Hepburn bill, amended to allow a judicial review of rates, with only three dissenting votes. The bill became a law on June 29, 1906.

The Hepburn act increased the membership of the Interstate Commerce Commission from five to seven and extended its authority over express companies, sleeping-car companies, pipe lines, bridges, ferries, spurs, and terminals; it forbade rebates and free passes; it abolished "midnight tariffs" to favored shippers by requiring advance notice of all changes in schedules; it prohibited the railroads from carrying any commodity (but timber) owned by themselves, except for their own use;² it prescribed certain methods of bookkeeping and opened the books of the railroad companies to inspection by the Commission; and, most important of all, it gave the Commission the contingent power of reducing an unreasonable or discriminating rate upon complaint of a shipper. The Hepburn act, in short, made the Commission an effective agency for the first time in its history of nineteen years. During all that time fewer than nine hundred appeals had been made to the Commission by shippers; whereas, now that it was competent to bring some relief, the cases of complaint rose to fifteen hundred in the first two years of the operation of the Hepburn act. Nor did the act injure the legitimate business of the railroads, as its opponents prophesied that it would. Although numerous reductions in rates were made, more often voluntary than compulsory, the roads continued to earn their dividends.

The restraining effect of the increased prestige of the Commission upon the conduct of the railroads was illustrated by an incident which occurred shortly after the passage of the act.

¹ The impetuous Tillman had made a physical assault on his colleague McLaurin in the Senate chamber, and in consequence Roosevelt had canceled his invitation to a dinner at the White House.

² This so-called "commodity clause" of the Hepburn act was practically annulled by judicial decisions.

In February, 1908, the Louisville and Nashville announced that "the drastic laws inimical to the interests of the railroads that have been enacted in the past year or two by Congress and the state legislatures" necessitated a reduction in the wages of its employees. Several other railroads followed with like announcements. President Roosevelt sent an open letter to the Commission, ordering an investigation to determine the true cause of the threatened reductions. If they were due to a general falling off of business, he said, the loss should be equally borne by the owners and the employees of the roads. If, on the other hand, they were really due to unwise legislation, "the public and Congress should know it." If, finally, they were due to misconduct in the management of the roads, "then everybody should know it," especially if the excuse of "unfriendly legislation" was put forward to cover such misconduct and to justify the failure to treat the wage-earners fairly. The Louisville and Nashville did not make the threatened wage reduction.

The same month that saw the passage of the Hepburn act was marked by social legislation which showed the interest of the administration in public health and morals. A prominent feature of the first few years of the twentieth century was the rapid growth of what Professor Paxson has aptly called a "literature of exposure." Partly as a reaction from the blunted ethics of a period of unprecedented material prosperity, partly as a result of President Roosevelt's reiteration of the gospel of equal justice and the "square deal," a goodly company of writers turned their talents to the rebuke of wickedness in the high places of politics, industry, and finance. A number of new and low-priced magazines appeared (*McClure's*, the *Cosmopolitan*, *Munsey's*, the *American*, *Collier's*), running exciting stories of the lawlessness of the beef barons and the lumber kings. Ida Tarbell's famous "History of the Standard Oil Company" exposed the iniquities of the Rockefeller group of monopolists. Lincoln Steffens's "Shame of the Cities" laid bare the ugly facts of the corruption in the government of the great metropolitan centers of the country like New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, and San Francisco. Thomas Lawson's "Frenzied Finance,"

Frank Norris's "Octopus," Winston Churchill's "Coniston," and Upton Sinclair's "Jungle" revealed the secrets of the stock market, the wheat pit, the railroads, and the packing-houses. It seemed as though a general revulsion against the degeneracy of our boasted American civilization had set in. "Muckraking"¹ was the business of the day. The public was shocked by the revelations of the iniquities that had grown up in our democracy "under the banner of an unbridled individualism."

In the spring of 1906 Roosevelt appointed a special commission to investigate conditions in the stockyards and packing-houses of Chicago, which were advertised to the country in Upton Sinclair's novel of the same year as pestholes. The report which the President submitted to Congress, June 4, declared that it was "imperatively necessary in the interests of health and decency" to remedy "the revolting conditions." Congress promptly passed a Meat Inspection Act giving Federal officials the authority to see that all the meat to be shipped in interstate commerce should come from healthy animals and be packed under sanitary conditions. This was followed by a Pure Food and Drugs Act to prevent the "manufacture, sale, or transportation of adulterated, misbranded, poisonous, or deleterious foods, drugs, and liquors." The labels on each article must state the truth as to contents, and no "deleterious drug, chemical, or preservative" should be used. These laws met the bitter opposition of the beef trust (against which a court had entered judgment a year before on Roosevelt's initiative) and of the concocters of various patent medicines and synthetic foods which were sold to the public under false names. President Roosevelt wrote to a congressman that he considered these acts as "second only in importance" to the Interstate Commerce Law. "The public welfare," he said in his message of the following December, "outweighs the right to private gain, and

¹ The term came from President Roosevelt's allusion to Bunyan's man with a muckrake in a speech delivered at an informal dinner given by Speaker Cannon to the Gridiron Club in Washington, March 17, 1906. The President warned his countrymen against overindulgence in the spectacular exposure of evil, so welcome always to the morbid taste of the populace.

no man may poison the public for private profit." A third piece of social legislation passed in June, 1906, was an Employers' Liability Act, which was the first attempt to make corporations engaged in interstate commerce responsible for injuries received by their employees.¹

When Congress adjourned at the end of the month, after a constructive session, the President stood high in the country's esteem. By a rare combination of courtesy and strength he had vindicated his leadership in the party, and his activities in securing wholesome legislation had won for him congratulations from all sides. "Even Mr. Roosevelt's bitterest opponents," said an editorial in the *New York World* (itself generally a bitter opponent of the President), "could not minimize the healthful influence upon public sentiment of these activities. At a time when a horde of demagogues are trying to convince the American people that there is one law for the rich and another law for the poor, the President is proving that there is only one law for everybody and that the National Government knows not distinction in offenders."

The next year, however, brought with it a condition in the business world which the big financiers exploited, with considerable success, to the discredit of the President. During the decade since the inauguration of McKinley the country had enjoyed an almost uninterrupted era of prosperity and industrial expansion.² The discoveries of gold and the increase of bank notes had brought the per-capita circulation up from \$23.85 at the time of the repeal of the Sherman act in 1893 to \$33.86 at the end of the fiscal year 1906-1907. The general rise in prices during this period of currency expansion had been about 16 per cent. This condition alone would have tempted to overspeculation and the tying up of capital in fixed forms. But when there was added the unprecedented movement toward

¹ This act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1908, on the ground that it failed to limit its operation to injuries sustained in interstate commerce. A new act, more carefully drawn, was passed in April, 1908, and was upheld by the court in a decision of January 15, 1912.

² For the brief "rich man's panic" of 1903 see page 328.

huge industrial combinations offering a great variety of attractive investments and disbursing generous dividends from their large profits, the temptation to overtrading was irresistible. The eagerness for capital investment wiped out the marginal safety of savings. A warning of trouble came in the spring of 1907, when the banks began to contract their loans, and in order to meet the demands of their depositors had to throw securities upon a market that was already sated with buying. A sharp decline in most of the "gilt-edge" stocks followed in the summer. General Electric, for example, dropped from \$162 to \$90 a share. In October the Knickerbocker Trust Company failed, followed by three other trust companies, six state banks, and one national bank in New York City. The panic spread from the financial center to the rest of the country. The New York banks not being able to meet the demands of their creditors for the shipment of currency, specie payments were generally suspended. Currency went to a high premium, as money was hoarded by private holders. Depositors were asked to draw from the banks only the sums of cash absolutely necessary. The solvent banks were tided over by loans from the clearing-houses on the collateral of the high-class securities which they could not immediately put on the market except at a ruinous loss. It was not until the beginning of February, 1908, that confidence was restored, and the recurrent poison of reckless and fraudulent trading was again purged out of our financial system. The immediate result of the panic was the passage of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908; this provided for an emergency currency of several hundred million dollars which was to be lent to the banks in times of stress by the Treasury Department on the collateral of approved securities, and was to be retired by progressive taxation as conditions improved. A National Monetary Commission, appointed at the same time, with Senator Aldrich as chairman, spent four years in a thorough investigation of the banking and currency systems of the world. It was largely as a result of the report of this commission that the present Federal Reserve System was adopted in President Wilson's administration.

The tendency of human nature is to find somebody to blame for one's misfortune. Not one man in ten thousand could understand the complicated and deeply rooted causes of the panic of 1907. If they could have understood them, it would have been little comfort to know that they were due to inveterate evils in which they themselves were probably implicated. A scapegoat was at hand. The President was evidently responsible. Had he not been unsettling business by his attacks on the railroads and the industrial corporations? Had he not precipitated the panic by bringing suit against the Standard Oil Company in November, 1906, and announcing his intention of breaking up the great Union-Central-Southern Pacific merger of the Harriman lines?¹ The newspapers controlled by "predatory wealth" published editorials on "the Roosevelt Panic" and "Theodore the Meddler," until many even of the President's supporters thought that it would be advisable for him to call a halt in the enforcement of the anti-trust laws, at least "for a year or two." What Roosevelt himself thought of such advice may be seen in the replies which he sent to his correspondents: "I will not deviate one hand's breadth from the course that I have marked out," he wrote to Colonel Henry Lee Higginson of Boston; "the one hope for the honest railroad man, the honest investor, is in the extension and perfection of the system inaugurated by that [Hepburn] law." "When hard times come," he wrote to Hamlin Garland, "it is inevitable that the President under whom they come should be blamed. There were foolish people who supported me because we had heavy crops, and there are now foolish people who oppose me because extravagant speculation, complicated here and there with dishonesty, has produced the inevitable reaction. . . . It may produce a temporary setback for my policies in either one of two ways: that is, in securing the election as my successor of a reactionary or of some good man who will be the tool of the reactionaries; or else through having the pendulum swing the other

¹ It was after this announcement and just at the beginning of the panic of 1907 (April 2) that the Harriman letter reflecting on the conduct of Roosevelt in the campaign of 1904 was given to the public (see page 416, note).

way with violence, so that my successor, as a wild radical, will bring utter discredit on the reforms. . . . But I am perfectly certain that in the end the nation will have to come to my policies, simply because the Republic cannot endure unless the government's actions are founded on these policies, for they represent nothing whatever but aggressive honesty and fair treatment for all."¹

As a matter of fact, far from causing the panic, the President did everything in his power "to restore confidence and give the banks a chance to get currency into circulation."² The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Cortelyou, visited the bankers in New York to assure them of the government's cooperation. When Judge Gary and H. C. Frick sought an interview at the White House President Roosevelt received them cordially and agreed to their proposition that the United States Steel Corporation be allowed to purchase the securities of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company in order to prevent a large business firm in New York, which held a majority of those almost worthless securities, from a bankruptcy which would have greatly exaggerated the panic. But he acted only after he had become convinced, with the Attorney-General, that Gary and Frick were telling him the truth when they represented the proposed transfer as a disinterested act from the point of view of the Steel Corporation. The Tennessee company was not a serious competitor. It was making rails at a constant loss. It never had earned dividends. And it would have taken an outlay of at least \$25,000,000 to put it on a paying basis. The acquisition of the company's properties added less than 2 per cent to the output of steel manufactures controlled by the great corporation, which, for the rest, manufactured but 60 per cent of the total steel production of the country, as against over 66 per cent at the time of the organiza-

¹ The letters from which these two quotations are taken as samples may be found in J. B. Bishop's "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," Vol. II, pp. 36-53.

² He wrote to Attorney-General Bonaparte on January 2, 1908, "I do not for a moment believe that our acts have brought on the business distress, . . . but if it were true that to cut out the rottenness from the body politic meant a momentary shock to an unhealthy seeming prosperity, I should not for a moment hesitate to put the knife to the cancer" ("Autobiography," p. 500).

tion of the corporation in 1901. As there was therefore no advantage to the corporation and no tendency toward monopoly in the purchase, the President and his advisers saw no reason why they should oppose it. Mr. Taft was at the time a member of the cabinet, and, according to the President's testimony, he interposed no objection to the transaction. A few years later, when Mr. Taft was president, a suit was brought against the United States Steel Corporation, the Tennessee Coal and Iron deal being made one of the chief points of the indictment. Mr. Roosevelt submitted a detailed defense of his action,¹ and the Federal district court of New Jersey upheld his course in a decision which was confirmed in 1920 by the Supreme Court of the United States.

In November, 1907, there were uncovered what President Roosevelt called "probably the most colossal frauds ever perpetrated" in the customs service. A certain Richard Parr, who was employed as a surveyor at the appraisers' stores in New York, confided to his old schoolmate William Loeb, Jr., the President's private secretary, his suspicions that the sugar companies were cheating the government by reporting short weight in their importations. Loeb told the President, who finally got Parr appointed as special investigator in the department. After several months of clever detective work at the Brooklyn docks, Parr discovered a steel spring in the scales of the Havemeyer and Elder sugar company, which reduced the indicated weight of the sugar far below the actual weight. Proceedings against the sugar trust for the recovery of duties were begun under the charge of H. L. Stimson, district attorney of the southern district of New York. The jury, after less than an hour's deliberation, brought in a verdict of guilty (March 4, 1909). The American Sugar Refining Company paid over to the government \$2,000,000; while other companies, confessing evasion by crooked methods, paid \$1,500,000 more. Henry O. Havemeyer, the president of the chief offending company, died just before the prosecution began. The secretary and treasurer, Charles Heike, was convicted of felony, but was saved from the

¹ The defense is printed in Appendix A to his "Autobiography," pp. 606-620.

penitentiary by President Taft's commutation of his sentence. The poorer men went to jail.

A less successful attempt to bring the law-defying corporations to book was made in the summer of 1907, when judgment was rendered in the Federal district court of Chicago against the Standard Oil Company for receiving rebates from the Chicago and Alton Railroad. The huge fine of \$29,240,000 was imposed on the company by Judge Kenesaw M. Landis on 1462 specific counts. It is said that the counsel for the defendant rose after the verdict and remarked that not a cent of the fine would be paid. If the story is true, he was a good prophet. The clever lawyers of the company found flaws in the construction of the case and dubious interpretations of the technicalities of the statute sufficient to secure an annulment of the verdict on appeal to the circuit court. The case was legally dismissed, but the public was hardly convinced of the innocence of the defendant. Meanwhile the suit for the dissolution of the Standard Oil Company, which had been brought by President Roosevelt, under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, was on its tedious way through the courts. The indictment, filling nearly sixty printed pages in the record, included charges of rebating and discrimination, restraint and monopoly of trade, unfair practices against competing pipe lines, compulsory contracts with competitors, local price-cutting, espionage, the operation of bogus "competing" companies, the distributing of territory to eliminate competition in sales, and "enormous and unreasonable profits" as the result of monopoly. The bill asked that "the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey be enjoined and restrained from in any manner continuing to exert control over the subsidiary corporations by means of ownership of their stock or otherwise." On May 15, 1911, the Supreme Court handed down the decision ordering the dissolution of the company and the return to their holders of the securities of the various companies that had entered the combination. "The object of the prosecution of the trusts," said President Taft in a speech at Detroit in September, "was to secure a degree of disintegration by which competition between its parts should be restored and preserved." If the

President or the court believed that the thirty-eight "independent" companies into which the Standard Oil had been broken up would really "compete" with one another, the public entertained no such illusion. The Rockefeller group controlled the companies severally as thoroughly as it had controlled them combined. The prices of petroleum products all over the country continued to be dictated from 26 Broadway, and the price of oil stocks advanced sharply after the dissolution. The only difference was that the stocks were listed in a column of forty titles, and the investor might receive a dozen small dividend checks instead of a single check for the aggregate amount.¹

On the whole, the Roosevelt administration shows a remarkable infusion of life into the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Twenty-five indictments and eighteen bills in equity were introduced against the trusts in the years 1901-1909, as against five indictments and ten bills during the administrations of Harrison, Cleveland, and McKinley. It is certain, too, that the effect of the dissolution of the Northern Securities Company, "which alone broke the long period of immunity from prosecution of the railroads," acted as a deterrent from the defiance of the law. Yet the practical failure of the Standard Oil prosecution confirmed President Roosevelt in his opinion that the greatest hindrance to an effective control of the corporations lay in the vulnerability of the Sherman act itself. "The Anti-Trust Law," he wrote in his message of December, 1907, "should not be repealed, but it should be made both more efficient and more in harmony with actual conditions. It should be so amended as to forbid only the kind of combination which does harm to the

¹ Just two weeks after the Standard Oil decision, another of the famous anti-trust cases was settled in the Supreme Court (May 29, 1911), by a decree ordering the dissolution of the American Tobacco Company. The results of this decision showed a more genuine return to competition than did the dissolution of the Standard Oil Company. The "successor companies" to the tobacco trust (the American Tobacco Company, Liggett and Meyers, Pierre Lorillard), while much larger producers of tobacco than any of the other independent companies, nevertheless have had no such monopoly of the field as have the affiliated group of oil companies. For example, the trust at the time of its dissolution had but 15 per cent of the trade in cigars.

general public, such amendment to be accompanied by or to be an incident of a grant of supervisory power to the government over these big concerns engaged in interstate business. This should be accompanied by a provision for the compulsory publication of accounts and the subjection of books and papers to the inspection of government officials." It was not, however, until five years after Roosevelt returned to private life that Congress undertook a thoroughgoing revision of the Sherman law of 1890. Only in the field of interstate transportation was there a Federal commission clothed with the powers of investigation and limited rate regulation. We still lacked the governmental machinery to bring the social and economic abuses of the great industrial corporations (such as monopoly prices, unfair competition, waste of natural resources, inadequate wages, woman and child labor) within the scope of the commerce clause of the Constitution. The day of the various Federal boards and commissions which seem now to be the most effective agencies in mediating between the public welfare and the evils of unregulated monopoly had not yet arrived.

Of course President Roosevelt was often accused of being a socialist on account of his interest in social reform. The term "socialism" is carelessly used. To the extreme conservative it means any interference of the government with business, any disturbance of the old liberalist doctrine of *laissez faire*. To thousands who call themselves socialists it means only sympathy with radical social reform. But the actual program of socialism is the public or collective ownership of the means of production and distribution. With this doctrine President Roosevelt had no sympathy whatever. He believed in the private ownership of mills, factories, mines, and railroads. He believed in large industrial units and in adequate rewards in profits for their successful organizers and managers. He was too thorough an individualist himself to accept any theory of collectivism, with its dangers of inefficiency, loafing, expropriation, and political manipulation. The government should not assume the herculean task of managing the big business of the country, but as the guardian of the liberties of the people it should hold all groups

and associations within its borders—whether of capitalists or laborers, rich or poor—to a wholesome respect for law and a strict regard for justice. The proper way to deal with the big business combinations was neither to destroy them nor to absorb them, but to supervise and regulate them in order that initiative, energy, and talent might have a free field for exercise—within the law.

It was not the bankers' panic nor the defiance of the Standard Oil Company, however, that disturbed the administration most in the summer of 1907. An ugly situation had arisen with Japan, over which the President confessed in a letter to Secretary Root (July 13) that he was "more concerned than over any other matter." Up to the close of the nineteenth century the Japanese had not come to this country in great numbers. There were fewer than 25,000 of them here in 1900. But the economic hardship which the terrible war with Russia entailed upon a people of nearly 50,000,000, crowded upon a territory of 148,000 square miles (an area equal to that of the state of Montana), stimulated immigration to our Pacific coast. By 1907 there were 75,000 Japanese here, most of them in California. The hostility of the people of that state was even greater toward the Japanese than it had been toward the Chinese a generation before (see page 153), because the Japanese not only offended the labor element by their cheap standard of living, but, with their more aggressive habits, sought land for farms and orchards and began to crowd into the public schools. Men of twenty and thirty years of age entered the mixed classes of children. In October, 1906, the Board of Education of San Francisco passed an ordinance directing all Japanese, Chinese, and Korean students to go to special oriental public schools. Japan, as a modern, progressive nation, had scorned exclusion treaties such as we had signed with China, and claimed the benefits of the treaty of 1894, which gave her residents in the United States the status of subjects of the "most favored nation," although naturalization was denied them. It was a question whether the right to attend school with white children, when equal facilities were offered at public expense in other schools, could be claimed as a

right of residence under a national treaty. Certainly the states of the South had successfully maintained their right to segregate the negroes in colored schools. Educational regulation seemed clearly enough to be a right of the state, but on the other hand the responsibility for the observance of a treaty with a foreign nation rested with the national government. The sensational newspapers on the Pacific coast and in Japan exacerbated the situation by mutual insults and appeals to hostile demonstrations.

President Roosevelt summoned the mayor of San Francisco and several of the anti-Japanese leaders of California to Washington. He explained to them that he was in sympathy with the people of the state in their protest against the increasing immigration from Japan and in their objection to the mingling of the utterly different types of civilization represented by Japan and the United States. At the same time he rebuked the agitators for their campaign of outrage against "a high-spirited, sensitive, and friendly people." He made it clear that the national government and not the state must deal with questions of international significance. He promised that he would "at once and in efficient and satisfactory manner take action that would meet the needs of California." A compromise was reached in the so-called Root-Takahira agreement of 1907, by which the Japanese government undertook to prevent the immigration of laborers to the United States, and in return the school authorities of California modified their ruling by allowing Japanese pupils under a certain age limit and with a sufficient knowledge of English to attend the public schools. In spite of the "gentlemen's agreement," however, the anti-Japanese agitation was not quieted. Early in 1909 the California legislature considered a bill for the exclusion of the Japanese from landholding in the state, the segregation of the Japanese in special quarters of San Francisco, and the separation of the Japanese and the white children in the public schools. President Roosevelt immediately telegraphed the governor of California to hold up the proposed legislation, and followed the telegram with letters to the governor and the speaker of the Assembly, furnishing figures from the Department of Commerce and Labor to show that the Japanese govern-

ment was carrying out its part of the agreement of 1907 in perfect good faith. He warned them that if the Assembly passed the bills proposed, "the United States government would be obliged immediately to take steps in the Federal courts to test such legislation as we hold to be clearly a violation of the treaty." This remonstrance succeeded in prolonging the truce a few years longer.

On constitutional grounds, despite his sympathy for the Californians, the President had taken a position of friendly justice to Japan. But he was determined not to give the hostile elements in that country any opportunity for interpreting his action as "backing down" before their threats. Chiefly as a counter-stroke, to show Japan the strength of the United States navy, but also as a grand manœuvre to test the morale and efficiency of the officers and men on a long cruise, he decided to send a fleet of battleships around the world. Instantly there was protest from all over the country. It would be criminal to leave our coasts unprotected. Japan would look on the movement as a hostile act, and would attack us before our fleet reached the Strait of Magellan. The chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs in the Senate declared that the fleet should not go and that Congress would make no appropriation. But the President, as commander in chief of the navy, had the right to send the ships where he would. He informed Congress that he had money enough to send the fleet to the Pacific coast, and that it would remain there if no further appropriations were forthcoming. "There was no further difficulty about the money," is his laconic comment in his "Autobiography" (p. 598). On December 16, 1907, sixteen battleships, six destroyers, and six auxiliary vessels left Hampton Roads under the command of Rear Admiral Evans and, after touching at the ports of several South American states, sailed through the Strait of Magellan and up the Pacific coast to San Francisco. There Rear Admiral Sperry took command and conducted the fleet to Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, China, Japan, and home again by the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, without an accident of any kind or an hour's delay in the schedule. The fleet was re-

ceived with enthusiasm at every port of call, and nowhere with greater cordiality than at Yokohama and Tokio. When the battleships steamed into Hampton Roads on February 22, 1909, the President was there to greet the officers and crews. From the deck of Admiral Sperry's flagship he congratulated them on their unique achievement: "You have been in the northern and southern hemispheres; four times you have crossed the line; you have steamed through all the great oceans; you have touched the coast of every continent. . . . This is the first battle-fleet that has ever circled the globe. . . . As a war machine the fleet comes back in better shape than it went out. . . . In addition you have shown yourselves the best of all possible ambassadors and heralds of peace. Wherever you have landed you have borne yourselves so as to make us at home feel proud of being your countrymen." Four days after the return of the fleet a conference of ten naval powers which had been sitting at London submitted a set of rules (the Declaration of London) to govern maritime warfare, especially in the important matters of contraband and the protection of neutral rights. The declaration was never formally ratified, but it was tacitly accepted as "embodying the generally recognized principles of international law."¹

In a long letter to Sydney Brooks of London (December 28, 1908) President Roosevelt reviewed with pardonable pride the achievements of his administration.² He gave the first place in the list to the improvement of the navy, which had more than

¹ It had been Roosevelt's purpose to summon a second Hague Conference in August, 1904, but the Russo-Japanese War interfered. After the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth the new Russian ambassador, Baron Rosen, proposed the conference in the name of the Czar, and on June 15, 1907, delegates from forty-four nations met at the Hague. The American delegation, presided over by Joseph H. Choate, tried in vain to secure an agreement on the limitation of naval armaments (the era of the dreadnaughts was just opening) and the establishment of a permanent court of justice. The conference made some slight advance toward the settlement of international disputes by arbitration and some recommendations for the more humane conduct of war, but the great cataclysm of 1914 showed how impotent these conventions were in the face of the rivalries of aggressive nationalism.

² The letter is printed in Bishop's "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," Vol. II, pp. 129-132.

doubled in size during his term. Among a score of other accomplishments (most of which we have noticed in this chapter) he mentioned his work for the conservation of our forests and the reclamation of the arid regions of the great plains of the West. But he spoke too modestly of this most beneficial and lasting service which he continued zealously from the passage of the Newlands act in the first year of his administration to the project for a world conference on conservation at the Hague in the last month of his term. "I do not hesitate to affirm," wrote President Charles R. Van Hise of the University of Wisconsin, "that from the point of view of our descendants this question of the conservation of our natural resources is more important than any political or social question in the solution of which we are now engaged."¹ And Gifford Pinchot, now (1924) governor of Pennsylvania, who, as Chief Forester of the United States from 1898 to 1910, was, next to Roosevelt, the leader of the movement, said: "The central thing for which Conservation stands is to make this country the best possible place to live in, both for us and for our descendants. It stands against the waste of natural resources which cannot be renewed, such as coal and iron; it stands for the perpetuation of the resources which can be renewed, such as the food-producing soils and the forests; and, most of all, it stands for an equal opportunity for each American citizen to get his fair share of benefit from these resources, both now and hereafter."²

Until the disappearance of our frontier toward the close of the nineteenth century, the natural resources of the United States seemed to be inexhaustible. Opportunity was free to all. Free homesteads in the West beckoned to the men who were uneasy or unsuccessful in the East. The prospector had only to stake out his claims in the regions of the newly discovered gold or silver mines or to sink his shaft in the oil fields. The

¹ Charles R. Van Hise, "The Conservation of the Natural Resources of the United States," p. 375.

² Gifford Pinchot, "The Fight for Conservation," p. 79. To supplement the necessarily brief account of the conservation movement which we give here, the student should read the enthusiastic chapter in Roosevelt's "Autobiography" entitled "The Natural Resources of the Nation," pp. 428-461.

forests, which had been obstacles to be cleared away by the pioneer, became rich treasures to be exploited by the "land shark." In their absorbing passion for the accumulation of wealth, men were plundering the resources of the country like burglars looting a palace. They wasted the timber by reckless cutting and wholesale logging; and if fire caused by their carelessness destroyed a forest on a mountain slope, they moved on unconcerned to cut elsewhere. In their haste to get at the richest seams of coal for immediate sale with least labor, they tunneled the mines in such a way as to make it impossible to work the larger but less productive layers for fear of cave-ins. For every ton of anthracite that they took out they left a ton and a half forever inaccessible.¹ They let streams of oil flow from the wells to fill the rivers of western Pennsylvania. If they struck reservoirs of natural gas in drilling for oil, they made no attempt to preserve the valuable fuel as it rushed from the well, but lighted it and let it burn itself out. In the Caddo field of Louisiana, where the wells burned year after year in "giant flambeaux," 70,000,000 cubic feet of gas were wasted every day—enough to light ten cities the size of Washington. Professor I. C. White, the state geologist of West Virginia, declared that the state had for years been losing its "unrivalled fuel" from burning wells and leaking pipe lines at the rate of not less than 250,000,000 cubic feet a day, an equivalent of the waste in heating value of a 45-ton car of coal every minute. "What an appalling record," he cried, "to transmit to posterity." Like an

¹ According to the estimate of the anthracite-coal commission, over 3,000,000,000 tons must have been lost by wasteful mining during the twenty-five years preceding the close of the Roosevelt administration. At the latter date (1909) there were estimated to be but 15,354,000,000 tons left in the ground. At the same time that this reckless process of mining went on, the demand for anthracite grew by leaps and bounds, as the following table shows:

YEAR	TONS OF ANTHRACITE USED	PER-CAPITA CONSUMPTION
1850	7,000,000	0.275
1875	52,000,000	1.00
1900	270,000,000	3.3
1907	481,000,000	5.6

irresponsible young man who runs through an inherited fortune that seemed inexhaustible, the nation was squandering its priceless inheritance of timber, soil, and mineral wealth. "The relation of the conservation of natural resources to the problems of national welfare," says Roosevelt in his "Autobiography" (p. 430), "had not yet dawned upon the public mind."

The foresters and geologists and physiographers sounded their warnings. Our timber would last but for thirty years at the present rate and with the present methods of cutting. The demands on our forests had increased doubly as fast as our population. The average price of building-woods had increased over 50 per cent since 1900. We had anthracite coal for only fifty years, and bituminous coal for one hundred and fifty years. Our unrenewable supplies of iron ore, oil, and natural gas were being rapidly diminished. The destruction of the forests, whose roots acted like great sponges to absorb the rains and prevent floods and erosion, had wrought incalculable damage to the fertility of the farms. The Mississippi was carrying four hundred million tons of the rich soil of its drainage basin down to the Gulf every year, robbing the farmers of the priceless covering for their seeds and choking the river channel with silt. With the cessation of the great cattle drive from Texas and the Indian Territory up through Kansas and Nebraska, and the fencing in of the ranges by the sheep-raiser and the homesteader, the proportion of food animals to the population of the country had steadily decreased (from 82.5 per cent in 1860 to 72.4 per cent in 1880 and 53.9 per cent in 1900), and the mounting price of meat was felt in every home in the land. The farmer, too, accustomed from the days of abundant land and scarce labor to seek the greatest return per labor unit instead of per land unit, had not learned the habits of intensive cultivation, such as scientific fertilization, subsoiling, drainage, crop rotation, and irrigation. As a result, we produced less wheat per acre than any of the great European countries except Russia.¹ It was evident

¹ The figures are as follows: Great Britain, 32.2 bushels per acre; Germany, 28 bushels; France, 19.8 bushels; Austria-Hungary, 17.7 bushels; the United States, 13.8 bushels; Russia, 13.2 bushels.

that a campaign of education in the responsibilities of the present generation for the welfare and even for the existence of the future generations was necessary to turn our people from their long habit of individualism to the recognition of the paramount interest of the community. It was evident, too, that this campaign would have to be waged against the selfish opposition of all those "pioneer pillagers" who had fastened their grip upon the natural resources of the country, and who deemed it their right to remain undisturbed in the enjoyment of the monopoly of land, lumber, coal, water sites, phosphate beds, ores, and oil fields. For the report of Herbert Knox Smith of the Bureau of Corporations showed, in respect to one item alone, that, whereas at the close of the Civil War three fourths of the standing timber of the United States was owned by the public, forty years later four fifths of it was in private hands; that fewer than two hundred men owned more than half of it; and of that half, the Union and Southern Pacific railroads and the great Weyerhaeuser Timber Company controlled more than 20 per cent. "The conservation issue is a moral issue," said Gifford Pinchot, "and the heart of it is this: for whose benefit shall our natural resources be conserved—for the benefit of us all or for the use and profit of the few?"

It was in this spirit that President Roosevelt took up the work. The chief points in his program were four: irrigation projects for the reclamation of arid lands, the enlargement and protection of the national forests, the improvement of our internal waterways, and a campaign of publicity for the stimulation of the conservation movement in all the states of the Union, in the North American countries, and among the nations of the world. Within four years after the passage of the Newlands act twenty-eight irrigation projects in fourteen states, from Kansas to California and from Montana to New Mexico, were under way. They resulted in the reclamation of over 3,000,000 acres of land and the watering of 30,000 farms. By June 30, 1907, there had been paid into the reclamation fund \$41,156,576. Three years later Congress recognized the importance of the work by authorizing a bond issue of \$20,000,000 to provide capital for

the completion and extension of the irrigation projects. The great Roosevelt dam, 280 feet high, completed in 1911, on the Salt River in Arizona, made a storage reservoir with a capacity of 56,000,000,000 gallons and covering an area of 16,320 acres. The main lateral canals were 120 and 208 miles long respectively, calculated to irrigate over 700,000 acres for the production of alfalfa, sugar beets, and semitropical fruits. The great Truckee project of Nevada and California made available the abundant water of Lake Tahoe by 670 miles of distributing canals, for the irrigation of grainfields and truck gardens. The Shoshone dam in Wyoming, 310 feet high (the loftiest in the world), the Elephant Butte dam on the Rio Grande, near Engle, New Mexico, the Pathfinder dam on the North Platte, are other notable examples of the irrigation projects undertaken under the Newlands act. A year after Roosevelt left office it was estimated that at a cost of \$120,000,000, lands formerly useless had been given a value of \$239,000,000, and that more than 3,000,000 acres of farm land had been so improved as to yield an added profit of \$75,000,000 a year.

Until the middle of Roosevelt's term the national forest reserves were in charge of the Public Land Office in the Department of the Interior, while the foresters were part of the staff of the Department of Agriculture. Thus "forests and foresters had nothing to do with each other," as Roosevelt ironically remarked. On February 1, 1905, he had the care of the forests transferred to the United States Forest Service under Gifford Pinchot. A law of 1891 had authorized the president "from time to time to set apart and reserve, in any state or territory having public lands bearing forests, any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth . . . as public reservations." Until Roosevelt's time the presidents, with one exception,¹ had shown little interest in this important mat-

¹ On February 22, 1897, President Cleveland had set apart the San Joaquin forest of southern California, containing 25,686,320 acres, as national domain. Shortly after Mr. Cleveland's death in the summer of 1908, President Roosevelt changed the name of the reservation to the Cleveland National Forest, and wrote Mrs. Cleveland a graceful letter in which he referred to her husband as "one of

ter. At the close of Harrison's administration there were only 17,500,000 acres of national forests. Cleveland added over 25,000,000 acres, but McKinley enlarged the domain by only 7,000,000 acres. Roosevelt's additions of 148,346,925 acres brought the total number of national forests up to 149, with an acreage of nearly 200,000,000. Through careful attention to reforestation and fire prevention the forests began to be an asset instead of a pure liability in Roosevelt's administration. On June 11, 1906, the President opened public lands for agriculture, grazing, and water power at proper rentals. Two years later over 8,500,000 cattle, horses, sheep, and goats were pastured on public ranges, and nearly \$1,000,000 came into the Treasury from the rents. The sales of timber, cut scientifically so as to preserve and not to waste the forests, increased from \$60,000 in 1905 to \$850,000 in 1908. Furthermore, President Roosevelt withdrew from entry public lands bearing mineral wealth (coal, oil, phosphates), in spite of the protests against his "illegal action," until Congress should agree to safeguard the wealth beneath the surface by proper forms of lease. On one occasion he withdrew 68,000,000 acres of coal lands at a single stroke.

Of equal importance with the conservation of the forests was the control of the rivers. The one depended closely upon the other. For denuded hillsides meant floods, erosion, and soil wash with the consequent loss of hundreds of millions of dollars to the farmers. The improvement of the rivers as lanes of transportation was also of importance. There were some twenty-six thousand miles of navigable streams in the United States,—more than enough to make a canal around the world at the equator,—and about half this mileage was in the great Mississippi basin. The rapid growth of the railroads after the Civil War had reduced the importance of the rivers as carriers of commerce and had condemned to decay most of the forty-five hundred miles of canals. New Orleans, the Queen City of the

the first to recognize the need of forest preservation." He had invited the ex-President to be a special guest at a meeting of the governors of the states and territories at the White House in May, 1908, to consider the problems of conservation, but Mr. Cleveland's failing health prevented his attending.

South, which was the second port of the country in 1840, had become a picturesque reminiscence by the close of the century. In 1900 less than 10 per cent of our domestic commerce was water-borne. Yet five years later J. J. Hill, the great railroad king of the Northwest, declared that our railways were not equal to the transportation needs of the country. From the commercial as well as from the physiographical point of view, therefore, the rehabilitation of our river systems was demanded. On March 14, 1907, President Roosevelt appointed an Internal Waterways Commission, with Theodore E. Burton of Ohio as chairman, to study the rivers from the economic point of view (power sites, navigation, correlation with railroad traffic, etc.). The purpose was to make them a great arterial system in the commercial and agricultural life of the country, as they are, for example, in Germany and France. The President himself was a guest of the commission on a trip down the Mississippi in October, 1907, and shortly afterward he responded to their request to call a conference of the governors of the states and territories to discuss the conservation of our national resources.

On May 13, 1908, there assembled in the East Room of the White House the governors of thirty-four states (with their representatives from the other twelve)¹ and of all the territories, including Hawaii, Porto Rico, and Alaska, the members of the Supreme Court and the cabinet, many congressmen and senators, delegates from sixty-eight national societies interested in conservation, the members of the Internal Waterways Commission, and about fifty special guests, among whom were William J. Bryan, James J. Hill, Andrew Carnegie, and John Mitchell. "For the first time in the history of the country the governors were assembled to consider a great national question. Even during the extreme stress of the Civil War the governors had not been asked to consult with the president and with one another upon the state of the nation. . . . Never before had the scientific men of the country met on equal footing with those engaged in politics. This in itself was sufficient to mark the White House

¹ President Roosevelt had signed the act admitting Oklahoma as the forty-sixth state on June 16, 1906.

conference as a meeting of the first importance for the future of the nation.''¹ The discussion lasted for three days; and on parting, the conference unanimously adopted a declaration of principles, drawn up by the governors of Louisiana, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Utah, and South Carolina. The declaration commended the work of the President and the men coöperating with him in the conservation movement. It characterized the work as "one of transcending importance, which should engage unremittingly the attention of the nation, the states, and the people in earnest coöperation." It recommended the appointment of a conservation commission by each state. It ended with the slogan "Let us conserve the foundations of our prosperity!" A few days after the adjournment of the conference President Roosevelt appointed a national conservation commission with Gifford Pinchot as chairman. The first act of many of the governors on returning to their capitals was to appoint a state commission. There were soon at work thirty-six of these bodies.

When Senator Nelson of Minnesota introduced an amendment to the sundry civil-service bill in the Sixtieth Congress, asking for \$25,000 for the commission for rent, clerical services, and traveling expenses, the Committee on Appropriations refused to report the amendment. The President had to get the various executive departments to contribute the time of their own clerks to furnish material which the commission had no funds to collect. But even this valuable assistance was cut off by an amendment added to the bill in the House through the efforts of Representative Tawney of Minnesota, which forbade all bureaus doing any work for commissions or boards appointed by the President. Roosevelt maintained that this was an infringement of his rights as chief executive and declared that he would disregard the amendment. "It is for the people," he said, "to decide whether they believe in the conservation movement." The Tawney amendment was carried; but the work went on, with lessened efficiency to be sure, under an unofficial Joint Committee on Conservation which came out of a second

¹ Charles R. Van Hise, "The Conservation of the Natural Resources of the United States," p. 6.

conference at the White House in December, 1908. It is significant that the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of Roosevelt's conservation policy in every case that has come up to it, and by a unanimous decision in every case but one.

It is doubtful whether any other president in our history has attained the height of popularity reached by Theodore Roosevelt. It is true that difficulties with Congress (especially with the stand-pat senators) increased as his policies developed, and that the magnates of Wall Street regarded him with undisguised hostility; but these facts only served to strengthen his hold on the people at large. They like a forceful, aggressive man in the White House, and do not share the fears of "executive usurpation" which disturb Congress. Every tilt that Roosevelt had with the Harrimans, the Havemeyers, or the Archbolds made him a thousand friends where it made him one enemy. "The most remarkable social and political phenomenon observable in this republic today," said the *New York Times* of August 7, 1907, "is the immense and growing popularity of Theodore Roosevelt. . . . The enthusiasm he has aroused asks no questions, demands no pledges, imposes no conditions. Its confidence, like its admiration, is boundless." "Marse Henry" Watterson sounded a warning in his Louisville *Courier Journal* against surrendering the country into the hands of a popular dictator. Oscar S. Straus, a member of the cabinet, returning from a trip to Hawaii in the autumn of 1907, told the President that in his journey across the continent going and coming he had observed "the almost universal determination" to force the nomination upon him the next summer. But Roosevelt held firmly to his declaration of election night, 1904, not to accept the nomination for a virtual third term under any circumstances. He could not, of course, prevent his fellow countrymen from hoping that he would reconsider or from stampeding the convention to him, but he showed the sincerity of his denial by a note of November 19, 1907, to the Secretaries of the Treasury and the Interior and the Postmaster-General, ordering the officials of their departments to cease immediately from their reported efforts to win delegates for him to the convention. As for the foolish

rumors in certain quarters that he was "intriguing" for the nomination, he disposed of them in a letter to the Reverend Lyman Abbott a few days before the convention met: "There has never been a moment when I could not have had the Republican nomination with practical unanimity by simply raising one finger. . . . Under such circumstances, when I could without the slightest difficulty have made each state convention declare for me, . . . it is simply silly to suppose that I would go into some 'intrigue.' . . . Moreover, the same people who speak of this as my secret intention are at other times the loudest in denouncing me for trying to bring about Taft's nomination."

Roosevelt was working tooth and nail for Taft. He regarded Root as the ablest man in public life, but Root was unacceptable to the liberal elements of the country on account of his long services as counsel to the big corporations before his entrance into McKinley's cabinet in 1899. "Root would make the better president," said Roosevelt, "but Taft will make the better candidate." Both the personal and the official relations between Roosevelt and Taft were particularly intimate. Twice the President had urged his "dear friend Will" to accept the coveted appointment to the Supreme Court, but each time Taft had felt obliged to decline the honor. During his four years as Secretary of War, Taft had been known as "the traveling secretary of the President" on account of his repeated political missions to Cuba, Panama, Japan, and the Philippines. When the President was absent from Washington on a speech-making tour or a bear hunt, it was Taft whom he left behind to "sit on the lid." "I think that of all the men in the country," wrote Roosevelt to Dr. Lyman Abbott in the letter just quoted, "Taft is the best fitted at this time to be president and to carry on the work upon which we have entered during the past six years." And on the day after Taft's nomination by a tremendous majority on the first ballot¹ at the Republican convention in Chicago (June 18),

¹ Of 979 votes cast, Taft received 702; Knox of Pennsylvania, 68; Governor Hughes of New York, 67; Speaker Cannon of Illinois, 58; Vice President Fairbanks of Indiana, 40; Senator La Follette of Wisconsin, 25; Senator Foraker of Ohio, 16; and President Roosevelt, 3. The permanent chairman of the convention,

he wrote to Sir George Otto Trevelyan: "Well, the convention is over, and Taft is nominated on a platform which I heartily approve.¹ No one can prophesy in politics, and so I cannot be sure that we will elect him; but the chances I believe favor it, and most certainly it will show unwisdom in the country if he is not elected. For, always excepting Washington and Lincoln, I believe that Taft as President will rank with any other man who has ever been in the White House. . . . He and I view public questions exactly alike."

Roosevelt's control of the Republican party in 1908 was no more complete, however, than Bryan's domination over the Democrats. Judge Parker's crushing defeat in 1904 had shown the futility of trusting to the "Wall Street gang" to restore the fortunes of the party. Bryan's own failures in the two preceding elections looked like victories compared with this Waterloo. The "Commoner" returned from a trip around the world in 1906 and immediately started his campaign for rallying the radical elements of the country. No one could contend with him at the Democratic convention held in Denver in July, 1908. He controlled the delegates and the platform. He was nominated with even greater unanimity than Taft, receiving 888½ votes on the first ballot to 50½ for Senator George Gray of Delaware and 46 for Governor John Johnson of Minnesota, who had twice carried a strong Republican state. The long platform condemned the whole course of the Roosevelt administration—but advocated many of the policies which Roosevelt had championed during his term. The most specific part of the platform was the trust plank. "A private monopoly," it declared, "is indefensible and intolerable. We therefore favor the rigorous enforcement of the criminal law against the guilty trust magnates and officials, and demand the enactment of such additional

Senator H. C. Lodge, had a hard time carrying out Roosevelt's imperative injunction to prevent a stampede to him. The convention went wild at the mention of Roosevelt's name or the display of his picture. The President dictated the succession as absolutely as an Antonine emperor of Rome. For vice president the convention named James S. Sherman of New York, a conservative who had sat in the House of Representatives for eighteen years.

¹ No wonder, for it was written at the White House!

legislation as may be necessary to make it impossible for a private monopoly to exist in the United States." The specific remedies it proposed were (1) a law to prevent the duplication of directors in competing corporations ("interlocking directorates"), (2) a law requiring corporations controlling as much as 25 per cent of the product of the commodities in which they dealt to secure a Federal license, (3) a law compelling such corporations to sell to purchasers in all parts of the country on equal terms. The Democratic party, the platform concluded, was "the champion of civil rights and opportunity for all," gauging progress by the prosperity of the average man. The Republican party was "the party of privilege and private monopoly," subservient to the few who were the "beneficiaries of government favoritism."

In addition to the two main parties, the Socialists for the third consecutive time nominated Eugene V. Debs, who polled about the same number of votes (420,000) as in 1904. The waning Populists named as their last candidate Thomas E. Watson of Georgia. The party which had polled over 1,000,000 votes in 1892 was rapidly disintegrating. Its candidate confessed that "everything seemed at sea, and no one could tell whither the country was drifting." He received less than 30,000 votes in November, more than half of them from his own state. The Socialist Labor party and the Prohibition party put tickets in the field as usual, with the usual slight results; and a new organization, called the Independence League, founded and financed by William R. Hearst for the advancement of his own political fortunes, drew 83,000 votes.

The campaign was almost devoid of interest. There was a flurry of excitement when Hearst made public some letters that had been stolen from the files of the Standard Oil Company, implicating both the Republican Senator Foraker of Ohio and Governor Haskell of Oklahoma, the treasurer of the Democratic national committee (who resigned). There was a good deal of argument between the parties about improper campaign contributions. And President Roosevelt entered the lists defending his administration against the "misrepresentations" of

Mr. Bryan, whom he called in a private letter to a friend in California "a kindly man and well-meaning in a weak way . . . but the cheapest fakir we have ever had proposed for the presidency" (Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," Vol. II, p. 99). Because the Democratic platform contained the more satisfactory plank on the issuing of Federal injunctions, which had been the main grievance of labor since the imprisonment of Debs for contempt of court in the Pullman strike of 1894, the president of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers, departed from the rule of the organization to take no part in politics, and pledged the labor vote of 2,000,000 to Bryan—a pledge which he was unable to redeem. Neither did the attempt of the Democrats to turn the 2,000,000 negro votes from the Republican candidate on account of the Brownsville affair¹ meet with more success.

On election day, November 3, Taft easily won with a plurality of 1,269,606 over Bryan, a little less than half of Roosevelt's plurality over Parker four years before. But whereas Taft's vote had been increased only 49,000 over Roosevelt's, Bryan had regained all the ground that Parker had lost, and polled 50,000 more votes than he had received in 1900. He could claim on this record to have reunited the Democratic party, in whose counsels his influence was destined to be dominant through still another campaign. Though Taft carried all the states outside the solid South except four (Colorado, Oklahoma, Nevada, and Nebraska), giving him 321 electoral votes to 169 for Bryan, the election was by no means as decisive as these figures would seem to indicate. It was more of a victory for Mr. Taft (or, perhaps we should say, for Mr. Roosevelt's can-

¹ On the night of August 13, 1906, a band of about a dozen negroes from regiments stationed at Brownsville, Texas, had left the barracks and "shot up" the town, killing one man and spreading terror among the inhabitants generally. When the guilty soldiers refused to confess and their companions violated their oath of enlistment by refusing to reveal the names of the offenders, President Roosevelt discharged nearly all the men from the three colored regiments to which the suspected soldiers belonged. His action aroused considerable protest, loudly led by Senator Foraker. But the necessity of his action, if discipline was to be preserved in the army, was soon recognized.

didate) than for the Republican party. Democratic governors were elected in the states of Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Montana, which gave Taft a combined plurality of 115,000. The Taft pluralities in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Illinois were twice, three times, and six times as large respectively as those of the Republican candidates for governor. The Taft electors ran ahead of the Bryan electors in New York by 202,602, but Governor Hughes was reelected by a plurality of less than 70,000. The meaning of all this was clear. The people, especially in the eastern and central sections of the country, still repudiated Bryan, but in their state and local elections they were registering protests against various abuses which they attributed to the hardening self-satisfaction of a party that had been in undisturbed control of all the branches of the national government for a dozen years. The people in 1908 showed a greater independence in voting than they had ever shown before. It was a portent of unrest which was realized by few of the conservative leaders—perhaps least of all by the gifted and genial gentleman who was forced by the raging elements outside to take the oath of office and deliver his inaugural address in the shelter of the Senate chamber on March 4, 1909.

As soon as his successor was duly installed, Colonel Roosevelt, now a private citizen for the first time since his appointment to the Civil Service Commission by President Harrison twenty years before, left the capital for his home in Oyster Bay to make the final preparations for his hunting trip to East Africa. One reason for his going was the desire to have President Taft unembarrassed by any sense of political obligation to the man who had put him in his high position. He had no desire to play the part of the "sage of Monticello" or the "oracle of the Hermitage." He had left the new President great tasks to perform, and he had the utmost confidence in his ability and purpose to perform them. He had written to Trevelyan three days after the election: "Taft is a strong, forceful, efficient man, absolutely upright, absolutely disinterested and fearless. In leaving, I have the profound satisfaction of knowing that he will do all in his power to further every one of the great causes for which I

have fought and that he will persevere in every one of the great governmental policies in which I most firmly believe. Therefore, nothing whatever is lost by my having refused to run for a third term, and much is gained. Washington and Lincoln set the standard of conduct for the public servants of this people. They showed how men of the strongest type could also possess all the disinterestedness, all the unselfish devotion to duty and to the interests of their fellow countrymen that we have a right to expect, but can only hope to see in the very highest type of public servant. At however great a distance, I have been anxious to follow in their footsteps, and anxious that, however great the difference in degree, my service to the Nation should be approximately the same *in kind* as theirs." With this prophecy of his successor's course (so strangely compounded of truth and error) and with this estimate of his own services (in which conscious merit and becoming modesty are so naively blended) Theodore Roosevelt passed for a brief moment from the stage of public affairs.

CHAPTER VII

THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

We have long rested comfortably in this country upon the assumption that because our form of government was democratic, it was therefore automatically producing democratic results.—ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE

SHALL THE PEOPLE RULE?¹

Democracy means literally "the rule of the people." But the phrase is a maxim of political theory, not a program of government. How shall the rule of the people be put into operation? In a New England town or a tiny Swiss canton the qualified citizens can meet in a body to elect officers and to propose, debate, and pass the laws governing their communities; but as the size of the political unit grows, it is obvious that only a decreasing proportion of the people can actually take part in governing. About sixty-eight hundred men (one out of sixteen thousand of our population), sitting at Washington and the various state capitals, frame the laws for the country at large and the forty-eight commonwealths of the Union. "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people," was the summary definition of democracy made by Abraham Lincoln and by Daniel Webster before him. It is an inspiring ideal. But on sober analysis the prepositions in the phrase are seen to admit of different interpretations. Government *of* the people may mean a government arising from the people or one controlling the people; government *for* the people may mean a government in the interests of the people or one in lieu of the people. Government *by* the people and government *for* the people can easily be interpreted as contradictory terms. The benevolent autocrats from Peisistratus to Napoleon III have in-

¹ I am indebted to Professor Everett Kimball's admirable book "State and Municipal Government of the United States" for many of the illustrations in this section.

sisted that their government was *for* the people, and even *of* the people. On the other hand, the Jacobin despotism in the French Revolution claimed to be a government *by* the people, while in reality it was narrowed down to a triumvirate of dictators. The history of Russia in the last few years is a suggestive commentary on the possible interpretation of the phrase "the rule of the people."

It is an inevitable, perhaps an insoluble, problem in our democracy to determine the proper balance between the control of the people by the rulers and the control of the rulers by the people. It does not help to insist, with Jefferson, that the people *are* the rulers; for however true this is in theory, in practice it is not and cannot be true. If it were, there would not have been any occasion for Jefferson's own campaign to "restore the government to the people," or for the similar campaigns urged by the Jacksonian democracy, the Populists, or the Progressives. That the American people at large were ever in control of their government in a golden age of democracy, which was turned into an age of brass and iron by the adulteration of political ambition and economic oppression on the part of the powerful few, is a fiction worthy to rank with Rousseau's dream of the happy savage in the unspoiled state of nature. The farther back we go in the history of our country, the less democracy we find. The colonial governments scorned the "leveling" idea of equality. "A democracy," said John Cotton of Massachusetts, "is no fit government either for church or for commonwealth." The men who framed our Constitution agreed substantially with John Dickinson, when he urged in the Federal Convention of 1787 that an instrument of government must be framed to defend liberty against "the dangerous influence of those multitudes without property and without principle, with which our country, like all others, will in time abound." Property qualifications, religious qualifications, educational qualifications, find a place in all our early state constitutions. Not more than one male adult out of seven enjoyed the privilege of voting in George Washington's day. The fight not to "restore" but to attain democracy has been continuous in our history.

This contest has been waged in various forms at various times. Under Jefferson it was not so much for institutional reform as for the stimulation of the voters to choose magistrates who had at heart "the cherishment of the people," instead of those who claimed to be "set over them in the Lord." There was little or no agitation for the revision of constitutions, the widening of the electorate, or the introduction of "direct government." Authority must be in the hands of competent and trained statesmen. Government was a noble stewardship. Only, the stewards must be the guardians of the interests of the people at large—the farmers, the small traders, the artisans, the workmen, who actually paid for the support of the government by their taxes and labor—and not the servants of the creditors who held the government securities and were therefore interested in maintaining a permanent public debt after the fashion of Great Britain. The Jacksonian democracy was far more radical. It rejected the doctrine of stewardship and vaunted the common man as competent to govern. Education lay at the bottom of Jefferson's program. It was a potential democracy that he envisaged—a people capable of gradual training in public school, academy, and university until they appreciated the principles of Locke and Sidney that underlie free government. But for Jackson democracy was actual. The people had already "arrived." They should take possession of the government forthwith. Constitutions were therefore rewritten to extend the suffrage, to provide for elective in the place of appointive officers, and to eliminate religious, property, and educational qualifications for voters or officeholders. The offices were to be "passed around." They were to be used as spoils of victory to reward the party workers. It was the first victory of the new, self-reliant West over the aristocracy of the seaboard states. It was the beginning of a social democracy as well as a political one. After the Civil War there came another change of emphasis in the perennial contest for a larger popular voice in our government. The rapid industrial expansion of the country; the control of mills and factories by larger and larger aggregations of capital; the regulation of the money supply by

the bankers, to whom the government had turned in its extremity; the dictation of freight rates and elevator charges by the transportation companies, on whom the farmer was dependent for getting his grain to market; the absorption of the public lands by grants to the railroads; the abuse of the Homestead Act by the land speculators,—all combined to make the economic factors predominant in the post-bellum struggle for popular control. It was an industrial democracy at which the farmers and the laborers were aiming in those political movements of the eighth and ninth decades of the last century which we have studied in earlier chapters (see pages 87-101, 229-237, 280-291).

During the twenty years between the emergence of the Liberal Republican movement and the consolidation of most of the elements of radical discontent into the Populist party, the attempts to secure a larger measure of democracy had taken the form of new party organizations. A dozen "third parties" had tried to capture the government of county, state, and nation. Except for local victories, their efforts in the face of the highly organized machines had been futile. After 1892 the reform movement was carried on inside the great parties rather than outside. Many of the third parties, indeed, remained in the field, casting a small vote (never more than 6 or 7 per cent of the aggregate) at each election; but for another twenty years, until the formation of the Progressive party at Chicago in 1912, no new party appeared except the Social Democratic (1900). Populism seemed to have met a definite defeat in 1896 after capturing the Democratic party. But it was rather the free-silver issue, on which the "Popocrats" staked their fortunes, than the general program of protest which was defeated then. The demands of the platform of 1892 on the subjects of transportation, the trusts, the public lands, the interests of the farmers, tax reform, the protection of labor, and the undue influence of big business in the government continued to be heard (in the Western communities especially), and acted as a leaven in the politics of both the great parties. For a few years, just at the turn of the century, these voices were hushed by the victory of McKinley in 1896, the prosecution of a successful foreign war, the

great wave of prosperity, the prestige of the United States in Europe and the Far East, and the lively interest of the country in the new problems raised by our distant possessions. Very early in the twentieth century there came a renewal of the battle for the larger sharing of the people in the rule of the country. And the new battle, like the older ones, was conditioned by the political and economic circumstances of the time and directed against the abuses which grew out of them.

The "new populism" went far beyond the criticism of a particular group of men or measures, and aimed at the reconstruction of the machinery of the government itself. Representative legislatures no longer represented the will of the people; hence devices must be found to bring them under popular control. A more democratic method than the boss-ridden convention must be adopted for selecting the candidates for office, in order that the people might have administrators pledged to the public welfare. Legislative bodies had always been regarded as the most democratic part of our system, and in the early days had been given large powers at the expense of the executive and even of the judiciary. But now there was a growing feeling that legislatures were not faithful to their trust. The great business interests had invaded them, and by powerful lobbies were preventing them from passing laws to safeguard the public from plundering by the special interests. Lord Bryce, in his "Modern Democracies" (Vol. II, pp. 52 ff., 335 f.), commented on the "decline of legislatures" in recent years and, with his exceptional understanding of American politics, pointed out some of the reasons for that tendency in our country. Some corruption there has been, undoubtedly, as there is in all public bodies; and more timidity than corruption. But what has done more, probably, than either guilty manipulation or cowardly timeserving to lower the morale of legislative bodies has been the unperformable amount of business which the extension of governmental activities into economic and social fields has entailed upon them. There is neither adequate leadership nor requisite time for dealing with the business on hand. During the single year 1915 over 22,000 measures were introduced into

the legislatures of the twelve largest states of the Union, and 16,222 acts and resolves were passed by forty-seven states. "During the last night of the New York Assembly of 1921, laws were passed at the rate of two a minute." That bad laws are passed under such circumstances is inevitable. However, the popular desire to curb the legislatures arose not from any sympathetic wish to relieve them of an intolerable burden, but from a distrust of their fidelity. It was not because the representatives were thought incompetent to perform their duty that they were criticized, but because they allowed themselves to be unduly influenced by the managers of the great political machines and the lobbyists of the trusts.

The ideal remedy for such an evil would be to elect men who are proof against any solicitation by the "interests," faithful exponents of the theory of the body politic expressed in the preamble of the Massachusetts constitution of 1780: "A social compact by which the whole people covenant with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." But such men are difficult to find, especially in an age when the emoluments of a business career offer rewards to talent and energy far in excess of public salaries.¹ The actual device adopted in many of the states for bringing the legislatures into harmony with the public will is the method of "direct government" known as initiative and referendum.² If the names of a certain percentage of the voters (usually from 5 to 8 per cent) can be secured for a petition to place a measure on the ballot, that measure must be voted upon either by the legislature or by the people directly.

¹ The pay of state legislators ranges from \$200 a session in New Hampshire and South Carolina to \$1750 a year in Illinois. Nearly three fourths of the states (31) pay their legislators on a per-diem basis, the average salary being \$6 or \$7 a day—less than half the wages of a New York plasterer. Oregon pays \$3 a day for a biennial session limited to forty days, West Virginia \$4 a day for a session of forty-five days. In no case does the per-diem salary amount to over \$600 a session.

² Thirteen states have the power to amend their constitution by initiative and referendum. In addition to these, nine use the device for making laws. New Mexico and Maryland have the referendum, but not the initiative. Thus exactly half the states of the Union have adopted the innovation in one form or another (1924). Only six of these states lie east of the Mississippi River.

In like manner, a certain percentage of the people may, by petition, have a law which has been passed by the legislature referred to the vote of the electorate for rejection or indorsement. The former process (the initiative) is a positive exercise of the people's will, the latter (the referendum) an exercise of a popular veto power.

Since the initiative and referendum were first adopted by South Dakota in 1898, they have been the subject of a lively controversy.¹ The opponents of direct government maintain that it impairs the dignity of the legislature and lowers its personnel by reducing its responsibility; that it tempts to the popular indulgence of prejudices against wealthy corporations; that it encourages "hobby-riding," since the collection of the statutory number of signatures for almost any proposition is comparatively easy, and to forge them is easier still;² that the propositions submitted by the referendum have seldom been voted on by a majority of the electorate. On the other side, the champions of direct government claim that it has been of inestimable value in the education of the people; that it has been used with moderation and discrimination; that it has been an effective check on corruption and chicanery in the legislatures; that it has roused the electorate from the apathy caused by impotence to correct political evils; that it has stimulated interest in local affairs and helped preserve state issues from being merged in national ones; and that it has not been abandoned in any state where it has been adopted.

In no other state of the Union has direct government been so fully tested as in Oregon. Since the adoption of the initiative and referendum by Oregon in 1902, by a vote of 62,024 to 5668, three times as many measures have been submitted to popular vote in that state as in all the other states combined. The practice reached its height in 1910, when the voters were called upon

¹ See especially the attack on the devices as "a demagogue's paradise" by Samuel W. McCall, in the *Atlantic Monthly* for October, 1911, and the reply by Senator J. E. Bourne of Oregon in the January, 1912, number.

² See *American Political Science Review*, Vol. X, pp. 519, 542, for cases cited of fraudulent signatures to initiative petitions.

to pronounce on no less than thirty-two measures, including such a variety of subjects as woman suffrage, proportional representation, judicial reform, liquor laws, the creation of new counties, employers' liability, salmon fisheries, good roads, tax reform, and state railroads. A pamphlet of two hundred pages, printed by the state and mailed to every registered voter fifty-five days before the election, contained the information necessary for an intelligent decision. That the electorate of Oregon was both alert and discriminating is shown by the fact that nearly 75 per cent of the voters expressed an opinion on these measures, adopting 9 and rejecting 23. During the decade 1910-1920 there were 174 constitutional and legislative propositions submitted to the voters of Oregon, 73 of which they approved. A radical revision of the Oregon constitution proposed in 1912-1913 was rejected by an overwhelming vote. The people of the state believe that their system of direct government has been a success. It has neither "reduced the legislature to impotence" (275 laws having been enacted by that body in 1910, as against 9 enacted by direct legislation) nor has it tempted the electorate to hasty and ill-considered action. But it would be unsafe to argue that the system must be equally successful in other states, especially where there are large foreign or proletarian groups easily brought under demagogic influences. Oregon has a fairly homogeneous population of 783,000 (8.2 to the square mile), with less than half its inhabitants living in cities or towns of 2500 or more. It ranks second among the states in education, according to the tests of the Russell Sage Foundation. The city of Portland sends a larger proportion of its population to high schools than any other city in America. It is evident, therefore, that the experiment of direct legislation is being worked out under exceptionally favorable circumstances in Oregon.

Another device for "curbing the legislatures," more questionable in its wisdom than the initiative and referendum, has been the expansion of state constitutions to include the regulation of a vast number of subjects which have generally been left to legislative discretion. The constitutions of some of the newer

states have tended to become codes of law rather than frames of government. The constitution of New Jersey, written in 1776, contained but 2500 words; whereas the constitution of Oklahoma, written in 1906, contains over 50,000 words, with fourteen pages devoted to the control of corporations. One of the state constitutions prescribes even how the legislature shall buy its stationery. Undoubtedly the vast number of social and economic questions which have become matters of public concern have necessitated some expansion in the provisions of the constitutions. But the process has gone much too far. Not only are the legislatures unduly restricted by trivial constitutional checks, but the distinction between fundamental and statutory law is obscured.

The movement for the popular control of legislation through the initiative and referendum or through constitutional prescription, has been accompanied by a scheme for holding public officials responsible to the popular will. "The people have the right to discharge an official," said the blunt Oregon phrase, "just as a farmer has to discharge his hired man." The electorate, on petition of a certain percentage (seldom less than 25 per cent) of the voters, may by the recall remove a man from office before the expiration of the term for which he was elected or appointed. The incumbent himself may be a candidate at the recall election, and in one state (Arizona) the expenses of his campaign of vindication are paid out of the state treasury. The recall is chiefly an instrument of municipal government, having been adopted first by Los Angeles, California, in 1903. But it has also been put into the constitutions of about a dozen states. It is a kind of popular impeachment. It has been frequently used in ousting mayors, attorneys, and minor judges in municipalities. It has been seldom invoked in state government.

The most serious objection to the recall has been its application to the judiciary. The judge, it is argued, should be defended against political passions and popular prejudices. He is not, like the legislature and the executive, a representative of the majority views prevailing at the time of an election. He is

the protector of the rights of the minority and should be far removed from any temptation to partiality. When Arizona applied for statehood in 1911, with a constitution providing for the recall of judges, a lively debate was precipitated in Congress, in which the most dire consequences were predicted—"the enthronement of the mob, the degradation of the bench, the destruction of the safeguards of private rights, and the spread of wreck and ruin"—if the provisions were allowed to stand.¹ Arizona was not admitted into the Union until she had removed the offending clause from her constitution. Shortly after Arizona had become a "sovereign state," however, she revised her constitution, restoring the recall of judges. The dismal prophecies of disaster, like similar ones made years before, when the question of the popular election of judges was under debate, have not been fulfilled. Not a single state judge has ever been recalled; nor was the device used against the higher officials of any state until 1921, when the opponents of the Non-Partisan League in North Dakota appealed successfully to a state-wide recall to remove the governor, the attorney-general, and the commissioners of agriculture and labor.²

Popular government also sought new methods of nomination in order to secure candidates who were acceptable to the public.

¹ A sample of the congressional rhetoric against the recall of judges is furnished by the speech of Martin W. Littleton of New York, on May 29, 1911: "Warring political factions, agrarian agitators, lying litigants, the culpable confederates of convicted criminals, and daring demagogues" would "drag the upright and stainless judge from the bench, invading the sanctuaries of justice with the sibilant hiss of a mob crying, 'Crucify him! Crucify him!'" (condensed from the *Congressional Record*, 62 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 1504-1505).

² These officials had been elected as candidates of the League, which was a quasi-socialistic organization. They were committing the state to a policy of public ownership of elevators, flour mills, and packing-houses, the exemption of farm implements from taxation, and the establishment of rural-credit banks operated at cost. The more conservative elements of the population viewed this program with alarm. The failure of forty-four of the state banks in 1920-1921, due to heavy crop losses and the general post-war slump in farm prices, helped to make the recall vote a success. The point to note is that this only conspicuous case of the recall of state officials was not engineered by the radicals to oust the conservatives, but for exactly the opposite purpose.

Until Wisconsin, after a long and bitter fight by Governor La Follette, succeeded in introducing the direct-primary system in 1903, the party committees had controlled the whole machinery of the primary-election campaigns. They had called the primary assemblies for the nomination of delegates to a convention, which, in turn, had made the nominations (or prepared the slate) for the various offices; they had provided the publicity agencies for the campaign and had "got out" the vote; in short, they had done everything except to cast the final vote at the polls. The people found themselves at election day confronted with a choice between candidates in whose selection they had had no part and in whose election they often had little interest. The direct primary was designed to "break the power of the machine" by giving to the people the *selection* as well as the *election* of their candidates. State after state followed Wisconsin in taking the control of the primaries out of the hands of the party committees and depriving the party conventions of the nomination of "hand-picked" candidates who would meekly follow the dictates of the boss. It was expected that popular interest would be aroused by this reform to secure the selection of better candidates, and that the field would be opened to men who had no hope of breaking up or breaking into the convention's "slate." These hopes have not been realized, however. The party committees, consisting of professional politicians, always "on the job," have been able to control the direct primaries almost as completely as they controlled the old primaries. The voters have not been willing to spare the time to discover candidates worthy of support. Moreover, the independent candidate has found himself confronted with a double financial obligation, for the primary campaign is often as expensive as the final one. Nevertheless the direct-primary system has been adopted in every state in the Union except Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, North Carolina, and New Mexico.¹

¹ In five Southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas) the direct primaries are not prescribed by state law, but are held under the rules of the party.

The only state in which it has been partially abandoned after once being tried is New York.¹

Beginning with Oregon in 1910, a number of states adopted the scheme of presidential preferential primaries, by which the electorate was given the opportunity to vote directly for presidential candidates and to instruct their delegates to national nominating conventions accordingly. By the time of the first presidential election after the beginning of this movement (1912) thirteen states had adopted the measure, and twelve of them made use of it at Chicago and Baltimore. In his first annual message (December 2, 1913) President Wilson recommended that the system be extended to all the states by act of Congress.² If this were done, the nominating feature of the national convention would disappear. The votes at the presidential primaries throughout the country having determined the nominees of the parties, all that the conventions would need to do would be to canvass and announce this vote and prepare the party platform. For this purpose President Wilson suggested that the convention be made up of (1) nominees for the House of Representatives to be chosen at the ensuing election, (2) nominees for vacant seats in the Senate, (3) senators whose term had not expired, (4) the members of the national committee, and (5) the party's candidate for the presidency. This proposal for the radical recasting of an institution which had functioned for over eighty years in our political history was not accepted, but it was a prophecy of the inevitable outcome of the presidential primary system. Just as the national nominating convention, by its selection of the candidate, reduced the electoral college to a mere

¹ The system was adopted in New York in 1913, largely through the persistent efforts of Governor Charles E. Hughes (1906-1910). In May, 1921, New York abandoned the direct nomination of candidates for governor, United States senators, elective state officers, and justices of the Supreme Court, who are now chosen by the convention system. Candidates for the House of Representatives, the state legislature, and various county and municipal offices are still nominated at direct primaries.

² Since the framers of the Constitution had made no provision for the nomination of a president, believing that the electoral colleges would select and elect whom they saw fit, Congress could by legislation regulate the national convention.

canvassing board, so the presidential primary, by taking the selection of the candidate out of the hands of the convention, would reduce the function of that body to a mere ratification of the popular choice. The people in the primaries would instruct the delegates to the convention whom to nominate for president, just as now the people at the polls instruct the presidential electors how to vote.

The momentum of the campaign for direct government carried through a reform in the Federal machinery which had been discussed for nearly a century; namely, the election of United States senators by popular vote. The earlier demands for this change had been based on the theory that the state legislators formed too narrow an electorate; but now the argument was reinforced by dissatisfaction with the personnel of the Senate and that widespread distrust of legislative bodies which we have already noted. The Senate was regarded as the stronghold of the law-defying trusts. It was common to speak of railroad senators, of sugar, oil, and lumber senators. Some were reputed to have boasted that they were in the Senate for the purpose of serving the interest of this or that corporation. The shameful way in which Lorimer of Illinois and Stephenson of Wisconsin bought their way into the Senate, and the cynical ease with which Boss Platt of New York terminated the legislative career of a few assemblymen who dared to vote for Joseph H. Choate as a reform candidate, gave point to the criticism directed against the upper House—though in general that criticism was not deserved. Again and again, by majorities far in excess of the required two thirds (185 to 11 in 1898; 240 to 15 in 1900), the House had voted for a constitutional amendment providing for the election of senators by direct popular vote. But the Senate refused to concur. Before the close of the first decade of the new century the legislatures of far more than half the states had put themselves on record as favoring the change, but still the Senate resisted. Then, "having failed to make an impression on the Senate by a frontal attack, the advocates of popular election set to work to capture that citadel by a rear assault."¹

¹ C. A. Beard, "Contemporary American History," p. 292.

Oregon, with its usual alertness in forwarding schemes of popular government, passed a law in 1904 to compel the members of the legislature to vote for the "people's choice" for United States senators. Opportunity was given at the state-wide primaries for the people to indicate their preference for senatorial candidates, whose names then appeared on the regular ballot at the ensuing election. Candidates for the state legislature were pledged to vote for the senatorial candidate whom the popular vote had designated. Other states followed Oregon with similar devices, till by 1910 at least three fourths of the states (enough to ratify a constitutional amendment) nominated candidates for the Senate by some kind of popular primary. The Senate finally gave way under these persistent "rear assaults," and on January 12, 1911, passed the resolution for the amendment by five more than the necessary two-thirds vote. The state legislatures promptly ratified the amendment, which was proclaimed on May 31, 1913. The Seventeenth Amendment vested the election of United States senators in electors in each state who had "the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature."

Meanwhile a movement was well under way for doubling the electorate of the country by the extension of the suffrage to women. From the days of the pioneers like Frances Wright, the Grimke sisters, and Lucretia Mott, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the advocates of "women's rights" had been fighting the battle of the slow emergence of women from their legal position as scarcely more than chattels of their husbands and their social position as drudges or playthings. The discussion of human rights in connection with the slavery question stimulated the demand for equal rights on the part of women. In the very year (1869) that Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment, forbidding the states to withhold the ballot on account of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude," Susan B. Anthony urged an amendment adding "sex" to the list of forbidden discriminations. The same year the territory of Wyoming enfranchised women, and on entering the Union in

1890 became the first woman-suffrage state. Colorado adopted the reform in 1893; Utah and Idaho, in 1896. For several years thereafter no further progress was made, and interest in the enfranchisement of women seemed to be dead. It had a lively resurrection, however, toward the close of the first decade of the twentieth century. In the first place, the movement for direct government naturally roused the women to demand their share in the game. Furthermore, changing economic conditions, especially the concentration of industry in large establishments, had attracted (or forced) women more and more into the business world to earn their living under practically the same conditions as men. Domestic service, school-teaching, keeping boarders, typesetting, bookbinding, and work in the cotton mills were no longer the only occupations open to women, as they had been when Harriet Martineau visited the country in 1840. Women had entered the professions as doctors, lawyers, and preachers. In 1910 more than a hundred thousand young women were attending universities, colleges, and professional schools. Tens of thousands were filling public positions in the civil service. About one in five of the employees in mills and factories were women of sixteen years of age or over.¹ Obviously the new economic status of woman gave her not only an interest but an important stake in legislation dealing with hours, wages, employers' liability, and sanitation. Again, the extension of the functions of the State into the fields of economic and social regulation, the multiplication of the public agencies in welfare work, charity, correction, health, and domestic relations, called for the services of women in public life. And the demand for service carried with it the reciprocal grant of recognition. Finally, the militant suffrage movement in England, started by the Women's Political Union in 1905, undoubtedly roused the women of this country

¹ The census of 1920 shows 8,500,000 women engaged in gainful occupations, as contrasted with 2,500,000 in 1880. The rate of increase of the men workers in the forty-year period was 124.2 per cent, and of the women workers 233 per cent. During the decade 1910-1920 women workers in the automobile factories increased 1408 per cent, while the same decade showed a decrease of 1,500,000 women farm laborers.


to a greater activity, although it did not inspire them to resort to horsewhipping, window-smashing, monument-hacking, arson, and the hunger strike, like their English sisters.

In 1910 the renewed efforts of the suffragists bore fruit in the capture of the state of Washington, and in the next two years California, Kansas, Arizona, and Oregon gave the ballot to women. The defeat of woman suffrage in Ohio, Wisconsin, and Michigan, however, in 1912, coupled with the declaration of the platform of the Progressive party in favor of equal suffrage, led to a revival of the Susan B. Anthony amendment for nation-wide woman suffrage. A Senate committee reported in favor of such an amendment in 1913, but the Senate rejected the proposal a year later. The defeat of suffrage in four important Eastern states (Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) in 1915 seemed to confirm the hopelessness of getting the measure adopted by state action, Illinois being the only state east of the Mississippi that had admitted the women to the vote, except on a few questions of local import, such as school administration. A mildly militant form of coercion in the shape of parades with saucy banners, the annoyance of public men opposed to suffrage, the "picketing" of the White House, was probably less effective than the gradual winning of the Western states. Politicians pay more heed to votes than to petitions. By 1916 the women in a dozen states had the right to vote for ninety-one presidential electors (approximately one sixth of the electoral college), and the candidates of both the great parties expressed their approval of woman suffrage. Mr. Wilson was still in favor of the accomplishment of the reform by state action, but Mr. Hughes came out for the Susan B. Anthony amendment. The accession of the great state of New York to the suffrage ranks in 1917 hastened the movement. In January, 1919, the House passed the amendment; and in July the Senate concurred, by the narrow margin of 56 to 25 votes. Only twenty-two states had ratified at the close of the year. The Woman Suffrage Association worked with redoubled effort to get the necessary number of ratifications to allow the women to take part in the presidential election of 1920. Their work was crowned with success

when Tennessee ratified as the thirty-sixth state, on August 28, 1920. An electorate of more than twenty-five million was privileged to vote in the Harding-Cox contest ten weeks later.¹

The extension of political privileges to the citizens by these various measures of popular government has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in responsibility, while the enormous extension of government activities has increased the administrative machinery at a rapid rate. The national civil-service list alone grew from 108,000 at the close of the nineteenth century to 325,000 fifteen years later. The vast number of officials to be chosen at elections made the "ballot's burden" almost intolerable to the electorate, especially when measures were added to it to be voted on by referendum. A closely printed ballot in a recent South Dakota election was more than six feet long. The ballot in an Oregon county election in 1922 contained the names of one hundred and forty-two candidates for forty-two offices, in addition to twenty-nine measures to be decided by a referendum vote. Various means of relief for the overburdened voter have been devised. We have already noticed the Oregon pamphlet of instructions (p. 464). A more efficient device is the "short ballot," widely used in municipal government, which reduces the number of minor officials to be elected and concentrates power in the hands of a few responsible men of whose qualifications and character the electorate may be expected to form some judgment. Several states have reorganized

¹ The following diagram shows the extension of the suffrage since Washington's day. The shaded portions represent the proportion of the voting population to the total population of twenty-one years of age or over.



their government on this principle. For example, in 1917, Governor Lowden of Illinois effected an administrative reform by which the functions of one hundred and twenty-five executive officers, boards, and commissions were consolidated into nine departments, each managed by a director appointed by the governor with the consent of the state senate. The voters of the state had henceforth but seven executive officers to elect (all but one for a term of four years) besides the civil-service commission and the board of trustees of the University of Illinois. The next year Massachusetts followed with the consolidation of about eighty separate administrative units into twenty departments. A dozen states have adopted the reform in greater or less degree. Even in states where the attempts at a radical consolidation have failed (as in New York in 1915 and 1921), much has been accomplished. For instance, in New York a state-tax commission and a public-utilities commission united a great number of independent and often conflicting agencies and abolished about two thousand offices of doubtful need.

It is in the government of the American cities that the greatest reform has been made, just as it is there that the worst evils of inefficiency and corruption have existed. The evils have been due chiefly to the unprecedented growth of the cities in the last generation. In 1880 the urban population was but 29.5 per cent of the total. By 1920 it had grown to 51.5 per cent, and the rate of its increase in the decade 1910-1920 was more than seven times the rate of increase in the rural districts. Now one person in six of our population live in cities of 500,000 or more. Migration and immigration have contributed nearly five times as much to the growth of the city population as the natural rate of increase. The drain on the country by the economic and social attractions of city life has long been a commonplace in the studies of our sociologists and economists. After the disappearance of abundant free land in the West and the concentration of industry in the great urban centers, the immigrant (coming in ever larger numbers from the poorer countries of southern and eastern Europe) tended to remain in the cities, an easy prey to the manipulations of the political bosses and a difficult problem

for the agencies of Americanization. It has not been uncommon in some of the large cities in the days immediately preceding an election for the courts to rush through fifty naturalizations an hour—aliens made Americans at the rate of almost one a minute! The foreign-born constituted only 7.5 per cent of the population of the country districts in 1910; but in the cities of over 500,000 they comprised 33.6 per cent, and in some of the smaller cities their numbers rose even to 40 or 50 per cent.¹ For their redundant and ill-digested population the cities have undertaken an increasing number of services. They not only furnish police and fire protection, water, light, and schools, but numerous charitable, correctional, recreational, and educational advantages as well. The poorest immigrant can have optical or dental treatment at the free clinics, a bed in the free hospital wards, the use of free parks, playgrounds, baths, libraries, and art museums, for all of which Mr. John Corbin in his "Return of the Middle Class" (1923, pp. 16-35) sees the middle class being taxed out of existence. Rapidly as the urban population has been growing, the city debts have increased about three times as fast, until today they amount, for the cities above 30,000, to \$4,000,000,000. New York City alone has a debt far larger than that of the forty-eight states of the Union combined, and its annual budget runs into the hundreds of millions. Our cities have grown to be great business corporations, requiring a unified and scientific administration. But that is precisely what they did not begin to have until a comparatively few years ago.

From the colonial days down to the end of the nineteenth century the cities in America preserved the form of government of the chartered borough, with an executive (mayor), a legislature (aldermen, council), and courts—all exemplifying the political scheme of the division of powers. The election of the city legis-

¹ In Passaic, New Jersey, for example, the foreign-born numbered 52 per cent of the population. In the South the foreign-born population is almost negligible, but of course the cities of that section of the country have their race problem to deal with. The negroes comprise more than half the population of the cities of Charleston, Savannah, Jacksonville, and Montgomery.

lature by wards or precincts was a recognition of representative government, but at the same time a suggestion that the city was a kind of federated area with different or conflicting interests in its various parts. There was constant occasion for friction between the mayor and the council, and a temptation to the shifting of responsibility among the numerous and often petty authorities. The important problems of the city were administrative, but its form of government was political. The partisan issues of state and nation were constantly thrust into its elections, with a paralyzing effect on its proper attention to its own business. The government of our cities was, in the judgment of James Bryce, "the one conspicuous failure" of the American democracy, and Andrew D. White called municipal government in the United States more inefficient and corrupt than in any country of Europe outside the Turkish empire.

In September, 1900, the city of Galveston, Texas, was almost wiped out by a tidal inundation from the Gulf of Mexico. Its debt was so large and its credit so poor that it had to go into bankruptcy and petition the state legislature to put it under a board of receivers. The whole political machinery of mayor, council, and bureaus was abolished. The government of the city was turned over to a board of five commissioners with unhampered authority. The results of this emergency government were so favorable that other cities (Houston, Texas, in 1905; Des Moines, Iowa, in 1908) adopted it. Since 1910 the commission form of government has been extended to over four hundred cities, including such important centers as Buffalo, St. Paul, Portland (Oregon), Omaha, Kansas City, Louisville, Jersey City, Trenton, New Orleans, Memphis, and Denver. About three fourths of the cities in which it is used are under thirty thousand in population. The commission form of government ignores party lines and ward boundaries. It fuses the executive and legislative functions of the old municipal governments. The commissioners, usually five in number, are elected by the people of the city at large, and each one of them is the responsible head of a department. In a few cities the mayor has the right to veto the measures of the commission. Where the

initiative, referendum, and recall are in operation the commissioners are directly and constantly accountable to the electorate of the city. Under the old mayor-and-council system the citizens of Chicago have to elect one hundred and six officials; under the commission system of Des Moines the only elected officials are the five commissioners and the board of education.

A still more concentrated responsibility in municipal administration is secured by the city-manager type of government, adopted by Dayton, Ohio, in 1908, and since extended to about two hundred cities.¹ According to this plan the commission appoints a single executive officer who is charged with the task of enforcing its ordinances, and who may be removed by the commission in case of incompetence or dishonesty. The city manager is often some expert in municipal administration, invited from another city or state, like the foreign podestà who was summoned to govern the faction-ridden city of medieval Italy. Sometimes cities advertise for a manager or call a man from some smaller city who has made a good record. Although the new devices in municipal government have been pretty widely adopted, they should by no means have the whole credit for the improvement of our cities in the last few years. Much progress has been made under the older types of government also. Forms and plans alone are impotent to secure good government unless they are operated by good men. An alert and devoted public spirit in the cities will make even the clumsiest form of government productive of beneficial results.

The foregoing measures do not exhaust the list of devices adopted or proposed for rendering the government more responsive to the public will. Proportional representation has been urged in order to give minorities their due weight in legislatures. Vocational representation has been proposed, instead of geographical representation, in order to make the legislative bodies epitomes of society as actually constituted rather than a group made up almost wholly of lawyer-politicians. In Wisconsin,

¹ These cities are usually of small size. Until the adoption of the city-manager plan by Cleveland, on January 1, 1924, Norfolk (Virginia) and Grand Rapids (Michigan) were the only cities of over 100,000 to use the system.

La Follette tried to abolish the vicious practice of lobbying by making it a legal offense for members of a legislature to entertain interviews with the agents of the railroads or the big industrial corporations. Various laws have been enacted regulating campaign contributions and requiring the publication of campaign expenses. Corrupt-practices acts punish attempts to bribe electors. All these reforms are of a political or remedial nature, aiming not at all at the overthrow or fundamental change of our system of representative democracy, but rather at making it truly representative and democratic. They have been supported in whole or in part by the more radical elements in both parties: by Republicans like President Roosevelt and Governor La Follette, and by Democrats like William J. Bryan and Governor Folk. On the other hand, they have been scorned as mere palliatives or branded as "middle-class quackery" and "bourgeois humbug" by the party which was launched just at the beginning of the new century and grew steadily during its first decade.

Ever since the close of the Civil War the industrial laborers of the country had been groping for an effective form of organization against the consolidating interests of capital. One school was in favor of abstention from politics, fighting with economic weapons alone, either in a mass union like the Knights of Labor, or in an autonomous trade union like the American Federation of Labor. The other school believed in political action, either as a separate party like the Union Laborites, or in fusion with the discontented farmers, like the Greenback-Labor party. Though some form of labor ticket had been in the field since the election of 1872, their success at the polls had been very meager. The only group that could boast any continuity was the Socialist Labor party which was a transformation of the old Workingman's party of 1879 in New York, and which began to nominate presidential candidates in 1892. Its highest vote (39,739) was reached in 1900. But the party was intensely hostile to the labor unions, intolerant of any departure from orthodox Marxism, and distracted by the bickerings of faction. A new Socialist organization was formed at Chicago in January,

1897, which absorbed the right wing of the Socialist Labor party, with many members of the disintegrating Populist party and the socialists of the labor unions. It called itself the Social Democratic party of America—altered in 1901 to the Socialist party. At their first national convention, held at Indianapolis in March, 1900, the Socialists nominated for president Eugene V. Debs of Indiana, who had supported Bryan in 1896, and for vice-president Job Harriman of California, a former Social Laborite. At the ensuing election the new party polled 87,814 votes. The enrolled members more than doubled in the first three years of the party's existence. In 1904, with the conservative Judge Parker leading the Democrats, the Socialist candidates, Debs and Hanford (of New York), received 402,283 votes. Again, in 1908, with the Democrats reunited under Bryan, and in spite of Gompers's pledge to throw the labor vote to the Democrats, Debs and Hanford increased their poll to 420,890. And in 1912, with two strong "progressive" candidates in the field in the persons of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, Debs and Seidel practically doubled the Socialist vote (897,011).¹

The Socialists regarded the bourgeois devices to reform the government as utterly futile. They were like trimming the branches of a poisonous tree instead of cutting its roots. It was not political tinkering that was needed, but thorough economic revolution. The source of all our trouble, said the Socialists, was the control of our industry, transportation, land, and credit (and, incidentally, of our press, pulpits, schools, and universities) by great aggregations of private and competing capital,

¹ Elated by their growth the Socialists freely predicted that they would cast 1,500,000 votes at the next election. But they made only slight gains. The Socialists split on the question of our participation in the World War. Many of the prominent intellectual leaders supported the war; and when the party as a whole condemned the war by a referendum vote of 21,639 to 2752 in July, 1917, John Spargo, William E. Walling, Upton Sinclair, Charles Edward Russell, J. G. Phelps Stokes, and Allan Benson (the presidential candidate in 1916) withdrew from the party. Debs was convicted and sent to prison for violating the Espionage Act by inciting to resistance to the draft. He remained in the Federal prison at Atlanta until pardoned by President Harding on December 23, 1921. A further breach in the party came in the autumn of 1919, when the left wing, or "reds," declared their allegiance to the program of the Russian communists.

which divided our people into the favored few who spent our wealth and the mass of landless, homeless, and toolless workers who created it. Mr. George K. Holmes estimated in 1893 that the concentration of wealth had already proceeded so far that 9 per cent of the families of the country possessed 71 per cent of its wealth. Professor C. B. Spahr published tables in 1896 showing that 125,000 "rich" with an average fortune of \$263,000 owned more of the wealth of the nation than 12,125,000 families comprising the other 99 per cent of the population. The "poor" and the "very poor," with less than \$1650, made up 88.1 per cent of the population. The Socialists maintained that with proper methods of production and distribution, and with the elimination of the wastes of competition, there would be enough wealth for all to enjoy not only security and the necessities of life but even comforts and leisure for the cultivation of the mind. Their remedy was the substitution of state for private ownership of the means of production and distribution. The railroads, the mines, the telephones and telegraphs, the mills and factories, the ships, the banks, the public-service utilities, should be the property of the people. Production should be for public needs and not for private gain. Distribution should be apportioned for the just reward of labor.

The strong point in socialism lies in its protest against the inequalities and injustices in the present capitalistic régime. Its weak point is in its program for remedying these evils. The difficulties confronting any scheme of collective ownership are enormous. The government would have either to purchase or to confiscate the billions on billions of dollars' worth of privately owned capital. In the former case where would the money come from? In the latter case would not the revolutionary cure be worse than the disease? Russia expropriated private capital, with the result that a despotic dictatorship of the proletariat threatened ruin to the industry of the country. After four years of this régime Lenin confessed its bankruptcy and began to make concessions to capitalism by the restoration of private initiative in industry, still under drastic state regulation. American Socialists, to be sure, with the exception of the extreme left wing,

do not advocate the communism of the Russian soviets. But would their more moderate régime of state socialism be free from the evils of political manipulation, economic coercion, and social rebellion? Would the aspirants for political power be less likely to bargain for support in a state which had at its disposal such unlimited economic favors? Would the workers be more willing to accept the assignments and rewards of labor dictated by an all-powerful state than they are to accept the terms which they arrange by collective bargaining with private employers? These are questions which are naturally answered both ways in the absence of the actual experiment of socialism. But the American people as a whole have not yet shown any great inclination to answer them in the affirmative. The Socialist vote is perhaps as much a protest against the evils inherent in our present system of economics as an indorsement of the political remedies offered for them in the Socialist platform. Undoubtedly many vote for the Socialist candidate as a rebuke to the great parties who would not vote for him if they thought that he had a chance of being elected.

Finally, the early years of the new century saw the rise of a radical movement in the field of labor which regarded the attempt of the Socialists to get possession of the government by the slow and orderly process of the ballot as scornfully as the Socialists themselves regarded the bourgeois reforms. At a secret conference held at Chicago in January, 1905, a group of the more radical Socialists and officials of the labor unions outside the American Federation organized the Industrial Workers of the World (the I. W. W.). Their manifesto declared that "the working class and the employing class have nothing in common; between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the world, organized as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production and abolish the wage system." They condemned the trade unions as "craft divisions which hinder the growth of the class consciousness of the workers and foster the idea of harmony of interests between the employing exploiter and the employed slave." Their program was "one great industrial union . . . founded on the class struggle and

conducted in harmony with the recognition of the irrepressible conflict between the capitalist class and the working class." Their method was "direct action"—the bomb, the mass strike, sabotage,¹ the incitement to violence by inflammatory appeals to the workers; in short, "energetic, implacable, revolutionary, and international action." The I. W. W. was an extension of European syndicalism to this country. It attracted chiefly the unskilled, foreign-born laborers. It first came into wide public notice through the indictment of three of the officials of the Western Federation of Miners for the murder of ex-Governor Frank Steunenberg of Idaho on December 30, 1905, and the trial two years later of the secretary-treasurer of the Federation, William D. Haywood, at Boise. Haywood was acquitted; and Moyer and Pettibone, who had been arrested with him and sent from Colorado to Idaho for trial, were discharged. President Roosevelt condemned these men as "undesirable citizens."

It was a far different country that Mr. Taft was called to govern on March 4, 1909, from the country which Theodore Roosevelt found at the beginning of the century. It was America awakened, seething with social unrest. A general house-cleaning was in progress. The writers of the "literature of exposure" seemed almost to gloat over our shameful untidiness and squalor. The voices of reformers were crying "Lo!" here and "Lo!" there. The advocates of change were proposing a score of plans for our political and social redemption. "In no period after the Civil War," says Professor Ogg, "was the American system of government more clearly on trial than in the opening decade of the present century." "Shall the people rule? is the overshadowing issue which manifests itself in all the questions now under discussion," said the Democratic platform of 1908. Apparently, then, the people were not ruling. On this point bourgeois tinkerer, socialist reconstructionist, and I. W. W. revolutionist were agreed. The projects of reform were being tested in state and municipal government. Presumably the battle would be carried into the halls of Congress.

¹ "Sabotage" is a word derived from the French *sabot*, or peasant's wooden shoe, thrown into the machinery like a monkey wrench.



Copyright Harris & Ewing

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

PRESIDENT TAFT AND THE INSURGENTS

It is on the background of the stimulated social and political consciousness described in the preceding section that the administration of Mr. Taft must be judged. The new President was not a reactionary, as many of his critics have called him; indeed, as compared with Cleveland or McKinley, he seems almost a radical. An imposing list could be drawn up of the progressive measures of his term, both in the way of the continuation of the Roosevelt policies (the prosecution of the trusts, the regulation of the railroads, the extension of the civil service, the encouragement of arbitration, the enlargement of the conservation program) and in the way of new legislation establishing postal-savings banks, the parcel post, a commerce court, an expert tariff board, civil government for Alaska, a new cabinet department of labor, taxation of the profits of corporations, and constitutional amendments providing for a graduated income tax and the direct election of senators. Some of these measures were the fulfillment of the demands of the Populists twenty years earlier. Mr. Taft moved forward; but as he did not move so fast as public opinion, he seemed to be moving backward—an illusion which the passenger will get from looking out of a car window at a train by the side of his own going more rapidly in the same direction. This elementary axiom of the "theory of relativity" must be recognized in order to do justice to the administration.

Few presidents in our history have had better training for their high office than Taft. Ever since he had been called by McKinley from a Federal circuit judgeship in Ohio to head the second Philippine Commission (1900), he had been an intimate and influential factor in the counsels of the government. He was an administrator of rare capacity, a lawyer of great distinction, a man of contagious courtesy, open, sympathetic, buoyant, and conciliatory. The task that he had inherited was a doubly difficult one. In the first place, the time of reckoning of the American people with their government had come. The President was called upon to act as an "honest

broker" between old customs and new ideals. In the second place, any man who came after Roosevelt would have had to echo Jefferson's response to Vergennes, on being received at Paris on the departure of Franklin: "Sir, I succeed him; nobody could replace him." Taft was pledged to carry out Roosevelt's policies, but he could not continue his methods. Temperament and training alike made it impossible for him to maintain the constant, vivid, and variegated appeal to the people which Roosevelt's inexhaustible energy prompted. Roosevelt was always "starting things." The men west of the Missouri River thought that if a week passed "without Teddy's starting something," he must be sick. He rode through his administration on a charger, with Henry of Navarre's white plume waving on his helmet. Taft walked, deliberately and slowly. For Roosevelt the law, which he had never studied, was a convenience, an instrument to be shaped by executive action for the welfare of the people. But Taft was a legalist through and through. A succession of purely executive offices from civil-service commissioner to president had confirmed Roosevelt in the executive habit of authority in counsel and finality in decision; whereas, long years on the bench had bred in Taft the judicial mind which ponders evidence, fearing the danger of a mistaken decision more than the delay of a suspended judgment. It is significant that every man whom Taft called into his cabinet (except the two members taken over from the Roosevelt administration) was a lawyer.¹

There were signs of the approaching storm before Roosevelt left office. The tension between the executive and Congress and

¹ Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania resigned his seat in the Senate to accept the Secretaryship of State; Franklin MacVeagh of Illinois and Jacob M. Dickinson of Tennessee (both former Cleveland Democrats) were put at the head of the Treasury and War Departments respectively. George W. Wickersham of New York was made Attorney-General; F. H. Hitchcock of Washington (D. C.), Postmaster-General; Charles Nagel of Missouri, Secretary of Commerce and Labor; Richard A. Ballinger of Washington, Secretary of the Interior. The veteran Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson, was retained for a fourth term, and George von L. Meyer of Massachusetts was transferred from the Postmaster-Generalship to the Navy Department.

between the liberal and conservative elements in Congress was increasingly visible. After the election of 1908 had removed Roosevelt, the ultraconservatives, like Aldrich and Hale in the Senate and Tawney and Dalzell in the House, raised their heads. The comment was current during the short session of the closing Congress of Roosevelt's term that the President was not holding his own against these men in his struggle for progressive legislation. Meanwhile in Congress itself protests were being raised against the domination of the Senate by Aldrich and of the House by Speaker Cannon. The conservatives were determined that the tide of "direct government" which was rising so fast in the state legislatures should be stayed at the doors of Congress. Bills of popular import were allowed to slumber in committees while the Speaker gave precedence to measures that had the support of powerful lobbies. Congressman Shackleford of Missouri attacked the whole arbitrary censorship of legislation in a vitriolic speech in 1908, in which he claimed the right of the House to act "as the chosen representatives of a free people in what is supposed to be a representative government." "Take your hands off the committees, Mr. Speaker," he cried, "and let them act; or if they will not act then recognize me or some other member to move to discharge them from further consideration and let the House act." Shackleford's speech was sent broadcast through the country, and newspapers and magazines took up the issue of parliamentary reform. Furthermore, there were protests against the effects of the Dingley tariff law. The cost of living had been rising steadily, and while wages had increased also, they had lagged far behind prices. The bulletins of the Labor Bureau showed that the per-capita cost of the necessary articles of daily consumption had risen from \$74 to \$107 in the first decade of the operation of the Dingley law. Manufactured goods had increased 32 per cent in price and raw materials 50 per cent, while the wages in over four thousand establishments investigated had risen only 19.1 per cent. At the same time, the profits of the great combinations in the manufacture of wool, cotton, thread, shoes, sewing-machines, farm machinery, and scores of

other commodities indispensable to the millions of plain working people in the country had grown to enormous proportions. The J. and P. Coats Company of Paisley, Scotland, after getting control of the American thread trust, sold spools of cotton here at almost double the price which they cost in England, and made a profit of \$12,600,000 a year on a capital of \$45,600,000. The shoe-machinery trust, which rents but will not sell its machines to the manufacturer, charged enough royalty on each pair of shoes turned out to make the royalties pay for the machines in the first year. The other nine years of the life of the machine were clear profit. When Andrew Carnegie retired from the steel business, he turned "state's evidence" and confessed that the industry was able to make ample profits without the subsidy of a protective tariff.

The Republican platform of 1904 had "stood pat" on the Dingley tariff, and President Roosevelt had done nothing during his administration for tariff reform. In his message of 1907, however, he recognized the rising tide of protest against high protection. The time had come, he thought, for tariff revision. Secretary Taft himself, in a speech at Bath, Maine, declared that the tariff must be reduced. The public was in earnest on the subject, and it is doubtful whether Taft would have been elected if the Republican platform had not promised "unequivocally" a revision of the tariff by a special session of Congress immediately following the election. It defined the principle of protection to be applied as "the imposition of such duties as will equal the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad, together with a reasonable profit to American industries." In the interval between the election and the inauguration of Mr. Taft, the Committee on Ways and Means followed the time-honored and rather farcical custom of holding "hearings" at Washington; that is, of hearing the representatives of hundreds of interests, protected and unprotected, plead for the continuance or the grant of the government's favor. The hearings fill nearly nine thousand pages of the committee's report, and few of these pages contain any elucidation of "the true principle of protection" as defined in the platform. They are *ex parte* ar-

guments by interested agents, each intent on showing that any reduction in the schedules in which he was interested would mean an assault on the very citadel of American industry and the independence of American labor. The friends of protection were organized and alert. The steel people, the lumber people, the hosiery people, were vocal and even eloquent. The "ultimate consumer" was unheard. It is said that when one witness, on being asked what interest he represented, replied "the people," his answer was received with considerable hilarity by the committee. The value of the manufactured products of the country in 1909 was \$20,672,052,000. It was useless to argue against that figure.

On March 15, 1909, Taft summoned the promised extra session. Insubordination immediately appeared in the organization of the House, when the usual motion to adopt the rules of the preceding Congress was defeated by a combination of thirty-one recalcitrant Republicans with the Democrats. But a motion of the minority leader, Champ Clark of Missouri, to deprive the Speaker of the right to appoint the committees was defeated. Speaker Cannon still enjoyed the vast power which he had wielded during three previous Congresses. The tariff bill introduced by Sereno E. Payne of New York was a poor redemption of the party pledge. It put wood pulp, hides, iron ore, and flax on the free list; reduced the duties on steel and iron, lumber, and various manufactures by some 50 per cent; made lesser cuts on the duties on refined sugar and chemicals; admitted the products of the Philippines free of duty, with limitations on the amount of sugar and tobacco; and laid a progressive tax on inheritances. On the other hand, there were a good many increases purely for the sake of protection, while some articles (tea and cacao, for example) were taken from the free list to swell revenue. The bill passed the House by a party vote of 217 to 161 on April 9, and went to the Senate the next day, where it met the usual fate of tariff measures. Senator Aldrich kept the bill in the Finance Committee for forty-eight hours, while "the corridors around his committee room were crowded with the representatives of the big protected interests." When

the bill emerged, it bore little resemblance to its original form. There were more than six hundred increases in rates. Iron ore and flax were put back on the taxed schedules. The duties on steel and iron and on agricultural products were restored. The inheritance tax was omitted. But what was even worse in the eyes of the genuine tariff reformers than the changes in the bill was the way in which Senator Aldrich attempted to railroad it through the Senate. Instead of laying before the members the customary written explanations for the changes in the bill, with recommendation for a reasonable time for discussion, he secured the order that the bill should be taken up immediately and discussed daily in sessions from 10 A.M. to 11 P.M. until passed. The alleged reason for this arbitrary procedure was that the business interests of the country were suffering from uncertainty as to the government's tariff policy; the real reason probably was that the tariff reformers might not have time to make a careful study of the bill. But the reformers were not daunted. They worked in the small morning hours after the adjournment of the Senate to master the details of the bill, dividing the schedules between them. Dolliver of Iowa took the woolen and cotton schedules. His colleague Cummins took metals and glassware, Bristow of Kansas worked on lead and sugar, and the indefatigable La Follette of Wisconsin familiarized himself with several of the schedules. They prolonged the debate for eleven weeks, hectoring the indignant Aldrich and advertising the injustice of many of the rates; but they could not hinder the Aldrich measure from passing the Senate on July 8, by a vote of 45 to 34. After ten days in conference the bill, not essentially altered from its Senate form, was again submitted to the House, which reluctantly adopted it by the narrow vote of 195 to 183 (July 31). President Taft affixed his signature on August 5.

The Payne-Aldrich act was a betrayal of the party promise to secure a "genuine and honest revision" of the tariff. The average rates under the new act were slightly higher than those of the Dingley act. There were no major changes in the main schedules, and the free list was enlarged by only a few important articles (hides, wood pulp, petroleum), though Mr. Dooley re-

joiced that it contained such "necessaries of life" as "curling-stones, sea moss, nux vomica, and canary-bird seed." The bill was characterized by one of the "rebels" of the Senate as "the most outrageous assault of privileged interests on the people recorded in tariff history." President Taft took no part in framing the bill until it reached the conference stage,¹ when it was too late to alter its character materially. The President made more effort to persuade the opponents of the bill to accept it as a party measure than he did to persuade the authors of the bill to make it conform to the party pledge. It was Dolliver, Cummins, and Beveridge who were invited to the White House for conversion, not Aldrich, Hale, and Cannon. The patronage was also used to punish the recalcitrant members of the House, who found their recommendations for postmasterships or census jobs ignored. The President knew that the Payne-Aldrich bill did not secure the "substantial downward revision" which he had promised in a speech at Milwaukee in September, 1908. He confessed that the woolen schedule was "unreasonable and unjust." Yet he signed the bill without protest; and in a speaking tour the next month he praised Aldrich highly and spoke of the bill, in a speech at Winona, Minnesota, as "the best tariff ever passed by the Republican party."² The country received the act with outspoken condemnation. "Depressed, cynical, sneering comments were heard on all sides," says Miss Ida Tarbell. "Congress went home anything but proud of itself. Here was a piece of legislation which had cost the entire time of a large body of legislators for more than a year, to which an extra five months' session of Congress had been given, and from it nobody carried away any enthusiasm, pride, a sense of triumph—nothing but a disagreeable, coppery taste of barter and

¹ Except to recommend in place of Senator Cummins's proposal of an income-tax clause the submission to Congress of a proposed amendment to the Constitution providing for the levy of such a tax.

² Senator Dolliver was the author of the humorous remark that the year 1909 "witnessed two events of unusual interest, the discovery of the North Pole by Dr. Cook and the revision of the tariff downward by the senator from Rhode Island—each in its way a unique hoax, and both promptly presented to the notice of the public by the highest official congratulations."

jugglery. . . . The only satisfaction was the negative one that at least it was over."¹

Still, there were some redeeming features in the bill. It subjected the corporations to a tax of 1 per cent on their net earnings above \$5000 a year, which brought about \$25,000,000 into the Treasury in the first year. It created a customs court of five judges to equalize and expedite the machinery of the assessment and collection of duties by deciding all appeals from the board of appraisers. It provided for a tariff board to study the schedules, primarily for the purpose of aiding the President in applying the maximum and minimum rates provided for in the bill and incidentally to furnish material useful in further revisions of the tariff. The significant thing, after all, about the tariff legislation of 1909 was that a bill—certainly no worse and probably considerably better than the Dingley bill of 1897, which it replaced—could be branded as a shameful betrayal of the people; and that the person who signed such a bill, instead of enjoying an increasing measure of confidence, like McKinley, could be condemned for having forfeited his claims to leadership. It was a striking illustration of the change in public sentiment in the first decade of the nineteenth century. To this sentiment the national government had been unresponsive. "Congress," says Professor Ogg, "had missed a great opportunity. The President had failed to rise to the level of statesmanship expected from him. . . . No display of Treasury balances could obscure these uncomfortable facts; no reasonable excuses could be found. Resentment that flows naturally from abuse of confidence rankled in the people's mind, producing a situation unfavorable alike to the furtherance of his general program and to the continuance of the Republican party in power."² The Payne-Aldrich act was the wooden horse of Troy, dragged joltingly through the gate of the Republican citadel as the talisman of the divinity of high protection.

When the regular session of Congress met four months after the passage of the tariff act, President Taft was eager to proceed

¹ Ida Tarbell, "The Tariff in our Times," p. 327.

² F. A. Ogg, "National Progress," p. 39.

with the program of railroad regulation, administrative reorganization, conservation, trust prosecutions, currency reform, and international arbitration which he had outlined in his inaugural address. The Republican platform recommended an enlargement of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, especially in the matter of the investigation and publicity of the accounts of the interstate railroads, and legislation to prevent the overissue of stocks and bonds. Early in June, 1910, a bill prepared by Attorney-General Wickersham was introduced into the House by James R. Mann and into the Senate by Stephen B. Elkins, the respective chairmen of the Committees on Interstate Commerce. Mr. Wickersham's measure tended rather to weaken the power of the commission by giving the department of justice a larger part in the determination of the railroad policy and conferring on the railroads larger scope for contesting the findings of the commission before the courts. It was therefore attacked fiercely in both branches of Congress by the insurgent leaders, who had completely broken with the administration on the tariff issue and who were determined to end the long dictatorship of the conservative group. Senators La Follette, Clapp, and Cummins were especially active in the fight against the Wickersham plan, and forced amendment after amendment until the Mann-Elkins bill that was finally adopted on June 18 presented a very different appearance from the original proposal. The jurisdiction of the commission was widened to include telegraph, telephone, and cable companies, and its authority was increased in two important respects. Under the Hepburn act of 1906 (p. 427) the commission had been empowered to "fix" rates only in the sense of naming a reasonable tariff which depended for its enforcement upon the confirmation of a Federal court. The new act gave the commission the right to suspend for a period of from four to ten months, pending investigation, any new rate imposed by interstate carriers. Again, under the Hepburn act, the commission had no power to institute legal proceedings against a carrier on its own initiative. Its function was that of a counselor rather than that of a prosecutor. The new act conferred upon the commission

the latter power. As prosecution of rate cases dragged for months and years owing to the crowded docket of the Federal courts, the Mann-Elkins act created a special Commerce Court of circuit judges to handle these cases.¹ The Republican platform, as we have seen above, had recommended national legislation for the supervision of the issuing of railroad securities; and the commission itself, in its report of 1908, had asked that its power be extended to cover this important matter. But in spite of the plea of Senator La Follette for a nation-wide physical valuation of the railroads, upon which alone a scientific estimate could be made both of fair rates of carriage and of the proper limits of capitalization, his amendment calling for physical valuation was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 33 to 29. The President, however, was authorized to appoint a commission to investigate the subject.²

On the very day that President Taft sent the Wickersham railroad proposal to Congress (January 7, 1910) he exploded a bombshell in the party by dismissing Gifford Pinchot, the head of the Forestry Service. This act was the result of a controversy between Pinchot and the Secretary of the Interior, R. A. Ballinger. The ardent conservationists had resented Ballinger's appointment to the cabinet. In the first place, he had been the attorney for certain parties in the Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate, who were interested in the so-called "Cunningham claims" to valuable mineral lands in Alaska—claims which L. R. Glavis, a subordinate official in the Forestry Service attacked as fraudu-

¹ The Commerce Court, however, was severely criticized on the ground of discriminating in favor of the railroads against the rulings of the commission and was brought into disrepute in 1912 by the impeachment and removal of one of its members, Robert W. Archbold of Pennsylvania, on charges of virtual bribery by the railroad interests. The next year the court was abolished.

² A favorable report of this "Securities Commission" in November, 1911, supplemented by the persistent oratory of La Follette, led to the passage of an act, signed by the President three days before the close of his term, directing the Interstate Commerce Commission to report within five years the original and the reproduction cost of the property of the common carriers subject to its jurisdiction. Preliminary reports of the commission appeared in 1916, but the entrance of the United States into the World War a few months later necessitated radical changes in the relation of the government to the transportation system of the country.

lent, and which were, as a matter of fact, later held void by the courts. In the second place, President Roosevelt had been particularly eager to have his Secretary of the Interior, James R. Garfield, retained in Taft's cabinet; and when the breach between Roosevelt and Taft came in 1912, the colonel asserted that Taft had explicitly promised him that he would keep Garfield. Pinchot was a thick-and-thin Roosevelt man. In the summer of 1909 he criticized Secretary Ballinger, especially in a speech at an irrigation congress at Spokane, Washington, for reopening to entry valuable water-power sites and coal lands which Roosevelt had withdrawn. He charged Ballinger with being a friend of the interests which were seeking to plunder the public domain. The Pinchot-Ballinger controversy was taken up by the press and became a political issue. President Taft stood by his secretary and was scolded by Glavis (who had been dismissed from the Forestry Service) in an article in *Collier's Weekly* in November, 1909, for "whitewashing" Ballinger. Pinchot continued the attack. When he wrote a letter to Senator Dolliver, breaking the rule of administration etiquette, which prohibits officials from corresponding with members of Congress on matters of controversy with departmental superiors, he, too, was dismissed from office. Pinchot crossed the ocean to meet Roosevelt as he was emerging from the East African jungle and to lay his side of the controversy before his old chief. It was the beginning of the "back from Elba" movement, which rallied the ardent supporters of Roosevelt against the administration. In spite of his exoneration by a joint congressional committee of investigation, Secretary Ballinger failed to win the confidence of the public, and in the spring of 1911 he resigned from the cabinet.

President Taft may be criticized, perhaps, for supporting with Grant-like fidelity an officer of his own appointment who had incurred a large amount of suspicion by the public, but it is utterly unjust to accuse the President of hostility or even lukewarmness to the conservation policy of his predecessor. He chose an able man from the Yale School of Forestry to succeed Pinchot; and only a few days after the latter's dismissal he sent

to Congress a strong conservation message, recommending bills giving the president the authority (for which Roosevelt had not waited) to withdraw other lands than forest reserves from entry by executive proclamation; providing for a better classification of the public lands, based on a scientific survey of their resources; and, most important of all, separating the title of surface lands bearing coal, oil, natural gas, asphalt, phosphates, from the title to the minerals beneath, and leasing instead of selling rights to the latter. These reforms were suggested by Secretary Ballinger's report of December, 1909. They were heartily supported by the National Conservation Association. They were enacted into law by Congress. Furthermore, in March, 1911, President Taft signed the Appalachian Forest Reserve act, which appropriated \$8,000,000, over a period of four years, for the purchase of lands (eventually more than 1,280,000 acres) controlling the sources of the important streams in the White Mountains and the southern part of the Appalachian chain. Secretary Ballinger may or may not have been under the influence of the Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate, just as President Taft may or may not have been really convinced that the Payne-Aldrich bill deserved the praise he gave it in his Winona speech, but certainly it was grossly unfair to speak of Mr. Taft, as Henry Watterson did in the *Louisville Courier Journal*, as "the first President of the United States who had openly allied himself with thieves."

While the Mann-Elkins bill was pending in the Senate, and Mr. Pinchot was carrying his tale of grievance across the sea, the insurgent members of the House renewed the fight started vainly in the extra session of 1909 (see page 485) to shear the Speaker of the enormous power which he had wielded since the days of "Czar" Reed and to revise the rules of the House so as to "restore the principle of representative government without interfering with the expedition of the public business." Thirty Republican members signed a statement announcing this program; and as the party had a majority of only forty-seven in the House, it was evident that by a combination with the Democrats the insurgents could force their reforms if they got recognition

on the floor. On the nineteenth of March, 1910 (after a two days' filibuster conducted by Speaker Cannon, in order to allow the full forces of the "stand-pat" Republicans to gather), George W. Norris of Nebraska proposed the following amendment to Rule X of the House: "There shall be a Committee on Rules, elected by the House, consisting of ten members, six of whom shall be members of the majority party and four of whom shall be members of the minority party. The Speaker shall not be a member of the committee, and the committee shall elect its own chairman from its own members." Speaker Cannon ruled that the motion was out of order, but after an all-night battle the combination of Democrats and insurgent Republicans overruled his decision and passed the amendment. Cannon thereupon defied the insurgents by declaring that he would entertain a motion to declare the Speaker's chair vacant, and Mr. Burleson (Democrat) of Texas promptly offered such a motion. Only a handful of insurgents supported it, and Cannon was kept in the chair by a vote of 192 to 155. The fight was not directed against the Speaker personally, but against the extreme powers that he wielded; for, before the passage of the Norris amendment, the Speaker not only had the privilege of recognizing the members who addressed the chair, but, with his two Republican colleagues (appointed by himself) on the Committee on Rules, he had the determination of the order of business and the special rules of procedure. The revolution of March, 1910, was continued the next year, when the Democrats regained the majority in the House after sixteen years of Republican control. They took the appointment of the remaining standing committees out of the hands of the Speaker, who had enjoyed the privilege since 1790, and vested it in the Committee on Ways and Means, subject to ratification by the party caucus. The Republicans intrusted the selection of the minority members of committees to the floor leader, J. R. Mann. Thus, of the three powers heretofore exercised by the Speaker—recognition of members, appointment of committees, and determination of rules—only the first, and least important, was left to him. He became the presiding officer instead of the dictator of the House.

The Taft administration, which had come into power in the spring of 1909 with the backing of a plurality of 1,269,806 popular votes over Bryan, had become sadly discredited by the close of the summer of 1910. Not only had the positive measures of legislation, like the Payne-Aldrich tariff and the Mann-Elkins railroad bill, alienated the liberals of the party, but the slow progress of business under the deliberation of commissions, which were so dear to the heart of Mr. Taft, had created impatience. The reports of the currency commission and the railroads-securities commission were not yet ready. The decisions of the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil and tobacco trust prosecutions were not yet reached. The Pinchot-Ballinger controversy had consolidated the friends of Roosevelt against the administration; and the return of the colonel himself in June, after a triumphant tour through the countries of western Europe, furnished strength to the insurgent cause. Roosevelt entered into politics with a vim, occupying the chair of the New York State Republican Convention at Syracuse and securing the defeat of the machine candidate for the governorship, William Barnes, by H. L. Stimson, the special prosecutor of the sugar trust three years before.

In a speech at Osawatomie, Kansas, August 31, 1910, Roosevelt defined the "New Nationalism" in terms of the Progressive principles—strict control of the trusts, labor legislation, tariff revision, graduated income tax, conservation, direct primaries, and the recall of elective officers. He declared that the national government was the steward of the public welfare, and that its power must extend to the complete protection of the people against lawless private interests which sought refuge in the "twilight zone" between national and state jurisdiction. When the Constitution was framed, the industrial interests of the country were so modest and so localized that there was no thought of extending Federal control over them. Interstate commerce was almost wholly a matter of coastwise water traffic, and that clause of the Constitution vesting its control in Congress was dictated rather in the interests of national defense than for the sake of economic regulation. There were no rail-

roads then. Now, however, the country was one great industrial and economic unit. The distributed political authority of forty-six states was not adequate to deal with the great corporations and transportation systems which had obliterated state lines. The spectacle of New Jersey, Delaware, and West Virginia bidding through low fees for the incorporation of nationwide and even world-wide trusts was ridiculous.¹ The state railroads must no longer be allowed to take refuge in the "twilight zone" by crying to the Interstate Commerce Commission, or (in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment) to the Federal courts, for relief from unfavorable legislation by the states, and invoking "states' rights" against hostile legislation by Congress. "The New Nationalism," said Roosevelt, "puts the national need before sectional or personal advantages. It is impatient of the utter confusion that results from local legislatures attempting to treat national issues as local issues. It is still more impatient of the impotence which springs from the overdivision of governmental powers, an impotence which makes it possible for local selfishness or for legal cunning hired by wealthy special interests to bring national activities to a deadlock."

These doctrines were acceptable to the insurgents, who carried state after state in the primaries, forecasting legislatures which would send reinforcements to the anti-administration group in the Senate. The election in November was a landslide for the Democrats. They turned a Republican majority of 47 into a Democratic majority of 54 in the House (227 to 173) and reduced the Republican majority in the Senate from 28 to 10 (51 to 41). Even Roosevelt's influence could not save his candidate in New York from defeat. The "safe" Republican states of Maine, Massachusetts, and Ohio, as well as the "doubtful" states of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Indiana, elected Democratic governors. Two of these governors were Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey and Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana.

¹ Mr. Dooley humorously summed up the situation by saying that if the United States government wished to control the trusts, it must get itself incorporated under the laws of New Jersey.

Before the expiration of the year which was so unpropitious for his administration, President Taft incurred further criticism by promoting Justice Edward Douglass White of Louisiana to the chief-justiceship of the Supreme Court on the death of Chief Justice Fuller in December. White was a learned judge who had served ably on the bench since his appointment by President Cleveland in 1894. But although the Supreme Court is removed from politics, and politics are separated from religion in our country, there were objections to Justice White's promotion on both political and religious grounds. He was a Democrat and an ex-Confederate soldier, whereas the venerable Justice Harlan of Kentucky, who had sat on the Supreme Bench since 1877, was a Republican and an ex-Union soldier.¹ Furthermore, White was a Roman Catholic, and hence his appointment gave offense to Protestant sectarians, who condemned the President for being unduly "subservient" to the interests of the Catholic Church (in the Philippines, in his negotiations at the Vatican over the Friars' lands, and in his attendance at celebrations where Catholic prelates presided) and for belonging to an unorthodox religious faith himself. Finally, White was *persona non grata* to the economic liberals, who pointed to his record on the bench, in distinction to that of Justice Harlan, as always favorable to the great industrial corporations. Mr. Bryan was outspoken in his attack, not only upon White but upon other justices (Hughes and Van Devanter) whom President Taft selected,² as "notoriously lenient to the trusts."

¹ It was widely expected that Justice Harlan would be promoted to the high place left vacant by Fuller's death, and it was said by some that his own death the next year was due to his bitter disappointment. At any rate, he doubtless felt some concern over the selection of Justice White. "As the senior member of the court," he said to a friend after the event, "it became my duty to administer the oath of office. On that day I wore my Grand Army and Loyal Legion buttons so that they were plainly visible as I faced him, and I never more profoundly or more solemnly pronounced the words of that oath than upon that occasion" (A. W. Dunn, "From Harrison to Harding," Vol. II, p. 132).

² It fell to President Taft in his single term to make six appointments to the Supreme Court (Lurton, White as Chief Justice, Hughes, Van Devanter, Lamar, and Pitney), a larger number than had been appointed by any president since U. S. Grant.

A French historian has divided the reign of Louis XVI into two parts: "those years during which revolution might have been avoided by reform, and those years during which revolution was inevitable." The same scheme could be applied to the administration of President Taft. The election of 1910 marked a sharp division between its halves. During the years 1909-1910 the administration had the opportunity to satisfy the popular demand for reform by an honest revision of the tariff and a hearty espousal of progressive policies. During the years 1911-1912 it was powerless to resist the rising tide of opposition inside as well as outside its ranks, which ended in disrupting the Republican party and terminating its long control of the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Shortly after the mid-term election the President launched a new project which ended by creating as much dissatisfaction as the tariff act. In January, 1911, he negotiated a reciprocity agreement with Canada for free trade in "primary" food products (grain, vegetables, eggs, cattle, and fish), a mutual reduction of the duties on "secondary" food products (flour, meats), and a lowering of the duties on manufactured goods. There were about one hundred free articles on the list and over four hundred reductions. The President sent the plan to Congress on January 26, with a message pointing out its advantage of binding Canada closer to the United States by economic ties. The people, he said, were "of the same race, intellectual condition, and traditions." No harm could come to the United States by the freest trade with her northern neighbor.¹ But the farmers of the Northwest did not agree with the President in this view. Canada was an agricultural country, and the free admission of her cheaper cereals would reduce the farmers'

¹ Reciprocity in trade had existed between the United States and Canada from 1854 to 1866 as an avowed policy on this side of the border of bringing Canada under the political influence of this country, with the purpose of eventual annexation. But the hostility of England to the American government in the Civil War had terminated the agreement in 1866. Since then a limited reciprocity in fisheries had been established (1872, 1888). In 1898 we had proposed free trade with Canada on condition that she should adopt the Dingley tariff.

prices; while the Eastern manufacturers would have the benefit of free raw materials and lower Canadian tariffs on their manufactures, without any serious competition from Canada. They were already selling machines cheaper in Canada than in the United States. The insurgent Republicans, therefore, who came chiefly from the Western states, opposed Canadian reciprocity; and they were joined by the high-tariff men of the party, who resisted the reciprocity principle at every point as a "breach in the walls" of protection. The Democrats, on the other hand, supported the measure, partly because it reduced the Payne-Aldrich rates and partly because it widened the split in the Republicans. It was therefore a Democratic bill as it passed the House (February 14) with 143 Democrats and 78 Republicans voting in the affirmative, and 87 Republicans and only 5 Democrats voting in the negative.

The Sixty-first Congress expired on March 4, 1911, before the insurgent Republicans in the Senate would allow the bill to come to a vote. President Taft, insistent on his measure, called the new Congress together in a special session on April 4, although it was pointed out to him that he was inviting grave trouble by summoning eight months before its statutory meeting a Congress in which the Democrats controlled the House and the slim Republican majority in the Senate was offset by the insurgents, who would not hesitate to vote with the Democrats. It was not until the end of July that the bill was finally passed by the Senate, by a vote of 53 to 27. Of the 27 negative votes 24 were cast by Republicans. President Taft won, but it was a Pyrrhic victory. The Canadian parliament debated the bill for four months without coming to a vote. Then the premier, Sir Wilfred Laurier, dissolved parliament and appealed to the people to return a majority in favor of reciprocity. The campaign, led by the conservative, Robert L. Borden, resulted in a complete defeat for Sir Wilfred. The decisive factor in the election was the fear of the Canadian people that reciprocity would endanger the political future of their country by subjecting it to the undue influence of the United States—a fear which they believed justified by the indiscreet utterances of Speaker Clark and even

of President Taft himself.¹ Thus the ill-fated reciprocity measure only served to bring further discredit on the administration. Champ Clark says, in his book "My Quarter Century of American Politics" (Vol. II, p. 8), that Taft would have been re-elected had he not called the extra session of April, 1911. And Arthur W. Dunn, since 1898 the Washington representative of the American Press Association, writes in his "From Harrison to Harding" (Vol. II, p. 145): "Canadian reciprocity wrecked two governments, one in Canada and the other in the United States. It is quite likely that the Taft administration could not have been re-elected even without the burden of Canadian reciprocity, but that measure made defeat a certainty."

The predictions that President Taft would only add to his embarrassments by calling the extra session were speedily fulfilled. In May the House began a series of attacks on the tariff bill by removing the duties on agricultural implements, wire fencing, cotton bagging, boots and shoes, fresh meats and flour, and other articles of special importance to the farmer (the "farmers' free list" bill). The next month it attacked the famous Schedule K by cutting the duties on wool and woolens by over 50 per cent. And in August it followed up these measures by reductions in the cotton, iron, and chemical schedules. All these "popgun" bills were passed by large majorities in the House and had ample support from the insurgents in the Senate. Indeed, La Follette worked with Underwood like a colleague in preparing the measures, which he succeeded in putting through the upper House in spite of Boies Penrose's vain fulmination that he did not propose to "allow La Follette to run the Senate in combination with the Democrats." Taft vetoed

¹ Clark had remarked in the House that he favored reciprocity because he "hoped to see the day when the American flag would float over every square foot of the British North American possessions clear to the North Pole." It was the language of Charles Sumner over again. President Taft had spoken of Canada being "at the parting of the ways," as if she were hesitating between a closer union with the United States and the strengthening of the imperial ties with Great Britain. In a letter to Roosevelt in January, 1911, Taft spoke of reciprocity as "producing a current of business between the two countries that would make Canada only an adjunct of the United States."

all the bills as "hasty, loosely drawn, haphazard, and empirical." He was committed to the plan of "scientific" tariff revision based on the report of the expert commission. When the opponents of the "popgun" bills complained that they were framed with "blacksmiths' tools," the *New York Nation* replied that at least they were not framed with "burglars' tools." The President's veto of the reductions in the woolen schedule especially, which he himself had called "indefensible," was used to prove that he was not a sincere advocate of tariff revision at all. The Underwood woolen bill failed to pass the House over the President's veto by only 14 votes. It was clear that the last lines of the administration's defense were weakening.

A few days before Taft submitted his reciprocity scheme to Congress the organization of the insurgents had begun to take shape. On January 21, 1911, a meeting was held at La Follette's house in Washington to form the National Progressive Republican League. Senator Jonathan Bourne of Oregon was chosen president. The league adopted a Declaration of Principles, which La Follette had drawn up during the holiday recess. "Popular government in America," it said, "has been thwarted and progressive legislation strangled by the special interests, which control caucuses, delegates, conventions, and party organizations, and through this control of the machinery of government dictate nominations and platforms, elect legislatures . . . and control cabinet officers." It put forward a program of five principles: (1) direct election of United States senators, (2) direct primaries, (3) direct election of delegates to national conventions, and their instruction by the popular vote in preferential primaries, (4) the incorporation of the initiative, referendum, and recall in the constitutions of the states, and (5) a thoroughgoing corrupt-practices act. The league disclaimed any intention of seceding from the Republican party. Its object was to capture the party for progressive ideas, not to disrupt it. The league also asserted that it was not formed in opposition to President Taft or for "promoting the political fortunes of any man or men." But it was evident from Senator La Follette's repeated indictment of the Taft administration

that the latter disclaimer was a polite prevarication. Three months after the league was formed, a meeting of the Progressives was held in the committee rooms of Senator Bourne at the capital. At this meeting it was unanimously agreed that the Progressives must unite upon a candidate for the presidential nomination in the coming year, and Senator Cummins of Iowa said, "There is but one man who should be considered as the candidate, and that man is Senator La Follette." The third step in the consolidation of the movement was a national Progressive conference of nearly three hundred delegates, held at Chicago, October 16, 1911, which adopted resolutions approving the Progressive program at all points and indorsing the candidacy of La Follette in the following strong terms: "The record of Senator La Follette in state and nation makes him the logical candidate for the president of the United States. His experience, his character, his courage, his record in constructive legislation, his administrative ability meet the requirements for leadership such as a presidential candidacy demands." La Follette was eager to make the race for the nomination. Indeed, since the midsummer his campaign, which had begun in Washington, had been well under way. In the autumn of 1911 he seemed to have the unanimous support of the Progressives.

Meanwhile the uncertain factor in the situation was Theodore Roosevelt. Since his return from Europe the colonel, both in his speeches and in his editorials as "contributing editor" on the staff of the *Outlook*, had been recommending Progressive policies. The defeat of his candidate for governor of New York in the autumn of 1910 had been hailed by his enemies as the end of his political influence, but that it did not really injure his popularity was shown by the enthusiastic reception which he met on a speaking tour through the West the following year. He professed the whole Progressive creed: "I am a progressive," he wrote to the organization in Jersey City; "I could not be anything else. We must work and we must fight for the restoration of popular rule, trying to secure direct primaries, strict election laws, and corrupt-practices acts, popular election of United States Senators, . . . and, with careful limitations

and safeguards, the referendum and initiative, when these are shown to be needed." Still he declined the invitation to join the league, although his intimate political associates, like ex-Secretary Garfield and Gifford Pinchot, were members. He showed no hesitancy in committing himself to principles, but he would not commit himself to an organization embodying those principles.

The fact was that Colonel Roosevelt was in a very embarrassing position. He had made Taft president and had vouched for him as a man after his own heart. He now found that he had been mistaken in his estimate of Taft's courage and consistency. "It took ten months," he wrote to Lawrence F. Abbott in 1912, "to convince me that he [Taft] was a first-class lieutenant but no leader, with no real conviction or appreciation of the magnitude of the really vital problems before this country."¹ He believed the President to be under the influence of the reactionary elements in Congress, and differed from him on many points of policy, such as the veto of the Arizona statehood bill, the management of public lands, the adequacy of the Sherman act of 1890 to curb the trusts effectually, and readiness to submit "all differences hereafter arising between the High Contracting parties which it has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy" to the permanent court of arbitration at the Hague, as provided in the treaties of arbitration which Taft had negotiated with Great Britain and France in the summer of 1911. Still Roosevelt, while freely criticizing the administration of his former protégé, was not willing (or not yet ready) to enter the lists against him. He believed that Taft would be renominated in 1912, for he knew by the experiences of 1904 and 1908 what enormous influence the administration exercised. Whatever may have been his views as to the ultimate expediency of a contest with Taft, he preferred for the time being to remain silent on the subject and, as it were, give the President "enough rope to hang himself." However, the open avowal of La Follette's candidacy in the spring of 1911, far too early for good

¹ Lawrence F. Abbott, "Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt," p. 69.

political strategy, forced Roosevelt's hand. Hints and hopes of his willingness to run began to appear in the press. Appeals came to him to put himself at the head of the Progressive movement as the only man in the country strong enough with the masses to carry the movement to success. More than "thrice" he put aside the offer of the crown "with the back of his hand," like Cæsar. He did not say categorically that he would not be a candidate, but he asked that "no movement should be made to bring him forward for the nomination," and that "the talk of [his] supposed candidacy should cease." It became increasingly evident, as the year 1911 drew toward its close, that the ardent Roosevelt men believed that he would accept the nomination. One by one they grew cool toward La Follette, evidently seeking a pretext for canceling their pledges to the Wisconsin senator.

La Follette's long and bitter arraignment of Roosevelt's behavior in 1911, in using him as a "stalking horse" for the nomination until he himself was ready to come to the front and capture the prize, must be read in the senator's "Autobiography" (pp. 530-619). Time and again the La Follette managers tried in vain to get such definite announcement from Roosevelt as would halt his friends in their efforts to substitute him for La Follette. And it is difficult to controvert the common-sense statement of the latter that "there was no way in which Roosevelt as a private citizen could be embarrassed by a statement that he would not under any circumstances be a candidate for the Republican nomination—*unless he intended to be a candidate*" (p. 590). On December 23, 1911, Roosevelt wrote a letter to William B. Howland, which was first made public by Mr. Howland's son, H. J. Howland, in his "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," in the *Yale Chronicles of America* (1921). This important letter furnishes an explanation of the situation which developed early in the convention year of 1912 and, in spite of Roosevelt's continued disclaimer, reveals him as a virtual candidate for the nomination. He says: "There is a strong undercurrent of feeling about me. The people are looking for leadership.

My article on the McNamaras¹ possesses the merit of being clear cut, and many plain people turned to me as leader. Taft is very weak, but La Follette has not developed real strength east of the Mississippi, except, of course, in Wisconsin. West of the river he has a large following, though there is a good deal of opposition to him even in states like Kansas, Washington, and California. East of the Mississippi, I believe he can pick up only a few delegates here and there.² Taft will have most of the Southern delegates, and he will have the office-holders, also the tepid and acquiescent, rather than the active, support of the ordinary people who do not feel very strongly one way or the other, and who think it is the usual thing to renominate a President. If there were a strong candidate against him, he would, I believe, be beaten; but there are plenty of men who are against him, but who are even more against La Follette, and who regard themselves as limited to the alternative between the two. There is, of course, always the danger [!] that there may be a movement for me. . . . I most emphatically do not wish the nomination. Personally, I should regard it as a calamity to be nominated. . . . But I have to tell the La Follette men and the Taft men that, while I am not a candidate and do not wish the nomination, yet I do not feel it would be right or proper for me to say that under no circumstances would I accept it if it came. Because, while wildly improbable [!], it is yet possible that there might be a public demand which would present the matter to me in the light of a duty which I could not shirk." His name had already been put on the primary ballot of Nebraska!

Meanwhile President Taft had no illusions as to his availability for a second term. There is nothing to show that he ever

¹ On December 1, 1911, James B. and John J. McNamara, active in the International Association of Bridge and Structural Ironworkers, were tried for the dynamiting of the *Los Angeles Times* building in October, 1910, in which several lives were lost. James McNamara pleaded guilty and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. His brother, who confessed complicity in this and other dynamiting outrages, was sentenced to fifteen years.

² La Follette had in the convention, as it turned out, only 36 out of the 382 popularly instructed delegates from the dozen states in which the presidential primaries were in force, as against 278 instructed for Roosevelt.

altered his mind on the justice or wisdom of his position on the tariff, the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, the railroad bill, Canadian reciprocity, or the arbitration treaties, in spite of the opposition which these measures aroused. But he appreciated the full force of the opposition. He spoke of himself as "a one-term President," like Hayes and John Quincy Adams. To an enthusiastic supporter who introduced him as "the next President," at a meeting in Salt Lake City during a Western trip in 1911, he replied, "That young man is a better Republican than prophet." He defined his idea of progressivism as "going along in the middle of the road between the reactionaries on the one hand and the extreme radicals on the other." After the Supreme Court decisions against the Standard Oil and tobacco trusts in the spring of 1911, which were the first instances of the "dissolution" of the great industrial combinations, he instituted fifteen new prosecutions. He secured judgment in the Federal courts in the bathtub trust, electric-lamp trust, the Du Pont powder trust, and the Southern Grocers' Association. He made the trusts the chief subject of his speeches on his Western trip, declaring that the prosecution under the Sherman act should "go on." In his annual message of December, 1911, he reiterated his purpose. The most sweeping indictment in the history of trust prosecutions was brought by Attorney-General Wickersham against the United States Steel Corporation in October, 1911. All told, there were 45 indictments and 22 bills in equity brought against the trusts in the Taft administration, as against 25 indictments and 18 bills under Roosevelt. And yet it is Roosevelt and not Taft who is known as the "trust buster."¹

¹ In an article on "The Trusts, the People, and a Square Deal" in the *Outlook* of November 18, 1911, Roosevelt condemned the attempt to regulate the trusts by a succession of lawsuits to restore competition as "just as foolish as if we should go back to the flintlocks of Washington's Continentals." He was in favor of strengthening government control by the creation of "some commission similar to the Interstate Commerce Commission, which in extreme cases should even regulate trust prices." The capitalist press agreed with him, at least in the negative part of his criticism. The New York *Sun* said, "There can be no substantial or continuing prosperity as long as the normal operations of business are conducted under the threat of grand-jury proceedings and the shadow of the penitentiary."

Secretary Ballinger and Attorney-General Wickersham were not the only members of Taft's cabinet to draw the criticism of the insurgents. A marked tendency on the part of the State Department to use our influence in the Latin-American countries and in the Near East and Far East to further American financial and commercial interests at the expense of disinterested political friendship came to be known as "dollar diplomacy." An example is furnished by Oscar S. Straus in his autobiography, entitled "Under Four Administrations." When Mr. Straus, serving for the third time as envoy to Constantinople, was busy with negotiations for the protection of American educational and religious interests in the Turkish empire, he was offended by a cable from Secretary Knox to the effect that those interests were "in fact receiving treatment in substance entirely satisfactory," and that "the chief influence should at present be centered upon a substantial advancement of our prestige and commerce." The administration was also criticized for its support of the proposition that the New York bankers should participate in the great six-power loan of \$300,000,000 to China in 1912. The loan was made on terms objectionable to the new Chinese republic, in that they permitted foreign control of certain sources of taxation as a guaranty of the safety of the investors. The critics of the dollar diplomacy pointed not only to the temptation to the exploitation of weaker peoples, toward whom the traditional policy of our country had been one of sympathetic aid, but also to the danger of our being drawn into military and naval expenditures for the protection of threatened financial interests of our citizens in countries of unstable governments.

Force was given to this warning during the entire year of 1911 by the condition of our neighbor on the southern border. In November, 1910, a revolution against the long-continued dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz broke out in the northern provinces of the republic of Mexico. The revolt, headed by Francisco Madero, made such rapid progress that in May, 1911, Díaz found it advisable to resign and retire with his family to Spain. In October, Madero was elected president in his stead; but the

revolution had aroused political ambitions in the breasts of several Mexican generals, who in the next decade contended with each other in civil war, like the commanders of the Roman armies after the death of Nero. President Taft ordered twenty thousand United States troops to mobilize in San Antonio Texas, close to the Mexican boundary, March 8, ostensibly for "field manœuvres," but really for the protection of the property and lives of our citizens on both sides of the border. At the same time two thousand marines were sent to our naval station at Guantanamo, Cuba, and five warships were directed to sail for Galveston. The troops were ordered to patrol the Mexican border to prevent the supply of arms or ammunition to the revolutionists. Much of the fighting in the spring of 1911 was very close to the boundary between the United States and Mexico, and American citizens were killed in Douglas, Arizona (April 17), and El Paso, Texas (May 8), by wild bullets fired in the battles of Agua Prieta and Juarez immediately opposite these towns. Demands for reprisals were made by Governor Sloan of Arizona and Senator Stone of Missouri, but the President held strictly to his policy of nonintervention, warning the warring Mexican factions to be more careful to confine their fighting within the boundaries of their own country. After Madero's victory and election Taft took advantage of the authority granted him by Congress to put an embargo on the export of arms from the United States to the revolutionists (March 14, 1912). For about a year thereafter affairs in Mexico gave us less anxiety, although Senator Lodge of Massachusetts and Senators Catron and Fall from the newly admitted state of New Mexico were persistent critics of Taft's "supineness" in the matter of defending our national honor.¹ Just at the end of President Taft's term, however, a new revolution broke out in

¹ Lodge was especially disturbed over the rumor that a Japanese company was attempting to secure land near Magdalena Bay in the Mexican peninsula of Lower California to be used as a naval base by the Japanese government. In spite of Secretary Knox's transmission to the Senate of the Japanese ambassador's "unreserved and categorical denial of the rumored purchase," Lodge put through the Senate (July 31, 1912) a resolution to the effect that "when any harbor or other place on the American continents was so situated that the occupation thereof for

Mexico, which, as we shall see later, led not only to our interference in the political situation but even to the intervention of our military and naval forces.

If the last two years of Taft's presidency had come first, he would have undoubtedly been in a much stronger position before the country; for the record of his last two years—at least from the unfortunate extra session of 1911—was one of increasing efficiency and dignity. He secured an eight-hour law for all workers under contract with the government. He enlarged the civil service by adding to the assistant postmasters and clerks in the first-class and second-class post offices, whom he had classified in 1910, the forty-two thousand rural free deliverers and all the remaining fourth-class postmasters. He extended the principles of the civil service to the lower positions in the diplomatic corps and provided statutory safeguards against hasty and arbitrary removals. He supported the constitutional amendments for the income tax and the direct election of senators. He instituted the parcel post. But all this, and much more that he did, failed to redeem the shortcomings of the earlier days. The test had come at the outset of his administration. He had his opportunity then to put himself at the head of the forces of reform that were gathering strength in the country and to lead them to victory. Had he withstood Aldrich and Hale as President Cleveland withstood Gorman and Brice, he might have prevented, as Cleveland could not prevent, the passage of a tariff bill which betrayed the party pledges. Had he even withheld his signature from the Payne-Aldrich bill, as Cleveland did from the Wilson-Gorman bill, he would at least have preserved his own reputation against the charge of subserviency to the big business interests. The Payne-Aldrich tariff was decisively condemned by the country at large. It was not satisfactory to President Taft himself. And yet he took the line of least resistance and signed the bill, and therewith his own political death

naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or safety of the United States," our government could not "without grave concern" see any non-American power take possession of those places. The Lodge resolution was approved as a necessary consequence of the Monroe Doctrine.

warrant. He never could retrieve that act. "Opportunity is bald behind." The day of President Taft's opportunity passed on August 5, 1909. The tide of popular government was running strong when he was inaugurated. He failed to take it at the flood, and all the voyage of his official life was "bound in shallows and in miseries."

1912—A STORY OF THREE CONVENTIONS

That peculiarly inelastic feature of the American Constitution which confers upon the president a popular dictatorship of four years, and then submits to a country-wide referendum the question of whether that dictatorship shall be renewed for a second four years or transferred to a rival candidate, inevitably focuses the attention of the government and the people upon the campaign of a "presidential year" to the neglect of other political business. While the administration in most of the European countries is doubly "responsible" to the people, in that its ministers are virtually a committee of the majority of the elected parliaments or chambers and can be changed at any time by a reversal of "confidence" in the chambers or an appeal to a general election, the sole American executive (the president) is neither beholden to Congress for his office nor responsible to Congress for his administration, nor, except for the remote contingency of impeachment for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," is he removable during his four years' term. The power vested in the president to shape our policies, both domestic and foreign, by his unhampered choice of the heads of the executive departments, his enormous patronage, his sole initiative in diplomacy, and his supreme command of the military and naval forces of the United States, makes the high office a prize to be fought for in the quadrennial contest of the parties, even when no great issues are at stake. But in times of stress and crisis, when conflicting conceptions of national duty and honor are arrayed against one another, the destiny of the republic may depend upon the people's choice of a leader. Who can compute the consequences for our future history if

Thomas Jefferson had not won his fight for a democratic against an aristocratic republic in 1800? if Abraham Lincoln had been defeated in 1860 or repudiated in 1864? if Populism had triumphed with Bryan in 1896?

The issue in 1912 did not present a parallel to the cases just mentioned, for history, with its infinite variety and combination of factors, never "repeats itself." Neither the nation's credit nor the nation's existence was at stake. Nevertheless the crisis was fairly comparable to the Jeffersonian revolution of more than a century before. In both cases a movement for a more complete expression of the people's will in government, which had been gathering strength for a decade, came to the test with the doctrines and practices of a less democratic régime. In Jefferson's day it was a struggle for emancipation from the aristocratic control of "the rich, the well-born, and the able," who claimed the right to the offices of government as a "ruling class" set over the people by virtue of social eminence or even of divine decree. In 1912 it was a fight for the liberation of the government from the control of the big business interests, which, it was felt, were dictating legislation, stifling wholesome competition, and limiting the exercise of the talents of the people at large by an economic despotism quite as arbitrary and even more deplorable than the social despotism of the early years of the republic. For, as Roosevelt wrote to Sir Edward Grey, there was "something to be said for a great aristocracy which has furnished leaders for generations," but "absolutely nothing to be said for a government by a plutocracy—by men gifted with the 'money touch,' but with ideals which in their essence are merely those of so many glorified pawnbrokers."

At the opening of the presidential year the situation in the Republican party, which had been in power for four administrations, was as follows: The Taft supporters had little hope that their candidate could be reelected, but they were determined to nominate him to prevent the party from falling into the hands of the Progressives, whom Taft in a speech before the Republican Club of New York described as "extremists who would hurry us into a condition which would find no parallel except in the

French Revolution or in that babbling anarchy that once characterized the South American republics." Senator La Follette was still the acknowledged candidate of the Progressives, although important leaders in the movement, like Garfield, the Pinchots, Gilson Gardner, and Medill McCormick, were turning to Roosevelt as the only man who could carry the ticket to victory. Roosevelt himself, as we have seen, was still protesting that he did not want the nomination, but at the same time he refused to declare that he would not accept it if it came "in the light of a duty" which he "could not shirk." The light broke in February, 1912. On the second of that month La Follette, who was under an exceptional physical and mental strain at the moment, made an interminable and incoherent speech at the banquet of the Periodical Publishers' Association at Philadelphia, which was seized upon as a proof that he had "collapsed" mentally. Gifford Pinchot telegraphed on February 10 to the president of the Roosevelt Club in St. Paul, Minnesota, "In my judgment, La Follette's condition makes further serious candidacy impossible." On the same day a group of seven Republican governors and seventy other influential men of the party met at Chicago to boom Roosevelt's candidacy. The governors¹ sent a joint letter to the colonel, urging him to sink his personal objections for the sake of "the happiness and prosperity of the country," and to respond to a "plain patriotic duty." "A large majority of the Republicans of the country," said the letter, "favor your nomination, and a large majority of the people favor your election as the next President of the United States." Roosevelt had not yet replied to the letter when President Taft made the attack on the Progressives mentioned a few lines above. That attack left Roosevelt no alternative to entering the fight. For it was not only the progressive ideas which he had been advocating in his speeches and writings that were scored by the President, but the progressive leaders themselves were referred to as "emotionalists" and "neurotics." "If Mr. Taft had de-

¹ They were Bass of New Hampshire, Hadley of Missouri, Osborn of Michigan, Carey of Wyoming, Glasscock of West Virginia, Stubbs of Kansas, and Aldrich of Nebraska.

signed to goad Roosevelt into acceptance of the proposal of the governors," says Bishop ("Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," Vol. II, p. 317), "he could hardly have hit upon a surer means." On February 24, Roosevelt wrote to the governors, "I will accept the nomination for the presidency if it is tendered to me, and I will adhere to this decision until the convention has expressed its preference." His "hat was in the ring."

Since a dozen of the states had the system of preferential presidential primaries in 1912, there was a hot pre-convention fight for delegates. It began in North Dakota on March 19 and ended (only a few days before the meeting of the convention) in South Dakota on June 4. The result was a great victory for Roosevelt. He carried Illinois by a majority of 138,400 over Taft, and Taft's own state of Ohio by 47,000. He won 67 of the 76 delegates from Pennsylvania. Nebraska, Oregon, California, New Jersey, Maryland, and South Dakota instructed their delegates for him. Of the 382 delegates to the convention from the states in which the primaries were held, Roosevelt received 278, Taft 68, and La Follette 36 (from Wisconsin and North Dakota). It was perfectly evident then, that so far as the Republican voters of the country had a chance to express their choice for a candidate, Roosevelt was their choice.

In three fourths of the states, however, the delegates to the national convention were still chosen by the state conventions. It was here that the administration had the great advantage. This was notoriously true in the case of the solid Democratic South, where the Republican conventions represented "neither party, people, nor principles." President Taft had himself said in the winter of 1908 that the Republican remnant in the South was "no longer to be run for convention votes" as it had been since Mark Hanna's pre-convention campaign for McKinley in 1896. Yet that was exactly what was done in 1912, when the Southern delegates were absolutely necessary to Taft's renomination. In the convention of 1908 he had had 338 delegates from states which did not give him a single vote in the electoral college. These 338 were more than the combined delegation of New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts,

Indiana, and Iowa, from which states he received 167 of his 321 electoral votes. The same story was repeated in 1912. When the test came between the Taft candidate, Elihu Root, and the Roosevelt candidate, Governor McGovern of Wisconsin, for the temporary chairmanship in the Chicago convention (June 18), Root secured the delegates from Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and the other states south of Mason and Dixon's line, where the Republican organization was a "political sham," but won a majority in only four of the states of the North and West (New York, Michigan, Indiana, and Iowa). McGovern carried the Dakotas, Minnesota, Nebraska, and New Jersey solidly, with 24 of the 26 votes of California, 34 out of 38 from Ohio, 49 out of 58 from Illinois, 64 out of 76 from Pennsylvania, and so on. Mr. Root won the chairmanship by a vote of 558 to 502; but when he stepped to the front of the platform to make his "keynote speech," he was greeted with cries of "Receiver of stolen goods!"

The charge of theft referred not to the support of the Southern delegates, which was legitimate though grossly inequitable, but to the manipulation of the convention roll by the national committee. Every national convention, before its dissolution, chooses a committee consisting of a member from each of the states and territories (including the District of Columbia, Alaska, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines) which holds over until the next convention, and represents the permanent organization of the party. It is the business of the committee to summon the new convention and to make up the temporary roll of delegates, which is confirmed by the convention's committee on credentials. The national committee, which met at Chicago ten days before the opening of the convention, had a single object in view, and that was to prevent the Progressives from getting a majority of the delegates. Of the fifty-three members of the committee, fifteen had been defeated in their contest for election to the convention, ten were representatives of Southern states which would not contribute a single vote to the Republican electoral column, and four were from territories that had no vote at all in the election. Thus a majority of the

committee which was to decide the complexion of the convention consisted of men who were to have either no part in the work of the convention or no influence in the results of the election. There were contests for 254 out of the 1078 seats in the convention. Many of these contests were instituted by the Roosevelt backers in the South "for psychological effect," to offset the Southern Taft delegates, who were being used to balance the delegations instructed adversely to Taft in the Roosevelt states of the North and West. The committee, with a Taft majority of more than two thirds (37 to 16), decided not only the "bogus" contests of the South, but practically all the real contests, in favor of the President. Its animus was shown by the remark of a Taft committeeman from Kansas to a Roosevelt member: "We can't elect Taft, but we are going to hold on to this organization, and when we get back four years from now, we will have it and not those d——d insurgents." Altogether 235 of the contested seats were given to Taft and but 19 to Roosevelt. This gave Taft 560 delegates in the convention, or 20 more than a majority. Roosevelt claimed that between 80 and 90 of his delegates were "stolen"; and La Follette, who was hostile to Roosevelt and wished to show that the colonel could not have controlled the convention anyway, admits that "some justification could be found" for counting 49 of the contested seats for Roosevelt.¹ An example of the committee's methods is shown in the case of California. That state had adopted a law providing for the election of delegates on a general state ticket. The state went for Roosevelt by a majority of over two to one, but the committee seated two delegates from a single district which was favorable to Taft, on the ground that a state law could not override the party convention rules. This "high-

¹ Senator Borah, a Republican member of the committee, who attended all the sessions, claims that 52 delegates were stolen from Roosevelt. Mr. A. W. Dunn, who also sat in the committee room for eight days, "watching the wheels go round," estimates that 51 Roosevelt men were deprived of seats to which they were entitled, and that "there would have been more" if it had been necessary, for the men who controlled the committee were "determined that Roosevelt should not again have the nomination of the Republican party" ("From Harrison to Harding," Vol. II, p. 174).

handed" defeat of the popular will was accomplished in spite of the language of the call of the national committee on December 12, 1911: "The election of delegates to the convention shall be held in conformity with the laws of the state in which the election occurs."

After a hundred and forty contests had been decided against him to only one in his favor, Roosevelt thought it was time to go to Chicago to look after his interests. But his presence was of little avail. He was not a delegate to the convention, and Mr. Root would certainly not have looked with favor on a request from him to be allowed to address the convention, as some of his supporters urged. Not only were the seventy-four delegates against whose right on the floor Roosevelt particularly protested admitted to seats, but by the ruling of the chair they were permitted to vote for the committee on credentials, which would pass upon their claims. When this final drive of the "steam roller" had been accomplished, and the "committee-made majority" had, in Mr. Bryan's words, "voted itself the convention," Roosevelt announced that he was "through." He declared that the convention was not representative of the Republican party, and that the man who accepted the nomination at its hands would be "the beneficiary of a successful fraud." His delegates either left the hall or refrained from further participation in the proceedings. "We shall sit in protest," said Governor Allen of Kansas, "and the people who sent us here shall judge us."¹

The convention thereupon adopted a platform pointing with pride to the achievements of sixteen years of Republican rule, and especially extolling the administration of President Taft

¹ That not all the disappointed delegates were agreed in this passive attitude is testified by Mr. A. W. Dunn, who says: "From the beginning of the convention there was talk of riot and there were rumors of an attempt on the part of the Roosevelt men to use 'strong arm' methods. At every session of the convention there were many policemen in every aisle, while the routes leading in from each entrance were crowded with policemen, who were ready to rush in at a signal" ("From Harrison to Harding," Vol. II, p. 178). Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, another eye-witness, confirms this report of threatened violence in her recently (1923) published autobiography, "From Pinafores to Politics" (pp. 98-101).

for "an unexampled amount of constructive legislation, framed and passed in the interests of the people and in obedience to their wish." It rebuked the alleged radicalism of the Progressives by declaring for a "self-controlled representative democracy, which is a government of laws and not of men, and in which order is the prerequisite of progress." Only Taft and La Follette were put in nomination, the former by Warren G. Harding of Ohio, who, without meaning to be humorous, called the President "the greatest progressive of the age." On the first ballot Taft received 561 votes, or 21 more than the necessary majority. Roosevelt received 107 votes, La Follette 41, Cummins 17, Hughes 2, and 344 delegates answered "present but not voting." La Follette in his "Autobiography" contends that the result of the ballot shows that Roosevelt never had a real chance of being nominated. For, adding to the 107 votes that he got the 344 that were not cast and the 49 that he might with "some show of justification" claim for fraudulently seated delegates, his total would have been only an even 500, or 40 less than a majority. But this reasoning will not hold. If Taft had not been nominated on the first ballot, as he would not have been had even half of the Roosevelt contestants been seated, it is more than likely that on subsequent ballots the Cummins and Hughes delegates (and even some of the La Follette delegates themselves) would have rallied to the support of the leading Progressive. Certainly none of them would have gone over to Taft.

On the evening of June 22, immediately after the nomination of Taft and Sherman, the followers of Roosevelt gathered in Orchestra Hall and passed resolutions denouncing the action of the Republican convention and inviting Roosevelt to lead a third party. The colonel entered the hall amid a storm of cheers and made a short but stirring speech, declaring "the time has come when not only men who believe in Progressive principles but all men who believe in those elementary maxims of public and private morality which must underlie every form of successful free government should join our movement." He asked the delegates to go back to their homes to sound the senti-

ment of the people, and to reassemble in a mass convention to nominate a Progressive candidate on a Progressive platform, who could appeal to every section of our country, and "to Republicans and Democrats alike in the name of our common American citizenship." "If you wish me to make the fight," he said, "I will make it, even if only one state should support me. I am in this fight for certain principles, and the first and most important of these goes back to Sinai, and is embodied in the command, 'Thou shalt not steal.' Thou shalt not steal a nomination . . . thou shalt not steal from the people the birthright of the people to rule themselves. . . . We stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord."

Roosevelt's opponents made merry over his Biblical fervor and his sudden conversion to the Eighth Commandment, pointing to the fact that he had been perfectly willing in two preceding conventions to accept the votes of the "sham delegates" from the South, and to have contests decided by the national committee when it was under his own control. His objection to the steam roller in 1912, they said, was only that he was under it instead of sitting on top of it—after all a natural objection. He should phrase the commandment "Thou shalt not steal *from me*." The "regular" Republicans denied the charges of fraud or force. In making the notification speech to President Taft on August 1, Elihu Root congratulated him upon a nomination obtained "entirely in accordance with the rules of law governing the party and founded upon justice and common sense." And the President, in his speech of acceptance, congratulated the party on being saved from a man "whose recently avowed political views would have committed it to radical proposals involving dangerous changes in our present constitutional form of republican government and our independent judiciary."¹ He condemned the radicals for pandering to a

¹ Mr. Roosevelt, in a speech before the Ohio constitutional convention at Columbus, February 21, 1912, had advocated the recall of judicial decisions; that is, the submission to a popular referendum of any decision of the supreme court of a state declaring a state law unconstitutional. As hundreds of such decisions were rendered every year, this suggestion was widely hailed as an important step in the

spirit of popular unrest, which had been stirred by the demagogues and the "yellow press," and which, so far from reflecting any worthy desire for reform, only aided the socialists and the communists in their campaign for the overthrow of our Constitution. He looked upon the devices of direct government as nostrums to encourage the discontent of the mob rather than measures for political or economic betterment. "Referendums do not pay rent or furnish houses," he said, "recalls do not furnish clothes, initiatives do not supply employment or relieve inequalities of condition or of opportunity." To which the Progressives replied that these devices might well aid in securing laws which would grapple more vigorously with the inequalities of conditions and opportunities than had the conspicuous legislation of Mr. Taft's administration.

Three days after the Republican convention at Chicago had adjourned in gloom and schism and torrid heat, the Democrats met in joy and still more torrid heat at Baltimore. Their hopes were high. They had only to nominate a candidate of the reform type to be reasonably sure of success, whether Roosevelt should head a third party or not. For they knew that in the former case the colonel, in spite of his appeal "to Republicans and Democrats alike in the name of our common American citizenship," would draw his votes from the conservative Republican candidate; and in the latter case thousands of the Progressive Republicans would vote for the Democratic nominee, as they had done in the Mugwump campaign of 1884. There were many aspirants for the nomination, including Governors Folk of Missouri, Foss of Massachusetts, Baldwin of Connecticut, Marshall of Indiana, Burke of North Dakota, and other "favorite sons"; but the results of the primaries narrowed the number of serious contestants to four: Governor Judson Harmon of Ohio, Governor Woodrow Wilson of New

direction of popular government, and Colorado embodied the scheme in a constitutional amendment of the same year. The idea made little headway, however, and was entirely dropped when Congress by the Judiciary act of 1916 allowed an appeal to be made to the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of state laws being declared unconstitutional by the state courts on the ground of their conflict with the Federal Constitution.

Jersey, Representative Oscar Underwood of Alabama, and the Speaker of the House, J. Beauchamp ("Champ") Clark of Missouri. Governor Harmon, however, was handicapped by the fact that he was a conservative, and somewhat identified with the corporation interests, at a time when a "progressive" nomination was imperative. Representative Underwood was under the double handicap of being both a conservative and a Southerner. It was evident from the opening of the convention that the fight was between Champ Clark and Wilson, each of whom had more votes on the first ballot than all the other candidates combined, and from two to three times as many as their nearest competitor, Harmon.

The most notable feature of the convention was the influence exercised by William J. Bryan. Though not a candidate for the nomination himself, Bryan dictated the platform and inspired the general tone of the proceedings at Baltimore as thoroughly as he had done at Denver four years before. In fact, ever since his first campaign in 1896, with the exception of the brief eclipse of 1904, the Nebraskan had wielded an almost despotic power over the Democratic party. His rôle at Baltimore was still that of the champion of the plain people against the "interests." At the very outset, before he had the chance to exercise his superb powers of persuasion upon the convention, he was defeated for the temporary chairmanship by the conservative candidate, Judge Parker (579 to 510), through the division of the Clark forces, who wished to conciliate both sides. But after that initial setback Bryan was supreme. He declined the permanent chairmanship, preferring to use his power on the floor. But his staunch lieutenant, Ollie James of Kentucky, was put in the chair. He censored the delegates and even proposed to have August Belmont of New York and Thomas F. Ryan of Virginia, conspicuous representatives of the big business interests, removed from the convention. He carried by an enormous majority the resolution that the convention should nominate no candidate identified with "the privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class." And when the opportune moment came he swung the delegates from the candidate who had led on every

ballot, and whose nomination had been virtually conceded by his nearest rival, to the man of his own choice.

The Nebraskan delegation which Bryan headed had been instructed for Champ Clark, who had beaten Wilson in the primary elections by more than 200,000 votes, although he had not thereby gained anywhere near enough delegates to insure his nomination. There were 1088 delegates in the convention, and as the Democratic rule which had been applied for seventy years required a two-thirds majority for nomination,¹ 726 votes were necessary to a choice. On the first ballot Clark had 440½ votes, Wilson 324, Harmon 148, Underwood 117½, with 58 divided between other names. On the eight successive ballots the relative Clark and Wilson strength remained about the same. But on the tenth ballot the New York delegation under Charles F. Murphy, the leader of Tammany Hall, transferred its 90 votes from Harmon to Clark, making the count Clark 556, Wilson 360½. It was at this point, as Mr. Tumulty tells the story,² that Wilson gave up the hope of the nomination and prepared a telegram of congratulation to Clark. But it was at this point also that Mr. Bryan stepped in. On the fourteenth ballot he announced that the vote of Nebraska, in spite of the primary instructions, would no longer be given to a candidate who had accepted the support of the New York delegation. He threw his strength to Wilson, who began to creep up steadily until on the twenty-eighth ballot he forged ahead of Clark, and on the forty-sixth was nominated by 990 of the 1088 votes of the convention.

It was a bitter disappointment to Speaker Clark, who, like Roosevelt, could claim from the verdict of the primary elections

¹ The rule had been adopted in the interests of the proslavery South (which could control a third but not a half of the delegates to a national convention) in order to prevent the nomination of a candidate hostile to the "peculiar institution." After the Civil War there was no further reason for the rule. The convention of 1896 had been ready to repeal it if it threatened to interfere with the nomination of Bryan, and the convention of 1904 had come near repealing it when a bogus telegram (from Judge Parker) was read, demanding the insertion of a gold plank in the Democratic platform.

² J. P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," p. 138.

that he was the popular choice of his party for the nomination, and who, unlike Roosevelt, could point to an unbroken plurality in the convention, until he was "betrayed" by his pledged supporter, Bryan. From the tenth to the eighteenth ballot Clark even had a majority of the votes of the delegates—and there was only one instance on record in the history of the party (that of Van Buren in 1844) when a candidate who had received a majority vote in the convention had failed of nomination. Under Republican rules Clark would have been nominated on the tenth ballot. Furthermore, Clark resented as a gross slander Bryan's charge that he was in any sense beholden to Tammany, Hearst, or the Morgan-Belmont-Ryan interests, and branded Bryan's righteous indignation against the New York delegation as the rankest hypocrisy. Bryan himself had eagerly accepted the support of Tammany in 1900 and in 1908. He had said in a speech at Madison Square Garden in the former year, "Great is Tammany, and Croker is its Prophet." He had sent Senator Pettigrew across the continent twice in 1908, first to beg the support of Murphy for his nomination and then to ask the support of both Murphy and Hearst at the polls. "His theory seems to have been," said Clark, "that Tammany is a great and beneficent institution when for Bryan, but a lot of scoundrels when for anybody else."¹ Professor W. E. Dodd says that "Clark, Underwood and Harmon, were understood to have permitted an agreement among their lieutenants, whereby their interests were to be pooled against Wilson, who was very popular with the people";² but if such an agreement existed, it was not carried out. On any of the ballots from the tenth to the eighteenth Underwood could have converted Clark's majority into a two-thirds majority by throwing his strength to him.

On the day after Governor Wilson's nomination Champ Clark gave a statement to the press thanking his friends for their support, pledging himself to support the nominee of the party, and concluding with the words, "I lost the nomination solely through the vile and malicious slanders of Colonel William J.

¹ Champ Clark, "My Quarter Century of American Politics," Vol. I, p. 422.

² W. E. Dodd, "Woodrow Wilson and his Work," p. 96.

Bryan of Nebraska." Clark had been a consistent supporter of Bryan since 1896. He was the choice of Bryan's state as expressed in the primaries. He had not, he claimed, received a penny for his campaign fund from T. F. Ryan, who had given over \$100,000 to the Underwood and Harmon managers. Bryan never attempted to prove the insinuation that Clark was beholden to the financiers. The most charitable view to take of his behavior at Baltimore is that he was so determined to keep the convention from any connection with the forces of reaction that he sacrificed the friend for whom the New York delegation voted. The most uncharitable is that he took vengeance on Clark for not helping him to defeat Judge Parker for the temporary chairmanship.¹ The nomination for the vice presidency went to Governor Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana. After the work of balloting was over, the platform was adopted. It denounced the tariff as a burden on the farmer, "who sells largely in free markets and buys almost entirely in the protected markets"; and a fraud on the laborer, whose wages in the most highly protected industries, such as cotton, wool, steel, and iron, were the lowest-paid in the country. It branded the trusts as "indefensible and intolerable private monopolies" with which the Republican administration had "compromised." It advocated popular government, rural credits, conservation, the creation of a department of labor, the declaration of the nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippines as soon as a stable government could be established, the adoption of a constitutional amendment making the president ineligible for reelection, and made the customary declarations in favor of economy, education, civil-service reform, generous pensions, and the equal protection of all American citizens.

¹ Bryan was not alone, however, in his suspicions of sinister influences at work for Clark. Franklin K. Lane wrote to President Mezes of the University of Texas (February 15, 1912) that Hearst's "malevolent influence" was being used "to kill off Wilson and nominate Clark" ("Letters of Franklin K. Lane" (1922), p. 88). George Harvey, who had repudiated his erstwhile protégé, Wilson, in December, 1911, and who was close to the New York financial magnates, was working tooth and nail for Clark. And Clark's manager in Virginia and the upper South, Senator Martin, was closely allied with Mr. Ryan.

The man whom the Democrats had nominated was of Scotch-Irish descent, with ancestors on both sides belonging to the Presbyterian ministry. Born at Staunton, Virginia, December 28, 1856, he had been graduated from Princeton and, after a short law course at the University of Virginia, had begun practice in Atlanta, Georgia. But academic attractions had drawn him away from his meager clientele. He had entered Johns Hopkins in the autumn of 1883 for the study of history under Professor Herbert B. Adams, who was introducing the German seminar method. Here, in the companionship of men like F. J. Turner, John Dewey, Albert Shaw, and J. Franklin Jameson, he had written his doctoral thesis on "Congressional Government," which won him a call to Bryn Mawr. After teaching at Bryn Mawr and Wesleyan colleges he had gone to Princeton in 1890 as professor of political science, and had been elected to the presidency of the university in 1902. As president of Princeton, he had waged a brave fight for seven years for the democratization of the college life. But in the spring of 1910 the opposition headed by Dean West and Professor (now President) J. G. Hibben had prevailed, and President Wilson was ready for a new field of activity. His work at Princeton had given him a wide reputation, which had been enhanced by his brilliant contributions to historical and political literature and his finished and forceful speeches. As early as 1906 Mr. George Harvey, the editor of *Harper's Weekly* and the *North American Review*, advertised him as the "predestined candidate" for the presidency, introducing him at a dinner of the Lotus Club in New York as the man who would open the way for the Eastern Democrats, who, like himself, were "tired of voting the Republican ticket," to return to the party.

As a stepping-stone to the presidency Mr. Wilson's friends had secured for him the Democratic nomination for governor of New Jersey in 1910, just at the moment when he was ready to retire from the university. The leaders of the Democratic machine in the state were willing to accept him for the votes that his eloquence would be likely to win, "trusting," as Professor Dodd says, "to his mere academic character and political in-

experience to make him either too timid or too conservative for the real work of reform."¹ They were right about the votes, for Wilson defeated his Republican opponent by 49,000 in a state which had given Taft a plurality of 82,000 two years before; but they were wrong about the academic timidity, as Governor Wilson stood firmly against the machine, using his influence with the legislature to defeat the Democratic boss, James Smith, who sought the election to the United States Senate in spite of the fact that the people in the primaries had designated James Martine as their choice. He also put through a program of reform legislation, including a stringent employers' liability act, a corrupt-practices act, a public-utilities act, and an electoral-reform act. He soon gained the reputation of being the most independent and progressive governor in the Eastern states, and in the autumn of 1911 his backers for the presidency arranged a Western speaking tour to enable him by his own persuasive personality to carry his interpretation of progressive democracy to his fellow citizens west of the Alleghenies and the Mississippi. He was an ideal candidate from the point of view of availability: a man without a record in national politics to be criticized by his opponents, and yet widely and favorably enough known by his work in New Jersey to entitle him to national recognition; a scholar whose published views on our Constitution and government were "safe" enough to suit the conservative East, and yet an executive who had always shown himself a true progressive; a combination of the "professor" and the "practical politician," which took the sneer of academic futility from the one title and the reproach of ignorant audacity from the other.

On the very day (August 7) that Governor Wilson was reading his speech of acceptance from the veranda of his summer cottage at Sea Girt, New Jersey, the man who was to give him the hardest fight for the presidency was nominated at Chicago. The Roosevelt committee, representing forty states of the Union, had sent out a call for a new convention to meet on the fifth of August. The two thousand delegates who assembled at Chicago

¹ W. E. Dodd, "Woodrow Wilson and his Work," p. 88.

formed a body unique in our history. It was more like "a family reunion or a great religious revival meeting than a political convention." There was a conspicuous lack of the professional politician, and nothing like a machine. Almost a score of women were among the delegates, and one of the most inspiring of the "keynote" speeches was made by Miss Jane Addams of Hull House. The "Battle Hymn of the Republic" and "Onward, Christian Soldiers" were sung over and over again with the zeal of a crusading army. The temporary chairman, ex-Senator Beveridge of Indiana, roused the assembly to a high pitch of enthusiasm by his plea for justice and social brotherhood in the place of the "savage individualism" which was robbing the people of their birthright of opportunity. "We mean to make human living easier," he said, "to free the hands of honest business, to protect womanhood, and save childhood." The next day Colonel Roosevelt was greeted as "the guest of the convention" by a demonstration of song and cheers which lasted for nearly an hour. He delivered a speech in the form of a "confession of faith," pledging himself anew to the program of reforms which he had been advocating since his plea for the "New Nationalism" at Osawatimie two years before. He called upon the men who had "come together to spend and be spent in the endless crusade against wrong" to gird themselves "for this great fight in the never-ending warfare for the good of mankind." He was nominated by acclamation as the candidate of the new Progressive party then formed, with Governor Hiram Johnson of California as his running mate. The two stood with clasped hands in a final tableau beneath the American flag and a banner inscribed with Kipling's lines:

But there is neither East nor West,
Border, nor breed, nor birth,
When two strong men stand face to face,
Though they come from the ends of the earth.

The platform of the Progressive party, like those of third parties generally, declared that both the old parties had proved

faithless to the duty of carrying out the people's will. "Behind the ostensible government," it said, "sits enthroned an invisible government, owning no allegiance and alleging no responsibility to the people. To destroy this invisible government, to dissolve the unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics, is the first task of the statesmanship of the day." The specific recommendations of the platform contained the whole program of direct government, with the promise of woman suffrage and "a more easy and expeditious way of amending the Federal Constitution." As against the Democratic doctrine of states' rights, the platform emphasized the need for a strong central government to control the trusts by legislative action rather than relying on lawsuits for their sham dissolution. A protective tariff was to be kept, in order to "maintain for labor an adequate standard of living," but the present unjust tariff should be subjected to "an immediate downward revision." The most significant part of the platform was its demand for legislation to improve the social conditions of the workers in the factories and on the farms; the prevention of industrial accidents, occupational diseases, overwork, and involuntary unemployment; the prohibition of child labor and night work for women; minimum-wage standards, and an eight-hour day in all continuous twenty-four-hour industries; full publicity as to wages, hours, and conditions of labor; the revival of agricultural credit and coöperation; and the creation of a department of labor in the cabinet.

A comparison of the Republican, Democratic, and Progressive platforms reveals far less difference than one would expect from their mutual denunciations. When the common planks are canceled out, there is not very much left that is distinctive. All three are conservative as contrasted with the Socialist platform published by the convention at Indianapolis on May 12, which demanded "the collective ownership and democratic management" of all the means of transportation and communication, of all large-scale industries, of grain elevators, stockyards, storage warehouses, and other distributing agencies; the abolition of the national Senate, the Federal district courts, and the veto

power of the president; the adoption of old-age pensions and state insurance—in short, “the transition from economic individualism to socialism, from wage slavery to free coöperation, from capitalist oligarchy to industrial democracy.” Taft, Roosevelt, and Wilson all claimed to be liberals, standing for sound progressive policies, but from the point of view of the Socialists their political contests reflected merely “superficial rivalries between competing capitalistic groups” and had “no issue of real value to the workers.”

In several of the states (Illinois, Michigan, Iowa, Indiana, New York, New Jersey) the new party formed regular organizations and put state tickets in the field. In other states (South Dakota, Washington, California) the Republican organization went over to the Progressives, and elsewhere there was considerable fusion between the Republicans and the Progressives. The campaign was marred by the continuance of the bitter personal controversy between Taft and Roosevelt, which had begun in the primary elections of the spring. Many of the personal grievances of Roosevelt against Taft, such as the dismissal of Pinchot or the failure to keep certain members of the cabinet,¹ seem rather trivial, but Roosevelt's desire for self-justification led him to magnify them. The very fact that he and Taft had been so close in their friendship gave a “news value” to their quarrel which the press was not slow to exploit. Still, it was by no means a personal motive against Taft that brought Roosevelt into the fight of 1912, against the earnest pleas of some of his

¹ Roosevelt was particularly anxious to have Garfield (Interior), Straus (Commerce and Labor), and Wright (War) retained in the cabinet, and claimed in a communication to Lawrence F. Abbott in January, 1912, that Taft had authorized him to say to the cabinet that these men would be kept (Abbott, “Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt,” p. 67). Not one of them was asked to stay by the new President. When Mr. H. H. Kohlsaat mentioned this to Taft on a visit to the White House in August, 1911, as the possible explanation of Roosevelt's unfriendliness, the President said, “But I didn't promise to appoint them.” He then showed Mr. Kohlsaat all the correspondence which had passed between him and Roosevelt since the election of 1908, upon which Kohlsaat's comment, in his “From McKinley to Harding” (p. 188), is, “Colonel Roosevelt's letters were so at variance with what he had told me the day before that I was dumbfounded.” At Mr. Taft's request these letters are not to be made public until after his death.

best friends, like Mr. Kohlsaas, William R. Thayer, and Judge Robert Grant. He believed, as he told the latter in February, 1912, that the rallying of the liberal elements of the country to a program of reform was the only way of preventing a socialistic revolution. He conducted a vigorous campaign, speaking to enthusiastic audiences in every section of the country.

Governor Wilson was no less active, but he sounded a different note of progressivism. It was the emancipation of the people rather than their protection which he stressed. "Free-men need no guardians" was his slogan. He did not believe that there was any group of men to whom we could afford to give the trusteeship of the people's welfare. He criticized Taft and Roosevelt as being associated with men who had arrogated to themselves the right of guardianship. They were willing to act *for* the people, but not *through* the people; to allow the middle class to have some share in prosperity, but not to originate it; to let prosperity trickle down upon the people in thin streams, but not well up from the people through their own unhampered energies. He preached the doctrine of economic liberalism. The evil thing about the trusts was not that they were large and rich, but that they had become powerful through the special favor of the government (the tariff) and by unfair practices in business. They had killed competition by crushing it out and buying it out. Take off the protective tariff, restore free competition, open the field of business to all comers on equal terms, and then let the men of enterprise and brains have their reward in as large and rich a business as they can honestly build up. The theory was attractive. But when the candidate was confronted with certain questions of a practical nature, such as the distinction between fair and unfair competition, or the way in which an enterprising man with a small capital could establish an independent business in steel, oil, sugar, or textiles where the modern plants cost millions of dollars, he took refuge in the statement that he was not so much interested in "specific measures and programs" as in "the new spirit of our politics." Obviously there could be no return to absolutely free competition unless the big industries and the economic accumulations


of capital were wiped out and a fresh start made. And when "enterprise and brains" had won their reward under free competition, would not the process of liquidation have to be repeated *ad infinitum*? Wilson criticized the plan of the public regulation of the trusts, which Roosevelt stressed, as a "partnership" between them and the government, in which "the firm will ostensibly be controlled by the senior partner (the government), but in which the junior partner (the trusts) will continue as heretofore to run the business." "There is no hope to be seen for the people of the United States," he said, "until the partnership is dissolved." But again he was confronted with the rather embarrassing question of how a government that was not strong enough to regulate the trusts was still powerful enough to destroy them. For certainly, to paraphrase John Marshall's famous dictum in the McCulloch case, the power to destroy is the power to regulate. It was Governor Wilson's stark individualism as an economic liberal and his states'-rights doctrine as a confirmed Democrat that colored his political theory here—a position which he modified considerably in his actual administration of the government.

Wilson carried forty states in November, giving him the unprecedented total of 435 votes in the electoral college. Roosevelt won in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, South Dakota, Washington, and California, with 88 votes. Taft carried only Vermont and Utah, with 4 votes each. The popular vote, however, showed large Roosevelt and Taft minorities. Indeed, outside the old slaveholding South from Virginia to Texas, Wilson did not have a popular majority in a single state of the Union, except Arizona. His total popular vote was 6,286,214 as compared with 4,126,020 for Roosevelt and 3,483,922 for Taft. Counting the 897,011 votes cast for Eugene V. Debs, who was for the fourth time the candidate of the Socialists, and the 258,002 cast for Chapin (Prohibitionist) and Reimer (Social Laborite), the majority of the popular vote against Wilson was 2,458,741. Like Lincoln, he received but 42 per cent of the vote of the country. But that is by no means a proof that he would not have been elected if the Republicans had not split.

For running against Taft alone he would have undoubtedly received, as a progressive candidate, a good many of the votes actually cast for Roosevelt; and running against Roosevelt alone he would have received, as a "safe" candidate, many of the votes actually cast for Taft. There were large numbers of Republicans in 1912 who were as tired of Roosevelt as the conservative Democrats were of Bryan. For all that, the outstanding feature of the election was its testimony to the general popularity of Roosevelt. That a man without the support of either of the great machines, heading a third party hastily formed and with some disaffection in its own ranks (for La Follette gave Roosevelt no support), should have polled over 4,000,000 votes, or nearly 30 per cent of the total number cast, was something of a triumph in itself. It was four times as large a vote as any independent candidate had received since the Civil War. Moreover, it was a personal tribute to Roosevelt; for he ran far ahead of the Progressive ticket in every state except New York, where his former cabinet officer, Oscar S. Straus, was the Progressive candidate for governor.¹

With the presidency the Democrats won also both branches of Congress, an advantage which they had not enjoyed since the days of Buchanan, except for one brief period (1893-1895) under Grover Cleveland. They would control the Sixty-third Congress by the slim margin of 51 to 45 in the Senate and the large majority of 291 to 144 in the House. They elected governors

¹ Straus received 393,000 votes in New York, and Roosevelt 389,000. Straus had tried in vain to prevent Roosevelt from advocating the recall of judicial decisions in his Columbus speech of February 21, 1912 (see page 519, note), fearing that it would be misinterpreted as an attack on the judiciary and used against him in the campaign. In his book "Under Four Administrations" (pp. 311-312) Mr. Straus says, "I believe now (1922), as I believed in 1912, that but for this unfortunate statement regarding judicial decisions, Roosevelt would have been reelected in 1912." William Draper Lewis, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania law school, says in his biography of Roosevelt (p. 343), "It would appear almost certain that if Roosevelt had either refrained from making this statement, or had carefully explained it to avoid misinterpretation, he would have been nominated at Chicago, and that the whole course of the recent history of the United States would have been other than it has been." We think both these judgments mistaken.



THE ELECTION OF 1912

in twenty-one of the thirty-five states where governors were chosen in 1912, including New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Nebraska. It was a Democratic year. Yet Wilson fell 123,000 below the Bryan vote of 1908 and more than 180,000 below the Bryan vote of 1896. The 100 per cent increase in the Socialist vote, in spite of the presence of two acknowledged "progressive" tickets in the field, shows the strength of the latent spirit of protest which cried, "A plague on both your houses!"

President Taft finished his discredited term with his usual buoyancy. In a speech before the Press Club at Washington a little before the end, he spoke of his eclipse as "due to the besetting sin of a disinclination for hard work." His record as governor of the Philippines and Secretary of War belied that confession, at least for the days before he became president. But the responsibility of the highest office in the land, which had been a stimulus to all our presidents with the exception of Buchanan, seemed rather to act as a deterrent on Taft's initiative. There is no doubt that Roosevelt was right in calling him a better lieutenant than leader. He disliked to "interfere" with Congress, as he told La Follette during the pendency of the Payne-Aldrich bill, and consequently he lost his opportunity of leading Congress. He traveled a good deal and was tempted to postpone important work until his return. The representatives of the press complained that his messages were never ready for them until the last minute before their delivery. He played golf a good deal and enjoyed social relaxation in the evening. Senator Foraker declared that the two chief reasons for his defeat in 1912 were golf and travel. The real reason, however, why the four years of apparently the greatest opportunity were just the four years of the least satisfaction in Mr. Taft's career is probably to be found in the fact already noted (see page 484), that he had the judicial and not the executive temperament.

In the recently published "Letters of Franklin K. Lane" (1922) there is an interesting judgment on Taft in the midst of his presidential term, written by a man of rare discrimination, who might well have been the Democratic nominee for the presi-

dency in 1920 had not his Canadian birth disqualified him. Lane was a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission by successive appointments by Roosevelt and Taft when he wrote to the former in the spring of 1910: "There is no feeling (or if there is any, it is negligible) that the President has been consciously disloyal to the policies which you inaugurated or to his public promises. He is patriotic, conscientious, and lovable. This was your own view as expressed to me, and this view has been confirmed by my personal experience with him. It is also, I believe, the judgment of the country at large. But the people do not feel that they control the government or that their interests will be safely guarded by a relationship that is purely diplomatic between the White House and Congress. In short, we have a new consciousness of democracy, largely resulting from your administration, and it is such that the character of government which satisfied the people of twenty years ago is found lacking today. Practically all the criticism to which this administration has been subjected arises out of the feeling that their opinions and desires have not been sufficiently consulted, and they are suspicious of everything and everybody that is not open and frank with them. Outside a few of the larger states the entire country is insurgent, and insurgency means revolt against taking orders" (p. 78). Rightly or wrongly, the country did feel that it was "taking orders" from the Aldriches, Canons, Ballingers, and Penroses, because the President hesitated to interpose his authority in behalf of the people.

Taft's cheerfulness in leaving the presidency is perhaps the best indication of how little he really wanted the office. His ambition was for a seat on the Supreme Court bench, an honor which, to his credit, he twice declined from a sense of duty. He had his reward in 1921, when President Harding appointed him Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to succeed the man whose promotion to that position had brought down so much criticism upon his own head eleven years before. He now (1924) enjoys the distinction of being the only man in our history who has held the two highest offices in the gift of the republic.

CHAPTER VIII

WOODROW WILSON, APOSTLE OF THE "NEW FREEDOM"

*The high-bred instincts of a better day
Ruled in his blood, when to be citizen
Rang Roman yet, and a free people's sway
Was not the exchequer of impoverished men.*

JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL

THE TRIPLE ATTACK ON PRIVILEGE

Since Abraham Lincoln's entrance into the White House no change of administration has been attended with more pronounced consequences for our history than was the transition from Taft to Wilson. The new President came into office with the consciousness of an immediate mission. There was something apocalyptic in his vision. He would "make all things new." His confession of faith published in "The New Freedom," just before his inauguration, abounds in prophecies of the new order for which the time was ripe. *Novus nascitur ordo rerum*. "I tell you," he said, "the so-called radicalism of our times is simply the effort of nature to release the generous energies of our people. . . . The men who have been ruling America must consent to let the majority enter the game. . . . We are just upon the threshold of a time when the systematic life of this country will be sustained or at least supplemented at every point by governmental activity. . . . We have great tasks before us and we must enter on them as befits men charged with the responsibility of shaping a new era. . . . America stands for opportunity, America stands for a free field and no favor, America stands for a government responsive to the interests of all. And until America recovers those ideals in practice she will not have the right to hold her head high again amid the nations,

as she used to hold it." He closed his inaugural address with the solemn reaffirmation that America had come to the parting of the ways: "This is not a day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here muster not the forces of party but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us, men's lives hang in the balance, men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do. Who shall live up to the great trust? Who dares fail to try? I summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men to my side. God helping me, I will not fail them if they will but counsel and sustain me."

In spite of his apostolic fervor the new President fully realized the difficulties which confronted him. Not only were the abuses of privilege, which he was determined to abolish, inveterate, but his own qualifications for leadership in the crusade were questioned by thousands of men whose professions of reform were as sincere as his own. His Southern birth made him invidious to a large class of Northerners, who, although they had buried the animosities of a former generation, were still not ready to see the administration of the country intrusted to the hands of a man who had been brought up in the atmosphere of secession and who, in his criticism of historians like Burgess and Rhodes, had defended the South against any hint of treasonable conduct in fighting its "war for independence." His party allegiance discredited him in the eyes of those Republicans who, by constant repetition of a dogma which for nearly a score of years there had been no opportunity to disprove, had fully persuaded themselves that Democrats were not fit to run the government. His total lack of experience in any branch of national politics gave plausibility to the prediction that his administration would be "amateurish," "arbitrary," "visionary," out of touch with trained legislators of Congress, and at the mercy of the machine politicians, who would pay scant heed to his "academic essays" on reform. He would find Washington quite a different place from Trenton, said the knowing ones.

Wilson's cabinet selections did not serve to increase confidence in him. He was practically obliged to offer the Secretaryship of State to the man who had assured his nomination

in the convention, albeit Mr. Bryan had no conspicuous gift for diplomacy, and was actually saved from many an embarrassing position only by the extraordinary wisdom and tact of the counselor of the department, Professor John Bassett Moore. Two other political appointments to the cabinet were made as rewards of faithful service to Wilson in the South, where the Clark and Underwood interests were strong. Colonel Edward M. House of Texas had secured a solid delegation for Wilson from his state, and while he himself preferred the unofficial rôle of confidential friend and adviser to the President, as "the power behind the throne," he recommended his fellow Texan, Albert S. Burleson, for the position of Postmaster-General.¹ Josephus Daniels, editor of the Raleigh (North Carolina) *News Observer*, who had directed the publicity work of the Wilson campaign, was made Secretary of the Navy. Both of the latter men, who, incidentally, were the only members of the cabinet (besides W. B. Wilson, the Secretary of Labor) to retain their original portfolios during the whole of the Wilson administration, were constantly criticized for administrative inefficiency and political jobbery. The war portfolio was given to Lindley M. Garrison, Vice Chancellor of New Jersey, who, according to the account of President Wilson's private secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, was discovered by the latter "by running through the pages of the *Lawyers' Diary*."² William G. McAdoo, a New York lawyer-financier, best known for his construction of the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad (the "Hudson tubes"), was made Secretary of the Treasury. James C. McReynolds of Tennessee, who had been Assistant Attorney-General from 1903 to 1907, and had since the latter date been practicing law in New York, was put at the head of the Department of Justice. Franklin K. Lane of California, acting chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, was made Secretary of the Inte-

¹ On the death of Justice Lurton, in the summer of 1914, another Texan, Thomas W. Gregory, was taken into the cabinet to replace Attorney-General McReynolds, who was appointed to Lurton's place on the bench. The Secretary of Agriculture, David F. Houston, though coming from Missouri at the time of his appointment, had previously lived for many years in Texas.

² J. P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," p. 138.



WOODROW WILSON

rior. David F. Houston, chancellor of Washington University, St. Louis, was Secretary of Agriculture; William C. Redfield, a wealthy manufacturer of New York, Secretary of Commerce; and William B. Wilson of Pennsylvania, a former secretary and treasurer of the United Mine Workers of America, was the first head of the newly created Department of Labor, which took over the work of the Bureau of Labor, together with immigration, naturalization, and the Children's Bureau. The cabinet list presented some peculiar features. Five of the members were Southerners by birth. In contrast to Taft's group of lawyers, only two of Wilson's selections (Garrison and McReynolds) were actively engaged in law, though others had studied it. Burleson was the only member chosen from the House or Senate, and Lane the only government official. For the first time since John Quincy Adams's administration New England was entirely unrepresented,¹ nor was there any member from the important states of the Old Northwest.

The predominance of the South in the new administration was shown in the legislative as well as in the executive branch of the government. The chairmen of five of the six most important committees of the Senate were Southerners: Martin of Virginia (Appropriations), Owen of Oklahoma (Banking and Currency), Simmons of North Carolina (Finance), Bacon of Georgia (Foreign Relations), Culberson of Texas (Judiciary), Newlands of Nevada (Interstate Commerce). In the House thirty-eight of the fifty-eight committee chairmen were from the South, including again five out of six of the committees corresponding to those of the Senate just named: Glass of Virginia (Banking and Currency), Underwood of Alabama (Ways and Means), Flood of Virginia (Foreign Affairs), Clayton of Alabama (Judiciary), Adamson of Georgia (Interstate and Foreign Commerce). This was partly due to the fact that Democratic

¹ There was no secretary from New England in the cabinet of John Quincy Adams, but the President himself was from Massachusetts. Altogether there were ten changes in the cabinet during Wilson's two terms, but New England was never favored with an appointment. This may partly explain the fact that there was considerable hostility to President Wilson in that section of the country.

members of Congress from the South, having virtually no Republican opposition to overcome, retained their seats at Washington and thus moved up, by virtue of seniority, to the chairmanship of the committees. But though the South was "in the saddle," it could not be counted on to back the President solidly. As a section of the country still predominantly agricultural, it would doubtless support his economic reforms, but it would have little sympathy with his "progressive" political and social program. The machine leaders, like Martin and Simmons, Bacon and Underwood, Clark and Stone, would not warm to the newfangled ideas on child labor, woman suffrage, or the treatment of the negroes. Finally, all through the South there was an intense anti-Mexican feeling, which, as we shall see in our next section, proved a great embarrassment to the President in his attempt to liberalize our policy toward the Latin American nations.

To offset the obvious handicaps with which he had to contend, however, the President had some decided advantages. He was strong-willed, eager, optimistic, and capable of keeping his counsels, almost to secretiveness, and of making up his mind with precision and finality. He had a well-matured ideal of leadership, which was a combination of the duties of a responsible prime minister and a popular tribune of the Jacksonian type. "The President is at liberty both in law and conscience," he had written in one of his earlier treatises, "to be as big a man as he can; his capacity will set the limit." He counted on the support of "all forward-looking men" who were not more partisan than progressive. And finally, in the make-up of the Sixty-third Congress he had the advantage that the election had returned in the huge Democratic majority a number of new men who would not be so jealous of executive direction as those who were broken into legislative work.

In his inaugural address Wilson summed up the evils which must be remedied in order to square every process of our national life with the standards which we had so proudly set up in 1776, and which we had "always carried in our hearts." Chief among these evils were three:

1. "A tariff which cuts us off from our proper part in the commerce of the world, violates the just principles of taxation, and makes the Government a facile instrument in the hands of private interests.

2. "A banking and currency system based on the necessity of the Government to sell its bonds fifty years ago, and perfectly adapted to concentrating cash and restricting credits.

3. "An industrial system which, take it on all sides, financial as well as administrative, holds capital in leading strings, restricts the liberties and limits the opportunities of labor, and exploits, without renewing or conserving, the natural resources of the country."

On this triple wall of privilege the President forthwith began his attack.

The Sixty-third Congress was called together in extra session on April 7, 1913. President Wilson, reverting to the custom abandoned since John Adams's administration, appeared in person before the two Houses to deliver his message.¹ It dealt in a few succinct paragraphs with the sole subject of tariff reform. "We must abolish everything that bears even the semblance of privilege or any kind of artificial advantage," he said, "and put our business men and producers under the stimulation of a constant necessity to be efficient, economical, and enterprising masters of competitive supremacy, better workers and mechanics than any in the world. Aside from the duties laid upon articles which we do not, and probably cannot pro-

¹ Thomas Jefferson, who was a man of the pen, not of the voice, had sent his messages to Congress to be read by a clerk, and all the succeeding presidents had followed his example. Taft, to be sure, had made the innovation of breaking up the long annual message and sending it to Congress in sections, to concentrate attention on one thing at a time. It was Walter H. Page, Wilson's friend of thirty years and his selection as ambassador to Great Britain, who made the suggestion of the new departure in a letter written to the President on election night of 1912: "The President reads or speaks his inaugural to the people. Why not go back to the old custom of himself delivering his message to Congress? Would not that restore a feeling of comradeship in responsibility and make the legislative branch feel nearer the executive?" (Burton J. Hendrick, "The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," Vol. I, p. 109). In 1925 President Coolidge returned to the long-established custom of sending a written message to Congress.

duce, therefore, and the duties laid upon luxuries or merely for the sake of the revenue which they yielded, the object of the tariff duties henceforth to be laid must be effective competition, the whetting of American wits by contest with the wits of the world." Wilson did not advocate free trade, but free opportunity. He conceded that it would be the policy of the government in the future as in the past to find the sources of its revenue chiefly in indirect taxation, but he rejected the Republican doctrine that tariff rates should be levied on the principle of the difference of cost between the production of an article abroad and in this country, with a reasonable profit to the producer here. The cost of production was an indeterminate factor that varied from country to country and from establishment to establishment. A "reasonable" profit would mean to the manufacturer "all the traffic would bear." The whole doctrine was conceived from the point of view of the protection of the producer and not that of revenue to the treasury or cost to the consumer. Under it particular groups of industry had grown at the expense of the vitality of the rest of the country. The true object of the tariff was to produce revenue without closing the field of natural competition through government favors to the monopolies "which exact a bonus for which no equivalent is rendered." American energy, inventiveness, and industry need fear no competition with any nation of the earth. We were past the need of "protection."

The new tariff bill which was introduced into the House by Chairman Underwood on the first day of the extra session was framed on the general lines of the "popgun" measures which Taft had vetoed in the last Congress.¹ Its main features were (1) the removal of duties on foodstuffs and raw material of manufacture, resulting in a free list of about three hundred articles; (2) the reduction of duties on articles which entered

¹ In contrast to Taft's unwillingness to "interfere with the men at the other end of the avenue" in the preparation of the Payne-Aldrich tariff, Wilson took an active part in discussing the schedules of the Underwood bill with the Committee on Ways and Means. As the leader of his party he regarded it as his duty to keep a guiding hand on Congress.

largely into our export trade, especially those articles, like steel products, which were generally sold more cheaply abroad than at home; (3) the heavy taxation of luxuries; and (4) a graduated income tax. Almost all the fourteen schedules into which the bill was divided showed reduction in rates. In the famous schedules of metals (C), cotton (I), and woolens (K) the cuts were about 50 per cent. There were altogether 958 reductions in the bill and 86 increases, with 307 items unchanged. The average rate on dutiable goods was reduced from 42 per cent in the Payne-Aldrich tariff to a little under 30 per cent.

The Underwood bill passed the House with little opposition, on May 8, by a vote of 281 to 139; but when it came to the Senate, there were repeated the same tactics which had defeated honest downward revision in 1894 and 1909. Senators Ransdell and Thurston of Louisiana protested against free sugar.¹ The fruit growers of Florida, the iron manufacturers of Alabama, the cotton manufacturers of Georgia, brought pressure to bear on their senators to safeguard their interests. Senator Simmons, chairman of the Committee on Finance, did not share Mr. Underwood's advanced views on tariff reform. It was only by the persistent efforts of President Wilson himself, and after a fight of nearly five months through the hot summer, that the victory was won. On May 26 the President issued a startling statement to the country that a "numerous, industrious, and insidious lobby" was making extraordinary exertions at Washington to alter the tariff bill. His charges resulted in an immediate investigation by the Senate, which was later extended to the House, and undoubtedly cleared the way for the adoption of the bill essentially unchanged, by a vote of 44 to 37. After a conference the bill was passed in its final form by a majority of over two to one in both branches. The President signed it on October 3, with the congratulatory statement that "a fight for the people and for free business, which had lasted a

¹ By the terms of the bill beet-sugar and cane-sugar growers were given three years of grace. Only 25 per cent of the duty on raw sugar was taken off at once, the remainder to be removed May 1, 1916. The need of revenue, however, led to the repeal of the free-sugar clause about a month before it was to go into effect.

long generation through, had at last been won handsomely and completely."¹

The Underwood-Simmons act marked a revolution in our tariff policy. It was comparable in a way to the repeal of the Corn Laws in England in 1846, for it was a tardy recognition of the fact that we had changed from an agricultural to an industrial basis. Between 1899 and 1909 our exports of manufactures had increased from \$380,000,000 to \$671,000,000, or 77 per cent. From 1909 to 1913 they had increased another 77 per cent—from \$671,000,000 to \$1,187,000,000. On April 21, 1913, the Committee on Ways and Means of the House reported that 224 industrial combinations controlling 4400 plants, with a total capitalization of \$8,000,000,000, had been formed "in recent years." The states of the Old Northwest, which had been converted to Republicanism in the late fifties on the issue of free soil, had a deep moral attachment to the party of Lincoln and Grant; but as that party had come more and more under the domination of the great industrial combinations, with their insistence on high protection, the agricultural West had felt itself injured in its economic interests. The Canadian reciprocity treaty negotiated by President Taft was a striking illustration of this discontent. The Western Republicans had been paying the piper in the high prices for their agricultural implements, their twine and cotton bagging, their farm mortgages and transportation charges, while their Eastern brethren called the tune. Now the tune was to be changed. Just what the effect of the new tariff would have been under normal conditions of production and trade it is impossible to state. Its opponents prophesied that it would result in insufficient revenues, industrial depression, underpaid labor, and crippled commerce. Its champions claimed that it would destroy monopoly, raise prices, free busi-

¹ Other features of the Underwood-Simmons act were the establishment of absolute free trade with the Philippines, the encouragement of our merchant marine by removing the limitation on the importation of foreign shipbuilding material, and the reduction of the duties by 5 per cent on merchandise imported in American ships. The tariff board of the Payne-Aldrich act was discontinued, but President Wilson found it advisable to reestablish a bipartisan tariff board of six members (September, 1916), of which Professor F. W. Taussig of Harvard became chairman.

ness, and stimulate our competition for foreign markets. As a matter of fact, it cannot be shown to have worked in either of these ways. Before there could be any adequate test of its effects, the World War broke out, creating an unprecedented demand for American foodstuffs, munitions, metals, clothing, cotton, machinery, and horses. Our foreign trade increased from \$4,500,000,000 in 1913 to over \$10,000,000,000 in 1919. Huge loans to the allied powers in Europe took the form of government credits for the purchase of goods in this country. The tariff duties sank to comparative insignificance either as an influence on commerce, which was determined by war-torn Europe's instant needs; or as a source of revenue, which was derived from mounting taxes on incomes and excess profits; or as a regulator of wages and prices, which were inflated to abnormal figures by the fierce competition of the government and private establishments for labor and by the inevitable gouging of the war-time profiteers.

To make up for the loss of revenue anticipated by the heavy reductions in rates and the great enlargement of the free list,¹ the Underwood-Simmons bill levied a graduated income tax on individual citizens, corporations, and joint-stock companies. Net incomes above \$3000 a year (\$4000 for married couples) were subjected to a normal tax of 1 per cent, and surtaxes were laid on incomes above \$20,000, increasing by degrees until they reached 6 per cent on incomes of \$500,000 or over. Since the time when the Supreme Court annulled the income-tax clause of the Wilson-Gorman act of 1894, on the ground that as a direct tax it was in conflict with Article I, section 2, paragraph 3, of the Constitution (p. 286), there had been on the part of those who were determined that wealth should bear its just burden of taxation a steady movement for such an amendment to the Constitution as would permit Congress to levy an income tax without regard to the distribution of the population. Such an amendment was passed in 1909, but it took nearly four years to secure the con-

¹ Goods representing nearly two thirds (63 per cent) of the value of our imports in 1915 paid no duties under the new act, whereas less than 49 per cent (in value) of our imports under the Payne-Aldrich act came in duty-free in 1910.

sent of three fourths of the states. Finally, on February 3, 1913, Wyoming ratified as the thirty-sixth state; and on the twenty-fifth of the month Secretary of State Knox proclaimed the amendment part of the Constitution, just in time to secure the sanction for the incorporation of the income-tax provision in the Underwood bill.¹ The resistance to the income tax in the highly industrial sections where wealth was concentrated was natural. New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, which comprised about 5 per cent of the area of the country, paid 75 per cent of the tax in 1916. The single state of Illinois paid more than all the states south of Mason and Dixon's line combined. As the income-tax rates were enormously increased after our entrance into the World War, they bore more heavily still on the industrial regions, where there was a great deal of complaint against the administration for favoring the South, which was then selling its cotton for 40 cents a pound, and for throwing the burden of the support of the war upon the North.

President Wilson did not wait for the tariff bill to get through the Senate before he started his second attack on privilege by a message to Congress (June 23) in which he urged the necessity of giving the business men of this country a banking and currency system by means of which they could "make use of the freedom of enterprise and of individual initiative" under the new tariff. "We must have a currency not rigid as now," he said, "but readily, elastically responsive to sound credit. . . . Our banking laws must mobilize reserves, must not permit the concentration anywhere in a few hands of the monetary resources of the country, or their use for speculative purposes in such volume as to hinder or impede or stand in the way of other more legitimate, more fruitful uses. And the control of the new


¹ Eventually the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified by forty-two states—all but Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Florida, and Utah. The Seventeenth Amendment, providing for direct election of United States senators, was ratified in less than a year after its proposal, and was proclaimed by Secretary Bryan on May 31, 1913. Delaware, Rhode Island, and Utah were the only states that failed either to ratify the amendment or to provide for a virtually direct election of senators by their primary laws.

system of banking must be vested in the Government itself, so that the banks may be the instruments, not the masters of business." Peculiar emphasis was given to the President's recommendations by their timeliness. Just before the expiration of Mr. Taft's term a committee of the House, with A. P. Pujo as chairman, had submitted the report of a year's investigation of an alleged "money trust," which monopolized banking corporations and credit as effectively as the great industrial and transportation companies monopolized production and exchange. The report found that there was "an established and well-defined identity and community of interests between a few leaders of finance," of whom J. P. Morgan, George F. Baker, and James Stillman formed the "inner group," with control over banking institutions having resources of \$1,300,000,000; and that by a system of majority stockholding, interlocking directorates, and joint-account transactions, there was rapidly taking place "a concentration of the control of money and credit in the hands of these few men." "Outsiders" were obliged to stand, hat in hand, before the door of the dictator's private office to beg for the credit to launch a new business enterprise; and it was even charged, as in the days of the "monster" National Bank, destroyed by Andrew Jackson, that favor was extended only to those whose political and social opinions were as "sound" as their economic prospects. A monetary committee had been at work since 1908 to study methods of equalizing credit, adapting the currency to fit business expansion, and preventing panics like that of 1907; but its recommendation of a central bank not unlike that established by Alexander Hamilton, acting as the government's fiscal agent and controlled by the financial interests, did not inspire confidence in the public, especially as the chairman of the committee was Nelson W. Aldrich, the leading "stand-patter" of the Senate.

The Aldrich-Vreeland act of 1908 (p. 431) had, to be sure, provided for temporary relief in times of financial stress, by its device of "emergency currency," but it had done nothing to liberalize credit or decentralize the control of the inner group of financiers. The new bill, which had been conceived by the

genius of Paul M. Warburg of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company and elaborated in conferences between President Wilson, Secretary McAdoo, Senator Owen of Oklahoma, and Representative Glass of Virginia (the two latter the chairmen of the Committees on Banking and Currency in their respective branches of Congress), was introduced into the House and Senate on June 26. It created the Federal Reserve Bank system, whose machinery may be briefly described as follows: The country was divided into twelve districts, in each of which was a central Federal Reserve Bank.¹ All the national banks, unless they wished to surrender their charters, were obliged to become "member banks" in the system and to subscribe a percentage of their capital and surplus to form the corporation of the Federal Reserve Bank of their district. Private banks and trust companies might enter the system on terms prescribed by the bill. The Federal Reserve Banks held the government deposits and performed its fiscal operations, but they did not, like the old national bank, deal with private individuals or corporations. They were bankers' banks, but their supervision and management was put in the hands of the government by the creation of a national Federal Reserve Board of seven members, consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury (chairman), the Comptroller of the Currency, and five other members appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate, one of whom was to be the active manager of the system, with the title of "Governor." Each regional bank had nine directors: three chosen by the member banks as their own representatives, three chosen by the banks to represent the agricultural and industrial interests of the district, and three chosen by the Federal Reserve Board. These directorates were not "interlocking." Instead of a little group of men controlling the banking facilities of the country, there were, thus, one hundred and eight Federal Bank directors, distributed through the twelve districts and all under the unifying control of the central government board.

¹ These banks were established in the cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, Atlanta, Cleveland, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, and San Francisco.



FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS, CREATED UNDER FEDERAL RESERVE ACT OF DECEMBER 23, 1913

BANK AND DISTRICT	NUMBER OF MEMBERS	PAID CAPITAL ¹	BANK AND DISTRICT	NUMBER OF MEMBERS	PAID CAPITAL ¹
1. Boston	435	\$5,134,000	9. Minneapolis . . .	730	\$2,489,000
2. New York	613	10,987,000	10. Kansas City . . .	954	3,923,000
3. Philadelphia	628	5,207,000	11. Dallas	648	2,764,000
4. Cleveland	704	5,944,000	12. San Francisco . . .	529	3,931,000

¹ This is one half of the subscribed capital, October 1, 1915.

The bill encountered a great deal of opposition both in the committees and on the floor of Congress, and was subject to many amendments in its complicated provisions. The more conservative banking interests of the Eastern cities resisted the decentralizing features and still showed a lingering fear of "wildcat" banking in the West. On the other hand, the more radical critics thought that the bill kept too many features of the old system. On September 18 the House passed the Glass bill by a vote of 286 to 84, but there was a hard fight in the Senate. The upper House had not yet finished its debates on the tariff, and many of its members were opposed to the consideration of any further major measures in the extra session. But President Wilson was inexorable. The currency bill must be passed; and unless it were passed before Christmas, Congress would have no recess except Christmas Day itself. The "school-master" was holding his ferule over the class at the Capitol. The extra session merged into the first regular session of the Sixty-third Congress at noon of December 1, without recess. The members got their Christmas vacation, however, for the Owen bill passed the Senate on December 19 by a vote of 54 to 34. The conference committee came to an agreement quickly. The final Owen-Glass bill was signed by the President on December 23, 1913. Congress then adjourned, after a session of two hundred and sixty days, to meet again on January 14, 1914, for another continuous session of two hundred and eighty-five days.

The Federal Reserve Act was designed to accomplish three chief reforms in our currency and banking system: the stabilization of bank reserves, the mobilization of credit, and the adaptation of the supply of currency to the expanding and contracting demands of business. Under the old system the thirty thousand banking institutions of the country were uncoördinated, except as they were formed into "chains" with a community of interests in their directorates. They were nominally on a competitive basis, each bank looking out for itself alone; and their reserves, totaling billions of dollars, were either lying idle in their own vaults or, in the case of the smaller country banks, on deposit with the banks of the larger centers. In case of a "run" (that is,

a concerted demand of the depositors for their balances), a bank might have its cash reserves exhausted and be obliged to close its doors. If the lack of confidence spread through a considerable area, the drain on reserves would tend to become general and a panic would ensue. The bank reserves in New England or on the Pacific coast might be ample and intact, but they would be of no help in preventing a panic in the Middle West states or the Gulf states. The Federal Reserve system met this danger by pooling a part of the reserves of the country. Every member bank was required to keep reserves in the regional bank equal to a certain percentage of its deposits. The collection of these reserves (which totaled the huge sum of \$3,196,569,000 on March 14, 1923) into national reservoirs of money and credit, which were all connected with one another through the machinery of the Federal Reserve Board, furnished the guaranty against depletion and consequent panic; for, as the reservoirs were all connected, it was easy to regulate the flow of credit from one part of the country to another as emergency demanded. When, for example, the banks in Minneapolis and Kansas City were subjected to heavy seasonal drains to move the grain crop, all they had to do was to call on the bank at Boston or New York or any other center where the loans were lighter. San Francisco could borrow from Philadelphia, or Cleveland from Dallas, by the click of the telegraph.

Not only did the Federal Reserve system insure an elastic credit, but it furnished an elastic currency as well. Our currency consisted of gold and silver (with the notes based thereon), greenbacks, and national bank notes. The gold circulation could be increased only as the metal was mined and brought to the mints, or imported from abroad. The silver, since the repeal of the Sherman act in 1893, was demonetized and used only as subsidiary coinage. The greenbacks were a fixed amount at \$346,000,000. And the issue of bank notes depended on the purchase by the banks of United States bonds upon which the notes were based. Thus the latter were the only element in the currency that might be expected to respond to the business of the country. But that is precisely what the bank notes did

not do. For when the price of government bonds was high, the profit on bank-note circulation declined, and the currency was consequently contracted.¹ The very period, however, in which the bonds were high was likely to be a time of general prosperity, when the business interests of the country were calling for an increased amount of currency. In other words, the amount of bank-note currency tended to vary inversely and not directly with the demands of business. This is what the President meant by his complaint against "a banking and currency system based on the necessity of the government to sell its bonds fifty years ago, and perfectly adapted to concentrating cash and restricting credit."

The Federal Reserve system remedied this anomalous situation by creating a new basis for currency circulation, and a new type of currency which would automatically expand and contract with the business of the country. This was accomplished by the ingenious device of "rediscounting," which can best be illustrated by a specific example. Suppose A to be a building contractor who gets a loan from his bank on his promissory note due in ninety days. Under the old system, the bank, after discounting A's note, would put it in the strong box, where it would lie until the day of its redemption and cancellation. Since one of the most important features of a bank is the discounting of notes, there would be lying in its vaults at any time perhaps millions of dollars' worth of this kind of securities, which, however sound in credit, could not be used as credit by the bank. By the new system a member bank could send A's note to the Federal Reserve Bank for rediscount, receiving in return for it (if its security satisfied the requirements of the Federal Reserve

¹ For example, if the government bonds were selling for 105, a bank would have to pay \$105,000 for \$100,000 worth of bonds at par value; and since, until the law of March, 1900, the banks were allowed to issue notes only up to 90 per cent of the par value of the bonds, the amount of credit which the bank could lend on its purchase of \$105,000 was \$90,000. This meant a virtual bonus of \$15,000 paid by the bank for the privilege of issuing notes—a bonus which would obviously increase with the price of the bonds. If the premium on the bonds rose to the point where their net yield of interest failed to meet the bank's rising loss of interest on the increasing bonus paid, there would be no profit to the bank in the transaction.

Board) currency in the form of "Federal Reserve treasury notes" guaranteed by the government and receivable as full legal tender. When the member bank was "flush," it could redeem its securities by sending back to the Federal Reserve Bank the notes, which were then canceled. In other words, the Federal Reserve system enlarged the circulating medium by making sound commercial paper, in which a vast amount of the country's business was transacted, the basis of note circulation instead of the unresponsive government bonds. Naturally, then, just at a time when business was most active and commercial paper abounded, the circulating medium would expand to meet the situation; and, conversely, when business slackened and the banks were not crowded with applications for loans or glutted with securities representing loans, the demand for the Federal Reserve notes would diminish. Provision was also made in the Owen-Glass act for the gradual retirement of the national bank notes over a period of twenty years, and the substitution thereof of Federal Reserve Bank notes. So that eventually all the paper currency in circulation, except the greenbacks and the gold and silver certificates, will be Federal Reserve notes of one type or the other.¹

Although the Federal Reserve Banks did not deal directly with individual customers, they helped industry and farming all over the country. They made credit cheaper, more available, and more equitably distributed. They stabilized investment and discount rates. The Federal Reserve Act authorized any member bank not in a central reserve city to make loans to run not over five years on approved real estate up to 50 per cent of its actual valuation. It facilitated the collection of checks and drafts and the transmission of funds from one part of the country to another. It limited the member banks in their speculative

¹ If the reader examines the money in his bill holder, he may find bills marked "Federal Reserve Note" and (less frequently) "Federal Reserve Bank Note." The former represent the rediscounted paper and certain other securities brought to the Federal Reserve Banks by the member banks; the latter are the substitutes for the national bank notes. On March 15, 1923, there were over \$2,000,000,000 of Federal Reserve notes in circulation and only \$2,600,000 as yet of the Federal Reserve Bank notes.

activities and made them the servants of the public. In short, as Professor H. P. Willis remarks, it differed from the law that preceded it in that it no longer regarded the business man "as one who borrows money at a bank," but "as one who manufactures a commodity—commercial credit and the paper representing it—which he sells to the banks, and which it is the function of the latter to insure and to keep liquid."¹

In its public aspects the Federal Reserve Act marked an epoch in the relations of government to banking. It was comparable to the establishment of the National Bank in 1791 or the inauguration of the independent treasury system in 1840. It was a happy compromise between the too complete identification of the government and the banking interests in the former case, and their absolute divorce in the latter. It differed, however, in its underlying motive from the scheme of national banking which Secretary Chase had devised during the Civil War. For the National Bank Act of 1863 was an invitation to the financiers to aid the government in the time of its distress, but the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was a notification to the financiers that the government intended to keep the paths of credit opportunity open to the people. It was in line with the trend of a decade toward "popular government."

The spring and summer of 1914 had passed before the cities were selected, the directors elected, and the machinery of the Federal Reserve system started, with Charles S. Hamlin of Massachusetts as governor of the board. The banks were opened on November 16, and within a week after beginning business they had total paid-in assets of \$225,000,000. Meantime the great war had started in Europe and brought its unpredictable disturbance in financial as well as commercial circles. There was widespread apprehension lest the foreign holders of American securities would "dump" them on the American market in such volume as to force down prices, take great quantities of gold out of the country, and compel the banks to call their loans suddenly, precipitating failures. The stock exchange and the cotton exchange were closed for several weeks. International

¹ H. Parker Willis, "The Federal Reserve," p. 74.

exchange, like international trade, was virtually suspended for some time, until the British fleet got the control of the Atlantic routes, which it held throughout the war. It was under these abnormal conditions that the Federal Reserve system went into effect. It immediately manifested its steadying influence on business and banking, and no financial panic has occurred since its establishment.

On January 20, 1914, President Wilson appeared before Congress to launch the attack on the third and inner wall of privilege in a message recommending legislation for the clarification, strengthening, and supplementation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, and the reformation of "an industrial system which holds capital in leading strings, restricts the liberties and limits the opportunities of labor, and exploits, without renewing, the natural resources of the country." This was the most important feature of the program of economic reform, because it was aimed directly at the evil of corporation control of which the tariff and currency problems were to a large extent but corollaries. It was also the most difficult from the legal point of view. For while, as our whole history has proved, it is impossible to adjust tariff rates exactly to the interests of business and the needs of the government, and while the regulation of the currency involves the most complicated questions of banking, credit, and exchange, nevertheless the legal right of Congress, and of Congress alone, to deal with these subjects to the best of its wisdom and experience is undisputed (see the Constitution, Art. I, sect. 8, pars. 1 and 5; Art. I, sect. 10, pars. 1 and 2). But when it comes to the regulation of business, Congress has no such clear mandate. That was never intended by the framers of the Constitution to be a matter of Federal control; it was left to the municipal laws of the states. The only clauses of the Constitution under which Congress could interfere with the vast structure of business which was built up in our country in the half century succeeding the Civil War were the grant of the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes" (Art. I, sect. 8, par. 3), and the guaranty that no person should be "deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law" (Amendments V, XIV). The Constitution has nothing to say about industry, factories, railroads, capital, labor, wages, profits, or methods of business. Moreover, there was, as we have frequently noticed in these pages, an inveterate prejudice among the American people against anything like "paternalism" in government, which persisted long after it became apparent that the central government was the only agency powerful enough to deal with the great transportation and industrial corporations which had grown beyond the restraint of the municipal laws of the states. Therefore, while there was little reason for testing the constitutionality of tariff or currency legislation, every act of Congress in exercise of the ill-defined or hypothetical power of trust regulation was subject to the interminable process of the courts.

The inadequacy of the Sherman act to curb the trusts had been demonstrated over and over again. One member of the Supreme Court had called it "a useless piece of legislation." In the first few years of its operation seven out of the eight decisions rendered under it by the courts had been against the government. In 1895 the Supreme Court in the famous *Knight* case had decided that manufacture and production were not a part of interstate commerce, and hence their monopoly was not prohibited by the Sherman act, as a "restraint of trade among the several states and with foreign countries." The confusion had been worse confounded when the Supreme Court, with only one dissenting voice (Justice Harlan), in handing down the decision in the oil and tobacco cases in 1911, had interpreted the prohibition of "every combination . . . in restraint of trade" to mean the prohibition of only those combinations which aimed at a monopoly by "undue" or "unreasonable" restraint of trade. The act must be construed by the "rule of reason," which was equivalent to saying that it might mean a great number of things. Every one of its terms—"combination," "restraint," "conspiracy," "trade," "monopoly"—was a fruitful topic for altercation.

President Wilson, in his message of January 20, made an appeal for "a common effort to square business methods with both

public opinion and the law," in order that antagonism between the government and business might cease; and to that end proposed measures for the clearer definition of the law. These measures were called "the five brothers," and were closely analogous in intent and language to the "seven sisters," a group of laws which Wilson had put through the legislature of New Jersey in the closing days of his governorship, just a year before. They included (1) the recommendation of a Federal Interstate Trade Commission to investigate and regulate methods of business and commerce, as the Interstate Commerce Commission regulated the common carriers and the Federal Reserve Board the banking operations of the country; (2) the prohibition of interlocking directorates in corporations with capital and surplus aggregating more than \$1,000,000; (3) the better definition of the terms of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; (4) the proscription of unfair practices in business competition; (5) the regulation of the issues of railroad securities. After prolonged discussion in the committee and on the floor of Congress these propositions simmered down to two laws, passed on the twenty-sixth of September and the fourteenth of October respectively. The first was the Federal Trade Commission act, called the Ovington act from the name of the chairman of the subcommittee, to which the House Committee on Interstate Commerce had assigned the subject. The second was a heterogeneous mass of provisions named the Clayton act after H. D. Clayton of Alabama, chairman of the Judiciary Committee. The recommendation of the regulation of the issues of railroad securities was indefinitely postponed when the European war broke out in August, lest such radical legislation should embarrass the roads in the important services which they were certain to be called upon to render.

The Federal Trade Commission act was a conservative measure designed to help business by the establishment of more equitable relations through the machinery of the courts, and not a penal statute like the anti-trust act. The commission would be, said the President, "an indispensable institution of information and publicity, and a clearing house for facts, by which both

the public mind and the managers of great business undertakings should be guided." By the terms of the act a commission of five members appointed by the president and serving for seven years, at an annual salary of \$10,000, was to replace the old Bureau of Corporations. The powers of the commission were chiefly investigatory and advisory, and all corporations except the common carriers and the banks (whose supervision was provided for by other Federal boards) were subject to its authority. It could require reports from the corporations, making public at its discretion such information as it believed the public should have; it could order a corporation to desist from unfair methods of competition, and, in case the order was disobeyed, it could apply to a circuit court of appeals for an injunction against the corporation; it could, by direction of the president or Congress, investigate any alleged infraction of the anti-trust laws and could recommend additional anti-trust legislation; it could act as "master in chancery" (that is, a sort of umpire) in any case in equity touching the corporations. The novel and most promising feature of the new act was that it brought the knowledge and advice of a body of economic experts to the help of both the corporations and the courts through the administrative arm of the government, instead of leaving the corporations and the courts, as did the Sherman act, to fight out their bitter quarrels.¹

The Clayton act, on the other hand, designed "to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies," was a penal statute, an amalgamation of several bills proposed for the amendment and clarification of the Sherman act. Its twenty-six sections are described by Professor W. Z. Ripley ("Trusts, Pools, and Corporations," p. 715) as "a hodgepodge compounded of various details, many unnecessary, some conflicting, others positively mischievous. It is the expression of an honest popular purpose to remedy the existing economic evils

¹ The enormous task of supervising the industrial corporations of the country is suggested by the figures published by the Federal income tax bureau. In 1921 some 345,600 corporations paid taxes on net incomes amounting to approximately \$8,000,000,000.

and to fulfill Democratic campaign pledges. But it is a broth which clearly suffers from too many cooks. . . . Unfair trade practices, interlocking directorates, intercorporation stockholding, dishonest railroad financiering, the legal status of trade unions, and even the use of the injunction in labor disputes are all comprehended within the statute." Another critic characterizes the act as "bungling and generally futile." It is impossible here to analyze the heterogeneous provisions of the Clayton act.¹ The prohibition of the absorption of the stock of one company by another to the extent of creating a monopoly (sect. 7), and the provision that no person could act as director in two or more banks with deposits, capital, surplus, and profits aggregating \$5,000,000 or in corporations with capital, surplus, and profits aggregating \$1,000,000 (sect. 8), were aimed at the destruction of the power of the "inner group" of financiers. The unlawful methods of business competition were enumerated.² Perhaps the most significant feature of the Clayton act was the concession to labor, without which it would have been impossible to get the support of the more radical element in Congress for its passage. Section 6 stipulates that "the labor of human beings is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual

¹ The text is printed in Ripley's "Trusts, Pools, and Corporations," pp. 717-734.

² The most conspicuous of these abuses were local price-cutting to freeze out a competitor, rebates, bribing a rival's employee to reveal secrets of business, the floating of bogus companies, exclusive sales (which compelled a purchaser to boycott the goods of the seller's competitors), "tying contracts" and "full-line forcing" (which compelled a purchaser to buy certain quantities of article B with every purchase of article A), branding a competitor's articles as worthless or making worthless articles ("knockers") in imitation of them, intimidating competition by threatening to bring suit for the infringement of patents when no patent existed and no suit was contemplated, etc. An interesting illustration of the pitiless ferocity of competition was furnished by the National Cash Register Company of Dayton, Ohio, which had a room called "the graveyard," filled with models of competing machines, all neatly ticketed with their history, which it had driven out of the field. It is said that this company boasted of the enforced failure of 153 out of 156 of its rivals.

help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit. . . . Nor shall such organization or the members thereof be held or be construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under the anti-trust acts." And section 20 forbids the granting of an injunction in any case between employer and employee "involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property," and declares that striking or boycotting, or the peaceful persuasion of others to do so, shall not be held a violation of the law.

The three reform measures which absorbed the greater part of the attention of the Sixty-third Congress were neither novel in subject nor, with the possible exception of the currency bill, definitive in effect. The tariff, like the poor, we have always with us. Since the abortive Mills bill of the first Cleveland administration, every change of party control in Congress has been accompanied by a revision of the tariff. The need of currency and banking reform had been before the country for twenty years, and various private bankers' associations had preceded the Aldrich-Vreeland scheme of 1908. A Federal Trade Commission had been recommended by President Roosevelt in a message to Congress and included among the demands of the platform of the Progressive party. And finally, numerous propositions for the amendment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act had been mooted long before the accession of President Wilson. "These are not new things," said the President in his message of January, 1914, "but old and now familiar." The significant fact in connection with this legislation is the persistence with which President Wilson held Congress to obedience to his firm determination to have discussion materialize in actual statutes. Though without constitutional power to prevent the adjournment of Congress, by the sheer weight of his personal influence he kept the Houses in continuous session (except for the brief Christmas recess) from April 7, 1913, to October 24, 1914. His hand was visible in all the bills, and his approval or objection was a constant factor in the decision of details. "Mr. Wilson is the whole thing at this juncture," said *Harper's Weekly* in

January, 1914; "he dispenses the high and the low and the middle justice. He has suffered no notable rebuff in putting into effect his plans and his ideas. . . . He is, indeed, chief magistrate to the uttermost fringe of his authority." Wilson himself had stated the case more succinctly in an address at Staunton, Virginia, at a celebration of his fifty-sixth birthday (December 28, 1912): "The Presidency is an office in which a man must put on his war paint."

Ten days after the adjournment of Congress the mid-term election occurred (November 3, 1914), resulting in a very large gain for the Republicans. The Democratic majority in the House was reduced from 147 to 29. A reaction against the party in power had been the usual feature of mid-term elections, but in the autumn of 1914 there were special reasons for the Democratic slump. In the first place, the very volume of legislation enacted in the twenty months of Wilson's administration offered an extraordinary number of angles for criticism. The *Boston Transcript* declared that the interests of New England had been "flayed" by the Underwood tariff. The bankers very generally objected to the decentralizing feature of the Federal Reserve Act. The anti-trust legislation was ridiculed as "undigested" and "amateurish," or denounced for its concessions to organized labor. There was jealousy of the predominating influence of the South in the administration. A strike of the coal miners of southern Colorado, beginning in September, 1913, had resulted in a pitched battle at Ludlow between the miners and the militia (April 20, 1914), in which the strikers' tent colony had been burned and nineteen of its inmates, including eleven children, had perished. The President acceded to Governor Ammons's request for Federal help to restore order and sent two thousand regular troops to Colorado. By the time of the autumn elections the strike had not been ended nor the troops withdrawn. Business had not been good during the years 1913 and 1914, owing, as the Republicans maintained, to the low tariff and the disturbance caused in financial and industrial circles by the currency and anti-trust acts. They claimed that large quantities of foodstuffs from South America and

Canada were coming into the country to the impoverishment of the farmers. Furthermore, the Progressive movement as a third party was on the wane, and many of the Progressives were returning to the Republican ranks to restore the normal majority of the latter party. The votes cast for Progressive candidates in the election of 1914 totaled less than 1,800,000, as against 4,126,020 cast for Roosevelt in 1912.

Finally, the outbreak of the European war three months before the election was disastrous to the immediate fortunes of the administration. The first effects of the war upon America were business depression, curtailment, unemployment, and near panic in the financial world. Trade was at a standstill. Cotton declined from 12½ to 6½ cents a pound. The planters, with a huge crop of nearly sixteen million bales (a good part of it raised on credit), believed that they were facing bankruptcy. They clamored for the bankers and even for the government to come to their relief. Citizens who could afford it were urged to "buy a bale" of cotton for cash to tide the planters over, and store it until the market should recover. The index prices of commodities which had varied from 137 to 142 in 1913, and from 139 to 144 in the first seven months of 1914, rose to 152 in August and 160 in September—the first two months of the war. Moreover, in addition to high prices, which are generally the most telling campaign argument against the party in power, the outbreak of the war brought new taxes. In the middle of August the Treasury estimated a decline in customs duties of from \$60,000,000 to \$100,000,000 for the fiscal year. President Wilson met the situation bravely in his message to Congress, September 4, by insisting on taxation rather than borrowing or using up the surplus in the Treasury, although he knew the effect that his policy would have on the election a few weeks later. Congress proposed to increase the normal rate of the income tax by 50 per cent and lower the exemption to \$2000, but the President refused to accept the plan because it would produce no additional income until the summer of 1915. The War Revenue Act finally agreed upon (October 22) was an excise measure increasing taxes on wines, liquors, and tobacco,

and imposing license or stamp taxes on brokerage transactions, amusements, promissory notes, insurance policies, deeds of property, steamer tickets, parlor-car seats, sleeping-car berths, and various other sources of income. The resort of "war taxes in time of peace" [1] was, of course, seized upon for campaign material by the Republicans, who maintained that it was not the war but the vicious Democratic tariff which was to blame for the falling off of revenues.¹ Under this combination of circumstances it is not strange that the administration suffered a setback in the election of 1914. The wonder is rather that it kept its control, even by slim margins, of both branches of Congress.

Though President Wilson took no direct part in the campaign, he probably harmed rather than helped the Democratic cause by a letter which he wrote to Representative Underwood on August 18, urging the reelection of every member of Congress "who has sustained and advanced the plans of the party," and adding, "the American people have been served by this Congress as they never have been served before." There was doubtless good reason for the President's opinion. So excellent a judge as ex-President Eliot of Harvard agreed with it in an article in *Harper's Weekly* of August 22, 1914, reviewing the eighteen months of the administration. Besides the major measures discussed in this section, Congress had, by the Newlands act of July 15, 1913, set up a board of mediation and conciliation which had averted a strike on forty-two railroads in the Eastern District of the United States. It had authorized the construction of a government railroad in Alaska and opened up the coal lands of the territory on equitable leases. It had extended government aid to agricultural education in the land-

¹ Figures hardly justify this contention. The receipts of the customhouse in 1913 under the Payne-Aldrich tariff had been \$318,891,395. In 1914, under the Underwood tariff, they were \$292,128 527. But the difference was much more than made up by the \$39,098,264 collected in the ten months of 1914 from the income tax. The Underwood tariff, therefore, as a whole, was producing more revenue than its predecessor, and the duties under it kept up well until August, 1914. Indeed, had the Treasury been obliged to rely on customs duties alone, it would have been worse off when the stoppage of trade came.

grant colleges by the Smith-Lever act. It had inaugurated a civil government for the Panama Canal Zone. It had set on foot legislation for the improvement of highways, for the establishment of farm-loan banks, for the extension of rural credits, and for the betterment of the conditions of American seamen. It had responded promptly to the new situation caused by the outbreak of war in Europe by bills looking toward the reorganization of the army, the expansion of the navy, the encouragement of American shipping, and the provision of adequate revenues for the Treasury.

Even in a time of undisturbed relations with foreign powers this record of domestic legislation would have been a remarkable testimony to the compelling leadership of President Wilson. It is all the more remarkable in view of the diplomatic difficulties with which he was beset from the very beginning of his administration. There was trouble with Japan, Great Britain, and several Latin-American nations, especially Colombia and Mexico. On April 4, 1913, the Japanese ambassador, Baron Chinda, protested against the proposed California law, which forbade aliens ineligible to United States citizenship to own land, as an infringement of the treaty rights of Japan. President Wilson tried to get the California legislature to modify the law, and sent Secretary Bryan to Sacramento to explain the view of the national government that "the economic policy of a single state cannot turn aside the strong and abiding currents of generous and profitable intercourse and good feeling." But the remonstrance was in vain. The California legislature passed the Webb Alien-Landholding bill, and Governor Hiram Johnson signed it on May 19. It was one of the cases, so frequent in our history, of that complicated relationship between national and state authority which foreign governments have found it so difficult to understand. The regulation of immigration and naturalization belongs to Congress. On the other hand, matters relating to the ownership and management of property fall within the sphere of state action. All treaties made under the authority of the United States were declared by the Constitution to be "the supreme law of the land," to take precedence over "any-

thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary.''' But when a treaty seemed to interfere in matters traditionally subject to the laws of the state, the advocates of states' rights maintained that the central government was trespassing, and that the said treaty, or at least that part of it to which they objected, was not made "under the authority of the United States." Japan and California naturally took the opposite views of the question. Japan continued to protest; California remained obdurate. The situation was relieved when the outbreak of the war checked immigration and turned the attention of Japan to schemes of aggrandizement in China. Nevertheless considerable apprehension remained. Ever since her victory over Russia there had been an uncomfortable suspicion in the minds of certain of our people that Japan entertained hostile designs toward the United States, as the discussion roused by Roosevelt's dispatch of the fleet around the world in 1907-1909 (p. 440) and the Lodge resolution on Magdalena Bay in 1912 (p. 509, note) had shown. Might not this smoldering feeling in California, if fanned by the jingo press of Tokyo and San Francisco, burst into the flames of war?

Although no official explanation of his motive has ever been made, it is not improbable that President Wilson's appearance before Congress on March 5, 1914, with an almost peremptory demand for the repeal of the act of August, 1912, which exempted vessels in the American coastwise trade from paying tolls through the Panama Canal, was influenced in some way by the Japanese situation.¹ According to the third clause of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901 (p. 400) the Canal was to be "free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations . . . on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation . . . in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic or otherwise." The act of 1912 maintained that "all" nations meant all foreign nations, and that the United States, as sole builder and owner of the Canal, was bound not to discriminate against any nation, but was not bound not to

¹ See the President's own comment on the message in *World's Work*, Vol. XXVIII, p. 490.

favor her own vessels engaged in the purely domestic trade. This position had been approved by both the Republican and Democratic platforms of 1912, and Wilson himself had justified it in a campaign speech to a gathering of farmers at Washington Grove, New Jersey, only nine days before the act was passed. Now he receded from his position, indorsed the protest of the British ambassador against the act, and said in his message, "We are too big, too powerful, too self-respecting a nation, to interpret with too strained a rendering the words of our own promises, just because we have power enough to give us leave to read them as we please." He asked for the repeal of the exemption act in support of the foreign policy of the administration. "I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence," he added cryptically, "if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure." Nothing shows more clearly the commanding position of the President than the compliance of Congress with his request, in spite of the declaration of the Democratic platform. The act was repealed on June 15, after a stirring debate, in the face of objections of such powerful Democratic opponents as Senator O'Gorman, Mr. Underwood, and Speaker Clark.¹ The President's motives were bitterly assailed by the anti-British agitators. He was accused of "truckling" to Great Britain, of seeking to form an Anglo-American alliance, of sacrificing American shipping to the greed of the British, of bribing England to stop her ally, Japan, from continuing the protest against the California land laws or from giving aid and comfort to Huerta's government in Mexico. Representative Knowland of California asserted on the floor of the House that the President was making a bargain with England by sacrificing our rights in Panama in exchange for a free hand in Mexico, an accusation which the President branded as an "insult." There is little use in speculating on the motives of President Wilson in demanding the repeal of the tolls exemption act, when he himself did not choose to reveal them. It is probable that they were mixed. The correspond-

¹ On the other hand, several Republican senators (Root, Lodge, Burton, Kenyon, McCumber) supported the President.

ence with Ambassador Page at London¹ shows how determined British public opinion was on the injustice of the exemption of American vessels, and how slim were the chances, so long as we insisted on a policy which could be plausibly resented as "broken faith," of arriving at the good understanding with England which seemed necessary for the success of our diplomacy in Latin-America and elsewhere.²

An attempt was made in a treaty negotiated April 7, 1914, to restore amicable relations with the republic of Colombia, which ever since the revolt of Panama had protested against the unfriendly behavior of the United States in that crisis, and had refused to recognize the new republic under our protection. The submission of the treaty to the Senate revived the controversy over the alleged "national dishonor" in the "rape of Panama," and brought down upon the President's head the imprecations of Colonel Roosevelt and his champions, who resented the concession to "the blackmailers of Bogotá." But the most persistent and serious of all the diplomatic questions which President Wilson had to handle in those two crowded years was the Mexican imbroglio, which he had inherited from the Taft administration.

¹ "Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," Vol. I, pp. 221, 229, 249, 262.

² The reasons for the support of the President's policy were varied. With many of the members of Congress the mere fact that the executive was responsible for the foreign policy of the country was sufficient argument for voting for the repeal. Senators Root and Lodge (who could never be accused of pro-British leanings) supported the President because they believed that the exemption act was a clear violation of the treaty. James J. Hill of the Great Northern Railroad came to Washington to use his influence for repeal, partly because he feared Great Britain would close the Welland Canal to American ships as a measure of retaliation. Mr. Burton Hendrick, in his "Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," believes that "a satisfactory solution of the mystery" is disclosed in the Page papers. He says (Vol. I, p. 269): "They show that the President and Colonel House and Page were at this time engaged in a negotiation of the utmost importance. At the very time that the tolls bill was under discussion, Colonel House was making arrangements for a visit to England, France, and Germany, the purpose of which was to bring these nations to some kind of an understanding that would prevent a European war. This evidently was the great business that could not be disclosed at the time, and for which the repeal of the tolls legislation was the necessary preliminary."

MEXICO AND THE CARIBBEAN

How little the anticipation of diplomatic complications entered into the calculations of Mr. Wilson may be shown by the fact that he did not discuss foreign affairs in his campaign speeches nor mention them in his inaugural address. His purposes and plans were centered in the domestic reforms which should introduce the era of the "new freedom" for the initiative, energy, and opportunity of the American business man and farmer, whom he saw bound down like Gulliver in the land of the Lilliputians by the withes of an iniquitous tariff, a cramping currency system, and the coercive domination of the trusts. But just before he took office the situation in Mexico had become so acute that his first statement of policy (March 11, 1913) was a declaration that one of the chief objects of his administration would be "to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorable way the interests which are common to the people of the two continents." "Coöperation," he added, "is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. . . . We shall lend our influence of every kind to the realization of these principles in fact and practice, knowing that disorder, personal intrigue, and defiance of constitutional rights weaken and discredit government and injure none so much as the people who are unfortunate enough to have their common life and their common affairs so disturbed. We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own political interest or ambition." This was a noble doctrine. Its attribution of the capacity and general desire for "the orderly processes of just government based upon law" to the people of Mexico did credit to the President's generous idealism. But its application to the actual state of affairs in the republic on our southern border was made infinitely difficult by the evident lack of such capacity and desire.


For centuries the thin veneer of the Spanish language and

the Spanish formalism in the government of state and church had created a deceptive appearance of national unity in Mexico. But beneath the superficial and limited culture imposed by the Spanish conqueror there was the great mass of unassimilated indigenous population attached to its agrarian barbarism and filled with hatred for the foreign oppressor. Eighty-five per cent of the Mexican people are still of Indian or mixed blood. About one half of these retain their Indian customs and dialects as well. The aboriginal attachments of the varied Indian population have always been a fruitful field of division and discontent to which the revolutionary leaders may appeal, and the latter have led armies feudal in type and loyalty rather than national. The long despotism of Porfirio Díaz (1877-1911), known officially as "Porfirism" and popularly as "Diazpotism," kept the racial and social antipathies of the Mexican population curbed under an iron hand. "Economically and socially," says Carlton Beals, "that system was an agrarian, feudal, sacerdotal, and aristocratic system based on serfdom and slavery. Politically it was a monarchy, represented by the absolute viceroy, who was surrounded by a small ruling clique, . . . the mass of the people enjoying no political rights. Ethnically it consisted of a ruling race divided into antagonistic Europeans and creoles, made up of nobility, priests, and incipient capitalists; and beneath—the hybrid mestizos and native Indians still conscious of national antipathies and differences in blood, but united in their common hatred of the white race."¹ Upon a people in the mass penetrated with age-long ideals of communism and isolation, Díaz suddenly grafted the modern industrial system. He handed over the incalculable riches of the country—the minerals, oil, rubber, ranching, and fruit-growing—to foreign concessionaires, who brought their hundreds of millions into Mexico for the exploitation of its resources and the firm support of the Díaz régime. Banks and railroads were organized under American promoters. The Greens and Hearsts were granted large concessions in copper, the Rockefellers and Aldriches in rubber, the Guggenheims and Pearsons in oil. Díaz gave his country

¹ Carlton Beals, "Mexico—an Interpretation," p. 25.

civilization but not culture. There was no attempt to educate or liberate the people. On the contrary, the power of the oppressive landed aristocracy and the medieval priesthood was strengthened. The *ejidos*, or communal lands, were seized. The workers were held in a ruthless system of peonage. Every aspiration for personal liberty or political independence was quenched by the despotic power of the political judge (*jefe político*). Díaz and his little group of political henchmen, the *científicos*, flourished on the graft which they obtained from the foreign concessions, while the people stagnated in poverty and sullen discontent.

It could not last forever. The celebration of the centennial of Mexican independence in 1910 stirred the hatred against the dictator, who was about to have himself reëlected for the eighth time. A wealthy tribune of the people, Francisco Madero, came forward to contest the election, and when his candidacy was contemptuously quashed, he started a revolution to force Díaz to resign or "to restore the dignity of the constitution." Madero had the sincerity of a fanatic and the faith of a fatalist, but he was barren of counsel and weak of will. He succeeded in eliminating the eighty-year-old Díaz by winning the revolutionary forces to his attractive program of the allotment of lands to the poor, the nationalization of the railroads, the extension of the suffrage, the establishment of local autonomy, the prohibition of presidential reëlection, the abolition of the political judges (bosses), and many other social, political, and economic reforms. But when he himself was elected, in October, 1910, he found himself entirely unable to redeem his promises. Month by month power slipped from his weak hands. His own relatives plundered the treasury under his nose. Díaz's nephew Felix and the old generals plotted against him. The governments (including our own) whose nationals found it hard to obtain concessions cooled toward him. His promise of land distribution failed to materialize. He was powerless to reward his supporters or punish his opponents. He was isolated and condemned. On February 18, 1913, the commander in chief of his own army, Victoriana Huerta, deposed the Merovingian Madero and pro-





claimed himself provisional president in his stead. A few days later Madero was "accidentally" shot while being conducted to jail by Huerta's officers. Thus dismally ended the first attempt for half a century to rid the Mexican people of the combined despotism of army, church, and landholder under which they had suffered since the Spanish conquest.

Huerta was a ruffianly half-breed, a dissipated, ruthless, ignorant soldier of fortune who had treacherously raised the banner of revolt against his elected chief and had in all probability instigated his murder. He had come into power through the violation of every principle that President Wilson laid down in his statement of March 11 as a condition of the coöperation and friendship of the United States. Nevertheless twenty-six European nations recognized Huerta's *de facto* government. Our own ambassador at Mexico City, Henry Lane Wilson, backed by the big investors, who cared less how a man opened his way to power in Mexico than how readily he opened the illimitable resources of the country to exploitation, urged President Wilson to follow suit. The alternative to Huerta, said the ambassador, was chaos. But the President preferred chaos, at least for a season, to Huerta. Ambassador Wilson resigned; and President Wilson sent ex-Governor John Lind of Minnesota to Mexico in August as special envoy to carry his ultimatum to the usurper. Hostilities must cease at once, a general amnesty must be proclaimed, a new election must be held, at which Huerta should not be a candidate, and all factions must agree to abide peaceably by the result. It is doubtful whether Huerta's compliance with this demand for his self-effacement would have brought peace and order. A few weeks after his *coup d'état* the revolutionists of the northern provinces were in arms against him, under the leadership of Don Venustiano Carranza, erstwhile senator in the Díaz régime and now governor of the important state of Coahuila—a cantankerous, conceited, conservative squirarch who had never shown the slightest concern for the welfare of the people until the adoption of the rôle of the agrarian-liberal revolutionist promised to further his personal ambitions. Carranza's ally at first, soon to be his bitterest

rival, was Francisco Villa, less respectable but more sincere, a curious compound of swashbuckling bandit and social reformer. Zapata, Orozco, Alvarado, Obregón, and lesser names swelled the list of feudal generals who hoped to fight their way to the first place in the revolutionary tournament. The prospects of general amnesty and a peaceful election were far from bright. Huerta scornfully rejected Wilson's terms (August 16), boasting that his army of eighty thousand would soon subdue the half-dozen provinces that still resisted his authority. Reviewing the situation in a speech to Congress a few days later, President Wilson counseled patience and "disinterested deliberation." We could "afford to exert the self-restraint of a really great nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it." "The steady pressure of moral force," he continued, "will, before many days, break the barriers of pride and prejudice down, and we shall triumph as Mexico's friends sooner than we would triumph as her enemies—and how much more handsomely, with how much higher and finer satisfaction of conscience and honor!" In his annual message of December 2 he reiterated his counsel of patience. Huerta had forfeited all claim to respect or moral support; his power and prestige were crumbling day by day. "We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting," he said; "and when the end comes we shall hope to see order restored in distressed Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberation of their people to their own ambitions."

The President's optimistic doctrine of "watchful waiting" provoked a goodly amount of mirthful scorn. But just what action he should have taken in the crisis, most of his critics failed to suggest. Few of them, besides the selfishly interested concession hunters, believed that we should recognize the unspeakable Huerta, who had shown his true colors in October by arresting half the members of the Mexican assembly and proclaiming himself dictator. Fewer still believed that we should intervene in arms to "clean up Mexico"—a course that would have united the hostile factions against us in a war of unpredictable duration and horror, and would have appeared to the

countries of Latin America and the world generally as an act of wanton aggression on our part.¹ It is true that a few American lives were lost in Mexico (ten in 1911, six in 1912, twenty-four in 1913, according to the report of Ambassador Fletcher in 1919); but thousands instead of tens of lives would have been sacrificed by an invasion of Mexico, and in the end the problem would still have remained (unless we purposed annexation or a permanent military occupation) for the Mexicans to work out their own salvation. The pressure of "moral force" was actually working to weaken Huerta. Without American recognition he found it impossible to obtain the foreign loans which were needed to reëstablish the "Diazpotism" of former days. Moreover, President Wilson, though asserting that we could not "be the partisans of either party to the contest in Mexico or constitute ourselves the virtual umpire between them," abandoned this position of strict neutrality on February 3, 1914, when he raised the embargo on the exportation of arms and munitions to Mexico (imposed by President Taft in 1912) in favor of Carranza, in whom he put his faith—mistakenly, as it proved—as a "leader who preferred the liberty of his people to his own ambitions."

The irritation of Huerta against the passive hostility of the Wilson administration was shown in various acts of reprisal on American citizens, which culminated in a serious incident. The United States gunboat *Dolphin* was one of the vessels of Admiral Mayo's fleet which had been drawn in close to Tampico to protect foreign property during the battles between the forces Huerta and Carranza in that region. On April 9, 1914, a

¹ Such a course was utterly abhorrent to President Wilson. In a speech at Mobile, Alabama, on October 27, 1913, dealing with our relations with Latin America, he said: "The United States will never again seek an additional foot of territory by conquest. She will devote herself to showing that she knows how to make honorable and fruitful use of the territory she has, and she must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarters are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity." This doctrine of disinterested friendship has been called the Wilsonian interpretation of the many-sided Monroe Doctrine. It was the announcement of the repudiation of the "dollar diplomacy," which he had already condemned by his refusal (March 8) to sanction the participation of the American bankers in the six-power loan to China (p. 508).

boatload of marines from the *Dolphin* landed at the Iturbide bridge at Tampico to purchase a supply of gasoline. They were promptly arrested by one of Huerta's officers and marched off to jail, two of them being taken forcibly from the launch, which was flying the American flag from bow and stern. Admiral Mayo immediately sent a message to the Huertista commander in Tampico, demanding the release of the prisoners, an apology for their arrest, and a salute of twenty-one guns to atone for the insult to the flag. The first two demands were complied with, but the salute was refused on the ground that there had been no insult. Huerta explained that Tampico was under martial law and that orders had been given to prevent anyone from landing at the bridge. However, our naval commander at the port had not received copies of such orders, and in any case the proper proceeding for the Tampico authorities would have been to send the American marines back to the *Dolphin* and lodge a protest with Admiral Mayo. Huerta also argued, with some show of logic, that it was inconsistent for a nation which did not recognize his authority in Mexico to ask him to fire a salute to the flag. President Wilson backed up Mayo's demand and, when Huerta persisted in his refusal, went before Congress (April 20) with the request for approval to "use the armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States." The President did not even wait for the consent of Congress.¹ Shortly after midnight of April 21 a wireless was received from Admiral Mayo to the effect that a German steamer carrying a cargo of machine guns and ammunition for Huerta's forces would arrive at Vera Cruz at about ten o'clock in the morning. After a brief conversation over the telephone with Secretary Daniels and Secretary Bryan,² he sent orders

¹ It was given two days later by votes of 337 to 37 in the House and 72 to 13 in the Senate.

² The interesting details of the midnight conversation are given by the President's private secretary, Tumulty, who "sat in" at the wire (J. P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 150-153).

to our fleet in the Gulf of Mexico to "take Vera Cruz at once." That morning the customhouse and arsenal of Vera Cruz were shelled, and a detachment of marines, landing under the protecting fire of the fleet, took possession of the city, with a loss of eighteen Americans and about sixty Mexicans. General Frederick Funston was sent to Vera Cruz with an army of six thousand men to hold the conquered city.

Although President Wilson disclaimed any intention of making war on Mexico, the reduction of Vera Cruz was a patent act of war. The cause for the President's departure from his policy of "watchful waiting" was the fear that the force of his moral pressure upon Huerta would be lost if he allowed the dictator to harass our citizens and defy our government with impunity. But the effect upon the fortunes of Huerta was only one aspect, and perhaps the least important one, of our armed intervention in Mexico. Carranza, in whose interest our policy was really shaped, took offense at this invasion of Mexican soil and never afterward showed the least faith in America's good intentions. The European governments very generally looked upon the bombardment of Vera Cruz as the opening act of an American war of conquest. The ever-present suspicion in the states of Latin America that in spite of our pacific avowals we meant to dominate the Western Hemisphere was increased. There was widespread criticism of the President among our own people for complicating the Mexican situation and sacrificing American lives for the sake of the formal satisfaction of punishing a usurper for refusing to salute the flag. President Wilson showed repeatedly during his administration that he could deal calmly and patiently with affronts to our national honor, even when they came from recognized and highly responsible governments. The precipitate action at Vera Cruz seemed inconsistent with our profession and incommensurate with the provocation. The first result was a proposal of mediation by the diplomatic representatives of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (the "A B C" powers) at Washington, to which our government gave prompt approval and which Huerta accepted "in principle." The mediators met at Niagara Falls on May 20 and, after a session of

six weeks, signed a protocol advising the establishment of a provisional government in Mexico by agreement between Huerta and Carranza. But Carranza, already near the goal of the ambition which our own support had made realizable, refused to coöperate. On July 15 Huerta gave up the unequal fight and fled to Europe. Carranza entered the capital in triumph on August 20. The only result of the mediation conference was some restoration of confidence among the Latin-American powers in the pacific intentions of the United States.

In Mexico the cast was altered, but the drama of revolution proceeded unchecked. Within a month after Carranza's triumph the northern provinces were again aflame with revolt under the bandit Villa. We withdrew our troops from Vera Cruz in November, though it was necessary to keep forces on the Mexican border. For a year the struggle raged between Carranza and Villa, desolating the provinces of northern and central Mexico. When finally Carranza had so far succeeded as to secure the recommendation of eight of the Latin-American republics for his recognition, and had promised that his government would respect the lives and property of foreigners in Mexico and settle the damages caused by the revolution, President Wilson (October 9, 1915) authorized his recognition by the United States as the *de facto* president of Mexico. The embargo on arms was reimposed to cripple the revolutionary activities of Villa. Carranza was given permission to transport troops across our soil to attack the rebel forces. In his annual message of December 7, President Wilson spoke in a congratulatory and optimistic tone of the Mexican situation. We had been put to the test, he said, and had stood the test. The fortunes of Mexico were in her own hands. We had proved that we would not "take advantage of her in distress and undertake to impose upon her a government of our own choosing." And we now could "hopefully await the rebirth of the troubled republic which had so much of which to purge itself and so little sympathy from any outside quarter in the radical but necessary process." Considering his hostility to Huerta and his favor to

Carranza, after the latter had twice refused to listen to a plan of mediation, President Wilson's disclaimer of any intention to impose upon Mexico "a government of our own choosing" seemed to many a bit of ironic self-deception.¹

It seemed so to Villa, who swore vengeance on the United States and proceeded forthwith to provoke our intervention. On January 10, 1916, at Santa Isabela, he seized eighteen American citizens who were traveling with passports from the Carranza government, and shot them down in cold blood. On March 9 he led a band of several hundred desperadoes across the American border and raided the town of Columbus, New Mexico, looting property and killing seventeen Americans. The next day Wilson announced that a punitive expedition, conducted "with scrupulous respect for the sovereignty and independence of Mexico," would be sent in pursuit of Villa. Five days later Brigadier General J. J. Pershing crossed the border at the head of six thousand men to get Villa dead or alive. Carranza had given a grudging consent to the expedition; but when the hunt for the elusive Villa drew General Pershing's men farther and farther into the province of Chihuahua, the hostility of Carranza became evident. His officers put every hindrance possible in the way of our locating Villa. They denied our right to be in Mexico at all, threatened our column with detachments of mounted troops, and finally attacked Major Tompkins's soldiers at Parral, more than four hundred miles south of the border (April 12). Thereafter the American troops had to defend themselves constantly against treacherous and unprovoked attacks from the Carranzistas, as well as to pursue the Villistas. On June 16 Carranza's general in chief came out openly in a message to Pershing, that the movement of the American troops in any direction except toward the border

¹ Although his accession to power was not characterized by the murder that marked Huerta's *coup d'état*, there was nothing to show that Carranza was any more acceptable to the Mexican people than was his predecessor. He had seized power by revolution, and had been unwilling at any time to submit his case to the decision of a popular election. It was not until March, 1917, that Carranza was elected president of Mexico under the newly revised constitution.

would be the occasion for attack by the forces of the Mexican government. To which Pershing replied that he took orders only from his own commander in chief. A pitched battle was fought at Carrizal on June 21, in which twenty-one American soldiers were killed or wounded and seventeen taken prisoners. The perilous situation of our troops in Mexico, together with fresh raids of the Villistas across the border, led Wilson to call into the service of the United States the militia of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. As our soldiers were massed on the Mexican border under General Funston to the number of one hundred thousand in the autumn of 1916, it looked as if war between the two countries were inevitable.

Carranza, at last aroused to the danger of his position, released the American prisoners and agreed to a conference. The representatives of the two governments proposed a settlement by which General Pershing's troops should be peaceably withdrawn within forty days, provided no new raids or attacks should occur meanwhile, that each nation should patrol its own side of the border by its own forces, that the United States should have the right to cross the border to capture bandits who raided American territory, and that claims for damages done should be referred to future negotiations. Carranza refused to accede to these terms, demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Pershing's troops and the prohibition of any further "punitive expeditions." In spite of the failure of the negotiations our troops were actually withdrawn from Mexican soil on February 5, 1917, chiefly because it was becoming more certain every day that we should need all our military resources to throw into the scale of the Allies in the World War. Carranza's position had been a difficult one, to be sure. To allow the armed forces of a foreign country to fight Mexicans of whatever party or faction on Mexican soil incurred for him the reproach of his countrymen. Yet he had given his consent to the American punitive expedition. His treacherous conduct in harassing and attacking our troops, instead of coöperating with them in the pursuit and punishment of the common enemy, Villa, was but an example of the base ingratitude which he never

failed to show toward the government that had done the most to make his own success possible.¹

At the opening of 1917 President Wilson resumed the long-interrupted diplomatic relations with Mexico by appointing Henry P. Fletcher as ambassador. The acute political strain was relieved and the danger of war was passed, but whether our two armed interventions had either improved our relations with Mexico or given any appreciable help in solving the difficulties of the republic is problematical. Carranza held his precarious power until near the end of the Wilson administration, bringing neither profit nor peace to his country. A high-sounding constitution proclaimed in February, 1917, promised the millennium—and ended in promises. The hollowness of Carranza's liberalism soon became apparent. The feeble beginnings of economic, educational, social, and agrarian reform were allowed to lapse, while the president was absorbed in the politics of personal ambition. The condition of Mexico was pitiable. Trade languished, agriculture declined, starvation threatened the cities, revolutionary bandits made life unsafe. Seventy American citizens were killed in Mexico in 1917 and 1918. Little by little Carranza's intransigence alienated all the decent and honest elements of his support—Generals Obregón and Calles, Governor De la Huerta of Sonora, and the famous reform governor, Alvarado of Yucatan. Control slipped from the hands of the intelligentsia and the labor and land reformers, to fall into the hands of a group of militarists whose one idea was public looting. As the election year of 1920 approached, Obregón, Calles, and De la Huerta formed a triumvirate to oust the Carranzistas from power. The constitution forbade reelection, but Carranza was determined to put his creature, Bonillas, into the presidency. Reluctance to part with power and its attendant plunder has ever been the curse

¹ The reports of Major General Funston and Brigadier General Pershing on the punitive expedition of 1916 were filed in the secret archives of the War Department by Secretary Baker, and the American people knew little of the heroic details of the campaign until extracts from these reports were published in the *New York Times* of Sunday, November 13, 1921.

of Latin-American politics, making elections synonymous with revolutions. It caused Carranza's overthrow. Unable to withstand the Obregón coalition in the field, he fled from Mexico City toward Vera Cruz in May, 1920, and was assassinated by a treacherous guard in an obscure hamlet in the Pueblo mountains. According to the agreement among the triumvirs De la Huerta was chosen provisional president by the Congress, Obregón was to succeed him at the ensuing "regular" election, and Calles was to succeed Obregón at the end of the latter's term (1924). Thus President Wilson was confronted at the close of his administration, as he had been at the beginning, with the question of the recognition of a régime in Mexico founded on revolution and murder. And, like President Taft, he passed the problem on to his successor.

It was, however, an economic rather than a moral objection that kept President Harding from recognizing the Obregon government. Article 27 of the Mexican constitution of 1917 provided that the ownership of lands and waters was vested in the nation, which had the sole right to transmit ownership thereof to private persons; that property in certain minerals—coal, petroleum, phosphates, natural gas—was inalienable by the state; that "only Mexicans by birth or naturalization" had the right to acquire land or obtain concessions to develop mines, waters, or mineral fields in the republic;¹ and, finally, that all contracts and concessions granted by previous governments since the year 1876 (that is, all the Díaz concessions) were subject to revision. Our State Department demanded a treaty explicitly safeguarding American business interests in Mexico, but President Obregón refused to give more definite satisfaction than his assurance that Article 27 would not be interpreted to the prejudice of those interests. A National Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico was formed in January, 1919, with the Rockefeller companies, the American Smelt-

¹ The state might grant the same rights to foreigners, to be sure, but only on the condition that they agreed "to be considered Mexicans in respect to such property, and accordingly not to invoke the protection of their governments in respect to the same, under penalty of forfeiture of the property so acquired to the nation."

ing and Refining Company, the Anaconda Copper Company, and the Mexican Petroleum Company as the chief promoters. From August, 1919, to May, 1920, a subcommittee of the Senate under the chairmanship of Albert B. Fall of New Mexico (a bitter opponent of the Obregón régime) investigated the treatment of American interests in Mexico since the accession of Carranza, and reported the imperative need for a formal guaranty of American rights. A few days before he became Secretary of the Interior in President Harding's cabinet, Senator Fall wrote a letter to the Association, in which he said, "I have opposed and shall continue to oppose any recognition of any Mexican government until all pending questions between the two countries shall be in the course of a settlement under the terms of a written agreement."

Month after month the two governments haggled over the terms which might justify American recognition, while Obregón gave proof that the Mexican revolution was at last entering on a constructive phase. He conciliated labor, relieved the peasants, placated Villa and Zapata by extensive land grants, reduced the army, opened schools, revived trade, funded the debt,¹ and generally encouraged the rise of a middle class of business men capable of managing the enterprises of a modern state in an age of economic expansion. At last the promise of Maderist liberalism seemed in a fair way of being fulfilled. The prospect of American recognition became brighter as the stability of the Obregón régime increased. In May, 1923, Charles B. Warren and John B. Payne were sent to Mexico, where they arranged a satisfactory settlement with the Obregón government on the questions of the foreign debt, indemnity for expropriated lands, and the petroleum concessions. On December 4, 1923, Secretary Hughes announced that President Coolidge would recognize the Obregón government as soon as the Mexican senate should

¹ His secretary of the treasury, De la Huerta, visited New York early in 1922, and arranged with Thomas W. Lamont, representing the bankers who held the Mexican bonds, for the eventual satisfaction of the creditors. Partial payments of principal and interest commenced on January 2, 1923. Full payment was to be resumed by January, 1928.

have ratified the agreement. And in March, 1924, Mr. Warren was appointed as ambassador to Mexico.

Meanwhile the approach of the presidential year had precipitated the usual revolution in Mexico. De la Huerta, repudiating the agreement of the triumvirs, raised the standard of revolt at Vera Cruz (December 6, 1923). Again our warships were hurried to the Gulf to patrol the Mexican shore for the protection of foreign property and lives. The Coolidge administration announced on December 29 that it would comply with President Obregón's request for the shipment of munitions "in view of the relation between this government and the Mexican government which was formally recognized last September." On January 4, 1924, Secretary of War Weeks made public the sale of five thousand Enfield rifles, five million rounds of ammunition, and eight De Haviland airplanes to the Obregón war office. Three days later President Coolidge laid an embargo on the private shipment of arms or munitions to Mexico. We refused, however, to sell Obregón two armored cruisers, on the ground that such action would be in violation of the principles of the Washington conference on the limitation of naval armaments (see page 788). By the spring of 1924 President Obregón had put down the rebellion. Our policy in aiding him with arms had reversed President Harding's announcement in April, 1923, that our government was opposed to the sale of our surplus military equipment to any foreign nation. Several questions arise out of our action in helping Obregón against De la Huerta. What will be its effect on the Latin-American countries, which are already inclined to suspect our readiness to interfere in the domestic affairs of the weaker states of the continent? What if some of these states should decide to sell arms to Obregón's opponents, as it has been rumored that Venezuela and Guatemala intend to do? What if a European power should dispose of surplus war material to aid a revolution against a Latin-American government with which we were in sympathy? What if other Latin-American presidents, when faced by revolution, should send agents to Washington to buy rifles, munitions, and airplanes? Such questions open up possibilities of incalculable

import for the future relations of the United States with the sister republics of the American continents.

President Wilson in his Mexican policy gave a new interpretation to the Monroe Doctrine. Heretofore the United States had interposed to protect the Latin-American republics from any attempt of the European powers to impose a government upon them, but had generally accepted the *de facto* régime of the faction which had gained possession of the capital and the treasury, whether that faction had come into power by peaceful or violent means. If recognition was delayed, it was only until we could be fairly sure of the political stability of the new régime. If intervention was contemplated, it was only because we could not permit chronic anarchy to ruin the economic and political fortunes of the states whose independence we had guaranteed. President Roosevelt, who believed in the vigorous assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, nevertheless assured the Latin-American countries that they need fear no intervention by the United States if they acted "with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters" and paid their debts. The important thing in his eyes was not how a Latin-American dictator got his power, but how he used it. Wilson went "behind the returns," and refused recognition to a régime that was not founded on the consent of the people in a regular election. "The government of the United States," he said in accepting his renomination in 1916, "so far as the power rests in me, will refuse to extend the hand of welcome to anyone who obtains power in a sister republic by treachery and violence." As a counsel of perfection the Wilsonian doctrine was admirable, but it was well-nigh impossible to carry it out in practice unless we were prepared suddenly to reform the political habits of several of the tropical and semitropical countries on this continent. The result of our new policy in Mexico was that we were without diplomatic representation there for seven of the ten years following the Huerta revolution; and if we were spared the recognition of other governments in the Caribbean region "founded on treachery and violence," it was only because we forcibly imposed upon them "governments of our own choosing."

The growing interest and the increasing control of the United States in the Caribbean in the twentieth century have been due primarily to the Panama Canal. The Spanish-American War brought us the possession of Porto Rico and a protectorate over Cuba.¹ But there was no ulterior motive in the establishment of our influence in these islands. They were simply delivered from Spanish misrule. It was not till our interest was fixed on the Isthmus of Panama a few years later that that point became the focus of a Caribbean policy. It was imperative that order should be maintained in that region. European powers must not be tempted by bankrupt Latin-American treasuries to send their warships to force the collection of the debts due their citizens. Peace must prevail, so far as possible, in the states of the Caribbean. Their rich resources must be cultivated for the enjoyment of the new avenues of trade to be opened, and not squandered in recurrent political revolutions. Hence the ultimatum to the Kaiser in 1902 to withdraw his battleships from Venezuelan waters and submit the German debt claims to arbitration. Hence the display of the "big stick" of the international policeman in Roosevelt's message of 1904. Hence the assumption in 1905 of the receivership for the Dominican customs. And hence the establishment in 1907, on the initiative of Presidents Roosevelt and Díaz, of the Central American Court of Justice, with obligatory and binding jurisdiction over all cases of dispute between the five signatory republics, and, in 1908, of a Central American International Bureau to further the interests of education, trade, agriculture, industry, and the reform of legal institutions.²

¹ As our relations to these islands and with Colombia have already been sketched down to the Harding administration (pp. 353-359, 401-410) they are omitted from this survey of the Caribbean region.

² The Court of Justice was opened with impressive ceremonies at Cartago, Costa Rica, on May 25, 1908. At the close of the exercises the American representative read a letter from Secretary of State Root, announcing that Andrew Carnegie had given \$100,000 for the erection of a "temple of Peace" at Cartago for the sittings of the court. This promising experiment of a League of Nations of the Central American republics came to an end, however, and the court was dissolved in 1918, on the refusal of Nicaragua (and the United States) to accept the decision of the court condemning the Bryan-Chamorro treaty of 1916 (see page 592).

During the Taft administration the activity of the United States in the Caribbean countries was generally directed toward the rehabilitation of their finances. Honduras, burdened with a debt of \$125,000,000, turned to us for help. Secretary Knox interested the American bankers in the situation. A loan convention was signed in 1911, approving a plan submitted by J. P. Morgan and Company for the refunding of the Honduran debt and the satisfaction of the bondholders. The Honduran government agreed to appoint a collector of customs approved by President Taft and to submit to a sort of financial protectorate by the United States. But in spite of the President's urging and Mr. Knox's persuasive argument before the Foreign Relations Committee to "make American capital an instrumentality to secure financial stability, and hence prosperity and peace, to the more backward republics in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal," the Senate refused to ratify the loan convention, and the bankers dropped the scheme. A diplomatic negotiation with Honduras in the same year, however, was more successful. Invited to act as mediator in a local revolution, President Taft sent Mr. T. C. Dawson to Honduras as special commissioner. The peace conference held on board the American ship *Tacoma* resulted in the establishment of a provisional government to which both the rival presidents gave allegiance, and brought Taft the thanks of the Honduran republic for his "friendly mediation."

The neighboring republic of Nicaragua, after a year of devastating revolution, likewise appealed to the United States for aid in the reestablishment of its finances. Mr. Dawson negotiated a convention providing for an American loan secured by the customs receipts of the republic, but our Senate again refused to sanction the measure. President Taft—this time acting on the precedent set by his predecessor—appointed a claims commission for Nicaragua and put an American agent in charge of the customs of the republic. A few months later President Díaz of Nicaragua, faced with a new revolution, invited the United States to "intervene with its forces" to guarantee the lives and property of American citizens in Nicaragua, and President Taft

ordered a detachment of American marines to be landed at the capital, Managua. They remained after order had been restored, as "a stabilizing influence." In December, 1912, President Díaz offered to sell us for \$3,000,000 the exclusive rights to build a canal through Nicaraguan territory and to erect naval bases at the Gulf of Fonseca on her Pacific coast and at Corn Island on the Caribbean side.

The advent of a Democratic administration on March 4, 1913, was the occasion of considerable speculation as to the nature of our future policy in the Caribbean area. The traditions of the Democratic party since the Civil War had been wholly anti-imperialistic. Cleveland and Bryan, agreeing in nothing else, had agreed in the dictum that the United States must not seek to impose its authority on weaker peoples in either hemisphere of the earth, whether in Samoa, Hawaii, and the Philippines or in Central America and the Antilles. On the other hand, the first Republican Secretary of State, William H. Seward, had been a pronounced expansionist,¹ and the whole program of "imperialism" following the Spanish War had been carried out by a solid Republican administration, against the protests of the Democrats at every step. President Wilson was in thorough sympathy with the Democratic tradition, as his conduct in regard to the Philippines and Mexico had shown. The logic of the situation in the Caribbean was too strong, however, to allow the disinterested counsels of the Mobile speech (p. 573, note) to prevail. We could not permit the states near the canal to revert to the condition of chronic revolution. There was no change in our policy of financial penetration and political supervision. Rather, if anything, was that policy strengthened under the Democratic administration. Secretary Bryan, the great anti-imperialist of

¹ "You want the commerce of the world, which is the empire of the world," said Seward in a speech in the Senate in 1857. "This is to be looked for not on the American lakes, nor on the Atlantic coast, nor on the Caribbean Sea . . . but on the Pacific Ocean and its islands and continents. Multiply your ships and send them forth to the East." Seward purchased Alaska and tried to purchase the Danish West Indies. He favored the annexation of Santo Domingo, attempted to buy two small islands near Porto Rico, and leased the harbor of the Mole St. Nicholas from Haiti as a naval station.

other days, had not been in office long before he wrote to the American commissioner in Santo Domingo asking for places in the customs service of the island as rewards for faithful Democratic campaign workers. "Yankee imperialism" grew steadily in the Caribbean countries "by homeopathic doses cleverly administered," while the attention of the nation was absorbed in the tremendous problems of the World War and the peace settlement. It was only with the revelations coming in the last year of the Wilson administration that the American people began to realize the rôle which their bankers and commissioners, their admirals and bluejackets, had been playing in the Caribbean region.

To take the island of Santo Domingo and Haiti first. The attention of Santo Domingo was called early in the administration to the necessity of our preserving in full vigor the financial protectorate of 1905. Our warships were kept near the coast, and the elections of the autumn of 1914 were held under the "observation" of American officers and marines. When a new insurrection broke out in 1916, our marines were landed, and a demand was made on President Jiménez to sign a treaty providing for the permanent retention of the protectorate and the establishment of an American constabulary force. The president chose to resign office rather than accept the treaty. Thereupon Captain H. S. Knapp of our navy declared the Dominican republic under the military administration of the United States. There was a profession that "no designs against the sovereignty of Santo Domingo" were contemplated, but on November 29 the captain suspended the Dominican constitution and appointed American naval officers to the various cabinet positions. For six years Santo Domingo was ruled by the Navy Department of the United States, until, on October 21, 1922, Señor Buigos was inaugurated provisional president, the executive departments were turned over to Dominican officials, and Admiral Robison sailed away from the island, leaving a guard of fifteen hundred American marines to preserve order. Announcement had been made in April that the marines would not be withdrawn before July 1, 1924. During all the six years of the American

occupation there had been haggling over the terms on which we would restore the sovereignty of Santo Domingo. The indignation raised by the opponents of intervention, especially in a series of startling and somewhat exaggerated articles in the New York *Nation* during the presidential campaign of 1920, led Harding to promise remedial action if he were elected. In June, 1921, he accordingly authorized Admiral Robison to say that the American forces would be withdrawn from Santo Domingo in eight months if the republic would ratify the acts of the American government of occupation, validating a loan of \$2,400,000 for the completion of public works begun by us, allowing the receiver of customs to handle this loan, and establishing a national guard under the direction of an American military commission. The Dominicans refused these conditions, which they deemed rather a prolongation than a cessation of American control. Elections were set for August 13, 1921, but the Junta of Election Abstention prevented their being held. It was impossible for still another year to secure a Dominican congress which would ratify our demands or to find a provisional president who would consent to be a mere figurehead.

Doubtless the American occupation of Santo Domingo was productive of important social, economic, and financial reforms. Admiral Snowden in his report of December, 1920, to Secretary Daniels told of the four hundred miles of road built and the new bridges, piers, and wharves. Between 1906 and 1916 the republic had spent only an average of \$400,000 a year on public works, but in the next three years the figures had risen to \$1,250,000. There were 18,000 children in the schools in 1916, and 100,000 in 1920. But there was another side to the picture. The political liberty of the island had been suspended. A rigorous censorship had been introduced. There were numerous complaints of arbitrary imprisonments and cruel punishments visited upon protesting natives. Ruinous rates of interest, reaching as high as 19 per cent, had been charged on American loans. Distrust of the beneficent attitude of the United States toward the Latin-American countries had been nurtured not only in Santo Domingo but in the neighboring states. On August 16,

1920, the Colombian Chamber of Deputies, congratulating Santo Domingo on the centennial of her independence, expressed the hope that the republic might soon regain the sovereignty which was now "ground under the heel of a foreign military occupation." This allusion to our presence in Santo Domingo was for prudential reasons stricken out of the resolution; but the editor of the leading liberal paper in Bogotá protested against the "inexplicable cowardice" of the Chamber for withdrawing its condemnation of "the blackest crime yet committed by Yankee Imperialism in Hispanic America."

Our treatment of Haiti during the Wilson administration was no better an exemplification of the ideals of "disinterested friendship" than our course in Santo Domingo. The year 1914 witnessed a series of revolutions in the western half of the island. On June 14 France and Germany made formal demands for the control of the Haitian finances, and the Haitian National Bank (which, since 1911, had been virtually a branch of the National City Bank of New York) refused payments to the government. In October, Secretary Bryan, advised an increase of our naval forces in Haitian waters, "not only for the purpose of protecting foreign interests, but also as an evidence of the earnest intention of this government to settle the unsatisfactory state of affairs which exists." The refusal of Haiti to allow us to establish a financial protectorate led to immediate action. On December 13 American marines landed from our warship *Machias*, marched to the National Bank, and took \$500,000 of gold deposits of the government from its vaults. The following July, Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton arrived at Cape Haitien. He was there, he announced, only to help Haiti establish a secure government. The election of a president by the legislature of Haiti was twice postponed by Admiral Caperton, on orders from Washington, which read: "The United States expects to be intrusted with the practical control of the customs and such control over the financial affairs of Haiti as the United States may deem necessary for efficient administration. The United States considers it a duty to support a constitutional government. It has no designs upon the political and territorial integrity of

Haiti." Nevertheless the American naval officers in Haiti would allow no man to stand for the presidential election who would not promise in advance to sign any treaty that the United States might be pleased to draft. Such a man was finally found in the person of Philip Dartiguenave, President of the Haitian senate, a rather stupid and stolid individual, who was willing to make any barter for the sake of the coveted honor. Our Navy Department notified Admiral Caperton that Dartiguenave was our choice, and the senator was elected on August 12, 1915. Two days later the draft of the treaty was presented to the puppet president, accompanied by the following instructions from Washington to the American legation: "The Haitian Congress will be pleased to pass forthwith a resolution to authorize the President-elect to conclude, *without modification*, the treaty submitted by you." When the Haitian congress manifested opposition, Admiral Caperton proclaimed martial law and held up the customs receipts, which were necessary for the current government expenses, announcing that they would "be immediately available on the ratification of the treaty." The congress ratified under protest.

But this was not the end of the chapter. In the spring of 1917 a new constitution was offered to the Haitians, providing for greatly enlarged powers of the president (under American influence), the right of foreigners to hold land, the immunity of Haitian citizens from punishment for obeying orders of the American officers, and the paramount authority of the courts-martial established by the American occupation. The Assembly was dissolved for refusing to accept this constitution, and when it became evident that no assembly could be elected which would accept it, ratification by a plebiscite was ordered. The Haitians of the better class abstained from voting, and the native peasants were reported as "terror stricken." The official figures declared the constitution adopted by a vote of 98,294 to 769. Opposition to the constitution forced upon them led to a revolt of the Haitians against the American military occupation, which was quelled with promptness. The report of Secretary Daniels for 1920 gives the number of Haitians killed in

the preceding year as 1861. In commenting on the situation in the autumn of 1920 our own Major General Barnett spoke of "the indiscriminating killings in Haiti," and a little later he came to Washington to protest against the American occupation. Being denied a hearing by the State Department, he left with the Secretary of State and the chairmen of the Committees on Foreign Affairs of the House and Senate a memorandum of charges of coercion and cruelty in Haiti, concluding with an indictment of our policy in the island since July, 1915, as "the most terrible régime of military autocracy which has ever been carried on in the name of the great American democracy." Undoubtedly the charges preferred by the Haitians and their sympathizers in America were exaggerated; but we need only to read the admission of our own official and the sworn testimony of American witnesses before the Senate investigating committee to realize that our government failed lamentably to improve political conditions in Haiti through military intervention.


As in Santo Domingo, the social and economic results of our occupation of Haiti have been salutary. Customs duties have been honestly collected and wisely administered. Labor conditions have been improved. Sanitation and education have been introduced. But the presence of a repressive military government imposing officials of its own choice and constitutions of its own drafting upon the people of Haiti will never be accepted without resistance. We have yet to learn how to exert over troubled republics like Santo Domingo and Haiti a form of supervision which shall be both adequate to our responsibility under the Monroe Doctrine for defending them against intervention by foreign powers and acceptable to the native population as a manifestation of a disinterested friendship. The task is one of enormous difficulty, but on its solution depends our reputation for good or evil in the eyes of Latin America.

On the mainland of Central America our record under the Wilson administration was better, but still far from satisfactory. The terms offered to us by Nicaragua in the closing days of the Taft administration (p. 586) were so amended by Secretary Bryan as to make Nicaragua a protectorate of the United States

on the model of Cuba. The republic was not to make treaties affecting her independence and territorial integrity or to contract debts beyond the strength of her revenues to support. The United States was to have the right to intervene in order to maintain the independence of Nicaragua and to protect life and property within her borders. Our Senate declined to accept a protectorate over Nicaragua, and subsequent negotiations eliminated the foregoing provisions. It was not until June, 1916, that the Bryan-Chamorro treaty was finally promulgated in practically the same terms as those proposed by Nicaragua nearly four years before. But the treaty injured rather than improved our relations with Central America. Costa Rica and Salvador protested against it, claiming that it infringed upon their territorial rights. The cases went before the Central American Court of Justice, which decided them in favor of the plaintiffs. The United States supported Nicaragua in her refusal to obey the decisions, with the consequence that the court was dissolved and the attempt to revive a Central American Union was frustrated. Meantime the American marines remained as a "legation guard" at Managua.¹

Even with our own protectorate of Panama our relations in recent years have been strained. The Canal was formally opened to traffic in August, 1914, when the steamer *Ancona*, of ten thousand tons, passed through, with the Canal officials and distinguished guests of the American and Panamanian governments on her deck. Landslides in the Culebra Cut twice compelled the temporary closing of the Canal to traffic, but by the spring of 1915 the trouble was remedied. The Canal commission had already been superseded by a civil régime, and Colonel George W. Goethals, the chief engineer of the great work, had been appointed (January, 1914) as the first governor of the Canal

¹ They were no more welcome than our soldiers in the other Latin-American republics. In March, 1922, twenty-six of the marines engaged in a shooting affray with Managuan police, in which three of the latter were killed. The marines were sentenced by a court-martial to terms of imprisonment of from eight to twelve years. On February 7, 1924, Secretary Hughes announced that the legation guard of one hundred Americans would be withdrawn from Nicaragua in January, 1925, on the installation of the new president to be elected in October, 1924.



THE GREATER UNITED STATES AND THE
PANAMA CANAL ROUTES

Zone.¹ Scarcely a month after the formal opening of the Canal, Chief Justice White, as the arbiter of a long-standing boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica, pronounced in favor of the latter republic. Panama refused to accept the award, and for six years and more resisted the attempts of Costa Rica to take possession of the territory. Finally, in February, 1921, Costa Rica invaded the region awarded to her. Panama drove the troops out, and both republics prepared for war. The Harding administration came into power just at this moment. After a careful study of the case Secretary Hughes, on March 15, advised the government of Panama, "in the most friendly but most urgent manner," to submit to the decision of Chief Justice White. President Porras of Panama appealed over the head of Secretary Hughes to President Harding, and when the latter supported his Secretary, Porras called a special session of the Panamanian congress and secured a vote of defiance to the orders of the United States. We then disciplined our unruly ward by the announcement that unless she promptly agreed to the award we should take steps to enforce it ourselves. Costa Rica was encouraged to take possession of the disputed territory, American marines were landed to back her up, and the Panamanian officials withdrew under protest (September, 1921).

A direct consequence of the completion of the Panama Canal was our purchase, in 1917, for \$25,000,000, of the Danish West Indies (the islands of St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John). This group, called the Virgin Islands, lies about fifty miles to the eastward of Porto Rico, at the northwestern point of the bowl-like sweep of the Lesser Antilles, and guards the entrance to the Caribbean from the east. Ever since their acquisition the

¹ The capital cost of the Canal up to January, 1921, including fortifications, was about \$470,000,000. The annual report of Governor Morrow of the Canal Zone for the year ending June 30, 1926, showed an excess of receipts over expenditures of \$17,340,865 as against \$9,201,623 for 1922. During the year the Canal was used by 5197 vessels, with a tonnage of 24,943,763, paying gross tolls of \$22,391,055. Over 56 per cent of the tonnage through the Canal was carried in American ships. With its heavy operating expenses, its interest and sinking-fund charges, and the payment of the \$250,000 annuity to Panama, the Canal is still far from being a "paying" proposition from a business point of view.

Virgin Islands have been governed by the Navy Department. Though the population of the islands is small (26,000), and over 90 per cent are of negro or mixed blood, the desire for a more democratic form of government has not failed to manifest itself. In the autumn of 1922 Congress was asked to grant American citizenship to the inhabitants of the islands and to establish a civil government in place of the naval administration.

The Caribbean has become in effect an American lake—landlocked formerly, but now, thanks to the Canal, one of the world's most important highways of traffic. The economic development of the countries bordering its shores has gone on apace. The trade of the six republics of Central America with the United States in 1913 was \$47,500,000. In 1920 it had grown to \$136,300,000. The American control of the Caribbean was far more complete than England's control of the Mediterranean; for while the latter power held the outlets of the Mediterranean at Gibraltar and Suez, with stepping-stones in the islands of Malta and Cyprus, she made no attempt to control the politics and finances of the European countries along the shores. We owned Porto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone. We had an effective protectorate over Cuba and Panama. We exercised a financial and military control over Haiti and Santo Domingo, and to a considerable extent dictated the financial policy of Nicaragua and Honduras. Semi-official loans to Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala gave us a preponderant influence in those republics. In short, no Caribbean republic could hope to maintain a régime which did not have the indorsement of the United States. The policy of our State Department had been essentially unchanged under Republican and Democratic administrations. Secretaries Root, Bacon, Bryan, Lansing, Colby, and Hughes all spoke the same language of respect for the sovereignty of the republics—and determination to keep them in the paths of sobriety and solvency.

Here, in fact, was the dilemma of the Caribbean. The duty devolved upon the United States, as the owner of the valuable and vulnerable Canal, and as the one power strong enough to preserve order in the region, to maintain the political stability

and the financial integrity of the Latin-American republics. But the performance of this duty seemed to negate our professions of disinterestedness. Every intervention of the United States to influence elections, dictate candidates, enforce conventions, and suppress uprisings lent weight to the argument of those Latin-American politicians and publicists who were determined to see nothing but a cynical policy of aggression in our behavior. The stable and prosperous states of South America, like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, were inclined to sympathize with the tropical republics in their protests against "Yankee Imperialism." For example, Dr. Ingenieros, one of the most noted authors of Argentina, wrote in October, 1922: "The famous Monroe Doctrine, which appeared for a century to be our guarantee of political independence against European conquest, has revealed itself gradually as a right of the North Americans to intervene in our affairs. The powerful neighbor and officious friend has developed to the highest extent the régime of capitalistic protection and has reached in the last war the hegemony of the world. . . . In the governing class there has grown at the same time a sentiment of expansion and conquest [!], so that the classical phrase 'America for the Americans' means now nothing more than America—our Latin America—for the North Americans. . . . The danger of the United States comes from her superiority. She is to be feared because she is great, rich, and strenuous."

Our government has been sincerely anxious to allay such fears. In an address at Philadelphia in November, 1923, in celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine, Secretary Hughes said: "In promoting stability [in Latin America] we do not threaten independence, but seek to conserve it. We are not aiming at control, but endeavoring to establish self-control. . . . We are seeking to establish a *pax Americana*, maintained not by arms but by mutual respect and good will and the tranquillizing processes of reason." Still, the complaint of Latin America is that we insist on being both judge and jury in the case. When Uruguay, at the fifth Pan-American Congress at Santiago de Chile, in the spring of 1923, proposed that

the Monroe Doctrine be "pan-Americanized," our representative, Henry P. Fletcher, interposed an immediate veto. The Monroe Doctrine "must be exclusively interpreted and exercised by the United States." This prerogative we insisted on having reserved to the United States in the covenant of the League of Nations; and though we are not (1927) a member of the League, that body has deferred to our authority in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere by refusing to entertain appeals from Bolivia and Panama against our rulings in boundary disputes.

The necessity for a broad, enlightened, and conciliatory statesmanship in our relation to the Central American and South American republics has been emphasized by the events of the last decade. In the first place, the economic growth of many of these countries has been marvelous. The result of the war has been to divert to the United States a good part of the trade which they formerly had carried on with the European nations. Mr. S. G. Inman, the executive secretary of the Committee on Coöperation in Latin America, writes: "The old idea in the United States was that Latin America, being so largely made up of Indians and illiterates, offered little opportunity for commerce. Business men are gradually awakening to the great error of such an opinion. Little Cuba, with a 2,500,000 population, had a foreign commerce in 1920 about equal to that of China, with a 400,000,000 population. Argentina alone did about \$2,000,000,000 of foreign trade in the year closed June 30, 1920. In spite of the revolution in Mexico the United States sold more farm implements to that country in 1920 than it did to France in the midst of reconstruction work. All the millions of Asia and Oceania bought less from the United States last year than did Latin America. Our foreign commerce with the whole world was \$13,000,000,000 in 1920. It would have been \$75,000,000,000 if the business we did with Latin America had been maintained in the rest of the world."¹ In

¹ "Obstacles to Pan-American Concord," *Times Current History*, February, 1923, p. 791. Our investments in Latin-American industries and public securities now (1927) total nearly \$4,000,000,000, or about \$35 per capita for our population of 112,000,000; and our trade with Latin America is almost \$2,000,000,000.

the second place, the war and the peace gave to the Latin-American countries for the first time a political status commensurate with their economic importance. Their delegates have held high positions in the League of Nations, and in the absence of the United States they have been the "American" representatives. Again, the overthrow of the autocracies of the Old World in the war seemed to the Latin-American republics to remove any further necessity for the Monroe Doctrine as a guaranty of their independence against European intervention and to leave that doctrine as an instrument of aggression in the hands of the United States. The Latin-American countries are now partners with Europe; they are no longer willing to be mere wards of the United States.¹

The advantages and opportunities, as well as the responsibilities, which confront the United States today in the Latin-American countries are far different from what they were in the days of Blaine and Bayard, but the American people have as yet hardly begun to comprehend the change. When they do, they will realize what far-reaching issues depend upon the establishment in those countries of a generous confidence in the doctrine of "disinterested friendship" and the equalitarian partnership of the United States.

THE STRUGGLE FOR NEUTRALITY

Never perhaps in history has the Persian doctrine of the powers of Light and Darkness locked in eternal conflict for the mastery of the world seemed better justified than in the second decade of the twentieth century. And never has the irony of history shown itself more pathetically than in the confidence manifested at the beginning of that decade in the near triumph of the power of Light. In spite of the fact that Europe was an armed camp; that the great nations whose policies governed

¹ Cuba, Panama, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua declared war on Germany between April, 1917, and May, 1918. Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Santo Domingo, and Uruguay severed diplomatic relations. Argentina was barely held by her president to a position of protesting neutrality.

its destinies were grouped in mutually hostile alliances and ententes in the vain attempt to preserve a "balance of power"; that their boundaries were bristling with forts and their people staggering under the burden of military and naval armaments; that the Balkans were a tinder box that had twice blazed into flames, which had been confined to their borders only by the heroic efforts of the European diplomatists; that Slav and Teuton were bitter rivals for the control of southeastern Europe; that the French and English had closed the door of Northwestern Africa in the face of the Kaiser, whose officers were drinking toasts to "the day" (*der Tag*) when they should wrest the control of the seas from Great Britain and secure for Germany her rightful "place in the sun,"—the optimistic view that the world was approaching the era of universal peace was gaining ground year by year. International societies for social, scientific, economic, educational, financial coöperation were being multiplied. World-peace organizations were flourishing. Arbitration was hailed as the new solvent for international disputes. War was branded as atavistic barbarism by the apostles of "the international mind," condemned as "inconclusive mass murder" by the pacifists, and ridiculed as "suicidal folly" by the economists. Closely bound together by the ties of commerce and credit, the civilized nations of the world could only injure themselves by destroying their neighbors. All must go up or down together. War only wasted common wealth. It did not "pay."

Yet with a strange infatuation the nations clung to the hoary lie that to be armed to the teeth is the surest way of preserving peace. The Kaiser, who walked in "shining armor" and rattled the sword in the scabbard, posed as an "apostle of peace" and was even praised as such. That he gave his first and last thoughts, by his own confession, to perfecting a military machine which should be irresistible when he should set it in motion seemed to be less significant than that he had not yet seen fit to launch that machine against any of his neighbors. At the very moment when the drum roll was drowning the voices of the diplomatists, who were frantically striving to avert war, Presi-

dent Poincaré of the French Republic was reviewing the troops of Czar Nicholas at St. Petersburg, to the strains of the "Marseillaise," and congratulating his host that the exhibition was a guaranty of the peace of Europe ("la paix assurée").¹ Lord Haldane, Lord Chief Justice of England, had returned from a mission to Berlin in 1912 with the announcement that the "indications were that there was a far better prospect of peace than ever before." The British cabinet was assuring the people who were inclined to be nervous that there was "nothing to fear." Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said, "This is the most favorable moment in twenty years to overhaul [reduce] our expenditures on armament."²

It is hardly surprising, when European statesmen could so deceive themselves that a temple of peace was being built upon the shaky foundations of alliances and ententes, that we in America, separated by the broad ocean and the long habit of political isolation from Europe's hates and fears, should have indulged the welcome delusion that all the labors for international good will were at last about to bear fruit. "Many happy manifestations," said President Wilson in his first annual message to Congress, "multiply about us of a growing cordiality and sense of community among nations, foreshadowing an age of settled peace and good will. More and more readily each decade do nations manifest the willingness to bind themselves by solemn treaty to the processes of peace, of frankness and fair concession." He referred with pride to the "assent in principle of no less than thirty-one nations representing four fifths of the population of the world" to Secretary Bryan's proposed treaties of arbitration, which bound the signatory nations to submit "all questions of whatever character and nature in dispute between them" to the investigation of an international commission, in case diplomatic negotiations failed, and to re-

¹ Poincaré had said in his presidential message to the French Chambers in February, 1913, "Our words of peace and humanity will be the more likely to be heeded if we are known to be more determined and better armed."

² Yet in a speech at Cardiff, Wales, on August 2, 1914, Premier Asquith owned that the cabinet had known for two years that "Germany was preparing for a war of conquest to overthrow and dominate the European world."

frain from hostilities until the report of the commission should be received.¹ In a speech at Mobile, Alabama, a few weeks earlier the President had waxed eloquent in his prophecy of the approaching millennium: "It seems to me that this is a day of infinite hope, of confidence in a future greater than the past has been, for I am fain to believe that, in spite of all the things we would wish to correct, the nineteenth century, that now lies behind us, has brought us a long stage toward the time when, slowly ascending the tedious climb which leads to the final uplands, we shall get our ultimate view of the duties of mankind. We have breasted a considerable part of that climb and shall presently—it may be in a generation or two—come out upon those great heights where there shines unobstructed the light of the justice of God."

Within less than a twelvemonth of this prophecy the continent of Europe was plunged into the abyss of slaughter. The assassination of the heir to the throne of the Austrian Empire by a Serbian fanatic in the streets of Serajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, lighted the powder train that had long been laid. Austria, backed by her ally in "shining armor," the German Kaiser, took summary vengeance on Serbia. Russia mobilized to block the path of the Teutons through middle Europe and the Turkish empire to the Persian Gulf. France rallied to the support of her ally, Russia. And when the German army ruthlessly invaded neutral Belgium in its drive toward Paris, Great Britain came into the fray on the side of France and Russia. In a few months Bulgaria and Turkey had joined the Central Powers, and Japan and Italy had been won to the side of the Allies. Only Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, and Switzerland, of all Europe, remained neutral.

America's first reaction to the cataclysm was an instinctive

¹ Secretary Bryan suggested one year as a fair period to allow for the investigation and report of the commission. During this year, he believed, the passion for war would be likely to subside. The first of these "cooling off" treaties was signed with El Salvador in August, 1913. Many of the smaller nations of the world followed suit. Great Britain gave its approval, as did the important nations of continental Europe, except Germany. The outbreak of the war, however, swept the arbitration treaties, like "scraps of paper," into the wastebasket.

appeal to the traditional policy of noninterference in Europe's affairs. The war was not of our making, and none of our business. We cared not at all whether Slav or Teuton controlled the Balkan peninsula. Probably not one out of ten thousand of our citizens could locate Bosnia or Bagdad on the map. Three thousand miles of "cooling ocean" rolled between us and inflamed Europe. Moreover, our land was the hospitable refuge for immigrants from all the belligerent countries. Hundreds of thousands of Austro-Hungarians were working in the coal mines of Pennsylvania. Nearly nine million of our population either had been born in Germany themselves or revered a father or mother born in Germany. Russians, Italians, and Irish abounded in our cities. Despite the quarrels that are proverbial among kinsfolk, we were still predominantly a people of English stock, and almost entirely a people of English language, institutions, and laws. On the fourth of August, 1914, President Wilson issued a formal proclamation of neutrality, based on Washington's proclamation of April 22, 1793, and the Neutrality act framed by Secretary Jefferson the next year. Two weeks after his proclamation he published a more intimate appeal to the American people, in which he warned them against the excitement of passions in a population "drawn chiefly from the nations now at war," and the division into camps of hostile opinion, which would be "fatal to our peace of mind." "The United States," he said, "must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle above another. My thought is of America . . . a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels, and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world."

The first phase of our neutrality, therefore, was the recommendation of indifference to the political and military aspects of the European struggle, combined with the readiness, when the propitious moment should arrive, to aid in the reestablishment

of peace. When protest came to the President from the German emperor against the use of the dum dum bullet by the Belgians and French, and from the Belgians against the atrocities committed by the invading German army, he declined to pass judgment on either complaint. To do so, he wrote to the Kaiser (September 16), "as one friend speaking to another," would be a "premature" act, "inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation which, like this, has no part in the contest." Theodore Roosevelt, writing in the *Outlook* of September 23, took the same ground of utter detachment. Both sides, he argued, could be defended in their action—Germany for invading Belgium, and Belgium for resisting. For both were acting to save themselves in what they believed to be a contest in which the issue was "national life or death." "Of course it would be folly," he concluded, "to jump into the gulf ourselves to no good purpose; and very probably nothing that we could have done would have helped Belgium. We have not the smallest responsibility for what has befallen her."¹ But proclamations, however solemn, are powerless to change opinions. The people of the country were not "neutral in fact" or "impartial in thought." They could not look with indifference on the outcome of the gigantic struggle which seemed to hold the alternative of military despotism or the triumph of democracy. The opposing currents of sympathy, instead of neutralizing each other, as the President hoped that they would do, only exacerbated each other. And the advantage of winning the preponderance of opinion in a country so rich and powerful as the United States soon led the emissaries of both sides to exert a tremendous pressure of propaganda upon our people.

Moreover, however possible it might have been for us to remain indifferent to the political, racial, colonial, and military aspects of the great conflict, it was absolutely impossible for us

¹ These words proved very embarrassing to Mr. Roosevelt a few months later, when he became an ardent advocate of our interference on the side of the Allies. He asked to have them removed from some textbooks in which they had been quoted. His apology for writing them was that he wished at the time to do nothing to hamper the President in his difficult task of maintaining our neutrality.

to be indifferent to the economic aspects. The second phase of our neutrality inevitably took the form of insistence upon a second point in the President's proclamation; namely, the full preservation of American rights and privileges. If we had no aggressive interests to urge, we had at least traditional interests to defend. After the initial drive of the huge German military machine upon Paris had been checked at the Marne (September 6, 1914), the war on the western front settled down to a long endurance test between the millions of men who held the opposing trenches, which stretched eventually from the North Sea to the borders of Switzerland. The British navy gained the control of the seas by destroying part of the German fleet in the great battle of the Falkland Islands in the south Atlantic, December 8, and bottling up the rest behind the Kiel Canal. Only a few German raiders were left to prey on the shipping of the Allies wherever they could find it unprotected by the vessels of war. Germany now found herself in a position with regard to Great Britain similar to that of Napoleon a century or so before. Great Britain, in control of the routes of sea-borne commerce, undertook to shut off the Central Powers from the importation not only of materials of war but even of food supplies. Germany retaliated by the attempt to isolate and starve Great Britain by destroying her commerce. Only the weapons in the hands of Napoleon and of William II were far different. The former, having no naval resources to oppose to Great Britain, after the destruction of his fleet at Trafalgar (1805), had relied upon his "continental system" of confiscating in the ports of Europe under his dominion, from Hamburg around to Naples, all neutral ships (mostly American) that had dared to touch at the British Isles. But William II, although without the control of the European ports, had a weapon of terrible efficiency which Napoleon had lacked—the submarine, which could suddenly deliver its deadly torpedo against merchant or war craft, and sink as suddenly out of avenging sight.

With almost all Europe in arms, her man power drained from field and factory, the demand for American food, clothing, horses, metals, and munitions was insatiable. Our securities

held abroad were sent home for resale by the hundreds of millions. A flood of gold began to pour into the country. The clamorous belligerents did not haggle at prices. Americans who had anything to sell them grew rich overnight. We cared little, like all neutrals in time of war, to whom we sold. A customer was a customer. But the opposing camps in Europe cared enormously to whom we sold; and controversy on this point was the entering of the thin edge of the wedge which was finally to split the American doctrine of neutrality wide open. Great Britain was determined that the Central Powers should not benefit by our commerce. Through successive Orders in Council, beginning August 23, 1914, she arbitrarily enlarged the list of contraband goods (that is, goods liable to seizure on the way to a belligerent) until it included as absolute contraband forty-two schedules, of which only ten had been authorized by the Declaration of London in 1909.¹ She seized cargoes billed for the neutral ports of Holland, Scandinavia, and Italy, on the ground that their ultimate destination was Germany or Austria.² She even seized our mails. Our State Department protested in a friendly note to Great Britain (December 26), expressing an

¹ This declaration, which had been signed by delegates of ten of the leading maritime powers, embodied a code of international law relative to prizes, blockades, contraband, visit and search, indemnities for seizure of cargoes, and other matters touching the treatment of maritime commerce in war time. It declared a number of articles free from seizure, but of these Great Britain now placed hides and leather, wool, cotton, rubber, and various metals and ores on the absolute contraband list. President Wilson tried on August 6 to get both belligerents to agree to the observance of the terms of the Declaration of London. Germany and Austria consented, but the Allies refused. The Declaration was not binding upon Great Britain, as Parliament had refused in 1911 to adopt it.

² Undoubtedly she was justified in this suspicion, as our exports to these neutral countries mounted to marvelous figures during the first year of the war. For example, our exports of copper to Scandinavian countries grew from \$7,000,000 to \$35,000,000. Our total exports to Sweden grew from \$377,000 to \$2,558,000; to Denmark, from \$58,000 to \$7,101,000; to Italy (which joined the Allies in the spring of 1915), from \$2,900,000 to \$4,700,000. Of course the Danes did not eat thirteen times as much food or wear thirteen times as much clothing in 1915 as in 1914! The neutral countries, though not particularly favorable to Germany, were nevertheless bound to her by economic ties. Switzerland depended upon her for coal, Sweden needed her market for iron and manganese, and Holland was physiographically but an extension of lower Germany.

appreciation of "the momentous nature of the struggle" in which she was engaged, but still maintaining that her conduct toward neutral shipping "exceeded the manifest necessity of a belligerent nation, and constituted a restriction of the rights of American citizens on the high seas." There was a hint that a continuation of the injury to our commercial interests might change the good feeling in America toward England.

The British government, however, refused to alter its policy. In conciliatory but firm language it insisted on the necessity of keeping from the enemy the resources which would enable him to win the war. It pleaded against us our own doctrine of the "continuous voyage" in the Civil War and the decision of our Supreme Court in the Prize cases. Lincoln had refused to allow clothing, food, arms, and munitions to reach the Confederate states through the ports of Bermuda, Havana, or Mexico. Great Britain was only following the same policy, she claimed. At the same time, the British press and public opinion made an understanding between the two countries harder to reach, by a scornful, querulous indictment of America as blind to the great moral issues of the war and sunk in selfish materialism. Because England's mark was on the Confederate guns, the North had blamed her during the Civil War for indifference to the cause of the Union and for caring "only for her 10 per cent."¹ Now our mark was on the cotton and meats going through Denmark to the aid of the enemy, and the profit was ten times 10 per cent. The "change of feeling" toward Great Britain prophesied in Bryan's note of December, 1914, was growing ominous. Hoke Smith of Georgia voiced the protest of the Southern planter against including cotton in the contraband list. The Chicago packers were angry over the seizure of their cargoes of meat. The New York commission merchants, who saw their shipments of wheat taken into English ports, complained that things had

¹ John Lothrop Motley wrote to the Duke of Argyll in June, 1861: "We didn't want material aid, but did expect sympathy. Instead, there was only denunciation of our Civil War—as if the war had not been forced upon us." For our grievance against England in the Civil War see "The American Adventure," Vol. I, p. 615 and note.

come to a pretty pass when "the United States could do business only with the permission of the British government." How serious the friction with England might have become, had not Germany soon given us far greater cause for remonstrance, we cannot say. The quarrel with England was over property alone, and the British government promised a full and fair settlement for the cargoes seized and the ships detained. On the other hand, the German government inaugurated a policy in the spring of 1915 which threatened American lives.

For the first six months of the war we had not the slightest cause for offense against Germany. But when, as a reprisal for Great Britain's attempt to cripple her war efficiency by the arbitrary extension of the contraband list and to starve her population by the stoppage of food, Germany proclaimed a "war zone" around the British Isles (February 4, 1915) and announced that her submarines would destroy enemy vessels within the zone, without observing the rule that the passengers and crew of a merchant vessel destroyed by a ship of war must be placed in a position of safety, we began to take alarm. Not only were Americans traveling on British and French merchant ships liable at any moment to lose their lives, but they were not safe even on our own ships. For merchant ships of belligerent countries often used neutral flags as a *ruse de guerre* to deceive the enemy, and Germany disclaimed the responsibility for any "accidents" that might happen. She might mistake a *bona fide* American ship for a Britisher flying our flag. The only safe way was for American ships to keep out of the war zone entirely and for American citizens to keep off the decks of the Allies' merchant ships. These were intolerable conditions. The high seas were neutral waters. No nation had a right to mark off any part of them as an area of belligerency. The privilege of Americans to use them, either in their own ships or as passengers on foreign ships, was a right which could not be abandoned except at the cost of national humiliation. On February 10 our State Department addressed a note to the German government to the effect that the sanctioned rule of visit and search must be observed by German war craft operating against merchant

ships; and that if American ships were destroyed or American lives were lost by the disregard of this rule, such an act would be viewed by us as an "indefensible violation of neutral rights," and "the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability." The German foreign secretary, Von Jagow, replied that the proposed submarine policy was a drastic measure, but that England's action made it necessary. She would not let Germany have food and ammunition from abroad, and hence Germany must take the only course possible to her to prevent England from receiving food and munitions. If the United States would get the Allies to observe the Declaration of London, Germany would reconsider her course of action.

The announcement of the submarine policy brought a third and most important phase of American neutrality. It was no longer a question of the protection of property only, but one of the preservation of American lives. Eager to avert the fatal deed which was almost certain to result from the German orders, Secretary Bryan proposed on February 20 a *modus vivendi* between the two powers. Germany was to agree not to use the submarine against merchantmen except for the enforcement of the right of visit and search. Great Britain was to allow goods to go to Germany for the use of the civilian population, and to refrain from the use of neutral flags to protect her shipping. Neither side was to sow floating mines.¹ Germany agreed to the proposition, on condition that Great Britain would not arm her merchantmen—the submarine being so frail a war craft that a single shot from a small gun would put it out of commission. Great Britain refused the terms. Even without the proposal of disarmament, they were so heavily weighted in favor of Germany that if they had been adopted, the Kaiser would probably have won the war; and if the disarmament proposal had been

¹ Both powers had been guilty of this breach of international law. Germany had sown mines on the main trade route from America to Liverpool via the northern coast of Ireland; and Great Britain had sown the whole North Sea, warning neutral vessels bound to Scandinavian, Baltic, and Dutch ports that they must call at the Strait of Dover for sailing directions which would take them safely to their destination.

accepted, the shipping of the Allies would have been at the mercy of the submarine. To allow foodstuffs to go to the German civilian population was equivalent to feeding the German army; for even if the particular cargoes imported should be distributed (as was suggested) by American agencies, so that they did not reach the battle front, still their receipt would release the food products of Germany for the use of the soldiers. The German Bundesrat had already (January 26) ordered the "nationalization" of the food supplies of the empire, with provision for rationing.

There was one other means of averting the submarine war which finally drew America into the great conflict, but that, too, was a concession which would have practically guaranteed the victory of the Central Powers. The latter, shut out from overseas commerce by the British navy, asked that America put an embargo on the shipment of war material. Ambassador von Bernstorff, in an impudent memorandum of April 4, 1915 (which he gave to the press a week later), after scolding the United States for "accepting England's violations of international law," upbraided us for a breach of neutrality in allowing "an enormous new industry of war materials of every kind" to be built up in the United States. "In reality," he said, "the American industry is supplying only Germany's enemies, a fact which is in no way modified by the purely theoretical willingness to furnish Germany as well if it were possible. If the American people desire to observe true neutrality, they will find means to stop the exclusive exportation of arms to one side." In this contention the German ambassador had the support of many peace societies in the United States and of several senators (Stone of Missouri, Hitchcock of Nebraska, Works of California) and representatives (Bartholdt of Missouri, Lobeck of Nebraska, Vollmer and Towner of Iowa), who endeavored to get Congress to force the hand of the administration by placing an embargo on munitions. Our State Department in its replies to both foreign and domestic critics made it clear that such a step would be a highly unneutral act in behalf of the Central Powers. By international law all belligerents had the right to purchase

munitions in neutral countries. "The markets of this country," said Secretary Bryan, "are open upon equal terms to all the world and to every nation, belligerent or neutral." Munitions of war were contraband; and the prevention of contraband from reaching its destination lay not with the neutral country where the material was bought, but with the belligerent power against whom it was to be used. The United States could not in the midst of a war assume to alter the law for the benefit of a belligerent who could not take advantage of it. If Germany could not purchase munitions here, that was her misfortune and not our fault. In a strong note of April 21, dictated by President Wilson himself, this position was made clear to the German ambassador.

Disappointed in the endeavor to offset the advantage of the Allies by diplomacy, the German government resorted to the policy of terror (*Schrecklichkeit*) which it had used with such efficiency in Belgium. The submarines had sunk about sixty merchantmen in the war zone and directly or indirectly caused the death of four Americans among the two hundred and fifty victims. But they had not checked the volume of British trade nor interrupted the transportation of a large army to the French coast. The German government now resolved upon a master stroke. On April 29 the German foreign office sent a wireless via the Sayville (Long Island) station to its ambassador in Washington, which read: "Warn *Lusitania* passengers through press not voyage across the Atlantic."¹ The magnificent Cunard liner had been selected by the Kaiser's government as a conspicuous prey for the submarine. On the morning of her departure from New York (May 1) a notice appeared in the newspapers, signed "Imperial German Embassy," warning travelers that vessels flying the British flag were liable to destruction in the war zone, but not mentioning the *Lusitania* by name. Several of the people on the passenger list were called anonymously on the telephone and advised to cancel their passage, which

¹ This message, sent in an unfamiliar code, was "caught" by the wireless station of the Providence *Journal*, and, after some clever work by the men of the *Journal* staff, was finally translated (see *World's Work* for February, 1918, and following months).

some did. The great vessel, carrying 1250 passengers and a crew of 667, was turning the southeastern corner of the Irish coast to head for Liverpool when, in the early afternoon of May 7, she was struck without warning by a torpedo,¹ and went down in less than twenty minutes, carrying 1153 men, women, and children to their death. Of the victims 114 were American citizens.

The world was horrified by this dastardly "act of piracy." It was a deed that justified the immediate declaration of war by the American government, and many of our people demanded immediate war. Still, we were not prepared to depart from our traditional policy of noninterference in Europe's struggles or to sacrifice our advantageous position as the one great neutral nation that might play the part of mediator and peacemaker. The eastern seaboard, with its important shipping interests, would probably have voted for war, but west of the Alleghenies there were large sections of the country unaffected by the struggle. The President could have committed the country to war in the summer of 1915, as a president can at any time, by the tone of his diplomatic negotiations; but had President Wilson done so, he would have driven and not led the nation into war. He could not have made war without an army, and he could have no army except what Congress was pleased to give him. Therefore, instead of calling the new Congress in extra session and sending in a ringing message, which would have precipitated a battle at home as well as a war abroad, he chose to deal with the situation alone through the channels of diplomacy. He counseled coolness and patience. He entered upon an interchange of notes with the German government, peremptory in tone at first,² but growing more argumentative as the summer proceeded. Germany expressed regret for the death of the American citizens,

¹ It has been commonly stated that two torpedoes were fired at the *Lusitania*, because there were two explosions in quick succession. But the official log book of Captain Schweiger (the commander of the *U-20*, which sank the vessel), published on April 15, 1924, from the archives of the German naval department, gives a different version (see the *New York Times* of April 16, 1924).

² In the first *Lusitania* note of May 13 the President repeated the threat to "hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability" for any infringement of American rights, expressed his "confidence" that Germany would

but denied the responsibility therefor. That rested upon England alone. The *Lusitania* was to all intents and purposes a warship, because she was carried on the reserve list of the British navy; she had left New York with guns on her deck; she carried a large cargo of ammunition (which was responsible for the internal explosion that had sunk her so quickly); Americans had been warned not to sail on her; if they had chosen to "commit suicide" by trusting their lives to a British captain rather than save themselves by heeding the German warning, that was their own affair. These arguments were hollow, impudent, and false. The *Lusitania* was not armed; she had a perfect right to carry ammunition; and the belated warning of the German embassy in the newspapers was not only an unpardonable breach of diplomatic conduct but also no slightest excuse for the perpetration of the horrible deed. "The fact," said the *New York World*, "that A formally announces his intention to murder B at three o'clock tomorrow afternoon does not make the subsequent murder of B an innocent or justifiable act." The correspondence over the sinking of the *Lusitania* continued, without bringing any disavowal from the German government; although President Wilson felt that he had won a partial victory when that government announced (September 1) that its submarine commanders would not sink any more liners without warning, disavowed and apologized for the destruction of the British steamer *Arabic* (August 19) with the loss of two American lives, and, for strategic and political reasons, virtually suspended the submarine campaign in the autumn of 1915.¹

Until the early summer of 1915 there had been considerable sympathy in this country for the German cause. Although Great

disavow her inhuman deed and "make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure," and warned Germany not to expect our government "to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

¹ The correspondence over the *Lusitania* affair brought a change in the State Department. Rather than sign the second *Lusitania* note of June 9, which he believed would commit us to war, Secretary Bryan resigned his portfolio. He was succeeded by Robert Lansing of New York, the Counselor of the Department.

Britain and France controlled the cables and rigorously censored and often doctored the news of the situation in Europe (so that we heard little or nothing, for example, of the Russian atrocities in East Prussia, and much of the German atrocities in Belgium), nevertheless the Germans were spending large sums of money to push their propaganda here. They bought newspapers, organized societies, disseminated pamphlets, and appealed to American scholars educated in German universities and to the business interests with German affiliations. Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, the former German colonial secretary, came to this country to direct the campaign. Ambassador von Bernstorff was the most intimate friend of President Wilson's in the diplomatic group at Washington. The German government had flattered us by appealing to the President as an impartial judge of military and commercial controversies. It had as yet done nothing to impair our rights or injure our interests, whereas Great Britain was giving offense daily by her treatment of our commerce and mails.

But the submarine campaign changed the situation completely. Dernburg was forced to leave the country. The Sixty-third Congress had come to an end in March without taking up any of the resolutions in favor of an embargo on war material, and the Germans were convinced that no hope of a change of policy on that subject could be expected from the administration. More and more the German emissaries here turned to illegal and violent means to accomplish their purpose. A network of intrigue was woven in the offices of their consuls and military and naval attachés. Passports were forged to allow German officers and reservists to get back to their country. False clearance papers were obtained for ships to carry munitions and coal from our ports to German raiders at sea. Bombs were placed on board munition ships sailing for Europe. In June a plot was engineered to bring Huerta back to Mexico from his home on Long Island, to start a new revolution.¹ From July

¹ The plan had the double purpose of shutting off the Mexican oil supplies to the Allies and of forcing the United States to put an embargo on arms to Mexico and thus stand convicted of inconsistency in the face of the world. Huerta was arrested on June 28 at El Paso, Texas. His death a few days later closed the incident.

to October over one hundred strikes occurred in munitions factories. The leaders of the American Federation of Labor were approached by German agents with the intent to instigate a general labor war. Destructive fires broke out in steel, wire, and locomotive plants. These instances of sabotage were so frequent that they precluded the theory of "accidents" advanced by the German representatives here and pointed to a well-directed campaign.

Proof of the complicity of both German and Austro-Hungarian officials in these plots was soon forthcoming.¹ On July 31, 1915, Dr. Albert, the financial adviser of the German embassy, lost a portfolio in a car of the elevated railroad in New York. He claimed that the portfolio was stolen by a British spy. The papers in it came into possession of the New York *World* and were published. They showed letters and memoranda over the signatures of Ambassador von Bernstorff, Captain Franz von Papen (German military attaché at Washington), Herr Albert and others, which encouraged various plans for "fomenting internal discord among the American people to the advantage of the German Empire." Even more direct and damaging was the evidence obtained against the Austrian ambassador, Dr. Constantin Dumba, at the close of August. James F. J. Archibald, a newspaper correspondent who had been active in spreading German propaganda here, was intrusted by Dr. Dumba, Von Bernstorff, Von Papen, and others with messages to the authorities

¹ They are contained in the three volumes of Hearings of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate of the Sixty-fifth Congress, second and third sessions. The most elaborate attempt to refute them is to be found in Ambassador von Bernstorff's book, "My Three Years in America" (1920), in the chapters entitled "German Propaganda in the United States" (ii) and "The So-Called German Conspiracies" (v). He says (p. 107): "I myself was never a partner to any proceedings which contravened the laws of the United States. I never instigated such proceedings nor did I consciously afford their authors assistance financially or otherwise." On the other hand, the Committee on Public Information in the United States said: "In this country official agents of the Central Powers, protected from criminal prosecution by diplomatic immunity, conspired against our internal peace, placed spies and *agents provocateurs* through the length and breadth of our land, and even in high positions of trust in the departments of our government" (quoted by J. B. McMaster, in "The United States in the World War," Vol. I, pp. 255-263).

in Vienna and Berlin. He was stopped at Falmouth by the British and obliged to surrender his papers. The most important of these was a letter from Dumba to the Austrian foreign minister, Baron Burian, "warmly recommending to his Lordship favorable consideration" of a plan for fomenting strikes in the munitions and steel works here. "It is my impression," he wrote, "that we can disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, which in the opinion of the German military attaché is of great importance and amply outweighs the expenditure of money involved." The publication of this letter led to the prompt demand for the recall of Dr. Dumba (September 8); and before the end of the year the German military and naval attachés, Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed, were called back to the Fatherland by request of our Secretary of State because of their "improper activities." President Wilson referred in scathing words to these sinister events of 1915 in his message to the newly assembled Congress (December 7), and asked for the earliest possible enactment of laws to allow the Federal government to deal with the hyphenated citizens, "who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life, who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue."

With this appeal of the President to Congress, our neutrality entered upon a fourth phase; namely, that of preparation to meet the possible crisis of our own call to take up arms. We had long passed the stage of bland indifference to the issues in Europe. The injury to our commercial interests was a comparatively trivial subject for complaint. The warnings against the destruction of American lives were likely to continue to prove futile in the absence of force to back them up. The Germans were already ridiculing President Wilson for "brandishing a wooden sword." The typewriter was a poor weapon to

match against the torpedo. From the early days of the war there had been two opposing streams of influence moving through our people. In the one direction flowed the stream of pacifism, carrying the hopes of the advocates of disarmament, arbitration, and human brotherhood; in the other direction flowed the stream of preparedness, carrying the warnings of the soldier and the statesman against national impotence and its consequent humiliation of insult and defeat. Over against the peace foundations and international societies of various sorts, there began to be formed leagues and associations for the strengthening of America's defenses. In December, 1914, a group of two hundred and fifty business men of New York organized the National Security League, whose object was to obtain exact information as to the adequacy of our military and naval defenses and to rouse public opinion all over the country to the necessity for rendering ourselves secure against possible attack from any foreign foe.¹ Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, proposed a bill shortly afterwards for the creation of a Council of National Defense, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and the chairmen of the Committees on Appropriations, Military and Naval Affairs, and Foreign Relations in both Houses of Congress. A. P. Gardner of Massachusetts, the leader of the preparedness movement in the House, said: "For a dozen years I have sat here like a coward in silence and listened while men have told us how the United States could safely depend on the state militia and the naval reserves. All the time I knew that it was not true."

It is impossible to say just when the President became convinced that we should have to take part in the war. According to his private secretary, Mr. Tumulty, he believed it from the

¹ In August, 1915, the more radical members of this organization founded the National Defense Society, which condemned the Democratic administration for its remissness in the matter of preparedness. Four months later the still more radical American Rights Committee urged the immediate entrance of the United States into the war.

first.¹ But as late as February 24, 1916, the President wrote to Senator Stone of Missouri, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations: "You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of the war. For many anxious months I have striven for that object . . . and so far I have succeeded. I do not doubt that I shall continue to succeed." Perhaps the President's real conviction on the subject lay somewhere between the pessimism expressed to Tumulty and the optimistic letter to the senator. At any rate, he began soon after the inauguration of the submarine campaign to assume a different tone from that taken in his message in December, 1914, when he rejoiced that we were not ready, and never should be ready, to put into the field "a nation of men trained to arms." His speeches in the spring of 1915 have a vague and mystic note of warning in them, "like the Greek chorus of Æschylus, announcing doom." On the day of the dispatch of the third *Lusitania* note (July 21) he wrote to the Secretaries of War and Navy, asking for their advice on a program of national defense to be incorporated into his next message to Congress. And in that message he declared: "If ever our citizens are to fight effectively upon a sudden summons, they must know how modern fighting is done . . . and the government must be their servant in this matter." He recommended the increase of our standing army by about 40 per cent (from 108,000 to 142,000 men), with a reserve army of 400,000 "disciplined citizens," and a naval program for five years, calling for the construction of ten battleships, sixteen cruisers, fifty destroyers, and one hundred submarines. Late in January, 1916, he set out for the Middle West on a tour to advocate preparedness. He spoke at Pittsburgh, Cleveland,

¹ "One day in August, just after the Great War had begun," says Tumulty, "he said to me, 'We cannot remain isolated in this war, for soon the contagion of it will spread until it reaches our shores.'" Again, after his return from the Capitol on the day he delivered his war message to Congress (April 2, 1917), he sat "pale and silent" with his secretary in the cabinet room for a long time, and finally remarked, "Tumulty, from the very beginning I saw the end of this horrible thing, but I could not move faster than the mass of our people would permit" (J. P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 228, 256).

Milwaukee, Chicago, Des Moines, Topeka, Kansas City, and St. Louis in almost identical language, and the burden of his message was the "danger at this present moment to our national life." The people had laid on him, he said, the double obligation of keeping them out of war and keeping the national honor unstained. "Do you not see," he said at Cleveland, "that the time may come when it is impossible to do both of these things?" At St. Louis he said, "Speaking with all solemnity, I assure you that there is not a day to be lost." On his return to Washington he lost a valuable cabinet member on the army issue. Secretary of War Garrison advocated a wholly Federal army, such as the President had recommended to Congress; but Chairman Hay of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House preferred to have the government utilize the national guard, or militia, which was raised and officered by the states. When the President refused to accept his Secretary's plan of a "continental army" (without as yet committing himself to the Hay plan), Garrison resigned (February 10), and was shortly afterwards replaced by Newton D. Baker, the mayor of Cleveland, Ohio.

On the day of Garrison's resignation the German government announced that after February 29 its submarines would treat armed merchantmen as auxiliary vessels of war, liable to destruction without warning. Petitions poured in upon the President and Congress to preserve us from almost certain war by prohibiting American citizens from sailing on armed belligerent vessels. Resolutions to that effect were introduced into Congress by Senator Gore of Oklahoma and Representative McLemore of Texas. But the President held firmly to his position taken in the *Lusitania* notes. "Once accept a single abandonment of right," he wrote to Senator Stone, "and many other humiliations would follow. . . . What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency." He demanded an immediate vote on the resolutions in order that the country might know who stood by the administration. The resolutions were tabled by large majorities in both Houses (Senate, 68 to 14; House, 276 to 142).

The President was learning to speak in a new tone. When a German submarine sank the French passenger boat *Sussex* in the English Channel on March 24, with a loss of American lives, he sent not a remonstrance but an ultimatum to the Kaiser's government: "Unless the Imperial German Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether." On May 4 the German government replied that no more merchant ships would be sunk "without warning and without saving human lives."¹

The *Sussex* ultimatum marked the fifth and final stage of our neutrality. The threat of the rupture of diplomatic relations with one of the belligerent powers, if it continued its present methods of warfare, was essentially a threat of war; for almost invariably the recall of ambassadors has been the immediate prelude to hostilities between two great powers. Henceforth it depended on Germany alone, by her observance or her breach of the *Sussex* pledge, to keep the United States neutral or to provoke us to war. During the remainder of the year 1916 it looked as if we had won a notable diplomatic victory—and security. The German submarine activities, while not suspended, were desultory. This was not wholly due to the American protest. From the first, many high officials in the German Empire (including the chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg) had been opposed to the ruthless submarine campaign, as likely to cost Germany more in the ill will of neutral nations than it could gain for her in the destruction of hostile commerce. Early

¹ There was a string attached to the German promise, in the expression of the expectation that the United States in return would force Great Britain to observe the principles laid down in our notes of 1914 and 1915 on her detention of cargoes, and failing which the German government "would be faced by a new [!] situation, in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision." But President Wilson brushed aside this condition by the reply that he "could not for a moment entertain, much less discuss," the suggestion that Germany's respect for the rights of our citizens on the high seas "should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government."

in 1916 the chief advocate of the unrestricted submarine warfare, Admiral von Tirpitz, had been obliged to yield the naval portfolio to the more moderate Von Capelle, and the Germans attempted to end the war by a series of drives on the French front. The Crown Prince failed in his tremendous fifty-day battle against Verdun, and some weeks later an allied counter-offensive on the Somme cost the Germans over fifteen hundred thousand men. Considerable opposition to the war developed in the Reichstag during the summer. The Minority Social Democrats under the lead of Haase and Ledebour broke with the government and demanded a negotiated peace. On December 16 the German emperor proposed a conference of the representatives of the belligerent powers at some neutral spot to discuss the possibility of ending the war. But the Allies regarded it as a "sham proposal," designed to sow dissension among them. They refused the invitation. Lloyd George, who had become prime minister of England a week before the Kaiser's offer, had declared that "only a crushing military victory" would bring the peace for which the Allies were fighting. Premier Briand of France agreed with him. "Peace can come," he said, "only out of our victory." When the German emperor was ready to sue for peace, he might ask the Allies' terms.

President Wilson's position was strengthened in the spring of 1916 by his diplomatic victory in the *Sussex* affair and by his political victory in the tabling of the Gore and McLemore resolutions. He had become the open champion of preparedness, marching at the head of parades in Washington and New York. He was speaking no longer with the mystic vagueness of a Greek chorus, but in clear and even defiant terms. He was urging upon Congress a military and naval program fully adequate to our national defense. He confessed in the opening speech of his Western tour, at New York (January 27, 1916), that he had "learned much in fourteen months," and had changed his mind on the question of preparedness. But his opponents attributed his "belated efforts to regain the prestige which he had lost by indecision and delay" to the persistent denunciation of his policies by "red-blooded Americans" like

Theodore Roosevelt and General Wood. Elihu Root, in a speech on February 15 at Carnegie Hall, New York, which might be called the opening gun in the campaign of 1916, characterized the President's course as "weak, vacillating, and stultifying," and arraigned him for attempting to be neutral "between right and wrong, between justice and injustice, between humanity and cruelty, between liberty and oppression." The Republicans had no faith in Wilson's conversion. If he had really been solicitous for the protection of our rights, he would have mobilized our fleet at the beginning of the war, as Holland and Belgium did their armies, and would have called upon Congress to strengthen our fighting arm. If he had really wished to make America's neutrality a power for the preservation of international law, he would have opened negotiations with the other neutral maritime nations for joint action in protesting against mine-laying in the open seas and illegal submarine attacks. When Colonel Roosevelt was asked what he would have done had he been President when the *Lusitania* was sunk, he snapped his jaw and said, "If I had been President, the *Lusitania* would not have been sunk."

The problem before the national Republican convention which met at Chicago on June 7, 1916, was to nominate a candidate who would heal the breach made in the party four years earlier; for the votes of the Progressives, although they had dwindled more than 50 per cent in the mid-term elections of 1914, were still necessary for the defeat of President Wilson. Elihu Root had the support of the conservative business interests of the East, but aside from his record as a corporation lawyer, his conduct of the convention of 1912 made him the last man in the party that the Progressives would accept. On the other hand, Colonel Roosevelt, for whom the Progressives clamored, had not yet been wholly forgiven by the Republican organization for leading the revolt which had made possible Wilson's election. The man on whom the convention finally united was Charles Evans Hughes, ex-governor of New York and, since 1910, an associate justice of the Supreme Court. Hughes's availability consisted in his record as a courageous,

progressive governor of the Empire State, his unimpeachable character and large wisdom, and his inoffensiveness to the Progressives on account of his political detachment in 1912. On the other hand, this same detachment from politics during the six years that he had worn the judicial robes lent a sort of aloofness to his candidacy, which he failed to overcome in the campaign. He had written early in the year that he was "entirely out of politics" and "totally opposed" to the use of his name in the convention. "The Supreme Court," he said, "must not be dragged into politics"—a sentiment which his opponents exploited with effect in the campaign.

At the same moment that Hughes was nominated, the Progressives, who were also holding their convention at Chicago, named Theodore Roosevelt. If the colonel accepted, it would mean a repetition of the three-cornered fight of 1912 and the sure reelection of President Wilson (who was nominated by acclamation at the Democratic convention at St. Louis a few days later). Roosevelt's reconciliation with the Republican organization had already begun. The necessity for defeating Wilson outweighed all other considerations in his mind. In the summer of 1915 he had taken advantage of an invitation to speak at the officers' training-camp at Plattsburg, New York, established by General Wood, to attack the President for his "supineness" in the matter of preparedness, and his condemnation of the administration had grown more violent ever since. He now sent from his home in Oyster Bay a conditional refusal of the nomination, which was read in the closing moments of the convention, to the great disappointment of the delegates. He must wait, he said, to see what attitude Mr. Hughes would take on the subject of preparedness, and if that attitude was satisfactory, he would support the Republican nominee.¹

It was natural that the campaign should be fought on the question of our policy toward the European belligerents and,

¹ Roosevelt was bitterly condemned for his "desertion" of the Progressives by some of the delegates. Miss Ida Tarbell, who was at Chicago, said of the Progressive convention, "It was a great and noble-hearted body, and it deserved a better end than the cowardly stab its leader gave it."

to a lesser extent, on the Mexican situation, which reached another critical phase in the summer of 1916.¹ President Wilson's record of constructive domestic legislation in 1913-1914 was overshadowed by the actual crisis in our foreign relations. Even in the Democratic convention the emphasis was put on the fact that the President had assured us peace with honor. The chairman, Ollie James of Kentucky, said, "Without orphaning a single American child, without widowing a single American mother, without firing a single gun or shedding a drop of blood, Mr. Wilson wrung from the most militant spirit that ever brooded over a battlefield a recognition of American rights and a concession to American demands." The Democratic slogan in the campaign was, "He kept us out of war." Walls and fences were covered with posters representing the contrasted scenes of the bloody battlefield and the smoking chimneys of factories and mills, of men agonizing beneath the wheels of the Juggernaut of war and men contentedly tilling their peaceful farms. President Wilson himself did not take the stump, but remained, after Congress had finished its session early in September, at his summer cottage "Shadow Lawn" at Long Branch, New Jersey, addressing weekly delegations of pilgrims in the defense of the policies of his administration. The Republican candidate toured the country, denouncing the administration for its indecision, its bungling diplomacy, its lack of appreciation of the danger of the European situation to the United States, and its sacrifice of American rights and American lives for the sake of preserving an illusive peace. Mr. Hughes reiterated the statement, "I stand for the firm and unflinching maintenance of all the rights of American citizens on land and sea," but he

¹ It was in the very month in which the nomination conventions were held that General Pershing's troops were ordered by the Carranza government to leave Mexico, and the attack at Carrizal was delivered (p. 577). In a scathing arraignment of the administration in a speech at Lewiston, Maine, on August 31, Colonel Roosevelt spoke of the "reign of anarchy, rapine, and murder in Mexico." "At this moment," he said, "Mr. Wilson's buglemen advance as his greatest claim that he has kept us out of war. This claim can be seriously made only by individuals who indorse President Wilson's belief that deeds are nothing and words everything."

failed to say how he would enforce those rights. The ambiguous declaration might be taken to mean that he would compel Great Britain to respect our continuing demands for the freedom of American trade,¹ or that he would use force to make Germany desist from sinking merchant ships. When he was asked just what he would do, if elected: whether he would declare war on Mexico, or impose an embargo on our shipping, or arm our vessels, or break off relations with Germany, he was silent. The cartoonists pictured him as the Sphinx. His speeches of reiterated negative criticism grew rather more unconvincing as the campaign progressed. Many found them monotonous and boring.

The action of Congress, which sat all through the summer of 1916, framing legislation to meet the eventuality of war, under the constant advisement of President Wilson, was an earnest of the fact that the administration was not "supine" or "indifferent" to the critical danger of the European situation. A National Defense act, signed on June 3, authorized the increase of the regular army to about 186,000 men (eventually 223,000), the "federalization" of the National Guard to reach a strength of 425,000 by successive increments, the establishment of civilian training-camps and of military training in schools and colleges, and the construction of a \$20,000,000 plant for the production of nitrates and other material for munitions. The military-appropriation bill, signed on August 29, carried an appropriation of over \$260,000,000. The same day a naval-appropriation bill of \$313,000,000 was signed, authorizing the building of 10 dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, and 140 minor

¹ Under a Trading-with-the-Enemy act, passed by Parliament at the close of 1915, eighty-five American firms were put on the "back list" by British Orders in Council on July 18, 1916. Great Britain also complained because we treated the German submarine freighter *Deutschland*, which arrived at Baltimore early in July, as a merchant vessel, allowing her to clear with a valuable cargo of nickel and rubber; and because we did not immediately restore to her the British steamer *Appam*, which had been brought into Newport News, Virginia, on February 1, in charge of a German prize crew. Continual interference with our mails and parcel post added to the causes of offense against Great Britain, and retaliatory measures were taken by our Congress in its general revenue act of September 18, 1916.

units, over a period of three years, at an estimated cost of over \$500,000,000. A Council of National Defense was created, consisting of six cabinet officers, assisted by an advisory commission of seven experts in the fields of transportation, raw materials, munitions, labor, medical supplies, and purchases, to bring unity of counsel and administration into the exploitation of our resources for war. The credit facilities which the Federal Reserve act of 1913 offered the industrial and commercial classes were extended to the farmers by the Hollis-Bulkley Rural Credits act of July 17, 1916, which enabled the farmers to borrow on long-term farm mortgages at rates not exceeding 6 per cent.¹ Twelve Farm Loan Banks were established on the analogy of the Federal Reserve Banks, and were operated under the control of a Federal Farm Loan Board, of which the Secretary of the Treasury was the chairman. This government relief to the burdened farmer was of great importance in mobilizing one of our most necessary resources in the event of war.

The improvement of our merchant marine was another matter of pressing importance. The United States (7,886,000 tons) was second only to Great Britain (16,541,000 tons), and far ahead of Germany (4,593,000 tons), in her merchant marine; but nearly all our shipping stayed at home in the Lake commerce or the coastwise trade, which was limited by law to ships of American registry, while the commerce of Great Britain and Germany went out on the high seas. Of our total foreign trade of \$3,793,000,000 in 1913, 66 per cent was carried in British ships and only 9 per cent in ships under the American flag. Moreover, about half our foreign commerce was with those nations which went to war in 1914; and the enormously increased demand for our products, combined with the diversion of many ships from the Allies' merchant marines for transportation service, mine-laying, and other military purposes, created a serious shortage in trade facilities, which constantly increased

¹ By the census of 1910 the farm indebtedness was \$3,600,000,000, on which interest reaching as high as 10½ per cent was being paid. Moreover, the mortgages generally ran for periods of from three to five years, necessitating constant expense for renewals.

as the submarines took their toll. President Wilson had secured the passage of a Ship Registry Act in August, 1914, providing for a fairly easy transfer of foreign-built ships to American registry, and under this act 148 vessels, with a tonnage of 523,631, had been added to our merchant marine. But this was only a slight measure of relief. What the President urged in vain during the first two years of the European war was a shipping act enabling the government to purchase and operate a merchant marine. After a contest of seven months a Ship Purchase Act was passed at the end of August, 1916, which created a Shipping Board of five members, with power to acquire by construction, purchase, charter, or lease, vessels "suitable for use as naval auxiliaries," except vessels engaged in our own domestic and foreign commerce and vessels under the flag of any of the belligerent nations, and to operate them for a period not longer than five years after the termination of the war. The board might form one or more corporations for this purpose, with a total capital stock not to exceed \$50,000,000, in which the board itself, representing the government, must always be the major stockholder. But the board should not actually operate the vessels unless it was "unable, after a fair trial, to sell, lease, or charter such vessels to citizens of the United States" by competitive bidding. In other words, the government was to act as a sort of promoter to induce American capital and commercial interests to build up our merchant marine. Other provisions of the act gave the Shipping Board considerable control over water carriers analogous to that of the Interstate Commerce Commission over the railroads.

A final emergency measure, signed on the day that the long and busy session of Congress adjourned (September 8), was a general revenue act, levying new taxes to cover some \$200,000,000 of prospective deficit. The normal rate of the income tax was raised from 1 to 2 per cent, and the surtax rates were increased to reach a maximum of 13 instead of 6 per cent. A Federal inheritance tax was levied on estates exceeding \$50,000. A munitions tax of 12½ per cent was laid on the net profits of the manufacture of gunpowder and other explosives (except for

industrial uses), projectiles, shells, torpedoes, bullets, and firearms for military purposes. Various miscellaneous taxes were continued from the War Revenue Act of 1914 (p. 562).¹

The revenue bill, like all measures of the Sixty-fourth Congress, was bitterly criticized by the Republican opposition as unduly favorable to the South by penalizing the industry and capital of the North. But the act which roused the greatest protest in the closing weeks of the presidential campaign and very nearly defeated the Wilson administration was the "surrender" of Congress to the dictation of organized labor by the passage of the Adamson eight-hour bill at the behest of the President. The four railroad brotherhoods of engineers, conductors, firemen, and trainmen, comprising about 20 per cent of the 1,700,000 railroad employees and constituting the strongest body of organized labor outside the American Federation, had been for five years contending for a raise in wages for the freight trainmen, under the guise of a shift from a ten-hour day to an eight-hour day. A day's run was one hundred miles; and if it was completed in less than ten hours (as it always had been in past years), the employee received the full day's wages. If he worked more than ten hours, he received pay for overtime on a *pro rata* scale. The growing congestion and the tendency to run heavier trains was slowing up the freight traffic, so that the completion of the day's run in less than ten hours became less frequent. The men now asked for the same pay for a basic day of eight hours. This meant that for the first eight hours of work they would receive the same pay as they were at present receiving for the first ten hours of work, with an hour and a half's pay for every hour beyond eight. It was not a shorter working day that they demanded, but a longer pay day. The rail-

¹ These new taxes, of course, would not bring in any revenue until 1917. They were not "war taxes" in the sense of being designed to pay for an American war, for which they would have been ludicrously inadequate, but to repair the strain on our finances due to the European war. While customs duties had increased only from \$209,000,000 to \$212,000,000 from 1915 to 1916, and the repeal of the free-sugar clause of the Underwood act (p. 543, note) had saved about \$42,000,000 to the Treasury, our naval and military appropriations had become so large that at the opening of the year 1917 the government was incurring a deficit of \$2,000,000 a day.

road officials objected that this bill would entail an extra wage expense of \$100,000,000, which would have to be passed on to the public in increased rates, that the trainmen represented only a relatively small group of the railroad employees, and that they were among the better-paid ones too. Attempts at arbitration failed and President Wilson met both the operators and the workers in futile conferences to adjust the dispute. The trainmen got the brotherhoods to sanction the appeal to a strike. Over 90 per cent of the workmen were in favor, and the American Federation of Labor supported their contention. On the twenty-eighth of August 637 representatives of the brotherhoods left a delegates' meeting at Washington with sealed orders for a nation-wide strike to begin on Monday morning, September 4. A final appeal by the President to the four brotherhood chiefs brought the reply that they could not override the decision of the delegates. Wilson confessed to his secretary that he was "at the end of his tether." He regarded the proposed strike as a calamity of the first magnitude. It might well mean the winning of the war by Germany. The anxiety in the allied countries lest their shipments of food and munitions from the United States might be stopped was intense.

On August 29 the President went before Congress with the request for legislation satisfying the trainmen's demands. He recommended the enlargement of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the approval by Congress of the Commission's increase of rates to meet the new conditions, the creation of a Federal organ of mediation and conciliation to avert future strikes, and the grant of power to the executive to take over and operate the roads if it should become necessary for military purposes. The Adamson bill passed the House on September 1 by a vote of 239 to 56, and on the same day the Senate, under executive pressure, reluctantly accepted it by a strictly party vote of 43 to 28. President Wilson signed it the day before the strike was to take effect. Notwithstanding the relief which the country felt when the brotherhoods called off the strike, there was a great outcry against the "pusillanimous surrender" of the government to a few hundred thousand representatives of or-

ganized labor. The leaders of the brotherhoods had sat in the gallery of the House "with a stop watch in their hands" and browbeaten the members on the floor to do their bidding. The President had yielded to the threats of a labor group who had put their own interests before the welfare and even the safety of the country. Far different, said the Republicans, had been the conduct of President Roosevelt in the coal strike of 1902. The cases were not very analogous, but a halting analogy is seized upon as a good campaign argument. Still, there was embarrassment for the partisan opposition in the fact that 69 Republicans had voted for the Adamson bill in the House.

The election on November 7 was one of the closest in our history. Early in the evening it was known that Mr. Hughes had carried the populous states of the East, and even the President conceded the Republican victory.¹ Telegrams of congratulation poured on Mr. Hughes that night, and not a few messages of condolence were sent to President Wilson. The first edition of the *New York Times* (a strong Wilson paper) announced the next morning in large headlines the "sweeping victory of Mr. Hughes." But as the day progressed, the returns from the West added a steady increment to the Wilson vote, and the Democrats took heart. By Wednesday night it was probable that Wilson had been reelected, and by Thursday night it was certain. Only Ohio and New Hampshire of the sixteen states east of the Mississippi and north of Mason and Dixon's line voted for him, but he carried all the rest of the Union except the border states of Delaware and West Virginia and the Western states of South Dakota and Oregon. The popular vote was 9,128,837 for Wilson and 8,536,380 for Hughes. The electoral vote was 277 to 254.² The exceptionally large

¹ At about 9.30 he telephoned to his secretary at Asbury Park: "Well, Tumulty, it begins to look as if we have been badly licked. The only thing I am sorry for and that cuts me to the quick is that the people apparently misunderstand us. But I have no regrets. We have tried to do our duty" (J. P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," p. 218).

² The Socialist candidate, Allan Benson of New York, received 590,294 votes; the Prohibitionist, J. F. Hanly of Indiana, 221,196; and the Socialist Laborite, Arthur Reimer of Massachusetts, 13,922.

popular vote of 18,500,000 was due partly to the intensity of feeling on the issue of the campaign and partly to the increase in the number of woman-suffrage states.

The predictions that Hughes would be elected by the German votes or the Irish votes or the women's votes were all belied. The Republicans probably lost as many German votes by Roosevelt's denunciation of the hyphenated citizens as the Democrats did by Wilson's *Sussex* ultimatum. The suffrage states showed a fairly equal division of the women's vote between the two candidates. The real reason for Hughes's defeat was his failure in the main task of the Republican candidate; namely, to heal the breach in the party. The Progressives divided their vote between him and Wilson. Many of the prominent Progressive leaders of 1912, like Francis J. Heney of California and Bainbridge Colby of New York, worked hard for the reelection of the President. In state after state of the West, where the Progressive doctrines had taken deep root, Hughes failed to win confidence. Wisconsin reelected the Republican senator La Follette by a majority of 116,000, but gave the Hughes electors a majority of only 28,000. Capper, the Republican governor of Kansas, defeated his Democratic rival by 162,000 votes, but the state went for Wilson by 37,000. Most significant of all was the result in California, on which the election of Wilson eventually turned. The Progressive sentiment in the state was very strong, and Governor Hiram Johnson (who was making the campaign for the United States Senate) was tremendously popular. Mr. Hughes visited California on his Western tour, but was carefully kept by his managers from any contaminating touch with the erstwhile Progressive candidate for vice-president, though Johnson, like Roosevelt, had given his support to the Republican ticket. The state went for Johnson by a majority of 300,000, but cast 466,289 votes for Wilson to 462,516 for Hughes. Had the latter won the thirteen electoral votes of California, as he might have done by showing some consideration for Governor Johnson, he would have been elected by a margin of three votes over Wilson.

President Wilson was far stronger than his party. The Republicans elected governors in a number of states which appeared in the Wilson column, reduced the Democratic majority of 16 to 12 in the Senate, and exactly wiped out the Democratic majority of 29 in the House (to which each party elected 214 members). Except for Mr. Wilson himself, it was very much like a Republican victory. But the presidential vote was, after all, the important element in the crisis. It was a vote of confidence in Woodrow Wilson. If the country was indeed approaching the brink of war, as an increasing number of our people (including the President himself) believed, it was a decision, in the homely phrase of Abraham Lincoln, not to swap horses while crossing the stream.

CHAPTER IX

THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR

The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.—WOODROW WILSON

THE TOGA YIELDS TO ARMS

President Wilson made heroic efforts to redeem the pledge implicit in the campaign slogan and explicit in his letter of the previous February to Senator Stone, to "keep us out of war." Although he had put himself at the head of the movement for preparedness at the beginning of 1916, warning the people that there was "not a day to lose" and urging upon Congress a military and naval program of adequate defense, his mind was still set not upon making ready for war but upon mediating peace. Preparedness was a disagreeable duty thrust upon him by his responsibility for the protection of American rights; mediation was a glorious opportunity offered to him by the proud position of the United States as the leading neutral nation of the world. As the summer and autumn of 1916 wore on, it looked as if the President's hopes might be realized. Germany was observing the *Sussex* pledge. As we have seen (p. 619), the advocates of the drastic submarine campaign were in temporary disfavor at Berlin. On the western front of battle both the Germans and the Allies failed to gain a decisive victory in their great drives at Verdun and the Somme, and it looked to many as if the war must end in a military stalemate. The Minority Socialists in the Reichstag were pressing for a negotiated peace. To consolidate the factions at home and weaken the cohesion of the Allies, the Kaiser dispatched his famous peace offer of December 12, not as a suppliant asking for terms, but as a victor fortified in the belief that the attempt of the Entente nations to crush the Fatherland in a "ring of iron" had failed.

If he was to be a successful mediator, as Roosevelt had been in the Russo-Japanese war a decade before, President Wilson must hold the scales of judgment equally balanced between the two sides, in detached and disinterested friendship. Speaking in Washington before the League to Enforce Peace, on May 27, 1916, he had prepared the way for his mediatory offices by emphasizing again that objective view of the European conflict which he had announced in its earlier days. "With the causes and the objects of the war," he said, "we are not concerned. . . . The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore." It was a condition and not a theory that confronted him. The world was torn with strife. Dwelling on the "causes and objects" of the strife would not heal but only exacerbate it. "The longer the war lasts," he said, "the more deeply do we become concerned that it should be brought to an end and the world be permitted to resume its normal life and course again." When Ambassador Page returned from London in August on a visit, he found an amazing indifference among the high officials at Washington to the situation abroad. The politics of the election campaign absorbed their attention. He sat at table with the President and with cabinet officers without hearing a word about our foreign affairs.¹ Though Page had been summoned home officially, it was five weeks before he succeeded in securing an opportunity to deliver to President Wilson his "important and confidential messages from the British government." When he finally did have an interview at Shadow Lawn late in

¹ "I sat at luncheon at a hotel with Lansing, Secretary of State; Lane, Secretary of the Interior; Gregory, Attorney-General; Baker, Secretary of War; Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; and Sharp, ambassador to France; and all the talk was jocular or semijocular and personal—mere cheap chaffing. Not a question was asked either of the ambassador to France or of the ambassador to Great Britain about the war or about our foreign relations. The war wasn't mentioned. Sharp and I might have come from Bungtown or Jonesville and not from France and England. We were not encouraged to talk. . . . The Vice-President confessed to his neighbor at a Gridiron dinner that he had read none of the White Papers or Orange Papers etc. of the belligerent governments—confessed this with pride—lest he should form an opinion and cease to be neutral!" (Burton J. Hendrick, "Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," Vol. II, pp. 174-175).

September, and tried to impress upon the President the sinister purposes of the German militarists and the desperate situation of the Allies, he found "Mr. Wilson utterly cold, utterly unresponsive, interested only in ending the war." The President showed no interest in the *Lusitania* medal which Page had brought, but expressed irritation with the commercial measures of Great Britain.¹ Page returned to England with the sorrowful conviction that the government at Washington was in truth "not concerned with the objects of the war."

Shortly after the indorsement of his administration by the American people in the election of November, President Wilson prepared an identical note to be sent to the belligerent powers, asking them for "such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms on which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal . . . as would make it possible frankly to compare them." He was not, he said, "proposing peace or even offering mediation." He was "merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerents, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing." The dispatch of the note was delayed (chiefly on account of the indignant protest raised in this country by the wholesale deportation of Belgians to work in the fields and factories of Germany), so that it was not until after the publication of the Kaiser's "peace drive" of December 12 (to which it seemed, but was not, a reply) that the Wilson note was sent. Its nicely balanced judgment, or rather disclaimer of judgment, between the merits of the respective causes of the belligerents again gave umbrage to the Allies and their sympathizers in this country. For the President took the liberty of calling attention to the fact that "the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world"; namely, to secure the rights and privileges of weak states against aggression and to make their own position assured against the recurrence of like

¹ "Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," Vol. II, pp. 185-188.

wars, to discourage the future formation of rival leagues, and to coöperate in "the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world." "The leaders of the several belligerents have," he said, "stated those objects in general terms. But stated in general terms they seem the same on both sides." He asked for an authoritative statement of the precise objects sought. Although the President did not say that the objects for which both sides were fighting were the same, he gave equal credence to the protestations of both sides. The Germans replied immediately, repeating their readiness to join in a conference at some neutral place, but specifying no more "precise objects sought" in the war than they had given before. The reply of the Allies (January 10, 1917), while declaring that their demands for restitution, reparations, and guaranties for the future had already been plainly stated, nevertheless enumerated the particular points as President Wilson requested: the restoration of Belgian, Serbia, and Montenegro, with indemnities; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, Russia, and Rumania, with reparations; the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, and Czechoslovaks from foreign domination; the expulsion of the Turk from Europe. The joint reply of the Allies was supplemented by a note from Belgium protesting against the President's apparent assumption that "the statesmen of the two opposing camps pursue the same objects of war." Mr. A. J. Balfour, the British foreign minister, also sent a separate note, repudiating the least suggestion that the belligerents were contending for the same objects or that any lasting peace could be had until the military despotism of the Hohenzollerns was destroyed.

While the reply of the Allies to the Wilson note was being awaited at Washington, an event happened in Berlin which persuaded many in this country that the administration was willing to go any lengths in its desire to conciliate the German government. Ambassador Gerard, who had just returned from a visit to America, was given a banquet at the Hotel Adlon by the American Association of Commerce and Trade. Vice-Chancellor Helfferich, the vice-president of the Reichstag, and the

foreign and colonial secretaries were among the guests. The ambassador (whom his memoirs, entitled "My Four Years in Germany," show to have been anything but acceptable to the Kaiser's court) indulged in a flattering tribute to the civil and military leaders of the empire. "Never since the beginning of the war," he said, "have the relations between Germany and the United States been as cordial as now. I have brought back an olive branch from the President. . . . I personally am convinced that so long as Germany's fate is directed by such men as my friend the Chancellor, and Dr. Helfferich and Dr. Solf, by Admirals von Capelle, Holtzendorff, and von Müller, by Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and, last but not least, by my friend Zimmermann, the relations between the two countries are running no risk." A few days later his "friend Zimmermann" was tempting the Mexicans to form an alliance with Japan against the United States, with the bait of the restoration of their "lost provinces" of Texas and New Mexico!

On the basis of the replies to his note of December 18, President Wilson formulated a statement of what he believed this country would approve as a fair basis for the negotiation of peace and for its voluntary adherence to a league for peace. He presented this statement to the Senate in a speech of January 22, 1917. The present war must first be ended, he said, but it must be ended by terms that would create a peace worth guaranteeing and preserving. We should have no voice in determining what those terms would be, but we should have a voice in determining whether they should be made lasting or not, by the guaranties of a universal covenant. "Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be not only a balance power but a community of power: not organized rivalries, but a peace representing security by the organized major force of mankind." After these general observations, which would no doubt win the assent of the belligerents, the President turned to the more specific conditions of peace. "First of all," he said, "it must be a peace without victory." He begged to be allowed to put his own interpretation on this startling announcement: "Victory

would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation under duress at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last." The President was still holding the scales evenly poised. The rest of his speech about government by the consent of the governed, the freedom of the seas, the limitation of naval armaments, the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the whole world, was lost in that single unfortunate phrase, "peace without victory." It marked the climax of the President's persistent idealism in the face of hard facts. Not one of the belligerent powers, who for more than three years had been sacrificing their blood and treasure to gain a victory, dreamed that peace could come in any other way. The Germans received the President's formula with scorn; the Allies with amazement and incredulous disappointment. A few days after the sinking of the *Lusitania* ex-President Eliot of Harvard had written, "With practical unanimity we shall desire the victory of the Allies." Now the President, speaking, as he averred, "as the responsible head of a great government," and feeling confident that he was saying "what the people of the United States would wish him to say," declared that there must be no victory. The great moralist seemed to ignore the moral issues of the war. He apparently saw only two deluded groups of nations fighting for their selfish interests. From his "remoteness from the reality of the war" he could confound the aims of the Hohenzollern-Hapsburg autocracy with the struggle of the European democracies, and condemn them both as a lust for victory which postponed peace. Such was the tone of the complaint of the Entente powers. In the place of the expected sympathy for those who were "shedding their blood for freedom," the London *Mail* found in President Wilson's speech only "an abstract pontifical statement of a future international morality."

Several days before President Wilson made his plea for "peace without victory," the German High Command, in a

meeting at Pless, had adopted a program to insure victory and the imposition of a humiliating peace upon the conquered. The submarine warfare was to be resumed in more ruthless form than ever. We know now from the cipher dispatches published by Count von Bernstorff in his "My Three Years in America" (1920), from Admiral von Tirpitz's "Memoirs," and certain of the Page papers that the slackening of the submarine campaign in 1916 was only a truce. The *Sussex* pledge was wrung from a reluctant government against the protest of most of the military and naval officers, on the assurance of the diplomats, backed by the chancellor, that a victorious peace would result. Von Bernstorff cabled to Berlin on April 26, 1916: "I repeat my proposal to suspend the submarine war, *at least for the period of negotiations*. This would remove all danger of a breach [with the United States] and also enable Wilson to continue his labors in his great plan of bringing about a peace based upon the freedom of the seas. . . . According to the assurances which Wilson, through House, has given me, he would in that case take in hand measures directly against England. . . . This would give us the advantage that the submarine war, being over Mr. Wilson's head like the sword of Damocles, would compel him at once to take in hand the task of mediation." The condition attached to the *Sussex* pledge given eight days later confirmed this purpose. The Von Tirpitz faction, however, by no means gave up the fight. A fleet of larger and more efficient submarines was built during the summer and autumn of 1916. On October 14 the chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, cabled to Bernstorff: "Demand for unrestricted submarine campaign increasing with prolongation of war and improbability of decisive military blow."¹ When the Kaiser's peace proposal of December was rejected, the turn of the militarists came. The refusal of the Allies to allow Germany to impose a victor's terms was utilized to unite the diplomats, the Socialists, and the Junkers in support of war to the bitter end. In a proclamation to the army and navy the Kaiser said: "Before God and humanity I declare that on the

¹ The drive on Verdun had failed, and the German armies had not yet humbled the Rumanians at Bucharest.

governments of our enemies alone falls the heavy responsibility for all the future terrible sacrifice from which I wished to save you. With justified indignation at our enemies' arrogant crime . . . you will become as steel. Our enemies did not want the understanding offered by me. With God's help our armies will enforce it." The resumption of the ruthless submarine warfare was decreed. Von Tirpitz was jubilant, and "friend Zimmermann" of the foreign office said to Ambassador Gerard, "Give us only two months of this kind of warfare and we shall end the war and make peace within three months."

Von Bernstorff at Washington was thrown into despair. He had been negotiating with the President and Colonel House, and had grown confident that pressure on England in the form of an embargo, or the threat of an embargo, would bring the Entente powers to terms. On January 16 he had cabled to Berlin: "It is clear that we cannot afford to have difficulties over the old U-boat question. . . . We must be careful not to act hastily and carelessly, so as not to create conflict before the President has taken further steps." But the decision of the German militarists had already been taken. On January 19 Von Bernstorff received his orders to communicate to the American government on the thirty-first that on that day unrestricted submarine warfare would be resumed. The ambassador still remonstrated with Berlin. In a cipher dispatch on January 23 he begged for a postponement of the decision, calling attention to the favorable reception of the President's speech by the Senate the day before and informing the chancellor that he had just received from Colonel House, in an interview at New York, the formal offer of President Wilson to act as mediator to bring about a negotiated peace. On the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh Von Bernstorff renewed his appeal for postponement, but on January 29 word came from the chancellor that it was too late to turn back: "Far-reaching military preparations have already been made which cannot be undone, and the U-boats have already sailed with new instructions." There was nothing left for the ambassador to do but to hand to Secretary Lansing

the fateful communication which he knew meant the end of his own mission in Washington, of the President's efforts for a negotiated peace, and of the neutrality of the United States. The *Sussex* pledge had been repudiated, and President Wilson had "no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States" but to sever relations with the German Empire.

On February 3 President Wilson announced this decision to a joint session of Congress attended by the members of the Supreme Court, the diplomatic corps, and a throng of invited guests who crowded the galleries. The President still hoped to avert war. He refused to believe, he said, that it was the intention of the German government to do what they had warned us they would feel at liberty to do. We desired no conflict with the German government. We were the sincere friends of the German people. We should not believe that they were hostile to us until we were forced to believe it by "actual overt acts" on the part of the German government. But if his "inveterate confidence in the sobriety and prudent foresight" of the German authorities "should unhappily prove unfounded," and "if American shipping and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders," he would again come before Congress to ask for the authority to use the means necessary for the protection of our people. On the same day Ambassador von Bernstorff was handed his passports. The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, with its inevitable destruction of neutral lives, was the direct cause of America's entering the war. Whether or not we should have remained neutral had it not been for this desperate folly of the German government, it is impossible to say. At any rate, the two men in whose hands the decision chiefly lay were hopeful of the success of the negotiations begun. President Wilson spoke in his address of January 22 of the "peace presently to be made"; and Colonel House wrote to Von Bernstorff on his departure: "It is too sad to see that your government should have declared the unrestricted U-boat war at a moment when we were so near to peace. The

day will come when people in Germany will see how much you have done for your country in America."¹

The terms of the submarine order were intolerable. A zone was drawn around Great Britain, France, and Italy, extending westward into the Atlantic to the twentieth degree of longitude, and the whole eastern end of the Mediterranean was shut off. Neutral as well as belligerent ships met within the zone were to be sunk. One American ship a week was to be allowed to arrive (Sundays) at Falmouth and depart (Wednesdays) from Falmouth, through a narrow lane. The ship must be plainly marked with three alternate red and white stripes a meter wide painted on her hull, and must have checkered red-and-white flags floating from each mast. No article on the German contraband list might be carried. Another safety lane, twenty miles wide, led through the Mediterranean to the coast of Greece. As a result of the proclamation, marine insurance rates rose sharply and sailings were canceled in large numbers. Before his departure Von Bernstorff had ordered the destruction of the machinery of the German vessels lying at American ports. Officers and men aboard the German ships at Philadelphia and New York

¹ Von Tirpitz in his "Memoirs" attacks Von Bernstorff's policy of "a compliant attitude on our part" in the submarine warfare, and says that no advantage resulted to Germany from it. "But I must confess," replies the ambassador, pointedly, "that I was not aware that the U-boat war had brought us any advantage either. Its results have been a heavy moral debt and a huge bill of costs that the German people must pay. And how could the policy which I recommended have yielded practical results, seeing that I was never allowed to carry it through? . . . Every time a diplomatic success was in view, an incident occurred which made it necessary to start one's labors all over again. It seems to have been our destiny that all our most important decisions of the war were the outcome of military and not political considerations. On the Entente side the converse was always true, and that is why, though it suffered many military reverses, the Entente won the war ("My Three Years in America," pp. 387, 390). Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in his testimony before the Examining Committee of the National Assembly, said: "It was perfectly clear to the authorities in Germany that the desire to prosecute the unrestricted U-boat war would destroy all chance of further efforts on the part of the President to bring about peace. The U-boat war meant rupture and ultimate war with America. . . . General Headquarters was firmly resolved to face even the risk of America's entry into the war, and wished to use the circumstance as a trial of strength with the political leaders" (ibid. p. 379).

were held prisoners. Various measures of precaution were taken against acts of sabotage by German sympathizers. Railroad bridges, shipyards, and munition plants were put under guard. The White House and the State, War, Navy, and Treasury buildings were closed to the public. The mint, the custom-houses, the armories and arsenals, were carefully protected. The



THE GERMAN SUBMARINE ZONE OF JANUARY 31, 1917

National Guard was ordered to be ready for immediate mobilization. On the other side of the water the American embassy in Berlin was surrounded by a German police guard, and Mr. Gerard's safe-conduct was delayed in order to bring pressure on the American government to allow perfect freedom to German citizens here.

The American peace societies redoubled their efforts to prevent the "overt act" that would mean war. Mr. Bryan, addressing a large peace meeting at Madison Square Garden, New

York, declared that it would be "a crime against this nation and the world at large" for us to go to war with "a nation that wishes us no harm." In an "Appeal to the People," a few days later, he proposed several methods for preserving peace. We could prohibit American citizens from sailing on the ships of the belligerents, or on American ships carrying contraband (a revival of the McLemore resolution); we could refuse clearance papers to ships which carried passengers and contraband of war at the same time; we could prohibit American ships from entering the danger zone. Let the people demand that no declaration of war be made without submitting the question to a referendum vote. "Wire immediately to the President, your senator, your congressman," he said; "a few cents now may save many dollars in taxes, and possibly a son." The general approval, however, of the President's rupture of diplomatic relations was hearty and instantaneous. The Senate supported him with only five dissenting voices—Gronna, La Follette, Works (Republicans) and Vardaman and Kirby (Democrats). Bankers, merchants, manufacturers, professional men, and laborers were eager to "get behind the President." Owners of private yachts offered them to the government. Great industrial plants, like the Bethlehem Steel, the Remington Arms, and the Ford automobile factories, signified their readiness to put their men and machinery at the service of the President. The American Federation of Labor agreed to waive the law prescribing an eight-hour day for workers in the government employ.

Meanwhile the German U-boats had entered with zest upon their work. In the month of February they sank 200 ships (of which 151 were neutrals) with a tonnage of 456,000. Only two of the ships sunk were American, but our shipping was suffering from apprehension, since the vessels "were keeping to their home ports."¹ On February 26, therefore, the President came before

¹ On the day after we broke off relations with Germany, President Wilson had asked other neutral nations to do the same. None of them followed his suggestion, although Switzerland, Holland, Spain, the Scandinavian countries, China, and some of the South American republics protested against the renewal of the unrestricted submarine warfare.

Congress to ask for authority to arm our merchant ships. A bill was forthwith introduced into the House giving the President the powers asked for and appropriating \$100,000 for their enforcement. While the bill was pending, the news was published of Zimmermann's attempt to engineer an alliance between Mexico and Japan against the United States in case we entered the war (see page 635). The revelation of the Zimmermann plot, which the author freely confessed, swept away the opposition in the House, and the Armed Ship bill was passed on March 1 by a vote of 403 to 13. But in the Senate it encountered a stubborn resistance by a group of about a dozen men, including La Follette, Norris, Gronna, Cummins, Clapp, Works, Kenyon (Republicans), Kirby, Lane, O'Gorman, Vardaman, and Stone (Democrats). There was no rule of cloture in the Senate, and although seventy-five senators signed a statement that they were ready to vote for the bill, the filibusterers prevented its passage before the expiration of Congress on March 4. President Wilson bitterly reproached the "little group of willful men, representing no opinion but their own," who had "rendered the great government of the United States helpless and contemptible."¹ Supported by the opinion of Attorney-General Gregory and Secretary Lansing, President Wilson took upon himself the responsibility of placing armed guards on our merchant vessels bound for the submarine zone.

The President had not intended to call the Sixty-fifth Congress in extra session. However, the necessity for passing the army-appropriation bill, which had also failed through the Senate filibuster, together with the growing seriousness of the foreign situation, prompted him to summon Congress to meet on April 16. He stood "firm in armed neutrality," as he said in his second inaugural address of March 5, but within a fortnight two events occurred which brought us closer to the verge of war. On March 15 the Russian Czar, who had been under the influences

¹ As a result of this incident the Senate, in the special session which followed, adopted a rule providing that on a petition of sixteen members, supported by a two-thirds vote, senators should be limited to an hour's debate on any measure, and that no amendments should be allowed except by unanimous consent.

of the "dark forces" of despotism and treason since the beginning of the war, was driven from his throne by a revolution. The reactionary ministers were thrown into prison by the leaders of the Duma, and a coalition cabinet chosen by the Duma and the landholders was set up at Petrograd, to the great rejoicing of the Entente nations. Our government recognized the new Russian régime on March 21. The prospect of our joining the Allies was made infinitely more inviting by the thought that it would not "pledge us to fight side by side with the autocratic and intolerable government of the Romanoffs." On the day after the Czar's abdication German submarines sank three American-built, American-owned, and American-manned merchant vessels, the *City of Memphis*, the *Illinois*, and the *Vigilancia*—the latter with the loss of American lives. On March 21 the President advanced the meeting of Congress by two weeks.

At 8.30 on the evening of April 2, President Wilson, guarded by a troop of cavalry, drove to the Capitol and addressed the eager, cheering, flag-waving throng that packed the floor and galleries of the House, in what were perhaps the most momentous words ever uttered within its walls: "With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking, and of the grave responsibility which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerency which has been thrust upon it, and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the government of the German Empire to terms and end the war." He reviewed the long course of outrages that had "served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and never could be our friend." He outlined the measures necessary for our "utmost practicable coöperation in counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany." He protested that

we "had no quarrel with the German people." He insisted that our motive should be "not revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of human rights," and that our ultimate aim should be "a steadfast concert of peace, maintained by a partnership of democratic nations." Armed neutrality was "worse than ineffectual against a government which threatened to deal with the guards upon our ships as pirates beyond the pale of law." Armed opposition was the only weapon against a government which had thrown aside all consideration of humanity and of right, and "was running amuck." "We are now about to accept gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German people included, for the right of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them."

"It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress," he concluded, "which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great and peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and

liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other."

The same evening a resolution was introduced into both branches of Congress, declaring that the United States accepted the war which had been thrust upon her by the German government, and directing the President to exert all the power of the country to bring the war to a successful termination. On April 4 the Senate, after a heated debate, in which the war was described by the pacifists as "useless" and "senseless," a product of Wall Street, and a pledge of vassalage to Great Britain, passed the resolution by a vote of 82 to 6. The dissentients were Stone (chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations), Lane, and Vardaman (Democrats), and La Follette, Gronna, and Norris (Republicans). The debate in the House lasted through the following day and night. Shortly after 3 A.M. on the morning of April 6 the resolution was passed by a vote of 373 to 50. President Wilson signed the resolution the same day. For the first time in over a hundred years the United States was at war with a first-class European power.¹

The rejoicing and gratification of the allied governments at the accession of America's unwasted strength to their hard-pressed cause was immense. The American flag suddenly burst out upon the streets of Paris, London, and Rome. On "America Day" (April 20) it was raised with the Union Jack above the Houses of Parliament, while the king and queen, with the high dignitaries of the nation, assembled in St. Paul's cathedral to

¹ Though diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary were severed on April 8, we did not declare war on the Dual Empire until the following December. We did not go to war with the other allies of Germany, Turkey and Bulgaria, nor did we break off relations with the latter power.

give thanks for "the entrance of the United States into the great war for freedom." President Poincaré of France, in a glowing dispatch, expressed the "deepest feelings of brotherly appreciation" to President Wilson and his "noble country." Some seventy members of the Italian Chamber thanked the President for his message, addressed "not to the United States alone, but to all humanity—the hymn of freedom." The British chancellor of the exchequer, Bonar Law, paraphrasing the remark of Canning ninety years before, spoke of the new world which had come in to restore the balance of the old. The German military authorities, on the other hand, whatever were the misgivings of men like Bethmann-Hollweg and Von Bernstorff, received the American declaration of war with indifference. As for our economic resources, they had been at the disposal of the Allies since the beginning of the war. As for our military strength, it was more contemptible than that of Rumania. The submarine warfare would bring England to her knees and the war to an end before an American army could be trained; and, even if an American army were ready to send across the sea, it could never reach the battlefield. The German U-boats would sink the transports before they reached the shores of France or England. If the United States would not stand aside and let Germany finish the job, then she must be unceremoniously brushed aside.

The war message marked a complete about face in President Wilson's position. Hitherto he had been the prince of pacifists. Even when he had put himself at the head of the movement for preparedness, his thought had been of the prevention and not the precipitation of war. But henceforth there was no talk of being "too proud to fight" or of our unconcern "with the causes and objects of the war," of the alleged identity of aims of both belligerents or of "peace without victory." The Hohenzollern government, in whose "sobriety and prudent foresight" he had expressed his "inveterate confidence" as late as the third of February, became for him on April 2 the Prussian autocracy, "which was not and never could be our friend." If our object was reprisal for the slaughter of American citizens, there was

more cause for our going to war when the *Lusitania* was sunk than there was two years later; if it was to make the world safe for democracy, there was as much need for intervention when Belgium was crushed under the invaders' iron heel. The purposes and methods of the German government had not changed since the days when President Wilson had relied on the remonstrances of polite notes to compel the observance of the rules of humane warfare. It was Wilson himself who had changed. Having once made up his mind that neutrality was "no longer feasible or desirable," he became the most inexorable advocate of "force to the uttermost." The Germans were inclined to attribute his change to pique at being thwarted in his ambition to pose as the arbiter of the world.¹ His opponents here declared that he had been forced at last to a spirited defense of our rights and honor by the constant pressure of the true patriots. But an explanation which accords better both with President Wilson's character and with the situation of the country is that what he himself called his "one-track mind" became finally convinced that the thoughts were moving through it in the wrong direction. He reversed the train and found, somewhat to his surprise, how generally the American people were ready to travel in the new direction. Some have said that he gradually educated the public, especially in the West, to accept a status of belligerency. There is little in his published utterances to support such a view. No doubt the country went to war more unitedly in 1917 than it would have done in 1915, but it was not because it had been led in that direction by the President.

The first (extra) session of the Sixty-fifth Congress, which sat from April 2 to October 6, 1917, was one of great productivity. Its chief measures may be considered briefly under four topics: (1) military preparation, (2) war finance, (3) the mobilization and coördination of our agricultural, industrial, and

¹ "After the thirty-first of January, 1917," says Von Bernstorff, "he was incapable of an impartial attitude toward Germany. He saw red whenever he thought of the Imperial Government, and his repugnance to it knew no bounds. Even today (1920), the bitter feeling still rankles with him that the German government deprived him of the glory of being the premier political personage on the world's stage" ("My Three Years in America," p. 370).

commercial resources, and (4) the maintenance of the country's morale for the most effective prosecution of the war. The President in war time has immense power as commander in chief of the army and navy, and that power Congress now augmented by giving Wilson authority in civil matters which it would not have dreamed of handing over to one man in time of peace. He was made virtual dictator of the country. The Democratic caucus of the House voted to leave out of consideration all bills except those which were recommended from the White House. Representative A. P. Gardner of Massachusetts, a stanch Republican, declared, "Whatever the President says he needs, that I shall vote to give him." The powers exercised by Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War seem modest when compared with those conferred upon President Wilson in the World War.

On April 5, while the House was debating the war resolution, Secretary Baker submitted to Congress the draft of an army bill prepared by the General Staff. It called for the immediate completion of the maximum strength of the regular army (223,000) and National Guard (425,000) by voluntary enlistments, and for the conscription of 500,000 young men (or 1,000,000, if the President thought it necessary) by a selective draft, apportioned among the states and territories according to population. The conscription feature of the bill was opposed by Speaker Clark, by Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, the majority leader on the floor, and by S. H. Dent of Alabama, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, who refused to sponsor the bill and turned it over to Julius Kahn of California, the ranking Republican member of the committee. The bill passed the House on April 28 by the large majority of 397 to 24, and was adopted by the Senate by a vote of 81 to 8.¹ It was the middle of May before the

¹ A Senate amendment provided for the recruitment of volunteer regiments. Theodore Roosevelt had offered to raise a division for immediate service in France, and claimed that three hundred thousand men were ready to go under his command. He asked to have several of the best officers of the regular army associated with him. But the President, while paying tribute to Colonel Roosevelt's "vigor and enthusiasm," declined the offer. To accept it, he said, "would seriously interfere with . . . the prompt creation and early use of an effective army, and would contribute virtually nothing to the effective strength of the

conference of the Houses agreed on the final form of the bill, which fixed the age limits for the draft at twenty-one to thirty years inclusive, raised the pay of the private from \$15 to \$30 a month, provided for the filling of the regular army and the National Guard by enlistment, authorized the President to raise a volunteer infantry force of more than four divisions, and required all males between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-one to register in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President. Registration day was set for June 5, and on that day 9,586,508 young men were enrolled in the 4557 registration districts of the country. The draft was conducted at Washington on July 20. Numbers ranging from 1 to 10,500, written in red ink on tiny slips of paper, were inclosed in black-celluloid capsules, which were mixed in a large glass bowl. Secretary Baker, blindfolded, drew out the first capsule, which contained the number 258. That meant that in every registration district in which as many as 258 men were enrolled the man with the number 258 was called to the colors. When the last of the 10,500 capsules had been drawn, after sixteen hours, it was found that 1,374,000 men had been drafted. The men reported to their respective boards for physical examination or to claim exemption under the various clauses provided in the law. About half the men drafted were retained for service. They were distributed during the summer and autumn among sixteen camps in various parts of the country. The national guardsmen called into the Federal service were sent to sixteen other camps.¹

armies now engaged against Germany. . . . The business in hand is undramatic, practical, and of scientific definiteness and precision. . . . The first troops sent to France will be taken from the present forces of the regular army and will be under the command of trained soldiers only."

¹ One of the most remarkable examples of American efficiency and energy was the construction in a few months' time of these thirty-two training camps to house tens of thousands of soldiers each. They were like little cities springing up overnight, with their barracks and hospitals, their heating and lighting plants, their water and sewage systems, their shops and amusement halls. On the eve of the departure of the first contingent of the National Army (the drafted men) for their camps, President Wilson sent them the following message: "The eyes of the world will be upon you, because you are in some special sense the soldiers of freedom. Let it be your pride, therefore, to show all men everywhere not only

Secretary Baker had been a pronounced pacifist and an opponent of preparedness. Two months after we declared war he issued a bulletin admitting the "difficulty, disorder, and confusion in getting things started." But he called it "a happy confusion," and expressed his gratification that "when we entered this war we were not, like our adversary, ready for it, anxious for it, prepared for it, and inviting it." His attitude was savagely criticized by men like Roosevelt and Wood, and the administration of the War Department became the subject of a prolonged and searching investigation by Congress when it met in its first regular session in December, 1917. The criticism was the more bitter because the President had thwarted the plan of the establishment of a congressional committee to supervise the conduct of the war, such as had hampered President Lincoln in the Civil War. Senator Chamberlain of Oregon, the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, asserted that the military establishment of the country had "broken down and almost stopped functioning because of inefficiency in every bureau and every department of the government." In July, Congress had appropriated \$640,000,000 for aircraft, and Secretary Baker promised that in a year's time we would have twenty thousand fighting planes in France. Month after month had passed, however, without anything to show for the huge appropriation. The Liberty motor was inexplicably long in developing; and when it was ready, it was found to be unsuitable for the lighter fighting planes. The munitions and quartermasters divisions were also severely criticized. Secretary Baker was charged with deception in his public statements. Senators Lodge, Johnson, and Poindexter mercilessly attacked the War Department at every point. The United States, said Lodge in the spring of 1918, had "only a wasted year" to show for all the billions that had been appropriated by Congress. We hadn't a single fighting plane in France. "Not a finished gun with a complete round of ammunition, of a caliber above six inches, was ever shipped from

what good soldiers you are but also what good men you are, keeping yourselves fit and straight in everything and pure and clean through and through. . . . My affectionate confidence goes with you in every battle and every test."

the United States to the army in France up to the time of the signing of the armistice" (November 11, 1918).¹

Secretary Baker defended himself in an aggressive and optimistic statement before the Senate, in which he maintained that no army of similar size in the history of the world had ever been raised, equipped, or trained so quickly and successfully as ours, and declared that "arms of the most modern and effective kind—including artillery, machine guns, and rifles and small arms—have been provided by manufacture or purchase for every soldier in France in the year 1918." President Wilson came to the support of his Secretary, characterizing Senator Chamberlain's criticism as "an astounding and absolutely unjust distortion of the truth," and praising the War Department for "having performed a task of unparalleled magnitude and difficulty with extraordinary promptness and efficiency." Mr. Baker, he said, was one of the ablest public officials he had ever known. An attempt, supported by Chamberlain, Lodge, Root, Roosevelt, and others, to have a special war cabinet created, on the model of the British war cabinet, failed. The victory remained with the President and his Secretary; but the criticism had an effect in the considerable reorganization of the bureaus of the War Department, resulting in increased efficiency.

The navy was in a much better position than the army. This

¹ Ernest W. Young, "The Wilson Administration and the Great War," p. 122. General Pershing, in his preliminary report of November 20, 1918, confirms this statement: "Among our most important deficiencies in materials were artillery, aviation, and tanks. We accepted the offer of the French government to provide us with the necessary equipment of 3-inch and 6-inch guns for thirty divisions. There were no guns of the caliber mentioned manufactured in America on our front at the date the armistice was signed. . . . In aviation we were in the same situation. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for training our personnel, and they have provided us with a total of 2676 pursuit, observation, and bombing planes." From the French side André Tardieu, an army officer and a member of the Chamber of Deputies, says: "On the day of the armistice, of the United States Army's war material then in line, France had manufactured 100 per cent of the 75's, 100 per cent of the 155's, howitzers, 100 per cent of the tanks, 81 per cent of the aëroplanes, 75 per cent of the long guns. All of the 65,000,000 rounds of 75 and 155 shells used by the American artillery came from French factories" ("The Truth about the Treaty," p. 35).

was due partly to the fact that a navy must always be kept in shape, and partly to the generous provisions which Congress had made in the naval bills of 1915 and 1916. Even before the actual declaration of war Rear Admiral W. S. Sims, president of the Naval War College at Newport, had been sent to England, in answer to the insistent request of Ambassador Page, to help in the blockade of Germany. On May 4 a small fleet of destroyers arrived at Queenstown. In another month our battleships followed. American vessels laid down over 55,000 mines, constituting four fifths of a great barrage of the North Sea, extending 230 miles from the Orkney Islands to the coast of Norway.

On the day war was declared we took possession of 87 German ships lying in American ports and began to fit them for transport service by repairing their damaged machinery. The Emergency Fleet Corporation, an adjunct of the United States Shipping Board, under the management of Colonel Goethals, announced a program in August for the construction of 10,000,000 tons of merchant marine to help repair the terrible ravages which the German submarines were making,¹ and asked for an appropriation of \$1,134,500,000 in addition to the \$800,000,000 which had already been given. Within three months contracts for nearly 900 ships of an aggregate tonnage of 4,700,000 had been signed. But a distressing quarrel between Chairman Denman of the Shipping Board and Colonel Goethals of the Emergency Fleet Corporation as to the relative merits of

¹ From January to July, 1917, the submarines, according to the figures of the French and British admiralities, sank between 3,500,000 and 4,000,000 tons of shipping. In the single week ending April 22, there were sent to the bottom 88 ships, totaling 237,000 tons. According to the Germans the figures were even higher. The situation was so serious in the first half of 1917 that the British government ceased its practice of publishing the tonnage sunk, and gave only weekly reports of the number of vessels sunk. It looked for a moment as if the predictions of Von Tirpitz and Zimmermann might be realized. But at midsummer the tide turned. The more careful convoy of merchant fleets by destroyers and airplanes, the perfection of electrical devices for the detection and destruction of the submarines, the utilization of camouflage, nets and depth bombs, all had their effect. The sinkings dropped from nearly 4,000,000 tons in the first half of the year to 2,750,000 in the second half. Replacements began to gain rapidly over losses.

wooden and steel ships paralyzed the work. By March, 1918, only two vessels had been actually completed and put into service. Then Mr. Charles M. Schwab was placed at the head of the Shipping Board, and the ships began to materialize. In celebration of the Fourth of July, 1918, we launched 95 ships in various yards on both our coasts.

Of course the revenue act of 1916, large as its provisions seemed, was utterly inadequate to meet the enormous appropriations for military and naval equipment when we actually entered the war. The naval appropriations alone for the years 1917 and 1918 were \$3,833,000,000, an amount about equal to the entire expenses of the department from the close of Washington's second administration to the year 1917. Nobody had any definite idea of how much the war would eventually cost us. When Professor E. R. A. Seligman suggested that the expense of the first year might run to \$10,000,000,000, his estimate was "greeted with a smile of incredulity." Yet the appropriations of the six months' extra session of Congress in 1917 amounted to \$18,897,000,000 (including \$7,000,000,000 of loans to the Allies), and government contracts brought the figures up to \$21,390,736,940. It had been the policy of the government to meet its obligations so far as possible by taxation, but it was clear that much the largest part of this vast burden of expense must be borne by a future generation. An administration revenue bill was reported to the House on April 11 and passed unanimously three days later. It authorized the issue of \$5,000,000,000 tax-exempt long-term bonds at a rate of interest not to exceed $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and the issue of \$2,000,000,000 in one-year certificates to be sold as funds were needed in the immediate future and to be accepted in payment for the bonds. Two of the five billions of the bond issue were to be used for national defense, and the other three to be lent to the Allies.¹ Early in

¹ Our "loans" to the Allies during the war did not consist of actual transfers of money from this country to Europe, but took the form of the extension of credit to the Allies for supplies bought here. The money remained in this country. Of course our people have to pay the interest on the loans through taxation. Great Britain in 1923 made arrangements for the repayment of her debt to us over a period of 62 years. Ten of our European debtors have followed her lead.

May, Secretary McAdoo, departing from the invariable practice of our government in offering the bonds in large amounts to the competitive bidding of the great banking houses, threw open the first Liberty Loan of \$2,000,000,000 (at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent) to popular subscription in denominations as low as \$50. A campaign of advertisement accompanied the offer. Posters on the billboards, placards in the windows of banks and stores, one-reel features in the motion-picture theaters, appeals in the papers and magazines, urged every American citizen to "buy a bond." Nearly \$450,000,000 were subscribed in the first four days. When the loan was closed on July 2, it was found that over 4,000,000 people had subscribed \$3,035,226,857. A second Liberty Loan was offered in October, for \$3,000,000,000 at 4 per cent, which like the first, was oversubscribed by more than 50 per cent, 9,400,000 persons participating. Two more loans followed at intervals of six months, aggregating \$9,000,000,000 at a rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Over 20,000,000 people, or more than one in five of our population, subscribed to the fourth Liberty Loan, which, called for \$6,000,000,000—"the largest sum of money ever raised at one time by any government in the world."¹

A revenue bill designed to produce \$1,800,000,000 in taxes came before the House on May 9, 1917. It raised the income tax to yield an increase of over \$500,000,000 and imposed a retroactive tax on incomes of 1916 to yield \$100,000,000 more. A flat 10 per cent increase of tariff duties was calculated to produce \$240,000,000, and an excess-profits tax another \$200,000,000. The balance was to be derived from taxes on distilled spirits, freight bills, express packages, railroad tickets, telegraph and telephone messages, etc. The bill passed the House on May 23 by a vote of 329 to 76. It was well into Sep-

¹ In addition to this wonderful support of the government, the American people subscribed about \$4,000,000,000 during the war to various welfare agencies, like the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Knights of Columbus, the Jewish Welfare Board, the "Y," and the War Camp Community Service. A fifth popular loan, called the Victory Loan, was announced in April, 1919, after the war was over. It called for \$4,500,000,000 at $4\frac{3}{4}$ per cent interest, and, like the Liberty Loans, was largely oversubscribed. The total subscription to the five loans was \$21,448,000,000.

tember, however, before the Senate bill was adopted. Toward the end of July, Secretary McAdoo presented a revised estimate of the government's needs, which he predicted would reach \$10,000,000,000 for the ensuing year. The Senate therefore increased the internal-revenue duties and the income taxes to yield over \$2,000,000,000. In the Senate radicals like La Follette, Borah, Gronna, and Norris fought hard for the "conscription of wealth," especially wealth made from the war. Senator Johnson of California proposed an 80 per cent tax on war profits, which would bring into the Treasury between \$3,000,000,000 and \$4,000,000,000. The bill, as finally passed and approved by the President (October 3), dropped the 10 per cent tariff increase, but kept or raised most of the other items of the House bill. It was estimated that the revenue from it would be \$2,500,000,000. The actual yield, however, was \$3,696,000,000.

These figures were modest in comparison with the demands of the Treasury the next year. In the spring of 1918 Secretary McAdoo asked for a revenue of \$8,000,000,000. The bill carried enormous increases in taxes on income, excess profits, and war profits. The House passed the bill on September 20 without a dissenting vote. While the bill was still under consideration by the Senate committee, the armistice was signed (November 11, 1918), and the Secretary cut down his demands to \$6,000,000,000 for 1919 and \$4,000,000,000 for 1920. In the third and final session of the Sixty-fifth Congress¹ the War Revenue Bill was passed by an almost unanimous vote in both Houses, and was signed by the President (February 24, 1919) on his return from his first visit to the peace conference at Paris. It raised the normal income tax to 6 per cent on incomes up to \$4000, and 12 per cent on amounts above \$4000. Graduated surtaxes reached 65 per cent on incomes of \$1,000,000. Corporations paid 12½ per cent on net incomes, in addition to the

¹ The Congress sat from April 2 to October 6, 1917; from December 3, 1917, to November 21, 1918; and from December 2, 1918, to March 4, 1919,—a total of twenty months and twenty-four days in the two years of its existence.†

taxes on excess and war profits. Altogether, the government raised \$11,280,000,000 by taxation from April, 1917, to October, 1919, or nearly one third of the total war cost of \$35,400,000,000. Such figures are almost beyond the reach of mental realization. We gain some idea of their meaning when we reduce them to familiar terms. The war cost us in those two and a half years over \$35,000,000 a day, or \$25,278 a minute!

For a people as individualistic in their social psychology, as fiercely competitive in their economic life, and as jealous of paternalism in their government as the Americans, the extent to which they coöperated in mobilizing and making available the agricultural and industrial resources of the country for the public service was little short of marvelous. Men gave up lucrative positions and went to Washington to serve at a dollar a year as experts on the various subcommittees of the Council of National Defense or to aid the President in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Congress. Labor, which assumed unprecedented importance in this war, gave ungrudging support to the President. Samuel Gompers was one of the members of the Council of National Defense. Under his leadership the labor unions agreed to waive the strike during the war, in favor of the settlement of disputes by arbitration. Early in 1918 a National War Labor Board was created, under the joint chairmanship of William H. Taft and Francis P. Walsh, to act as a supreme court in labor disputes. In the few instances in which labor refused to accept the decisions of the board, the President either forced the men to return to work through the pressure of public opinion or took over the plant. A War Labor Policies Board was established to investigate conditions of labor employed in the various departments of the government and to determine fair standards of distribution, production, and remuneration. Special boards and executive commissions were multiplied: an Exports Board, a War Industries Board, a War Trade Board, a General Munitions Board, a Railroad War Board, etc. "Dictators" were appointed to regulate the supply of food and fuel, the priority of shipments on the railroads, and finally the

whole railroad system of the country.¹ The government went into the banking, the insurance, and the employment-agency business, organizing the War Finance Corporation (with a capital of \$500,000,000 to lend through the banks to approved war industries), selling to the soldiers and sailors billions of dollars' worth of insurance at cost rates, and placing millions of unskilled laborers in necessary industries through a "network of employment offices throughout the United States." Labor was conscripted like soldiers. In addition, some five hundred unofficial committees were organized in competing industries (steel and iron, textiles, chemicals, etc.) to cooperate with the government in effective production.

Any adequate description of the work of these agencies, and of the legislation of the Sixty-fifth Congress on which most of it was based, would require volumes. Perhaps the most important measures of the extra session (besides the army and revenue acts, which we have already noticed) were the Espionage Act of June 15, the Lever Act of August 10, and the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act of October 6. The first of these measures, besides conferring on the President certain powers of censorship, gave him authority to control the export of commodities necessary for the Allies. Direct trade with Germany had been prevented from the beginning of the war by the British blockade, but neither the enlargement of the contraband list nor the application of the doctrine of the continuous voyage had availed to keep the Central Powers from drawing supplies from the neutral countries. The trade with neutrals, therefore, was rigidly controlled by the Exports Board and the Espionage Act. For ex-

¹ In the first month of the war the railroads had formed a voluntary association to promote efficiency in transportation. But they were badly in need of equipment and burdened both by the rising cost of labor and materials and by the statutory increase of wages prescribed by the Adamson Act. Strictly controlled in rate charges by the Interstate Commerce Commission, they were unable to make the profits necessary to attract capital investment for further equipment. Unused to cooperation, they struggled in vain with the problem of car shortage and congestion at the points of shipment. On December 26, 1917, the President, exercising the authority given him by Congress, took over the railroads of the country to operate as a single system, with the resources of the government behind it. Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo was made director general of the railroads.

ample, in the midsummer of 1917 one could see several Dutch ships loaded with grain, lying for weeks in the Hudson River, unable to obtain clearance papers until they gave assurance that their cargoes were not destined for the replacement of food sent to Germany.

The most imperative need of the Allies was food—and the ships in which to send it. "Food will win the war" and "Ships will win the war" were the common slogans. Just after we had entered the war President Wilson made an appeal to the American people to "turn in hosts to the farm" and "help solve the problem of feeding the nations." In May he appointed Herbert C. Hoover as voluntary food controller, with "full authority to take any steps to mobilize the forces of the country in saving food and eliminating waste."¹ We were an extremely wasteful people, reveling in a superabundance of food. Our per-capita consumption of sugar, for example, was three times that of the allied countries. Mr. Hoover inaugurated a campaign of economy. The saving of an ounce of sugar a day by every person in America would mean over 1,000,000 tons at the end of the year. A third of an ounce of animal fat saved daily would spare 375,000 tons. A pound of wheat a week saved meant 150,000,000 bushels at the end of the year. The grain harvest of the allied countries would fall 500,000,000 bushels below their normal yield. We must send over at least 225,000,000 bushels to ward off actual starvation. The Lever Act of August 10 gave the President dictatorial control over food and fuel. He could fix prices, regulate distribution, and, at his discretion, take over plants and operate them; he could buy, store, and sell fuel, grain, and vegetables; he could require producers to sell to the

¹ Mr. Hoover, a California mining engineer, had, since October, 1914, directed the Commission for Relief in Belgium, which had kept millions of the civilian population of Belgium and the invaded district of northern France from starvation. On our entrance into the war he had, of course, not been permitted by the German government to continue his work. He returned to America and was made chairman of the committee on food supply created by the Council of National Defense in April, 1917. Aside from being a remarkably able executive, he probably knew better than any other man in the world the conditions and capacities of food production in the various countries of Europe.

government through the agencies which he might designate;¹ and he could compel individuals or corporations operating grain elevators, cold-storage plants, packing-houses, coal mines, or farm-machinery factories to take out licenses if their products entered into interstate commerce. He appointed Mr. Hoover as Food Administrator and Mr. H. A. Garfield as Fuel Administrator under the Lever Act. State and local food and fuel administrators were also chosen. The country was called upon to observe wheatless, meatless, and heatless days. The sugar bowls were removed from the tables of hotels and restaurants. Housewives and bakers were pledged to make "victory bread" with corn, rice, or barley flour instead of wheat. Front lawns were turned into vegetable gardens. Society ladies took lessons in canning and preserving. The Department of Agriculture, working in close coöperation with the Food Administration, sent out millions of leaflets and pamphlets instructing the people how to make their contribution to winning the war in the homely matters of kitchen, pantry, and garden. The value of our food products sent to the Allies in the year 1918 was over \$2,000,000,000.

The Trading-with-the-Enemy Act of October 6 prohibited dealing with persons residing in countries or doing business in countries at war with the United States. It authorized the President to place an embargo on imports and to establish a censorship of communication by mail, cable, or wireless with foreign countries. It provided for the creation of a custodianship of alien property in the United States. Every citizen of an enemy country or its ally doing business in the United States was obliged to take out a license, and every newspaper printed in a foreign language was obliged to furnish the Postmaster-General with English translations of everything that it published concerning the war. A. Mitchell Palmer, the Alien Property Custodian, collected enemy property in the country to the amount of some \$700,000,000. For this property he acted as a trustee,

¹ The Federal Food Administration Grain Corporation (capital \$150,000,000) was created on August 14, with the monopoly of the purchase of wheat. A clause of the Lever Act forbade the use of grain for the manufacture of distilled liquors during the period of the war.

depositing with the Treasury, to be invested in United States bonds, such moneys or securities as he collected. Business properties might be transferred, in the discretion of the custodian, to be operated by American citizens. The eventual disposition of the property taken by the custodian was to be determined by Congress.¹

So long as neutrality was maintained, opposition to our entrance into the war was a right of citizens; but with the declaration of April 6, 1917, any attempt to obstruct the government in the prosecution of the war was equivalent to giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and as such was treason to the United States. Of course no declaration of Congress could alter the honest convictions of the pacifists and the "conscientious objectors" to war, but active opposition was confined to a comparatively small group. The government took precautions to bar enemy aliens from places where they might do mischief. They were compelled to register, were forbidden to go up in balloons or airplanes, to come within one hundred yards of wharves or piers, or to be found in waters within three miles of the shore line. The Espionage Act of June 15 imposed severe penalties upon persons disclosing any information respecting places connected with the national defense, advocating treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to the laws of the United States, carrying false reports intended to interfere with the operation of the military or naval forces, encouraging insubordination, disloyalty, or the refusal of military duty, or obstructing the recruiting service of the United States. Provision was made for the few thousand conscientious objectors who belonged to "any well-organized religious sect whose creed or principles forbade its members to participate in war in any form" to enter the

¹ Later, authority was given to the custodian to sell alien property. "The word 'enemy' for the purposes of the work of the Alien Property Custodian covers all persons within the military or naval lines of the Central Powers, and all persons residing outside the United States transacting business with anyone within such military or naval lines. A German citizen in the United States (unless interested) is not an enemy under the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, whereas an American citizen in Germany may be so considered" (Bertram Benedict, "A History of the Great War," Vol. I, p. 376).

various classes of noncombatant service which were enumerated by the President's proclamation (medical corps, quartermaster's department, engineering, construction, and repair departments). For the extremists who could not tolerate any kind of uniformed service under military control, work on farms was permitted under the surveillance of the War Department. All but about five hundred conscientious objectors accepted one form or another of noncombatant service. The recalcitrants were imprisoned, along with some fifteen hundred to two thousand offenders against the Espionage Act—chiefly leaders of radical groups, alien agitators, paid agents of the Central Powers, and certain of the Socialists.¹

A strict censorship of the press was advocated by President Wilson, and a provision to that effect was put into the Espionage Act by the Department of Justice. But the House rejected the censorship clause by a vote of 184 to 144. Freedom of the press was guaranteed by the Constitution. Henry Watterson, the veteran Democratic editor of the Louisville *Courier Journal*, wrote: "That the war involves autocracy, I understand well enough, but in the field, not in the White House. . . . I reject, loathe, and spit upon the plea that because of war the press should abdicate its duty to the people." Nevertheless the administration took measures to commend its own policies to the reading public. A week after the declaration of war the President set up a Committee on Public Information under the management of George Creel. Beginning May 10, a daily *Official Bulletin* was published by the administration, containing the war news which it wished to have disseminated. In the spring of 1918 a drastic amendment to the Espionage Act imposed penalties on

¹ An emergency convention of the Socialist party held at Chicago the day after war was declared passed resolutions denouncing the war as "a conspiracy of capitalism." On July 1 the party as a whole condemned our entrance into the war by a referendum vote of 21,639 to 2752. Thereupon prominent American Socialists, like John Spargo, William English Walling, J. G. Phelps Stokes, Upton Sinclair, and Allan Benson (the presidential candidate of 1916), withdrew from the party, declaring that it had been "scuttled by German nationalist jingoes and anarchistic impossibilities."

any persons who "used abusive language about the government or institutions of the country," and empowered the Postmaster-General to refuse the delivery of mail matter to any person who, in his opinion, was using the postal service in violation of the act. Under these provisions several newspapers and periodicals which criticized the policies of the administration or protested against the "denatured news from the government news factories" felt the heavy hand of the Postmaster-General.¹

It is a difficult and delicate question how far the government should interfere with the freedom of speech and of the press in time of war—one on which the American people will never be in agreement. Professor W. E. Dodd, in his enthusiastic defense of President Wilson, points to the fact that he never proclaimed martial law, or suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus, or placed armed men at election polls, or threw suspected men into prison without charges being preferred against them, or ordered any traitor before a firing squad, as did Abraham Lincoln, "the great political saint of the country" ("Woodrow Wilson and his Work," pp. 224-225). This is all true; but, on the other hand, the exigencies of the Civil War were vastly different (as the late Professor W. A. Dunning showed in his comparison of the repressive policies of Presidents Lincoln and Wilson in the *American Historical Review* for July, 1919) from the conditions of a war waged more than three thousand miles from our shores. Most of the criticism that was rebuked by the Wilson administration was anything but "seditious" in character, having for its purpose, in the words of Theodore Roosevelt, "to tell the truth and speed up the war." Disregarding the grosser charges that the Committee on Public Information was merely a political agency disseminating willfully distorted news in order to cover up the inefficiency of the departments and build up the reputa-

¹ For the experiences of the New York *Nation*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Detroit News*, the *New York Times* (foreign edition), and the Philadelphia *North American* see E. W. Young's "The Wilson Administration and the Great War," pp. 159-167; also an article by George R. Brown in the *North American Review* for June, 1919.


tion and influence of President Wilson,¹ we may still have grave doubts whether there were beneficial results of the committee's activities to any degree commensurate with the millions of dollars which it spent.

That there were some American citizens who put loyalty to the ideal of peace above loyalty to their country; some, even, who worked for the defeat of the cause for which their government was fighting, was unfortunately true; but they were, after all, comparatively few, and the most effective answer to them was not an overzealous campaign of suspicion, which invariably tends to confound the innocent with the guilty, but the spectacle of the millions of Americans who rallied to the support of the government's war policies and to the call to the colors.

"OVER THERE"

President Wilson had no immediate intention, when we entered the war, of sending American troops overseas. Even if the few tens of thousands of disciplined officers and soldiers of our regular army could have been spared from the work of training the volunteers and the drafted men at home, they would have been only a tiny addition to the millions on the western battle front of Europe, which, for the rest, was comparatively quiet in the spring of 1917. Our task was first to create an efficient army, instead of launching a small trained force into the fray and leaving an undisciplined mob at home. However, soon after our declaration of war, high commissioners were sent to America by the governments of Great Britain and France (followed later by the Belgians, Russians, Italians, Rumanians, and Japanese) to bring the thanks of their countries and to discuss methods of

¹ "The real purpose of the propaganda in which Creel is the most active figure is to overlay the facts of history with studied inventions. . . . False in substance and implication, this propaganda under the present circumstances is an especially atrocious thing. For Washington authority behind it causes it to find reflection in the press of the allied countries, which pay glowing tribute to President Wilson for having overcome the reluctance and stimulated the patriotism of his countrymen, so that they have at last been aroused to defend themselves and civilization" (editorial in the Philadelphia *North American*, August 28, 1918).



GENERAL PERSHING

economic and military coöperation. Arthur J. Balfour, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, headed the British mission. The eloquent René Viviani, former premier of France, was the spokesman of the French mission, and with him came Marshal Joffre, the hero of the Marne. The commissioners received an ovation in Congress and were enthusiastically welcomed by the municipal authorities and chambers of commerce in several of the great cities of the country. The plea of Viviani and Joffre, reënforced by Balfour, was that there should be no delay in sending our soldiers to France. The presence of even a few thousand men in the uniform of the United States would do more than all the millions of tons of food and munitions or the billions of dollars' worth of credits to make America's participation in the war seem like a reality and a harbinger of victory to the armies which had borne the incessant burden of war for thirty-three months. As a result of the plea the decision was made to begin the dispatch of an American Expeditionary Force (the A.E.F.) to France at once.

The man selected by President Wilson to command the A.E.F. was Major General John J. Pershing of Missouri, a magnificent type of American soldier—trim and straight, with clear, direct eyes, a firm jaw, and a quiet manner that gave assurance of vigor in action and power in reserve. General Pershing had a long and varied record of service. After his graduation from West Point in 1886, he had fought the Apaches in Arizona and the Sioux in Dakota. He had been military instructor at the University of Nebraska and had taken a degree in law. He had left his new appointment as instructor of tactics at West Point to enter the Spanish-American War, and had earned the rank of major of volunteers in the Santiago campaign. He had twice served in the Philippines—first as adjutant general of the department of Mindanao (1899-1903) and then as commander of the department and governor of the Moro province (1907-1913). In 1905, as military attaché to our embassy in Japan, he had been for several months with General Kuroki's army in Manchuria, "observing the first great war fought with modern arms." On his return to America he was promoted by

President Roosevelt from captain to brigadier general in the regular army, over the heads of eight hundred and sixty-two senior officers. He had commanded the punitive expedition against Villa in 1916 (p. 577); and when we declared war on Germany, he was a major general in command of all the American forces on the Mexican border. The instructions which General Pershing received from the War Department in May were to proceed with his staff officers to Europe, there "to command all the land forces of the United States operating in continental Europe and in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; to establish, after consultation with the French War Office, all necessary bases and lines of communication, and make all the incidental arrangements essential to active participation at the front." The general and his staff reached England on the White Star steamer *Baltic* (June 8), and after a few days of lavish entertainment, including an audience with the king at Buckingham Palace, crossed to Paris, which, like London, was decked with the Stars and Stripes for their reception. Taking modest quarters on the left bank of the Seine, the general plunged immediately into the gigantic task of acquainting himself with the military and economic situation in the allied armies.

There were already a considerable number of Americans aiding the allied cause in France—aviators who had joined the Canadian Royal Fliers or the Lafayette Escadrille; drivers serving the two American ambulance associations which helped to carry back the French wounded from the front; doctors and nurses, who manned the hospitals which American donations had founded. But the uniforms of these volunteer workers did not have the letters U. S. on the collar. Therefore, when fifteen thousand American regulars of the First Division arrived at "a port in France" late in June, and a battalion of the 16th Regiment paraded through the streets of Paris on July 4, the joy of the Allies was full. America was really in the war. In August General Pershing established his headquarters at Chaumont, about fifty miles southeast of Toul, where the American troops were to have two months of intensive training in methods of trench warfare under the instruction of the French "chasseurs"

and artillery officers before going to their "quiet sector" at the front, between Verdun and Belfort. General Pershing had been instructed to coöperate in all ways with the allied military authorities, but to "preserve the identity of the United States force." His troops not being available for replacement service in the British and French armies, it was necessary to assign them to a sector of their own. The British naturally held the northern part of the line, with its railroad connections with the Channel ports. The French held the middle section, for the protection of Paris. There was no place for the Americans, therefore, except at the southern end of the line. Besides, since the attempt of the Germans to break through from Alsace in the early weeks of the war, there had been practically no fighting in this region. It was not until late in the spring of the next year that the American troops were called upon to take an active part in the war.

The assignment of the American troops to a sector below Verdun, as well as the British need for the facilities of the French ports on the Channel, made it most convenient for us to use the ports on the Bay of Biscay from Brest down to Bordeaux, for the debarkation of troops and food and war material. From these ports railroad lines ran to Tours, where General Pershing established headquarters for the commissary and quartermaster's departments, called the Service of Supply (the S. O. S.); and from Tours the line of communication ran eastward via Orléans and Troyes to Chaumont. There was an enormous amount of work to be done in dredging harbors, building piers, erecting warehouses and storage plants, running telegraph and telephone wires, laying spur tracks, and repairing and reënforcing the light railroads at various points to bear our heavy locomotives and cars. Indeed, Joffre had called for American engineers even before he called for American troops. England and France, by their network of railroads from the Channel ports and Paris, could get men and supplies to the front in a day, but we were obliged to maintain one of the longest lines of communication in the history of warfare. In the matter of clothing, for example, for every soldier at the front there had to

be "a three months' reserve in France, another two or three months' reserve in the United States, and a third three months' supply continuously in transit." By our fastest transports the average "turn round," or time taken to sail to France, discharge their troops, return and reload, was about a month; and the slower cargo ships, with their convoys, required from sixty-five to one hundred days, according to the weather and the nature of the cargo. The expense of maintaining this continuous flow of food and clothing to our soldiers overseas increased in geometrical progression with every increment of our army in France. When we finally had 2,000,000 "over there," it meant an immediate supply of 8,000,000 coats in order that each soldier might have a coat to his back.¹ In addition, Mr. Hoover was asking us to send to the allied armies hundreds of millions of bushels of cereals and vast quantities of sugar and potatoes; and the requisitions for locomotives, cars, motor trucks, horses and mules, telephone wire, pile drivers, concrete mixers, wrecking outfits, cranes, and tools of all sorts were incessant. Our lumbermen cut pine in the forests of France for warehouses, and spruce in the forests of Oregon for airplane propellers. Cantonments, training-schools, supply depots, and recreation huts were built along the lines of communication. Seventy American storage depots, clustered chiefly around St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, Tours, and Chaumont, dotted the map of France. Our noncombatant army engineers, carpenters, masons, mechanics, truck drivers, and stevedores was equal to about one third of the fighting force, and there were tens of thousands of volunteer workers in the Red Cross, the "Y," the Knights of Columbus, and other welfare and relief organizations.

¹ Colonel Leonard P. Ayres, chairman of the statistical branch of the General Staff, in his report to Secretary Baker, May 31, 1919, gives the following figures for clothing delivered to the army in the first fourteen months of the war: 131,800,000 pairs of woolen stockings, 168,600,000 pieces of underwear, 30,700,000 pairs of shoes, 26,500,000 flannel shirts, 21,740,000 breeches, 13,900,000 woolen coats, and 8,000,000 overcoats. The army purchased twice as many blankets in 1918 as the total number manufactured in this country in 1914. The cost of these articles of clothing alone was over \$1,000,000,000, or an average of \$500 for each soldier.

Troops of the Second Division of the regular army arrived in France late in October, after the First had gone to their sector at the front, and were followed soon after by the 26th (New England), the 42d ("Rainbow"), and the 41st ("Sunset") Divisions of the National Guard.¹ By the end of December, 1917, we had only 176,665 troops in France and only one division at the battle front. That division had already had its baptism of fire. In the early morning of November 3 a detachment of Americans in an advanced instruction salient were cut off from the main force by a barrage and attacked by the Germans. In the hand-to-hand fight which followed, three Americans were killed, five wounded, and eleven taken prisoners. Our first dead on the field of battle in the World War (Corporal James D. Gresham of Evansville, Indiana, Private Thomas F. Enwright of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Private Merle D. Hay of Glidden, Iowa) were buried with military honors at the little village of Bathélemont on the afternoon of November 4. General Bordeaux, addressing the French and American soldiers who surrounded the graves in a hollow square, said: "The death of this humble corporal and of these two private soldiers appeals to us as an event of extraordinary grandeur. We will therefore ask that the mortal remains of these young men be left to us forever. We will inscribe on their tombs: 'Here lie the first soldiers of the United States to fall on the soil of France for justice and liberty.' The passer-by will stop and uncover his head. The travelers of France, of the allied countries, of America, the men of heart, who will come to visit our battlefields of Lorraine, will go out of

¹ The National Guard, or militia, was called into the service of the United States in July, and was distributed as rapidly as accommodations were ready, into sixteen camps in the Southern states. A few of the National Guard divisions (the 27th New York, the 28th Pennsylvania, the 33d Illinois, the 37th Ohio) were made up of regiments from a single state; but for the most part the divisions were composite, and they all contained an admixture, ranging from 5 to 50 per cent, of troops of the new (drafted) National Army. The "Rainbow" Division was composed of picked militia from twenty-six states of the Union. The "Sunset" Division contained troops from ten of the Far-Western states. In August, 1918, the distinction between regulars, National Guard, and National Army was lost, and all our soldiers in France were merged into the First American Army.

their way to come here to bring to these graves the tribute of their respect and gratitude. Corporal Gresham, Private Enwright, Private Hay, in the name of France I thank you."¹

It was the original plan of the War Department to have approximately 1,000,000 soldiers in France by the end of the year 1918. We had but a few American and British troopships, chartered from their owners, and the German ships which we had seized were not repaired and ready for service until the early winter of 1917. At the time of our entrance into the war there were only 37 steel-ship yards and 24 wooden-ship yards in the country capable of launching vessels of 3500 tons. The maximum building program of the Shipping Board contemplated employing 44,000 men and constructing a fleet of 3115 vessels, with an aggregate tonnage of 17,276,318.² But it would be many long months before any such program could be realized. Both the losses to the allied shipping by the ravages of the submarine and the paucity of American soldiers with sufficient elementary training to be transported to the French camps made the transportation of our troops overseas slow at first. Up to March, 1918, less than 50,000 had gone in any one month, and less than 375,000 altogether, of whom only three divisions (the 1st, the 26th, and the 42d) had entered the front lines. None had taken their places in the active combat sectors. But events occurred on three European war fronts in the autumn of 1917 and the spring of 1918 which hastened the call for the United

¹ The first American shot from the trenches was fired on October 23. The shell case was presented to President Wilson, and the gun was sent as a relic to West Point. Our first actual shot of the war was claimed by the gunners of the armed merchantman *Mongolian*, who fired at a German submarine on April 19 (the anniversary of Lexington and Concord in 1775, of the conflict in the streets of Baltimore in 1861, and of the resolution of Congress in 1898 directing President McKinley to employ the armed forces of the United States for the liberation of Cuba from Spanish rule).

² At the signing of the armistice (November 11, 1918) there were 223 shipyards at work with 1100 ways and 381,000 workers, and the Shipping Board controlled a fleet of 1196 vessels of 6,540,205 dead-weight tons. The greatest yard in the world, at Hog Island, near Philadelphia, covering 900 acres, was built in less than six months on the waste marshes on the banks of the Delaware River, at a cost of \$66,000,000.

States to throw her armed men by the hundreds of thousands into the trembling scales of war to tip the balance to the side of allied victory.

First came the *débâcle* of Caporetto. In October, 1917, the Germans joined with their Austro-Hungarian allies in a campaign to smash Italy out of the war, as they had smashed Serbia in 1915 and Rumania in 1916. The summer had revealed a considerable amount of war weariness in Italy, as well as in France and Russia. Bolshevik agents had been busy sowing the seeds of "defeatism" among the Catholic peasantry and the industrial workers of the large cities. The Pope had issued an appeal to all the belligerent nations to cease from mutual slaughter. In the same month (August, 1917) anti-war riots had broken out at Turin, and the troops sent to suppress the rioters had mutinied and fraternized with them. At certain points on the Italian front also the troops were fraternizing with the Austrians, especially where the "territorials," or older men of the Italian reserve, were holding the line. The growth of the Bolshevik peace movement in Russia (which we shall note presently) allowed the German General Staff to divert one hundred thousand soldiers and many hundred heavy guns from the eastern front to the Italian border. On October 21 the Austro-German army attacked the Italian territorials on the upper Isonzo River, broke through their defense, and drove them from their key position at Caporetto, capturing huge stores of supplies. In treacherous cowardice two Italian army corps threw away their arms and surrendered. Seasoned Italian troops operating on the plateau at the head of the Adriatic to gain Trieste, were obliged to retreat rapidly to the westward to prevent being outflanked by the enemy, who pressed steadily down from the Isonzo. Week after week the Italians were driven back, across the Tagliamento, across the Livenza, until finally they held their ground on the Piave, a few miles above Venice. The fields between Venice and the lower Piave were flooded to keep the queen city of the Adriatic from falling into the hands of the enemy. Nearly two hundred thousand prisoners and twenty-five hundred guns were captured by the Austro-German army in

this disastrous campaign, which, had it not been for the ten divisions rushed by the French and English from the western battle front to the Piave, might well have been the end of the Italian resistance to the Teutons and have made the German path through Austria-Hungary and the Balkans—the “Mittel-europa” corridor—secure.¹

The Italian crisis gave the Allies a moment of grave anxiety, which was fortunately pretty well over by the opening of the new year. But the course of the revolution in Russia during the winter of 1917-1918 brought results for the situation on the western front which might have meant defeat for the allied cause had it not been for the timely assistance of the United States. That revolution which had begun, like the great French Revolution of a century and a quarter before, as a liberal-conservative constitutional movement, proclaiming a program of civil rights and political and social reforms, fell more and more into the hands of the extreme radicals (Bolshevists), who wished to establish an immediate rule of the proletariat. Profiting by the general proclamation of amnesty, the political refugees returned to Russia to work for a thoroughgoing Communist régime. Chief among them were the Marxian fanatics Lenin (Vladimir Ulianov) and Trotzky (Leo Bronstein)—the former a scion of the Russian nobility who had become an ardent revolutionist in his youth and had spent more than fifteen years in exile in Switzerland, the latter a Jew of Moscow who had escaped from his prison in Siberia and found his way eventually to an obscure flat in New York City. These two tireless revolutionists were head and front of the Bolshevik agitation in Petrograd. Their program comprised three main points—political, economic, and military. The powers of government were to be exercised by “soviets” of workmen, soldiers, and peasants, who repudiated all responsibility for engagements entered into

¹ Fortunately the rout of Caporetto proved to be the crisis in Italy's disease of defeatism. General Diaz, who supplanted General Cadorna in the chief command, gradually restored the morale of the army. The lukewarm Boselli was replaced in the premiership by Vittorio Orlando, who, with Nitti in the war department and Baron Sonnino in the foreign office, gave Italy a ministry of patriots.

by the old Czarist régime or by the new (bourgeois) reformers. The landed estates were to be confiscated and distributed among the peasants, and the industrial establishments to be handed over to the workmen, with the control of production and distribution in the hands of the soviet government. An immediate armistice was to be declared, and peace "without annexations or indemnities" was to be forced upon the capitalistic government by the pressure of the international brotherhood of the workers and the peasants. Against the drift toward Communism and pacifism the constitutional reformers labored in vain. One by one they were forced out of the government, and their places were taken by the radicals. Even the Socialist war minister, Kerensky, with all the power of his enthusiasm and eloquence, could not keep the Russian soldiers in the line. Utterly war weary, ill fed, and ill equipped, they listened to the propaganda of the Bolshevik agents who came among them. They left their trenches, often shooting down the officers who tried to hold them to their duty, and streamed back to their villages by the tens of thousands to receive their promised share of the lord's estate and to cultivate their fields in peace.

In the early days of November, while the Austro-German armies were invading the Italian plains, the Bolsheviks overthrew the provisional republican government, drove Kerensky into exile, and set up a popular régime based upon the soviets, with a ministry of fourteen Commissaries of the People, in which Lenin was prime minister and Trotzky Commissary for Foreign Affairs. Lenin immediately telegraphed all the powers at war, suggesting a cessation of hostilities for three months for the discussion of terms of peace. When no replies came from the Allies, Trotzky published the secret treaties in the archives of the Foreign Office, showing the various territorial rewards which were to go to Russia, France, Italy, and Greece in case of the Allies' victory. He prophesied that when the German proletariat by means of revolution should get access to their chancelleries, they would find documents which would make the Central Powers appear in no better light.

Soon after the outbreak of the war Russia had bound herself

in an agreement with Great Britain and France not to make a separate peace with the Central Powers. The Bolsheviks repudiated all the obligations, political, financial, and military, of the old Czarist régime, and entered upon peace parleys with Germany and her allies at Brest-Litovsk (December, 1917), foolishly believing that the autocratic governments of the Central Powers would accede to their proposals of "peace without annexations or indemnities." They put their heads in the Teuton noose. When Count Czernin, the Austrian foreign minister, demanded in the name of the Central Powers a full state of independence and separation from Russia for Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and portions of Esthonia and Livonia, the Bolshevik delegates "indignantly" refused and withdrew from the conference. "We did not overthrow the Czar to bow to German imperialism," said Trotzky, bravely. Whereupon the Germans invaded helpless Russia and, when their armies were within seventy miles of Petrograd, forced her to accept the humiliating terms of dismemberment and vassalage (March 3, 1918). Not only was Russia completely eliminated from the war coalition of the Entente by the peace of Brest-Litovsk, but half a million German troops were set free to fight on the western front.¹ As

¹ Russia gave up Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, Lithuania, Poland, the Ukraine, and Russian Armenia—a quarter of her territory and population. The Germans were allowed to "police" the Baltic provinces and were granted extraordinary commercial privileges in Russia. The Bolshevik government was forced to abstain from all propaganda in the countries of the Central Powers—the very weapon which it had relied upon to conquer the capitalistic, military autocracy of those countries. Great Britain, France, and Italy immediately denounced the Brest-Litovsk treaty. The United States not being an ally of Russia made no formal protest, but President Wilson cabled the Pan-Soviet congress at Moscow, expressing the "sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purpose of the people in Russia." Germany's ruthless behavior toward Russia did more than anything else to convince us that her professions of a war of pure self-defense forced upon her by the murderous designs of the Entente were hollow. In his Baltimore speech of April 6 President Wilson said: "I call you to witness that at no stage of this terrible business have I judged the purposes of Germany intemperately. Her military masters have answered in unmistakable terms. . . . Their purpose is evidently

a result Germany's strength on that front was, by the middle of March, 4,101,000 to the 3,850,000 of the Allies.

Von Tirpitz had had his chance in the spring of 1917 to end the war "in three months" by the unrestricted submarine campaign, and had failed. It was Ludendorff's turn now. The time had come for the superior German forces on the western front to leave their trenches and launch a vigorous attack, driving a wedge between the British and French armies, seizing the Channel ports, overwhelming the exhausted French, and pressing on to the capture of Paris. It would be a costly operation, but it would be successfully accomplished in a few months, before the American troops could arrive to give the French and British effective aid. Accordingly, on the morning of March 21, after a terrific gas bombardment, the Germans, 800,000 strong, struck the allied front on a line forty miles long between Cambrai and the Oise River, drove the British Fifth Army under General Gough in disastrous rout, and in eight days had penetrated thirty-five miles to the southwest, capturing 90,000 prisoners, 1300 guns, and 100 tanks (see map, p. 687). The great railroad center of Amiens was barely saved. Hardly had the Allies' line near Amiens been stabilized by the hurried dispatch of French divisions, when the Germans struck a second blow (April 9) against the British at the north in the effort to seize Ypres and the Channel ports. These attacks were followed in May and June by drives along an eighty-mile front in the direction of Paris,¹ which reached Château-Thierry on the Marne, only forty-two miles from the outskirts of the capital. The crisis of September, 1914, had come again.

to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Baltic peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition, and build upon that dominion an empire of force. There is therefore but one response possible for us: Force, force to the uttermost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every dominion down in the dust."

¹ At the beginning of their drive in March the Germans had placed three huge guns ("Big Berthas") in a position near St. Quentin, some seventy-five miles northeast of Paris, with which they bombarded the French capital at intervals, killing eventually about two hundred persons and causing a considerable emigration of the more timid citizens.

The Germans in this tremendous offensive of the spring of 1918 had two great advantages besides superiority in numbers. They were under a unified command and held the interior lines. They were nearer the center of a circle down whose radii they could launch their attacks in any direction they chose, while the Allies had to meet them at various points on the circumference. The first requisite for successful resistance, therefore, was a complete coördination of the allied forces. There had been a Supreme War Council of the Allies, formed in the autumn of 1917, but each nation had jealously retained the distinctive command of its own armies. General Pershing led the way toward a unified command by offering to place at the disposal of the Allies all the American troops in France to use as they would. The British General Staff, moved by the generous example of the American commander and by the disaster to General Gough's army, agreed to the appointment of a generalissimo of the armies of the Allies. On March 26 the Supreme War Council conferred this burdensome honor upon General Ferdinand Foch, the first soldier of France and perhaps of Europe. Between April 14 and May 1 the British, French, Belgian, American, and Italian governments sanctioned the choice of General Foch as generalissimo, and for the remaining six months of the war he was the master of the millions of allied troops on the western front, with Pétain, Haig, and Pershing as his lieutenants.¹

The Germans failed in their objectives in 1918. They neither broke the continuity of the French and British lines nor reached the Channel ports on the north or Paris on the south. Yet the Germans came perilously near to success before Amiens and Ypres and Château-Thierry. They advanced the Hindenburg line to include three thousand square miles of conquered French territory, took over one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners, captured scores of cities and towns, and drove out tens of thou-

¹ On August 6 General Foch was made a marshal of France. After the war, honors were showered upon him at home and abroad. He was elected to the Académie Française in 1919. England conferred upon him the rank of field marshal in the British army. In 1921 he was enthusiastically welcomed on a visit to the United States.

sands of panic-stricken refugees to choke the roads along which reinforcements must come up. From the first the few trained American troops in France played a creditable part in the allied defensive.¹ The day after Foch's appointment to the supreme command, when the German "storm troops" were closing in upon Amiens, General Pershing called on him at his headquarters to say that "the American people would hold it a great honor for our troops were they engaged in the present battle. There is at this moment no other question than that of fighting. Infantry, artillery, aviation, all that we have are yours to dispose of as you will." The generous offer was accepted by Premier Clemenceau and the French War Council at the front. An official note, published in Paris on March 31, said: "The American troops will fight side by side with the British and French troops, and the Star-Spangled Banner will float beside the French and English flags in the plains of Picardy." Two days later (April 2) the American First Division, commanded by General Hunter Liggett, was ordered to leave its quiet sector near Toul for the scene of conflict, and the same day a cable from our War Department announced that during the present emergency preferential transportation would be given to American infantry and machine-gun units. The troops of the First Division were joined to the Fifth French Army on the important front near Montdidier, where on May 28 they won a notable success in storming and capturing the high fortified position of Cantigny, which dominated the river valley from Montdidier to Amiens. It was the first great offensive of the American troops, accomplished with magnificent dash and daring. Our losses in killed and wounded were 45 officers and 1022 men, but we captured 300 prisoners and left 250 Germans dead on the field. General Pershing, General Foch, and Premier

¹ On March 21 approximately three hundred and fifty thousand American troops had reached France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight French or British divisions, were available—the 1st and 2d, then in line, and the 26th and 42d, just withdrawn from the line after a month's trench-warfare training. The last two divisions at once began taking over quiet sectors to release French divisions for battle. The 26th relieved the 1st, which was sent to the northeast of Paris as a reserve (see General Pershing's Final Report, 1919, p. 32).

Clemenceau arrived at Cantigny presently to congratulate the troops on their success.¹ At the same moment (May 26) the American Second Division, under the command of General Omar Bundy, was ordered to "deploy along the northern bank of the Marne, astride of the main Paris-Metz highway, to aid in stopping the German drive on Paris." The Third Division, under General Joseph Dickman, though it had been in France less than two months and had had no training in the front lines, was ordered to coöperate. Again the Americans showed their valor and endurance in more than a month's incessant fighting, driving the enemy from the strongly fortified positions at Belleau Wood, Bouresches, and Vaux, and capturing fourteen hundred prisoners. For the "brilliant conduct of the 4th brigade of marines (led by Brigadier General J. G. Harbord) in the taking of Bouresches and the important stronghold of Belleau Wood," the French army orders of June 30 changed the name of Belleau Wood to "The Wood of the Marine Brigade."

In the midst of the great German offensive (June 2) the prime ministers of France, Great Britain, and Italy, in a conference at Versailles, sent the following message to President Wilson, with the approval of General Foch: "We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for the remarkable promptness with which American aid, in excess of what at one time seemed practicable, has been rendered to the Allies during the past month, to meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues. General Foch has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 allied divisions oppose 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions (on the contrary, they are put to extreme straits to keep them up), there is great danger of the war being lost,

¹ The French army orders cited the 28th Regiment of the First Division in the following words: "This regiment was animated by a magnificent and aggressive spirit. On the twenty-eighth of May it attacked under the orders of Colonel H. E. Ely with irresistible dash a strongly fortified position, reached all objectives, and held all the ground gained."

unless the numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied as rapidly as possible by the advent of American troops. He therefore urges with the utmost insistence that the maximum possible number of infantry and machine gunners . . . should continue to be shipped from America in the months of June and July, to avert the immediate danger of an Allied defeat. . . . In addition to this, and looking to the future, he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory in the war, unless America is able to provide such an army as will enable the Allies to establish a numerical superiority. He places the total American forces required for this at no less than 100 divisions, and urges continuous fresh American levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total American force of 100 divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done." In response to this Macedonian cry our War Department planned for the dispatch of troops to bring our effective forces in France up to 80 divisions (or about 3,000,000 men) by the middle of March, 1919.

Our first year in the war had necessarily been one of preparation. Before the soldiers could be trained, camps had to be constructed, and before they could be sent to France, the ships had to be built. Provisions of food, ammunition, and quartermaster's supplies for the mounting hundreds of thousands of troops required the revolutionizing of our industrial plants, our transportation system, and, above all, our national habits of individualism, competition, and extravagant waste. To describe any of these phases of preparation adequately would require a volume. We may take the government's mobilization of the railroads as an example. When we entered the war the 250,000 miles of railroad in the country were controlled by 441 corporations, with 650,000 stockholders. They represented an investment of \$17,500,000,000 and employed nearly 2,000,000 men. We have already seen how the railroad heads tried in the summer of 1917 to help the government through a voluntary association, and how the President finally took over the railroads and placed them under the control of Secretary McAdoo (p. 658, note). On January 4, 1918, President Wilson

addressed a joint session of Congress on the policy of the government management of the railroads, pointing out the need for unified control and promising the owners that their interests would be "as scrupulously looked after as they could be under private boards of directors." The railroad bill signed by the President on March 21 provided that the roads should be restored to their owners not later than twenty-one months after the close of the war, that they should be paid a yearly rental based on their average net income for the three years preceding June 30, 1917,¹ and that freight and passenger rates might be fixed by the President, subject to approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Director General McAdoo, on the day after the government had taken over the railroads, pooled all the terminals, locomotives, and rolling stock. A week later he met the representatives of the four railroad brotherhoods and promised labor "a square deal." "Every railroad employee," he said, "is now in effect a government employee, and as much in duty bound to give his best service to his country as if he wore the uniform of the United States army and occupied the trenches at the front." On May 20 McAdoo authorized one hundred and eighty-two railroads to spend \$938,000,000 for repairs, equipment, and improvements during the coming year, and on May 26 he granted the railroad employees a wage raise totaling \$300,000,000, increasing freight and passenger rates to meet the expense. Congress also provided a revolving fund of \$500,000,000 for loans to the roads. Every effort was made to get the maximum of service for war needs. Demurrage charges were doubled to secure the prompt unloading of freight cars. More than two hundred and fifty passenger trains were cut out on the Eastern roads. The public was asked to refrain from all but the most necessary travel. The government operation of the railroads during the war was severely criticized as extravagant and

¹ This average was something above \$1,000,000,000, and it was estimated that the government guaranty would secure a dividend rate of about $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Railroad stocks rose from 3 to 11 points on the stock exchange in a few days, adding over \$350,000,000 to the listed values of the securities.

injurious to the roads. But it should be remembered that the government paid high for everything in war time, that it was obliged to use the roads very hard, and that the roads were in poor condition (see note, p. 658) when the government took them over. It is not fair to judge the government operation by the standards of peace times. The railroads had acknowledged that they were unable to meet the situation under private management, and there is no doubt that the government operation was a necessary condition for the winning of the war. The congestion at the Eastern ports at the beginning of 1918 was alarming, and shipments were in hopeless confusion. Great stores of material were piled on the docks, while thousands of carloads of coal to fire the ships to carry the material to France were blocked on the lines. Aided by the drastic regulations of the food and fuel administrations, the government freed the priority shipments and provisioned the ships. As the spring and summer months passed, the transatlantic cargo fleet grew from a tonnage of less than 925,000 (April 1) to 2,750,000 by the end of November. We celebrated the Fourth of July, 1918, by launching 95 new ships with a tonnage of 474,464—exceeding the total loss to American shipping by the German submarines since 1914. The loading of all these ships depended upon the ability of the railroads to get the materials to the seaboard.

Before the desperate call of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando for a great American army to turn the victory on the western front we had sent only a small percentage of our soldiers from their training camps to France (ranging from 4 per cent in July, 1917, to 14 per cent in May, 1918). When the German drives began we had only three hundred and fifty thousand men in France to put at General Foch's disposal. With the help of ships lent by the British government, we were able to double that number by the end of May, but still we were thinking in terms of hundreds of thousands of men, while the Allies were calling for millions. The acceleration of the flow of our troops to France between the first of June and the first of December, 1918, is shown by the following table:

MONTH	TOTAL STRENGTH OF UNITED STATES ARMY	IN A. E. F.	PERCENTAGE
June	2,112,000	722,000	34
July	2,380,000	996,000	42
August	2,658,000	1,293,000	49
September	3,001,000	1,576,000	52
October	3,433,000	1,843,000	54
November	3,634,000	1,971,000	55

The total number of troops transported to France during the war was 2,086,000, of whom 49 per cent were carried in British ships or in ships leased by Great Britain, 46 per cent in American ships, and the remaining 5 per cent in French and Italian ships. The American navy, however, which had 1990 vessels in the service in November 1, 1918, as against 364 vessels in April 1, 1917, furnished 83 per cent of the convoy force for the troopships; and American cargo ships carried more than 95 per cent of the 7,452,000 tons of supplies shipped to the army down to the end of April, 1919. Not a single American troopship was lost on the eastward voyage, though three were torpedoed and sunk on the way home. Only a few hundreds of the 2,000,000 troops transported were lost at sea,¹ and only 140,000 dead-weight tonnage of our cargo fleet. It was a convincing reply to the German threats that the submarine would prevent an American army from reaching the shores of France. And it was a piece of grim irony that the great German liner *Vaterland*, seized by the Americans and converted into the troopship *Leviathan*, alone ferried almost 100,000 American soldiers across the sea to help break the Hindenburg line.

The heavy shipment of troops to France—reaching 10,000 men a day at its peak in July—threatened to exhaust the drafted men of Class I, which included single men who were without dependent relatives, married men who were not dependent upon

¹ The most serious loss came when the Cunard liner *Tuscania* was torpedoed off the northern coast of Ireland in February, 1918. There were over 2000 American soldiers, engineers, and aviators aboard, most of whom were rescued by the convoying destroyers. The bodies of 175 were washed ashore on the coast of Scotland.

labor for support of their families, and unskilled farmers and industrial laborers. On June 5, therefore, a new registration was made of the men who had reached the age of twenty-one since the date of the first draft. This added about 750,000 new soldiers. At the same time the Provost Marshal, General E. H. Crowder, issued his "work or fight" order, compelling all the men of draft age who were not engaged in essential industries to appear before their registration boards and show why they should not be at work in occupations contributing to the winning of the war. Drives were made by the agents of the Department of Justice, the Council of National Defense, and the American Protective League to round up the slackers and the idlers. Amusement parks, bathing-resorts, theaters and motion-picture halls, saloons, factories, and office buildings, were "combed." Motor cars were held up on the road, and their occupants of draft age were asked to show their registration cards and explain their destination. There was considerable protest from the liberal and radical press against the "arbitrary interference with the freedom of the American citizen," but public opinion on the whole supported the contention of the authorities that "to take men from the farms and mills and factories and march them away to training-camps past crowds of idlers and loafers was worse than foolish." Altogether, about fifty thousand persons were rounded up, of whom one in three were sent before their registration boards or into the camps.

Anticipating that the war would last through the summer of 1919, and perhaps into the next year, we made preparations to have an eventual force of 5,000,000 men in France. The army-appropriation bill of 1918 carried some \$12,000,000,000. On August 31 President Wilson signed a bill extending the draft-age limits to include men from eighteen to forty-five years; and at the third registration (September 12) 13,288,762 men were enrolled, bringing the total of registered men up to 23,509,000.¹

¹ As a matter of fact, owing to the signing of the armistice forty-one days after the draft of the newly registered men was made, less than 1 per cent of them (120,157) were inducted into the service, as against 25 per cent (2,666,867) of the registrants of 1917.

Young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one were allowed to continue their studies in colleges and technical schools, as the Student Army Training Corps (S.A.T.C.). They followed a curriculum prescribed by the military authorities. They were in uniform, under military discipline. On October 1 nearly 150,000 of these student-soldiers in five hundred educational institutions of the country took the oath of allegiance to the American flag.

The end of the war proved to be nearer than any of the statesmen or generals of the Allies had dreamed. In mid-July the four months' offensive of the Germans came to an end in the vain attempt of Ludendorff to outflank Reims on the east, extend the Marne salient to include the south bank of the river, and move down the valley upon the capital, forty-two miles away. The German chief, at the end of his tether, fell back on the defensive; while Foch struck the first blows of the four months' Allied offensive, which was steadily and remorselessly to push the German lines back across one third of Belgium and nearly to the border of northeastern France, and to end in the abdication and flight of the Kaiser and the collapse of the mighty military autocracy which Bismarck had built upon "blood and iron." In those closing months of the war the American troops, rapidly mounting from 1,300,000 to 2,000,000, played a glorious part. Two out of three of the soldiers saw active service in the combat lines. Our divisions were no longer scattered among the French and British armies, as in the spring months, but were concentrated into two American field armies—the first formed in August, of eighteen divisions or three army corps, under the command of General Pershing himself (later under General Hunter Liggett), and the second in October, under the command of General Robert L. Bullard. Up to the beginning of September our troops had not been handled in units larger than a division or, at most, an army corps of six divisions; but now our commander in chief (always under the supervision of General Foch) planned major American operations on a complete equality with the British and the French. Indeed, there were frequently French divisions in the American armies under Amer-


ican command. In none of the allied defenses from March to June had as many as 30,000 American troops been engaged. But 85,000 took part in the Marne-Champagne battles of July 15-17, and 1,200,000 in the great Meuse-Argonne offensive of September 20-November 11. When the German drive began in March, our soldiers were holding only 12 miles of the front line, in quiet sectors. When Foch's counter drive was launched in July, they were holding 60 miles, and by the middle of October, 101 miles, extending from Sedan on the Meuse to a point on the Moselle midway between Metz and Nancy—nearly a quarter of the entire front.

American troops participated in thirteen major operations against the enemy in France, earning from General Foch the laconic praise, "The American soldiers are superb." The two outstanding exploits of the American army were the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient and the clearing of the Argonne forest in the drive to the Meuse. Since September, 1914, the Germans had held a triangle of high ground some two hundred miles in area, jutting into the French lines southeast of Verdun, with its apex at St. Mihiel on the Meuse River. The position was one of great importance, for from the heights of Mont Sec back of St. Mihiel the German artillery fire could interrupt traffic on the Paris-Nancy railroad; and the salient served as an outpost protecting the fortifications of Metz and the rich Briey coal fields to the northeast. In his early conversations with General Pétain in the summer of 1917 General Pershing had shown his desire to wipe out the St. Mihiel salient, but the French army command did not feel strong enough, after an unsuccessful attack on the position in 1915 and after the losses at Verdun in 1916, to resume the attempt. Early in September, 1918, General Pershing, with his American forces increased to over 1,000,000, got the consent of Marshal Foch for the undertaking. Seven American divisions were massed on the southern face of the salient and two on the western side. Four divisions of French troops were included in Pershing's command, ready to assault the apex of the salient at St. Mihiel, as the American troops pinched the flanks. In addition to 70,000 French troops, about 2000 French and



THE GERMAN DRIVES AND THE ALLIED RESPONSE

British guns, 273 tanks, and 192 airplanes were put at Pershing's disposal. He had altogether 500,000 men, 2900 guns, and the largest aviation force hitherto assembled in the war. Before the attack was launched on the early morning of September 12, the Germans, realizing the hopelessness of holding the salient, had begun to withdraw; but they were caught by the rapid flanking movement of Pershing's army. The American attack



THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

was irresistible. It swept through the wire entanglements and stormed the fortified ridges. In three days' fighting and at the cost of only 7000 casualties (mostly slight wounds), our army cleared the entire salient, capturing 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns, and vast quantities of military stores and equipment abandoned by the enemy in his hasty retreat. Many French villages were liberated from their long domination by the German invader, and the Allies were established in a position to threaten Metz and the important railroad lines northward to Luxemburg and the Belgian border. The French troops took St. Mihiel; and on the morning of September 13 Generals Pershing and Pétain en-

tered the town together, crossing the Meuse by "a rough wooden bridge hastily thrown over the river near the spot where stood the old stone arches blown up in 1914." The people received them with enthusiastic greetings. The principal street of the town was rechristened *Rue du General Pershing*. The President of the French Republic and the American Secretary of War arrived on the scene to add their congratulations.

"The material results of the victory achieved," wrote General Pershing in his Final Report (p. 43), "were very important. An American army was an accomplished fact, and the enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the depressing effect on the morale of the enemy. . . . Our divisions concluded the attack with such small losses and such high spirits that, without the usual rest, they were immediately available for heavy fighting in a new theater of operations."


The new theater of operations proved to be the stage of the greatest battle of American history, a titanic struggle of forty-seven days, involving 22 divisions, with a total of 1,200,000 soldiers, many of whom had seen no actual combat service before. They were pitted against more than 40 German divisions, or about one fourth of the total enemy strength on the western front. The scene of the conflict was the region between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River, and the objective was the Carignan-Sedan-Mézières railroad, upon which the Germans depended for the movement of men and supplies, in connection with the roads from Luxemburg, Thionville, and Metz. It was the desire to reënforce this strategic position on the middle Meuse that had led to the desperate struggle of the Crown Prince's army to capture the forts of Verdun in the spring of 1916. Failing this, the Germans had made the Argonne a fortified wilderness. Mile on mile of barbed-wire entanglements crisscrossed the pathless wastes pitted with shell craters. Dense undergrowth hid the ravines and ridges which sheltered nests of machine guns. The French officers had declared the position impenetrable and impregnable. Yet our army never faltered. After a fortnight's incessant fighting they had cleared the Germans out of the Argonne (October 4), and at the end of another

month of steady hammering against some of the best of the Kaiser's troops they reached the bank of the Meuse at a point opposite Sedan. "The strategic goal which was our highest hope was gained," wrote General Pershing. "We had cut the enemy's main line of communication, and nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army from complete destruction." The American losses had been heavy. The dead and wounded numbered 117,000, or nearly half our casualties in the war (286,000). The price was high, but the gain was invaluable. We had driven the enemy back 30 miles, and broken his whole line of defense from Metz to Sedan. We had taken 560 square miles of territory, liberated 150 towns and villages, and captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3000 machine guns, and large quantities of supplies. The signing of the armistice a few days after the "Rainbow" Division had reached the banks of the Meuse at Sedan interrupted the plan of the First Army to cross the German border and attack the fortress of Metz.¹

The American operation at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne were only details of the great offensive launched by General Foch in mid-July. The supreme commander was a disciple of the Napoleonic school, whose motto was, "To make war is to attack." His strategy was to strike rapid blows at various points, so as to keep the whole German line too busy to conduct an orderly retreat or to stabilize any part of the front or to strengthen any part at the expense of another. He left no quiet

¹ Some idea of the immensity of the operations of the Meuse-Argonne battle may be gained from the following passage in Colonel Leonard P. Ayres's report of May 31, 1919, to Secretary Baker (see page 668, note): "In some ways the Meuse-Argonne offers an interesting resemblance to the battle of the Wilderness fought from May 5 to 12, 1864, in the Civil War. Both were fought over a terrain covered with tangled woods and underbrush. The Wilderness was regarded as a long battle, marked by slow progress against obstinate resistance, with heavy casualties. Here the similarity ends. The Meuse-Argonne lasted six times as long as the battle of the Wilderness. Twelve times as many troops were engaged as were on the Union side. They used in action ten times as many guns, and fired about one hundred times as many rounds of artillery ammunition. The actual weight of ammunition fired was greater than that used by the Union forces during the entire Civil War" (p. 112).

sectors. While the Americans were pushing their drive on a twenty-mile front down the Meuse valley, the British were striking at Cambrai, the Belgians at Ypres, and the French at



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE DRIVE

St. Quentin. The German generals used euphemistic phrases in their reports to the Imperial headquarters about "rectifying fronts" and "shortening lines," in order to cover up the plain fact that they were steadily retreating in a defeat which was growing more decisive with every week. The Kaiser still talked

of his invincible, heaven-favored armies and their "mighty generals," who were soon "to bring home the laurels of a glorious victory." Hindenburg and Ludendorff knew better. They knew that the superiority of the Allies in men, guns, planes, and everything was growing greater day by day. They saw the morale of the German army weakening, and thousands of soldiers, with a fatalistic weariness, preferring to surrender rather than fight. They knew that the world outside of Germany knew that the German cause was lost.

At the beginning of 1918 both Lloyd George and President Wilson had made official announcements, in addresses to Parliament and Congress, of the terms upon which an acceptable peace must be founded. These pronouncements were prompted in large part by the fact that the Bolshevik government of Russia had published the secret treaties revealing the imperialistic aims in the Allies' policy, and had amplified its formula of a peace with "no forcible annexations and no punitive indemnities" by a list of specific desiderata for a world settlement. At the same time Lord Lansdowne, a conservative-unionist peer who has served as foreign minister in two British cabinets, published a letter in the London *Daily Telegraph*, in which he stated that the people of Germany and Austria-Hungary were eager for peace; and that peace would be "brought immeasurably nearer" if the assurance were given by the Allies that they did not contemplate the political or economic annihilation of Germany, and that they were ready, after the necessary victory to enter into some kind of league or association for the guaranty of future peace by international action. The demand among the more radical elements in the Entente countries for a clear restatement of the ultimate aims of the war was shown by the remarkably sane and temperate declaration issued by the British, French, Belgian, and Italian delegates to the conference of the Socialist and Labor parties at London in February, 1918.

It was on January 8, 1918, two days after Lloyd George had outlined Great Britain's war aims in a speech to Parliament, that President Wilson addressed Congress, reasserting the disinterested motives of the United States in entering the war

and proposing in the "fourteen points" what he believed to be the "only possible program" for the world's peace.¹ The first five points called for open diplomacy, the freedom of the seas, the removal of international economic barriers, the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety, and an impartial adjustment of colonial claims, with due regard to the interests of the populations concerned. Points six to thirteen dealt with territorial and political problems concerning Russia, Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, Italy, the Balkan States, the Turkish empire, and Poland. The last point, and the most important of all in the eyes of President Wilson, read: "A general association of nations must be formed, under specific covenants, for the purpose of affording mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." As to Germany, President Wilson declared: "We have no jealousy of Germany's greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. . . . We only wish her to accept a place of equality among the people of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery." In his subsequent major addresses at Baltimore, on the anniversary of our entrance into the war (April 6), at Washington's tomb at Mount Vernon (July 4), and at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, on the launching of the fourth Liberty Loan (September 27), President Wilson reiterated the determination of the nation to fight the war to a finish against the "military masters of Germany," who had "shown themselves to be devoid of honor or humanity."

In the spring of 1918 the German politicians took only a mildly argumentative interest in President Wilson's fourteen points, and the German militarists, none at all. They were

¹ The Russian proposals, Lloyd George's demands, and President Wilson's fourteen points are printed in parallel columns in the *New York Times Current History*, February, 1918, pp. 257-259.

absorbed in the "Friedensturm," the great drive which was to win the war. Conditions of peace would be announced not from London or Washington, but from Berlin. "Forward with God!" was the Kaiser's cry. But the events of the summer and autumn brought other counsel. The U-boat campaign was a failure: ships were being launched faster than they were destroyed. Hundreds of thousands of fresh troops were coming from America every month—276,664 in June, 306,350 in July, 256,974 in August, and 256,457 in September. The Hindenburg line was receding week by week. The only German soldiers going "forward" were the long files of stolid prisoners marching to the rear of the allied army to the good-natured chaffing of the "Yanks," who hailed them with, "You're on your way to Paris now," or, "Kaiser Bill will miss you." The eastern allies of the Teutons were deserting the cause, like rats leaving a sinking ship. A revolutionary movement, aided by the tons of propagandist leaflets which were dropped from the Allies' airplanes, was gaining ground among the German people. They began to wake to the fact that they had been deceived by the reports of their military leaders.¹ On the day that Bulgaria signed an armistice with the French general D'Espérey, crowds gathered before the Bulgarian embassy in Berlin, cheering King Ferdinand and crying, "Down with the Kaiser!"

At last the German masters began to jettison the Junkers in order to save the ship of state. The Kaiser spoke of his desire that "the people should coöperate more effectively than heretofore in deciding the fate of the Fatherland." Plans were discussed for the democratic reform of the Prussian constitution. Chancellor von Hertling resigned and was replaced by Prince Maximilian of Baden, an avowed advocate of peace. Although President Wilson had been daily depicted as a tyrannical hypocrite in the columns and cartoons of the German press, it was to

¹ As late as September 12 the Kaiser, in an address to the workers at the Krupp gun works at Essen, claimed the victory for his "death-defying navy" and "mighty generals." He was ready, he said, to extend the hand of mercy to the enemy, who lay "prostrate and bleeding."

Wilson that the German government turned in its distress, knowing that America had no imperialistic ambitions to gratify, no European territory or colonies to claim, no ancient grudges or enmities to satisfy. On October 4 Chancellor Max approached us through the Swiss minister at Washington with the following appeal: "The German Government ["Imperial" omitted!] requests the President of the United States to take in hand the restoration of peace, acquaint all the belligerent states with this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. It accepts the program set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8 [the fourteen points] and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27, as a basis for peace negotiations. With a view to avoiding further bloodshed, the German Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and sea."

President Wilson neither refused nor complied with this request. Before he could act as the peace broker he must have certain capital points made clear. There could be no terms made while the armed German or Austrian troops were on the soil of France or Belgium. There could be no dealing with "the military masters and monarchical autocrats" of Germany. For whom was the chancellor speaking? If for the Hohenzollern war lord and his satellites, then the appeal was vain. During the month of October, while our troops were fighting their way through the Argonne to the Meuse, several notes passed between President Wilson and the German foreign office. The latter protested Germany's willingness to withdraw her troops from French and Belgian territory, and insisted on the genuineness of the reforms in the German government, which was in "complete accord with the wishes of the people." The request for a peace conference and an armistice had come from a people "free from arbitrary and irresponsible influences." The chancellor's word seemed confirmed when General Ludendorff resigned his command toward the end of October, and the Reichstag subjected the military power to the civil authority. There was a wide-

spread demand for the abdication of the Kaiser and the end of the Hohenzollern dynasty.¹ When he was at last satisfied of the good faith of the new German government, President Wilson submitted the correspondence to the allied governments, with the suggestion that if they were disposed to effect peace on the principles indicated, they should authorize their military authorities to submit the details of an armistice.

On November 1 the supreme War Council of the Allies at Versailles, attended by President Wilson's representative, Colonel House, the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, Marshal Foch, Field' Marshal Haig, General Tasker H. Bliss, and a number of military and civilian dignitaries, began the preparation of the terms, which they completed on November 4. The next day Secretary Lansing asked the Swiss minister to inform the German government that Marshal Foch had been authorized to conclude an armistice. Germany accepted promptly. Her delegates, headed by Matthias Erzberger, were conducted, blindfolded, within the allied lines late in the evening of November 7, and the next morning were received by Marshal Foch at his headquarters in a car of his special train at Rethondes in the forest of Compiègne. When their credentials had been verified, Marshal Foch, without ceremony, read in a clear, slow voice the terms of the armistice. They called for the immediate evacuation of France, Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, and Luxemburg. All of Germany west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads at Mainz, Coblenz, and Cologne, with the territory on the east bank of the river in a radius of thirty kilometers, was to be occupied by the allied troops. A strip ten kilometers wide on the right bank of the Rhine, extending from Switzerland to Holland, was to be a

¹ The Kaiser and the Crown Prince signed letters of abdication and renunciation at General Headquarters at Spa on November 9. The next day they fled to Holland, where the Kaiser was "interned" in Count Bentinck's castle at Amerongen, which had once housed an English prince (later Charles II) in his exile. In the week from November 8 to 14 German crowns and coronets fell from royal and ducal heads like apples shaken from a tree in autumn. Three kings (besides the emperor-king of Prussia), four grand dukes, three princes, and two dukes renounced their ruling titles and became plain German citizens.

neutral zone. The Germans were to surrender a vast amount of war material (including 5000 guns, 25,000 machine guns, 5000 locomotives, 150,000 cars, 5000 motor lorries, 10 battleships, 6 cruisers, 50 destroyers, and all their submarines). They were to withdraw all troops from Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Rumania, and Russia, and to renounce the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. They were to repatriate all prisoners of war, restore money and valuables taken from invaded countries, and annul all preferential commercial agreements imposed upon neutral countries.

The time accorded the German delegates for signing the armistice was seventy-two hours. The terms were drastic. Protest against signing came from the Kaiser at headquarters. But Germany's hour of extremity had come. Even Von Hindenburg insisted that the terms must be accepted. The revolution which stalks in the wake of fallen autocracies was threatening the country. The red flag was flying in half the cities of Germany. There was mutiny in the fleet at Kiel. The frightful sacrifices of the German people for the sake of the Hohenzollern autocracy were at an end. The Kaiser was about to flee across the border, imploring the people to save the Fatherland from anarchy and famine. A few hours before the expiration of the time limit the German delegates signed the armistice, and at 11 A. M. of November 11, 1918, the last gun was fired on the front.

Throughout the world the cessation of the four years of carnage was hailed with wild demonstrations of joy—in Berlin and Vienna as well as in London, Paris, and New York. Shortly after noon President Wilson drove to the Capitol through the avenue lined with cheering crowds to announce to a joint session of Congress the terms of the armistice and "the attainment of the object upon which all free men had set their hearts." "It is not now possible," he said, "to assess the consequences of this great consummation. We know only that this tragical war, whose consuming flames swept from one nation to another until all the world was on fire, is at an end, and that it was the privilege of our own people to enter it at its most critical juncture, in such fashion and such force as to contribute in a way in which we are

all deeply proud to the great result." On the same day the President issued the following proclamation to the American people: "My Fellow Countrymen, The armistice was signed this morning. Everything for which America fought has been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty to assist by example, by sober friendly counsel, and by material aid in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world."

THE TREATY AND THE LEAGUE

Peace had its problems no less staggering than those of war. For in this war the entire resources of three fourths of the nations of the world had been involved. Food, fuel, textiles, minerals, shipping, railroads, banking, insurance, science, labor—in short, every material and moral asset—had been summoned to aid the gigantic strife of the armies at the battle front. About sixty million men had been mobilized and taken from the constructive work of peace in agriculture and industry. Hundreds of billions of the world's wealth had been destroyed. Great areas of Europe had not only been depleted of workers, but had been temporarily lost to cultivation by ravages of bomb and shell. Towns and villages had been wiped out by the thousands, and their starving inhabitants thrown upon the mercy of a heroic charity. The eight million dead in battle alone far outnumbered all the hosts ever marshaled by Julius Cæsar or Napoleon Bonaparte. The map of Europe east of the Rhine, and of Asia west of the Euphrates, had to be redrawn. The fall of the autocratic governments of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey had liberated peoples oppressed for centuries and had rekindled the national aspirations of Finns, Letts, Poles, Czechs, Jugoslavs, Rumanians, Ukrainians, Syrians, and Arabs. Bolshevik propaganda threatened to complete the wreckage which defeat had brought to the countries of eastern and central Europe, by the proscription of what remained of the property and influence of the upper and middle classes and by the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in politics and industry. The pre-war debt of Germany had been multiplied thirty-two-fold, of

Great Britain tenfold, of Austria-Hungary sixfold, of Russia fivefold, of France and Italy fourfold, until it stood at over 60 per cent of the national wealth in Italy, 50 per cent in Germany, and 40 per cent in Great Britain and France. Victory, fortunately, rested with the Entente nations. But it was a victory whose costs were heavier than the penalties which any defeated nation had ever had to bear in a previous war. It was under the lowering clouds of bankruptcy, famine, and anarchy that the delegates of twenty-eight victorious nations assembled at Paris in January, 1919, to undertake the appalling task of concluding peace.

We can no more attempt in these pages to describe the negotiation of the European treaty than we have attempted to describe the operations of the European war. America is our theme. And it is only as America's participation affected the results that we can speak. Three important points must be borne in mind. In the first place, when the war ended, America's strength was on the upward curve. Instead of being at the point of exhaustion, like the European nations, we were just beginning to marshal our enormous resources. We were planning to have an army of 5,000,000 in France in 1920. In the month of the armistice we constructed 171 vessels, with a tonnage of 357,668. From July to September we had manufactured 27,270 machine guns and 233,562 rifles, as against 10,947 guns and 112,000 rifles manufactured in Great Britain and 12,126 guns and 40,000 rifles manufactured in France. We had been entirely dependent upon the Allies (especially France) for airplanes, tanks, and heavy guns, but the American planes began to arrive in large numbers in the closing months of the war. There were 1400 American planes in France when the armistice was signed, and we were planning to send 10,000 a month after January, 1919. A \$60,000,000 gas plant in Maryland, completed just as the armistice was signed, was ready to turn out three or four times as much mustard, phosgene, and chlorine gas as the output of England, France, and Germany combined. Though our debt had increased nearly twentyfold (from \$1,300,000,000 to \$24,000,000,000), it was still only about 10 per cent

of our aggregate wealth. As for man power, only 2,801,296 of the 23,509,000 men registered for the draft were inducted into the service. The total number of participants in actual warfare was less than 1 in 25 of our male population, as compared with 1 in 6 in France. We lost 49,000 men killed in battle—less than half the number lost by Bulgaria and Belgium and hardly more than a tenth of the number lost by Italy (463,000), a twentieth of the number lost by Great Britain (900,000), a thirtieth of the loss of France (1,385,000), and a thirty-fifth of the loss of Germany or Russia (1,620,000 and 1,700,000). It was Europe's dire need and America's infinite promise that made our position so commanding at the close of the war.¹

In the second place, though we were closely associated with the Entente Powers in the prosecution of the war, we were never formally "allied" with any of those powers. Though we were at war with Germany and (after December, 1917) with Austria-Hungary, we had neither pledged ourselves not to make a separate peace nor taken any part in the treaties, secret or open, by which guaranties of territorial rewards had been made to Japan, Italy, Greece, or Rumania or agreements entered into between Great Britain, France, and Russia for the division of the spoils of victory. President Wilson has been criticized for not insisting, as a condition of American help, upon the abrogation of those treaties, which were so at variance with his professed principles of world democracy. But even if he had known of the existence of the treaties before our entrance into the war, it is

¹ In view of the indispensable contribution of each of the Allies, it is idle to make the claim that any one nation "won the war." England's fleet, France's army, America's wealth, were all needed. Yet we may record the opinions of three men who were close to the situation. Marshal Joffre said to a friend in New York: "It was the weight of America, her moral and material resources, and surely not the least her very considerable army, thrown into the balance at the critical moment, that turned the scales and won the victory." General Pershing wrote in his Final Report (p. 90): "The coöperation of our soldiers with the French, British, Belgians, and Italians was decisive in bringing the war to a successful conclusion." And former Ambassador von Bernstorff, in the issue of *Foreign Affairs* for March, 1924, asserts that it was "the political mistakes of the military leaders in Germany that drew America into the war," adding, "The fact nevertheless remains that America and America alone [!] won the war."

difficult to see how he could have advised France and England to treat them like "scraps of paper." They had been concluded, as Mr. Balfour told him regretfully at the time of the visit of the British mission in April, 1917, as a necessary concession to gain valuable alliances. Their existence, however, was a great source of embarrassment to the President at the peace conference, since they conflicted at many points with his program of "open covenants," the liberation of oppressed nationalities, and the right of self-determination for the weak as well as the strong nations.¹

In the third place, America came to the peace table not only untrammelled by treaty obligations but also unvexed by the immediate problems confronting the European countries. We had no boundaries to redraw, no wasted areas to rebuild, no reparations to demand, no guaranties to exact. We did not have to live as neighbor to a conquered foe whose recuperative vengeance we feared, nor to calculate the dangers of the political and economic groupings of the new states formed from the fragments of the dismembered empires. Remote and secure, we could regard the peace conference rather as the opportunity for emphasizing the principles upon which the nations should base their future action than for wrangling over the terms on which they should adjust their present difficulties. Long before our entrance into the war President Wilson had condemned the European "balance of power," always in unstable equilibrium, and had declared the need for some association of the nations to prevent, by the common exertion of the major force of the world, the violations and aggressions which led to wars. "The United States," he said in his address before the League to Enforce Peace, on May 27, 1916, "is willing to become a partner in any

¹ It is impossible to understand President Wilson's statement to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, at a conference at the White House on August 19, 1919, that he had not known of the secret treaties until he had reached Paris to participate in the peace conference. Mr. Balfour had said in the House of Commons, in March, 1918: "President Wilson is kept informed as to the treaties entered into by the Allies." Trotzky had published the secret treaties in the Russian archives in November, 1917. They had been reprinted in the *Manchester Guardian*, and a few weeks later many of them had been published by the *New York Evening Post*.

feasible association of nations for this purpose." He repeated the sentiment in his speech of January 22, 1917, to the Senate, in his war message of April 2, and in his greeting of May 26 to the provisional revolutionary government of Russia. In the Metropolitan Opera House speech of September 27, 1918, he declared not that the peace must be *followed* by a concert of the powers, but that "the constitution of a League of Nations must be a part, and in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself." This position once reached, the President held to it with dogged tenacity. This was the crux of the situation in Paris, the key to the long negotiations of the spring of 1919. The leading European statesmen maintained on the whole an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward a League of Nations. They had no objection to the adoption of such a plan after the terms of peace were settled. The pressing matters were the determination of boundaries, the assessment of Germany's bill of damages, the satisfaction of the claims of the victorious nations, the measures of security against the revenge of militarism on the one hand and the ravages of Bolshevism on the other. Lloyd George won his "khaki election" in December, 1918, on the issue of hanging the Kaiser and making Germany pay ton for ton and shilling for shilling for the entire cost of the war. Premier Clemenceau was supported by a vote of three to one in the French Chamber, on December 30, when he declared his fidelity to the "old system" of alliances "which appears condemned today by some very high authorities," and invited the Chamber to "change pilots" if it did not wish him to carry the defense of that system into the peace conference. It was a direct challenge to President Wilson, who replied the next day, in a speech at Manchester, England, "if the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of power, the United States would take no interest, because she will join no combination which is not a combination of us all."

President Wilson had determined some time before the close of the war to go to Europe himself to enforce the adoption of a League of Nations. He made the official announcement of his purpose through Mr. Creel's Committee on Public Information

a week after the armistice was signed: "The President expects to sail for France immediately after the opening of the regular session of Congress, for the purpose of taking part in the discussion and settlement of the main features of the treaty of peace. It is not likely that it will be possible for him to remain throughout the sessions, . . . but his presence at the outset is necessary in order to obviate the manifest disadvantage of discussion by cable in determining the greater outlines of the final treaty, about which he must necessarily be consulted." He opened Congress on December 2 with a review of our part in the war and a suggestion of the problems of demobilization. At the end of his speech he mentioned his intention of departing for France: "I realize the great inconvenience that will attend my leaving the country, particularly at this time, but the conclusion that it was my paramount duty to go has been forced upon me. . . . The peace settlements which are now to be agreed upon are of transcendent importance both to us and to the rest of the world, and I know of no business or interest which should take precedence of them. . . . I shall be in close touch with you and with affairs on this side of the water, and you will know all that I do. . . . I shall not be inaccessible. The cables¹ and the wireless will render me available for any counsel or service you may desire of me, and I shall be happy in the thought that I am constantly in touch with the weighty matters of domestic policy with which we shall have to deal. I shall make my absence as brief as possible, and shall hope to return with the happy assurance that it has been possible to translate into action the great ideals for which America has striven." The President sailed on December 4, with Mrs. Wilson and a staff of several hundred experts, on the transport *George Washington*, conveyed across the Atlantic by the super-dreadnaught *Pennsylvania* and a squadron of destroyers. He landed at Brest on the thirteenth

¹ On November 16 an order was published, taking over all the cable lines and putting them under the control of Postmaster Burleson. This drastic act of censorship, after the armistice was signed, was most severely criticized as a device to keep the people of the country ignorant of what was to happen at the peace conference, except for such news as the administration chose to give.

and spent the next few weeks in a triumphal progress through France, Great Britain, and Italy, where he was received with the highest honors by the heads of the states and hailed as a savior by the populace.

The opposition to President Wilson's visit to Europe ranged from malicious suggestions of a pleasure trip for himself and Mrs. Wilson at the expense of the United States to the charge that he was betraying his constitutional duty to execute the laws of the country at a time when executive leadership was sorely needed. He was accused of wishing to pose as the savior of Europe and the dictator of the peace, of assuming that he alone could faithfully represent American ideals, of flouting the Senate, by whose "advice and consent" treaties were made, by not appointing a single member of that body on the peace commission. He named as his colleagues Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State; Colonel E. M. House, his personal, unofficial adviser; Henry White, ex-ambassador to France, a Republican who had long ceased to be an important factor in the party; and General Tasker H. Bliss, the American representative on the Supreme War Council of the Allies. According to Secretary Lansing's story of the conference ("The Peace Negotiations, a Personal Narrative," 1921) none of the associate members of the commission, except Colonel House, knew much of what was being done by President Wilson, who, during the last three months of the conference, made the important decisions in daily informal, unreported meetings with Prime Ministers Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando—the "Big Four." Other reporters of the conference, like Professor Charles Seymour, Colonel House, and Ray Stannard Baker, with more sympathy for President Wilson, say that he took a vast amount of counsel with his American advisers and was always open to suggestions and criticisms. At any rate, the optimistic assurances of the President, in his speech of December 2 to the members of Congress, that he would be in close touch with them during his brief absence and always available, that they would know all that he did, proved utterly vain. Absorbed in his difficult fight to make the League of Nations the preferred business of the conference, and willing to abandon



PRESIDENT WILSON'S WELCOME IN PARIS

Copyright Underwood & Underwood



many of the fourteen points to accomplish this purpose, he had little contact with the American Congress. Except for a brief visit home at the end of February, the President remained abroad more than six months till the completion and signing of the treaty on June 28, 1919, during which time Congress knew not "all," but hardly anything, of what he was doing. If, said his critics, the cables and the wireless could keep him in close touch with affairs at Washington from Paris, why could not the same cables and the wireless have kept him in close touch with affairs at Paris from Washington? He had already given his answer that the affairs at Paris were of "transcendent importance."

The action at the President which most exasperated his opponents here, however, was his assumption to speak in the name of the American people. Here we must review briefly the political situation in the closing weeks of 1918. On October 24, after having said the previous spring, "Politics is adjourned," President Wilson issued an appeal to the country to vote for none but Democrats in the approaching congressional elections. He confessed that the Republicans were "pro-war"; but declared that they were "anti-administration," and that at almost every turn since we had entered the war they had sought to take the choice of policies and the conduct of the war out of his hands and put it under the control of instruments of their own choosing. The election of a Republican majority to Congress, therefore, would be interpreted in Europe as a repudiation of his leadership. "I am your servant," he said, "and I will accept your judgment without cavil." To this extraordinary partisan appeal Will S. Hays, chairman of the Republican National Committee, replied three days later: "A more ungracious, more unjust, more mendacious accusation, was never made by the most reckless stump orator." Ex-Presidents Roosevelt and Taft (now reconciled) signed a joint protest against the President's charge that the Republicans, who, said Roosevelt, "were good enough to pay taxes for the war and give their lives for the country," were not good enough to share in the government. As a matter of fact, the Republican minority in Congress had cast more votes for the

President's war measures than the Democratic majority,¹ and no reorganization of the governmental agencies which the Republicans had recommended for "speeding up the war" had attempted to take the direction of the war out of the President's hands. Even the proposed "war cabinet" (which was favored by some of the leading Democrats) was to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. On the other hand, several prominent men of the President's own party had opposed his policies. Speaker Champ Clark had resisted the Selective Service bill, declaring that the term "conscript" differed little from the term "convict." Claude Kitchin, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, had voted against the war. Chairman S. H. Dent of the Committee on Military Affairs had refused to sponsor Wilson's army bill, which had then been taken in charge by the ranking Republican member, Julius Kahn of California. The result of the election in November was a decisive Republican victory. In 1916 President Wilson had carried thirty states of the Union, and polled a majority of 600,000 votes. In 1918 the Republicans carried twenty-nine states, and their aggregate majority in the congressional districts was over 1,200,000. The Republicans gained both branches of the Sixty-sixth Congress.

Despite the fact that he himself had made the issue of the election the test of his leadership and had agreed to accept the judgment of the voters "without cavil," the President completely ignored the result of the election. He proceeded to Paris as though he had been indorsed, like Clemenceau and Lloyd George, by a large vote of confidence in the legislative chambers or an overwhelming victory at a general election. In the full session of the peace conference on January 25, he made the following amazing statement of the mission of the American delegates: "If we return to the United States without having made every effort in our power to realize this program [the League of Nations as the keynote of the treaty] we should return to meet

¹ On fifty-one roll calls on war measures between April, 1917, and May, 1918, the Republican vote in favor had been 72 per cent, as against 67 per cent on the Democratic side of the House.

the merited scorn of our fellow citizens. For they are a body that constitute a great democracy. They expect their leaders to speak, their representatives to be their servants. We have no choice but to obey their mandate. But it is with the greatest enthusiasm and pleasure that we accept that mandate. . . . We would not dare abate a single item of the program which constitutes our instructions." Nothing could be more misleading to the European statesmen than these words. President Wilson had no mandate, no instructions of any sort, except what he gave himself.¹ Only the better informed of the statesmen of Europe understood our system, by which the head of the government remains in office to the end of a statutory term, even after he has lost his majority in Congress (if he ever had one). In Great Britain, France, or Italy he would have yielded office to the leader of the opposing party after the Democratic defeat of November, 1918. His very appearance at Paris as the head of the American government carried with it the implication that he was indeed clothed with a mandate from the electorate. Instead of making the true situation clear, as he should have done, if he spoke of it at all, he actually confirmed the misapprehension by speaking of his "mandate" and his "instructions." To the blunder of the partisan appeal for a purely Democratic Congress he added the sophistry of the "mandate." The gibe of the *New York Tribune*, "The President goes abroad a rebuked and discredited leader in his own nation," was unwarranted; but neither was it true that he went as the accredited spokesman of the American people.

¹ In a speech at Pueblo, Colorado, on September 25, 1919, on his tour in support of the League of Nations, President Wilson gave this highly subjective interpretation of his "mandate": "I had gone over there with, so to say, explicit instructions. Don't you remember that we [!] laid down fourteen points which should contain the principles of a settlement? They were not my points [!]. In every one of them I was conscientiously trying to read the thoughts of the people of the United States, and after I had uttered these points I had every assurance given me that could be given me that they did speak the moral judgment of the United States and not my single judgment." The weakness of the President's logic is obvious. His "instructions" turn out to be his inner conviction that he was speaking America's real sentiment. Though one may wish that he had been, no vote of the American people thus far has indicated that this was true.

Seats were provided for seventy delegates from twenty-seven nations at the great horseshoe table in the hall of the foreign-ministry building on the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, for the opening meeting of the peace conference on January 18, 1919. Nearly all the seats were filled when President Wilson rose, after a graceful address of welcome by President Poincaré, to nominate Premier Clemenceau as the president of the conference. Of course no body of more than half a hundred men could conduct the business of the conference with order and dispatch. The direction of affairs, the appointment of the fifty-eight committees, the calendar of proceedings, and the hearing of the claims that the delegates of the various countries had to advance were all in the hands of a Supreme Council, consisting of the premiers (including President Wilson) and the foreign ministers of the five principal nations of the Allies—Great Britain, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan.¹ But after more than two months had passed without much progress toward a settlement, with the tendency growing toward confusion rather than clarification of the issues by the ten councilors and their scores of expert advisers, the executive committee of the conference was narrowed down to four men—President Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando. The Big Four held one hundred and forty-five meetings between March 24 and May 7, during which "the whole treaty was put into shape: territorial, financial,

¹ When Sir Robert Borden of the Canadian delegation mildly reproached the great powers for taking into their hands the direction of the conference, Clemenceau made the following reply: "Yes, we decided in the matter of the commissions, as we decided to call the present conference, as we decided to invite the representatives of interested nations. I make no secret of it. . . . A few months ago the Prime Minister of Great Britain reminded me that the day the war came to a close the principal Allies had 12,000,000 soldiers fighting on the field of battle. That is a title. . . . We might have been selfishly led to consult our wishes alone. Who can say that we should not have been justified? Such was not our wish. We called together the entire assembly of interested nations. We called them together not to impose our will upon them, but to ask their coöperation. . . . Behind us stands a very great, very august, and at times very imperious force called public opinion. It will not ask if such or such a state was represented on such or such a commission. That is of no interest to anybody. Public opinion will ask us what we have done. It is my duty to direct our work so that we may get things done."

economic, and colonial clauses alike." The four men met informally and conversed freely. No stenographic reports of their proceedings were made. The press was furnished only with such official communiqués as they chose to make public. The delegates and experts were summoned for hearings and advice at their will. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson (for Signor Orlando took a very minor part in the conversations) took practically the whole onus of responsibility for the terms of the treaty, which was presented to the German delegates on May 7 at the Trianon Palace at Versailles.¹

Even in times of profound peace and order it would have been a tremendous task for the peace commissioners to fix the boundaries and appease the claims of newly awakened nations in three continents; to allocate colonies, determine indemnities and reparations, supervise the demobilization and disarmament of Germany, restore equitable trade conditions, prepare the way for financial and economic rehabilitation, satisfy labor, and take measures for the security of the world. But the work of the conference was accomplished in the midst of a world seething with hatred, anarchy, and revenge. The armistice had not brought peace. No less than sixteen wars were in progress in various parts of Europe and Asia. The Poles were fighting on three fronts—against the Germans on the west, the Bolsheviks on the east, and the Ukrainians on the south. Egypt and India were in revolt. French and American troops on the frozen Archangel coast and Japanese troops in far-eastern Siberia were fighting to save depots of munitions and supplies from falling into the hands of the red armies of Russia. Bolshevism was threatening to overwhelm the states of central and eastern Europe. War between

¹ John Maynard Keynes, financial adviser of the British delegation at the conference, has given a picture in his "Economic Consequences of the Peace" (1920), pp. 29-55, of the sinister influence of Clemenceau in the Council of Four, compelling Wilson and Lloyd George to accede to the imposition of terms of vengeance and intolerable severity upon Germany. Against his extreme view may be balanced the account by Captain André Tardieu, a member of the French delegation and the French high commissioner to the United States in 1917, whom Colonel House called "the one nearly indispensable man at the conference" (André Tardieu, "The Truth about the Treaty" (1921), pp. 101-114).

the bourgeoisie and the Communists was raging in Bavaria, Hungary, and Lithuania. The scenes enacted in Munich in the spring of 1919, when a soviet was substituted for the city council and the Bavarian premier, Kurt Eisner, was murdered, could be paralleled only by the wild excesses of the Jacobins at Lyon or Nantes during the French Revolution. Thousands of citizens were massacred and property was destroyed to the value of over \$60,000,000 before a combined Bavarian and Prussian army recaptured the city in a bloody assault on the fourth of May—three days before the terms of the peace conference were handed to the German delegates at Versailles. Hungary, in the power of the Bolshevik leader, Bela Kun, was at war with the Czechoslovaks on the one side and the Rumanians on the other, when an ultimatum from the peace conference was sent to threaten the immediate advance of allied troops against her unless she withdrew her armies within her own borders.

After the flight of the Kaiser and the fall of the regal and ducal dynasties in Germany, power had come into the hands of the Socialists. A saddle-maker, Friedrich Ebert, was made chancellor, and the executive power was put into the hands of a cabinet of six Majority and Independent Socialists, called the "people's commissioners," pending the call for a national assembly to frame a new constitution for Germany. The country was threatened for a time with civil war between the Ebert government and the "Spartacides," or German Bolsheviks, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, who fomented strikes in the industrial centers, spread soviet propaganda among the returning soldiers, and sowed mutiny in the garrisons and barracks. At length, thanks chiefly to the stern measures of repression exercised by Noske, the minister of war, the Spartacide resistance to the government was broken down. The National Assembly met at Weimar, in February, 1919, and chose Ebert provisional president of the provisional German republic. It was the foreign secretary of this new government, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, who headed the German delegation invited to Versailles to receive the terms of the treaty. In presenting them Clemenceau spoke curtly: "Gentlemen Plenipotentiaries

of the German Empire, it is neither the time nor the place for superfluous words. You have before you the accredited plenipotentiaries of all the small and great powers united to fight together in the war that has been so cruelly imposed upon them. The time has come when we must settle our account. You have asked for peace. We are ready to give you peace. We shall present to you now a book which contains our conditions. You will be given every facility to examine these conditions and the time necessary for it. Everything will be done with the courtesy that is the privilege of civilized nations. . . . But we must say at the same time that this second treaty of Versailles has cost us too much not to take on our side all the necessary precautions and guaranties that the peace shall be a lasting one." The Germans were not allowed to enter into any discussion of the treaty, but were given two weeks in which to present their "observations" in writing, in English and French. In their first note of May 10 they protested that the treaty was not based upon the principles (the fourteen points) which Germany had accepted in her surrender, and that it contained demands "which no nation could endure." To which Clemenceau promptly replied that the Allies could admit no discussion of their right to insist on the terms of the peace substantially as drafted. They would consider only "such practical suggestions as the German plenipotentiaries might have to submit."

The terms were severe. This most voluminous treaty ever written (eighty thousand words) was divided into fifteen main sections, covering boundaries, renunciations, military, naval, and air conventions, prisoners of war, reparations, finances, colonies, shipping, contracts, labor clauses, guaranties, and a host of other matters. Germany lost in her foreign dependencies and colonies alone an area of over 1,000,000 square miles, and had to surrender about 50,000 square miles of her empire in the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to the French, and territory to Poland, Denmark, and Belgium. She was reduced to military impotence with an army fixed at a maximum of 100,000 men. Her ships, submarines, and docks were surrendered. Her fortifications in large areas were demolished. Her bill of damages was fixed at

200,000,000,000 gold marks, to be paid "in gold, goods, ships, or other specific forms of payment within two years." She was made to confess her responsibility for the war.

The reception of the treaty in Germany was one of savage resentment. President Ebert declared that history had "no precedent for such a determination to annihilate a vanquished people." Professor Hans Delbrück said that rather than agree to the terms Germany would open her gates to Bolshevism. Prince Lichnowsky, whose famous memoir of two years before had acknowledged Germany's guilt in causing the war, now condemned the "peace of violence which would mean Germany's annihilation." The atmosphere was not one to encourage conciliation on either side. Ever since the armistice, which had been renewed periodically pending the conclusion of peace, there had been quarrels over its observance. The Allies had accused Germany of evading and violating its terms as to the delivery of war material and the reduction of armaments, while Germany had pleaded the necessity for maintaining sufficient military strength to preserve order against the Bolshevik revolution.¹ The allied statesmen were inexorable. In spite of repeated protests and proposals and counter-proposals, only slight changes were made in the treaty, which was presented to the German plenipotentiaries in its final form on June 16, to be accepted or rejected. Chancellor Scheidemann declared that acceptance was impossible. "This murderous volume," he said, "by which confession of our own unworthiness, our consent to pitiless disruption, our agreement to helotry and slavery, are to be extorted—this book must not become the future code of law." But protests were useless in the face of determined force. Test votes showed that a majority of the German assembly were prepared to bow to the inevitable. The ministers resigned, and new agents were found to go to Versailles at the bidding of the assembly (235 to 138) to perform the humiliating duty of affixing their signatures to the treaty. They signed, "yielding to

¹ An American cartoon represented Germany as a bad boy with an enormous pocket in the back of his breeches filled with sticks of dynamite labeled "Bolshevism," and remarking with a grin, "They dassn't spank me." -

superior force, and without renouncing in the meantime their own view of the unheard-of injustice of the peace conditions." The ceremony was performed on June 28 (the fifth anniversary of the assassination at Sarajevo, which had precipitated the war) in the great Hall of Mirrors in the palace of Versailles, where, forty-eight years before, the Hohenzollern king of Prussia, William the Great, had been proclaimed the first emperor of the proud Germany which now lay crushed at the feet of its former victim. In the eternal seesaw of supremacy from one side of the Rhine to the other since the days of Charlemagne's grandsons, the fortunes of Richelieu, Louis XIV, and Napoleon were again in the ascendancy, and the glories of Charles Quint, Frederick the Great, and Bismarck were dimmed.

"Woodrow Wilson" was the first name of the representatives of the victorious powers to be affixed to the treaty. The President's position throughout the conference had been one of great delicacy and difficulty. He had gone to Paris without any of the main interests which inspired his associates in the council of the Big Four. He had no territory to claim, no nationals to liberate from alien rule, no colonies to demand. His immense prestige, combined with his essential disinterestedness in the inveterate racial, religious, and economic rivalries of European neighbors, made him the broker in conflicting claims and exposed him often to the bitter reprimand of unsatisfied claimants. His path had been strewn with flowers when he arrived in Europe. At the conference it was filled with thorns. When, for example, he allowed Japan to retain her hold upon Shantung and maintain the sphere of influence in China which we had unfortunately sanctioned by the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917, the Chinese delegates refused to sign the treaty.¹ When he denied Italy the possession of Fiume, the Italian delegation left the conference to receive a tremendous ovation of gratitude at home, and Wilson was hooted and jeered in the streets where he had been hailed as a savior a few months before. And all the

¹ The Lansing-Ishii agreement was canceled by an arrangement between Secretary Hughes and the Japanese ambassador at Washington, Mr. Hanihara, on April 15, 1923.

time he was being bitterly assailed by the Germans for destroying the confidence which they had put in his program of the fourteen points and his professions of "an even-handed justice that must know no vengeance and play no favorites," in reliance upon which, they claimed, they had laid down their arms while their still unbroken armies were on the enemy's soil.

President Wilson had come to Paris with one absorbing purpose: to write into the peace treaty the terms of a League of Nations which should guarantee the future peace of the world. His interest in the settlement of every question before the conference—territorial, political, financial, military, and economic—was dictated by its bearing upon that ideal. In accepting the honorary doctor's degree conferred upon him by the Sorbonne, on his arrival in Paris, he made the League his topic, declaring it to be the "mandate of mankind" to the delegates, and warning them a month in advance of their meeting that unless they heeded that mandate they would make themselves "the most conspicuous and deserved failures in the history of the world." A few of the important members of the conference, like Lord Robert Cecil of England, General Jan Smuts of South Africa, and Léon Bourgeois of France, were enthusiastic advocates of the League, but most were rather indifferent to it. It would do well enough to consider it after the main business of settling the terms of peace was over. Clemenceau, the dominating figure of the conference, paid it lip service. He did not trust it for security against the vengeance of a renascent Germany. He wanted to have it contain a provision for an international army; and, failing that, he accepted it only on condition of the negotiation of a tripartite treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and France, guaranteeing military aid to the latter in case of attack from her ancient foe.¹ At the price of this and many other concessions the President had his way. On

¹ A treaty which ran counter to President Wilson's emphatic declaration that there should be no special alliances within the League. The President signed this tripartite agreement, however, and promised to submit it to the Senate at the same time with the treaty; but he withheld it for several days, and it never was acted upon by the Senate.

January 25 the Supreme Council appointed a commission of two members each from the five great powers to draft the covenant of the League, which was to be "an integral part of the general treaty of peace, open to every civilized nation which could be relied upon to promote its objects." President Wilson and Colonel House were the American members, Lord Cecil and General Smuts represented Great Britain, Léon Bourgeois and Dean Larnaude of the law faculty of Paris represented France, Premier Orlando and Vittorio Scialoja represented Italy, and Viscount Chinda and Baron Makino represented Japan. These men, with the coöperation of representatives from nine other nations, including V. K. Wellington Koo of China, Venizelos of Greece, and M. Hymans of Belgium, drew up the terms of the League, based largely on the draft of General Smuts, which President Wilson reported to a plenary session of the conference on February 14. The text of the covenant, as finally amended, was adopted by the conference on April 28.

The covenant consisted of twenty-six articles dealing with membership and organization (Arts. I-VII), limitation of armaments (VIII, IX), guaranties of security (X, XI), arbitration (XII-XV), enforcement of sanctions (XVI, XVII), the guaranty of the Monroe Doctrine (XXI), mandates (XXII), and a variety of international pledges in regard to labor, traffic in women, children, and opium, the freedom of commerce, the prevention of diseases, the publication of treaties, the support of the Red Cross, and the process of amendment (XXIII-XXVI). An annex to the covenant specified the thirty-two original member nations of the League, all signatories of the treaty of peace, and named thirteen neutral states which were invited to join. Sir James Eric Drummond was designated as first secretary general of the League. The machinery of the League was to be in the hands of two bodies. An Assembly consisting of delegates from all the member states, in which each state should have a single vote, was to meet at stated intervals at the seat of the League (Geneva) "to deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." The Assembly was the final resort of authority. A smaller executive

body, called the Council, was to consist of nine members and have the initiative in directing the activities of the League. The five great powers of the conference were to be permanently represented in the Council; the other four members were to be elected by the Assembly. The famous Article X, which provoked the severest criticism in the United States, and which President Wilson declared to be "the heart of the covenant," reads as follows: "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

Immediately after the presentation of the covenant to the Paris conference President Wilson returned to this country to sign the bills of the expiring Sixty-fifth Congress, cabling the request (which was not complied with) that Congress should refrain from making the League a subject of debate until he had had the opportunity of discussing it with the members of the Senate and House Committees on Foreign Affairs, whom he had invited to dine at the White House on February 26. The President landed in Boston on the twenty-fourth and spoke to a large audience in Mechanics Hall in general justification of his work at Paris, but without discussing any of the specific points of the covenant. He foreshadowed his purpose of appealing to the American people rather than to Congress for support, saying, "The people are in the saddle, and they are going to see to it that, if their present governments do not do their will, some other government shall." The dinner at the White House two days later failed to win the members of the committees. The President received them graciously and assured them that the League endangered no American interests, that fourteen nations had already accepted it, and that our failure to ratify it would cause "deep sorrow" throughout the world. He confronted them with an accomplished fact—a fact accomplished without their counsel or consent. Before Congress adjourned, thirty-seven Republican senators who would sit in the next Congress

(four more than enough to defeat the treaty) signed a round robin declaring that they would not vote for the treaty if it contained the covenant of the League as drawn. On the day of adjournment (March 4) the President left Washington to return to the conference at Paris. That night he appeared with ex-President Taft on the platform of the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, where he returned the defiance of the senators. He said that one of the first things that he would tell the people in Paris was that "an overwhelming majority of the American people" favored the League. The men who criticized it had "never felt the great pulse of the heart of the world"; they had no appreciation of the temper of those "splendid boys in khaki" who had gone across the sea not only to beat Germany but to win liberty for mankind. No peace would be "vital" without the League of Nations, and he had no intention of bringing back a "cadaver" with him. "When the treaty comes back," he said, "gentlemen on this side will find the covenant not only in it but so many threads of the treaty tied to the covenant that you cannot dissect it from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure." The next morning the President sailed on the *George Washington* for France.

He was as good as his word. Finding that the members of the conference had cooled somewhat toward the League during his month's absence, and were willing to postpone it till the conclusion of the peace terms, he rallied them to its support again and secured its adoption as the first article of the treaty on April 28. Just two months later he set his name to the treaty, and on the morrow sailed again for home to confront the Senate with another accomplished fact. It is necessary here to examine the reasons for the opposition of the Senate. The elections of the previous autumn had returned Republican majorities to both branches of the Sixty-sixth Congress. In order to compel the President to call the new Congress in extra session, the Republicans of the Senate had conducted a filibuster in the closing days of the Sixty-fifth Congress, refusing to allow the indispensable appropriation bills providing for the army and navy, the civil service, the Indian service, the District of Columbia, and

the general deficiency (carrying a total of more than \$3,500,000,000) to come to a vote. The country had shown itself to be Republican, they contended, and the Republicans should be allowed to determine its policy. But the President would not interrupt his work at Paris to call in extra session a hostile Congress. "A group of men in the Senate," he said, "have deliberately chosen to embarrass the administration of the government. . . . It is plainly my present duty to attend the peace conference at Paris. I take it for granted that the men who have obstructed and prevented the passage of necessary legislation . . . are willing to assume the responsibility of the impaired efficiency of the government and the impoverished finances of the country during the time of my enforced absence." His break with the Senate was complete before he returned to Paris. In the last two weeks of the session ending March 4, Senators Poindexter of Washington, Borah of Idaho, Reed of Missouri, Cummins of Iowa, Lodge of Massachusetts, Sherman of Illinois, and Knox of Pennsylvania had already attacked the League in all the essential points which they were to resume in the debates of the following session in the autumn, when the treaty was before them for ratification. It was necessary to call Congress for the passage of the appropriation bills before the expiration of the fiscal year on June 30, but the President did not send the cable from Paris summoning the extra session until May 8, the day after the completed treaty had been submitted to the German plenipotentiaries at Versailles. He returned to America immediately after the signature, and on July 10 presented the treaty to the Senate, which had already been discussing it hotly for more than a month.¹

Undoubtedly there was petty partisanship in the opposition of the Senate to the treaty, and resentment against the President, who had ignored the Senate in the selection of the peace commis-

¹ It was impossible to keep the treaty secret until it was submitted to the parliaments for ratification. The Germans had published it to stir the hostility to the "murderous peace." Copies were in the hands of newspaper men and business men in this country. Senator Borah, on threat of reading the entire document before the Senate, had had it incorporated into the *Congressional Record* of June 10 (see *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 1st session, pp. 802-857).

sioners and defied it in bringing back a draft of a League of Nations which more than a third of its members had declared in writing that they would not support. But it is equally petty and resentful to attribute the whole motive of the Senate's opposition to the desire to "dish" Woodrow Wilson. There was plenty of honest objection to the League even in its amended and final form, which provided for the explicit recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, the right of any nation to withdraw within two years, the consent of the government concerned to any reduction in armaments, the exemption of purely domestic questions like immigration from the jurisdiction of the League, and the requirement of unanimous consent of the Council. Article X still remained unchanged. It seemed to many to pledge the United States to send soldiers to Europe or Asia to defend the territory or sovereignty of Serbia, Siam, or the Hejaz, at the bidding of nine men, eight of whom were foreigners; to submit to the arbitration of a foreign tribunal vital questions affecting our honor; to admit the interference of alien nations with our measures of defense, our commerce, and our colonial policy; to play a subordinate part to the British Empire, which was represented by six votes in the Assembly to one for the United States—in a word, to abandon the advice of Washington and Jefferson to avoid "entangling alliances." During the two months that the treaty was in the hands of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the President labored to convince his opponents that their objections were trivial and their fears groundless. Nothing could happen in the Council of the League without our consent, because the vote had to be unanimous. Our domestic interests were adequately safeguarded. The Monroe Doctrine was explicitly recognized. The right to withdraw from the League was guaranteed. Our obligations would be rather "moral" than "legal." In a three hours' conference at the White House on August 19 the President answered the question of the Senate committee, endeavoring to convince the members that the treaty without the League, especially without Article X, which put "teeth" into the covenant, would be futile. But the senators left the conference unconverted.

A group of about a dozen irreconcilables, led by Borah, Johnson, Reed, La Follette, Brandegee, Moses, Sherman, and Poin-dexter, opposed our entering a League of Nations in any form.¹ Less than forty senators were satisfied with the covenant as presented by the President. The majority were in favor of ratification with some amendments and reservations. This also was the position of many of the prominent citizens of the country in private life, like ex-President Taft, Mr. Root, Mr. Hughes, and Mr. Hoover. Therefore, when the treaty was reported out of the committee by Senator Lodge, the chairman, on September 10, it was with the recommendation of ratification on condition of the acceptance of a number of amendments in the text of the League covenant,² and the publication of certain reservations, designed in the main to protect the authority of Congress from possible encroachment by the Council of the League. The reservations, boiled down to fourteen, released us from the obligation to fulfill Article X or to accept any mandate or to serve on any committee of the League or to boycott trade with any nation, except by the authority of Congress, and made us the sole judge of the fulfillment of our obligations and of the questions which we might refuse to submit to arbitration. All the reservations except the last were accepted by majorities in the Senate. The preamble to the resolutions, providing that the treaty should not be binding upon us until at least three of the

¹ An example of the extreme scare-head oratory indulged in by the irreconcilables is furnished by the speech of Senator L. Y. Sherman of Illinois on March 3: "The League will embargo our commerce, close our exchanges, destroy our credits, leave our merchantmen rotting at the piers, shut the Isthmian Canal, order Congress to declare war, levy taxes, appropriate money, raise and support armies and navies, and dispatch our men to any quarter of the globe to fight and die, because an alien Executive Council has willed it." Senator Cummins of Iowa said, "I predict that when the citizens of the United States thoroughly grasp the meaning of the proposed agreement and fairly understand its inevitable consequences, it will be rejected in a storm of obloquy, the like of which has never been witnessed within the borders of our Republic."

² The only part of the treaty besides the first article (the League covenant) that interested the Senate much was the clause depriving our good friend China from receiving back in full sovereignty her valuable province of Shantung. The third amendment proposed by the committee provided for the restoration of Shantung, but it was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 35 to 55.

four principal powers associated with us in the war had accepted our conditions of ratification, was adopted on November 7 by a vote of 48 to 40.

President Wilson insisted that the treaty should be ratified without amendments, though he was not opposed to having ratification accompanied by "informal interpretations" setting forth the Senate's understanding of the document. His grounds of insistence were that peace waited upon ratification, that any amendments would require the resubmission of the treaty to the German assembly at Weimar and the reopening of the Paris conference, and that the best way to obtain any modification of the terms of the covenant would be through the action of the League itself after it had been established. In spite of the vote of November 7 he wrote on the nineteenth to his spokesman in the Senate, Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, urging the Democrats to defeat the reservations offered by the committee. The Lodge resolution, he said, "does not provide for the ratification but rather for the nullification of the treaty. . . . I trust that all true friends of the treaty will refuse to support the Lodge resolution." The vote was taken on the same day; and ratification with the amendments was rejected by a vote of 39 to 55, the result being due partly to the President's advice and partly to the refusal of the irreconcilables to support a treaty containing a League of Nations in any form. Immediately afterwards a vote was taken on the ratification of the treaty without amendments or reservations, as President Wilson desired, and was lost by the equally decisive vote of 38 to 53. Thus a majority of the Senate rejected the treaty of peace with Germany, either with or without the reservations. The irreconcilables would have been powerless to defeat the treaty if the President had given the word to the Democrats to accept the reservations. But, convinced as he was that the reservations "nullified" the treaty, he could do nothing else than counsel their rejection. The six months' session of Congress adjourned the same day (November 19), leaving the treaty deadlocked.

Early in September President Wilson, knowing that there was no hope of getting a two-thirds vote in the Senate for the ratifi-

cation of the unamended treaty, had started on a tour across the continent to recommend the League to the people. There was, of course, no constitutional provision for the ratification of a treaty by a plebiscite; but if popular pressure could not be brought to bear upon the Senate to secure a favorable vote, at least public sentiment might be roused to turn out the Republican Senate at the elections of the ensuing year. The President spoke to large and enthusiastic audiences in the West; but Senators Borah, Johnson, and McCormick, who followed on his trail to denounce the League, met with an equally enthusiastic reception. It was impossible to tell what the real sentiment of the country was. Certainly, before he had gone far on his tour, the President must have realized that his confident assertion that "an overwhelming majority of the American people were in favor of the League" could not be proved. President Wilson was a sick man when he left Washington. He was under the constant care of his physician, Dr. Grayson, who had tried in vain to deter him from making the tour. He showed signs of exhaustion as he turned homeward from California, and just as he was approaching Wichita, Kansas (September 25), he was stricken. He was hurried back to Washington, where his condition was critical for several days. He recovered sufficiently to be able to see a few callers and to attend to a few matters of business, but his physical, like his political, power was at an end.

The year and a half of office which remained to the President after he was stricken down presents a pathetic contrast to the years of masterful leadership before and during the war. He had lost his political leverage when the Republicans took away his majorities in both Houses of Congress in November, 1918, and he had been in only remote and mediated touch with the men at the Capitol since his departure for France a month later. Now a hostile Congress ignored his advice and his vetoes, the cabinet disintegrated,¹ the opposition press rejoiced brazenly in

¹ On February 12, 1920, he curtly dismissed Secretary Lansing from the State Department and replaced him with Bainbridge Colby of New York, a supporter of Roosevelt in the Bull Moose campaign of 1912. His reason for dismissing Lansing was ostensibly because the secretary had called cabinet meetings during

"the downfall" of the President, and the people failed to justify his faith in their hearty approval of his foreign policy.

No reference was made to treaty or league in the message which President Wilson sent from his sick-room to Congress on the opening of the regular session in December, 1919. The message recommended economy in the national budget, the simplification of the taxes, the control of "unconscionable profiteering," and the cure of industrial unrest. An official notice was issued from the White House a few days later to the effect that the President had decided that his responsibility in the matter of the treaty was at an end: "He has no compromises or concessions of any kind to make, but intends . . . that the Republican leaders of the Senate shall continue to bear the undivided [!] responsibility for the fate of the treaty and the present condition of the world in consequence of that fate." On the occasion of the Jackson Day dinner at Washington, January 8, 1920, he sent a letter to the fifteen hundred diners in which he said "Personally I do not accept the action of the Senate as the decision of the nation. . . . We cannot rewrite the treaty. We must take it without changes which alter its meaning, or leave it . . . and face the unthinkable task of making another and

his illness; but the fundamental reason was that the secretary's mind did not "go along with his." Lansing had criticized the treaty and, according to the testimony given to the Senate by William C. Bullitt, had said that the covenant of the League was "thoroughly bad" and would be rejected by the Senate if they thoroughly understood it. McAdoo had already resigned as Secretary of the Treasury in December, 1918, to repair his private fortunes. He was succeeded by Carter Glass of Virginia, who, in turn, resigned in January, 1920, to go to the Senate. Glass was succeeded by D. F. Houston, former Secretary of Agriculture, and E. T. Meredith of Iowa became Secretary of Agriculture in Houston's place. On March 4, 1919, Attorney-General Gregory left the cabinet to resume his law practice, and A. Mitchell Palmer, the alien property custodian, took his place. In December, 1919, Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield resigned, and was succeeded by J. W. Alexander of Missouri. Finally, the able Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane, retired on February 7, 1920, his place being taken by John B. Payne, chairman of the Shipping Board. Postmaster-General Burleson, Secretary of the Navy Daniels, and Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson were the only members of the cabinet to retain their original appointments to the end of the administration, and the first two were far from popular with the country at large.

separate treaty with Germany. If there is any doubt as to what the people of the country think on this vital matter, the clear and only way out is to submit it at the next election to the voters of the nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemn referendum as to the part the United States is to play in completing the settlement of the war." Many leading Democrats in the Senate and out disagreed with the President. It was the constitutional privilege of the Senate to pass upon treaties, and accordingly the Democrats made another attempt in the spring of 1920 to come to terms with the Republicans. But it was in vain. Though a majority of the senators again concurred in the reservations proposed, the final vote on the treaty, taken March 19, after another letter of negative advice from President Wilson, showed 57 ayes (34 Republicans and 23 Democrats) to 39 nays (15 Republicans and 24 Democrats). Thus, though half the Democratic senators ignored the President's request and voted for ratification, the other half, joining with the irconcilable Republicans, were sufficient to defeat the treaty by seven votes. The document was returned to the White House, with the formal announcement that the Senate had been unable to obtain the constitutional majority for ratification. In April and May both Houses passed a resolution declaring that the war with Germany was at an end. The President vetoed the resolution on May 27, as "an ineffaceable stain upon the gallantry and honor of the United States."¹

Meanwhile the ratification of the treaty of peace by the German Assembly (July 8, 1919) and the principal allied nations (July-October, 1919), and its formal proclamation at Versailles (January 10, 1920), had automatically brought into operation the League of Nations. The first meeting of the Council was held in Paris, January 16, on the call of President Wilson, as provided in the terms of the covenant. Of the thirty-two nations

¹ The House failed to override the veto by a vote of 219 to 155. Resolutions were passed on June 3 and 4 for the repeal of all war legislation except the Lever Act and the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act. The President refused to sign these resolutions, and the session adjourned on June 5, three days before the meeting of the Republican national convention at Chicago.

named in the annex as eligible to membership, the only important one to remain outside was the United States. It was an anomalous situation, something like the play of *Hamlet* with the Prince of Denmark left out. It is extremely doubtful whether there would have been any league at all had not President Wilson, fitfully seconded by the opportunist Lloyd George, persisted in his advocacy of it in the face of the skepticism of Clemenceau and the indifference of Orlando. Frequent meetings of the Council and of various committees of the League were held in the spring and summer of 1920. A permanent secretariat of about one hundred persons was organized, domiciled temporarily in London, the budget was established, the National Hotel on the shore of Lake Geneva was purchased for the permanent headquarters of the League, and a vast number of projects were undertaken looking to the political, economic, and social recovery of Europe through the coöperation of men of international good will. Committees were organized to deal with health, labor, the repatriations of war prisoners, the government of mandates, the reparation of finances, the reduction of armaments, the administration of the Saar basin by France, the organization of a World Court, and a score of other important subjects. Though it was not anticipated, as the president, Léon Bourgeois, said in reviewing the work of the League at a meeting of the Council at Paris in September, 1920, that "the rule of right and justice would be set up on the ruins wrought by violence and barbarity in a single night" or that "human passions would give way at once to kindness and virtue," yet the League, even in its first year of existence, could point to possible wars averted (between Finland and Sweden over the Aland Islands, between Lithuania and Poland over Vilna) in a Europe that was seething with national ambitions and rivalries. By October 1, 1920, the League had thirty-four members, and thirteen more states had applied for admission. By the very fact of its existence and growth, more than by any of its specific accomplishments, the League had already justified itself against its detractors when the representatives of forty-one nations met, under the presidency of M. Hymans of Belgium, in the first general assembly at Geneva

on November 15, 1920—just thirteen days after the “great and solemn referendum” at the polls had seemed to confirm America’s determination to have no part or parcel in it.

Since the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and the consequent failure of the American delegates to take the chairs reserved for them at the table of the League of Nations was perhaps the most momentous fact in our recent history, a brief comment on the situation is not out of place at the end of our chapter on the relations of America to the World War. To one part of our population our action seemed (and seems) like a deplorable and ridiculous anticlimax. We had been gloriously present at the conflict; we sulked in our tent in the hour of victory. We had gone forth in our strength to make the world safe for democracy, and now we had no confidence that our democracy could be safe in close association with the world. We had appealed to an unselfish and unseeking internationalism to win the war, and now we were retreating into a narrow, selfish nationalism under the slogan “America first!” To another part of the population our behavior was in keeping with American traditions from the days of Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe. We had only asked for the proper guaranties that the authority of Congress should not be in danger of being overridden by the decisions of an international body in which we should be represented by a single vote only, even as Brazil or Japan. Political partisanship and personal animus between the two authorities in whose hands the fate of the treaty lay—the President and the Senate—exacerbated the differences of opinion into mutual defiance. The champions of the President saw in the behavior of the Senate only a diabolical plot to discredit the work of a political opponent, covered by the pretext of defending American rights. The advocates of conditional ratification, on the other hand, accused the President of an obstinate determination to browbeat the Senate into accepting his own interpretation of the League by his pontifical assumption of *non possumus*. If the guaranties of American sovereignty were implicit in the covenant, it would do no harm to have them explicit. As for the objection of the President, that negotiations would

have to be begun all over again if reservations were attached to the treaty, that was a mere pretext. There was nothing in the reservations that the German assembly at Weimar would object to. The peace conference was still in session at Paris. A majority of our own delegates (Lansing's successor, Frank L. Polk, General Bliss, and Mr. White) were still there. The desire of the Allies to have the United States in the League was so strong that they would have gladly welcomed us with the reservations. In fact, Viscount Grey, special ambassador to Washington, acknowledged as much in an open letter to the London *Times* of January 31, 1920, which was favorably commented upon by the Paris press.

We need not commend the motives of many of the Republican senators in their opposition to the covenant as presented by President Wilson, if at the same time we emphasize the fact that it was a condition and not a theory which confronted the President in the Senate's attitude. That body was, after all, the constitutional ratifying agency. It offered him ratification with reservations. He chose the rejection of the treaty altogether rather than accept the reservations offered. For this uncompromising attitude he is commended by some and reprobated by others. But champions and opponents alike must acknowledge that he alone assumed the responsibility for the choice. It was not the Republican senators who defeated the treaty and kept us out of the League of Nations. On the final test, they voted 34 to 15 in favor of ratification—a ratification which they believed would be acceptable to the nations associated with us in the war. It was the twenty-four Democrats who, in obedience to the President's advice, joined with the irreconcilable Republican minority to defeat the treaty.

Such was the disappointing ending of a chapter of unusual glory and inspiration in our history. The generous enthusiasm, the unstinted devotion, the unselfish coöperation of 1917 and 1918, gave place to a reaction of political rivalry, economic strife, and social antagonisms in 1919. It seemed as if the idealism of the nation had been exhausted by the war. "The vision for which we fought" was clouded over by the emergence

of a crass materialism. Disillusionment succeeded exultation, as the prophecies of a new and better world order remained unfulfilled. In the Old World war did not cease with the treaties of peace. Armies and navies were not reduced with the orders of demobilization. Imperial ambitions were not quenched in the blood bath of Europe's agony. And in our own land, where optimistic voices had proclaimed that the millennium was at hand and that whatever remained of the vestiges of inequality and injustice must die in the grave of autocracy, the path immediately before our feet lay through the valley of humiliation and the slough of despond—through a welter of industrial chaos, social ferment, class struggle, destructive propaganda, commercial profiteering, and reckless plunging. It was the aftermath of war.

CHAPTER X

THE TEST OF THE REPUBLIC

*America! America!
God mend thine every flaw,
Confirm thy soul in self-control,
Thy liberty in law!*

KATHARINE LEE BATES

PAYING THE PIPER

A less auspicious moment could not have been found for urging a spirit of unselfish international coöperation upon the American people than just the period immediately following the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles. By the autumn of 1919 we were so absorbed in the effort to adjust our own political, industrial, and social system to a régime of peace that a call to consider first the conditions of the world's recovery seemed to millions of our citizens an intrusion upon more important matters of concern at home. The social psychology of a people is not suddenly changed by a revolutionary shock, nor are the political habits of generations laid off like a garment. No amount of generous zeal in intrusting to government agencies control over the business and social habits of the country during the acute crisis of war could disguise the fact that such control was utterly repugnant to our traditions; nor was that control exercised long enough either to accustom the government to a smooth and consistent execution of it or to reconcile the people to its continuance. We were as unprepared for peace as we had been for war. The British government, for example, had been at work almost from the beginning of hostilities on constructive plans for the readjustment of industry, commerce, labor, taxation, housing, and health to the new conditions of the post-war era. They had created an able and representative Ministry of Recon-

struction, with scores of commissions to coöperate with agencies like the Bank of England, the Board of Trade, the Board of Education, the Landlords Association, and the labor unions in facilitating the transition from a war to a peace basis. But when our Secretary of Commerce, Mr. William C. Redfield, attempted to carry on the work of the War Industries Board (dissolved on December 31, 1918), through the voluntary coöperation of the business interests of the country with the government, in an Industrial Board of the Department of Commerce, established February 5, 1919, he found so little willingness to allow any prolongation of public control of industry into times of peace that he abandoned the plan in a few weeks. Indeed, it was only by virtue of our being technically still at war with Germany that the President was able to exercise some necessary control over the industrial and social situation at the close of actual hostilities. Appreciation of this fact of the traditional jealousy of the power of the executive and the consequent comparative lack of organs of executive administration in our political system—a feature which may be traced back to the experience of our forefathers in colonial days—is fundamental to the understanding of the cross purposes, confusion, and chaos which characterized the transition from war to peace.

Actual military demobilization was one of the lesser problems. Although we were deprived of the help of the British ships, which had carried half our troops across to France but which were needed after the signing of the armistice for the return of the British colonial troops to Canada, South Africa, and Australia, nevertheless the rapid conversion of our own cargo ships into troop transports and the utilization of the cruisers and battleships put at the disposal of the army, enabled the homeward movement of our soldiers to proceed at an even faster rate than their flow to France. Before the treaty of peace was signed in June, 1919, nearly 1,500,000 of our men were back in America. Within five months of the signing of the armistice, demobilization in the training-camps at home was 44 per cent complete and 1,300,000 young men had returned to civil life, the rate of discharges reaching in one camp 4000 a day. Not only were the

American troops better paid, fed, and clothed than they had been in any previous war, but the provisions for their health, comfort, education, and even entertainment overseas had been most generous. So efficient was the hospital and nursing system that 6 out of every 7 of the wounded were restored to fitness for service at the front. In the Mexican War 110 men had died of diseases for every 15 killed in battle. In the Northern armies in the Civil War twice as many men died of disease as had been killed on the field. In the Spanish War the deaths by disease had been more than five times as many as the deaths by bullets. But from the first battle on the soil of France down to the signing of the armistice, only 19 men of the A.E.F. had died of disease for every 53 killed in battle.¹ Intestinal diseases, which had been the cause of 4 out of every 5 deaths in the Spanish War, were practically eliminated from our army in the World War.

Not only was the soldier himself well taken care of, but generous provision was made for his dependents at home. Instead of the pension system, which had been accompanied by so much fraud and abuse in the decades following the Civil War, the government adopted the plan of allotments and compensatory insurance. To the \$15 a month which the soldier was compelled to allot to his wife, the government added another \$15 for wife alone, \$25 for wife and one child, \$32.50 for wife and two children, with \$5 for each additional child up to a maximum of \$50. The compensation granted by the government for total disability was \$30 a month for a single man, \$45 for a man with a wife, \$55 for a couple with one child, and \$65 for a larger family.² Another beneficent innovation established by the government

¹ The influenza-pneumonia epidemic which swept through this country in the autumn of 1918 caused tens of thousands of deaths in the camps and cantonments, so that the total number of deaths from disease both in the United States and in France from our entry into the war down to May 1, 1919, was slightly more than the deaths in battle (ratio 15 to 13). Up to September 14, 1918, the death rate in the army had been only 5 in 1000 per year. For the second week in October alone it reached 4 in every 1000 in American camps.

² These rates of compensation were increased by the Sweet bill of December 24, 1919, to \$80, \$90, \$95, and \$100 a month respectively.

was the system of soldiers' insurance. By a law of October 6, 1917, drafted by Secretary McAdoo, every man in the service was permitted to take out a life-insurance policy to the amount of \$10,000 to be carried until five years after the President's proclamation of peace, at considerable less than the current premium rates. These government insurance policies, issued to more than 4,500,000 men, reached the enormous total of \$40,000,000,000, "an amount more than that in force at the end of 1918 in all the life-insurance companies and in all the fraternal associations and societies of the country combined." The cost in claims to the government up to December, 1919, was more than \$1,000,000,000. The enormous amount of labor involved in handling these schemes of allotments, compensations, and insurance tasked the government beyond the power of efficient performance. When the War Risk Bureau was inaugurated in September, 1914, for the insurance of American vessels, cargoes, and seamen, it had but 93 employees. In March, 1919, the clerical force had grown to 17,000, occupying eighteen buildings. There was much complaint, especially in the matter of delayed payments of allotments; and bitter comparisons were made, not unjustly, between the regularity with which men at home, safely engaged in work for the government, received their swollen wages, and the anxiety of the soldier in the trenches for his wife and children, waiting for their overdue allotments from the Treasury. But the unfortunate situation was due rather to the involutions of red tape than to any deliberate neglect.

By January, 1920, the last of the A.E.F. had returned home, except for the small army of occupation of 17,000 officers and men under General Henry T. Allen at Coblenz. Major General Pershing, returning early in September, 1919, had been enthusiastically received by the people and Congress and had been raised to the full rank of general.¹ The return of 3,000,000

¹ On July 1, 1921, Secretary of War J. W. Weeks appointed General Pershing chief of staff of the American army to succeed General Peyton C. March. General Pershing was the tenth officer to hold this position since the General Staff was organized by Secretary Root in 1903.

soldiers to civil life in the year following the armistice, naturally made some disturbance in the labor situation. A good many employers had kept their places open for the returned soldiers, but in such cases the displacement of the new employees was often attended with trouble. The government employment service labored diligently to find positions for the discharged war workers and the returning soldiers, but by the middle of January, 1919, it had succeeded in placing only about 25 per cent of the former. In March the failure of Congress to make an appropriation for the continuance of the service reduced its force by 80 per cent and caused the virtual suspension of its activities. Labor, like capital, was jealous of the continuance of government interference when peace came. In August, 1918, the government had organized a Federal Board for Vocational Training, to help the disabled soldiers fit themselves for such occupations as they were capable of filling. About half of the 200,000 disabled men were recognized as eligible for vocational training, but at the beginning of 1920 less than 25,000 of these had been actually trained. A special committee of the Senate investigated the failure of the War Risk Bureau in this branch of its activity, reporting, in October, 1921, "with deep regret the melancholy fact" that up to July 1 of that year only 5000 of the hundreds of thousands of applicants for vocational training had been placed.

Influence was brought to bear upon the government and public opinion by the ex-service men themselves, who on the first anniversary of the signing of the armistice formally organized the American Legion in convention at Minneapolis. Membership in the Legion was open to men and officers on equal terms. Its general purpose, like that of the G.A.R. formed by the veterans of the Civil War, was to maintain the spirit of patriotism which had inspired the men to offer their lives for their country, and to exert the power of their united efforts in political and social life. The objects of the Legion as stated in its constitution were "to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States, to maintain law and order, to foster 100 per cent Americanism, and to preserve the memories and incidents of

the Great War." The American Legion was incorporated by act of Congress, September 16, 1919. In 1920 it formulated plans for asking subsidies from Congress in the shape of effectual vocational training for the disabled, lands for those who wanted farms, aid for housebuilding, or a cash bonus.¹ The House by a vote of 325 to 4 instructed the Committee on Ways and Means on February 26, 1920, to report a bonus bill carrying monetary and land grants to the soldiers, and on May 29 it passed the Fordney bill, providing for a bonus, by the decisive vote of 289 to 92; but a vote on the measure was not reached in the Senate during the session. We shall note later the history of the bonus legislation under the Harding administration.

The reabsorption into civil life of the men returned from the battle front in France and discharged from the camps at home was obviously the first task of demobilization. But there were important economic and social problems attendant on the resumption of a peace basis. At the time of the armistice our cargo movement as well as our troop movement to France was at its peak: 829,000 tons of cargo were shipped from the United States in November, 1918, as against 572,000, 682,000, and 750,000 tons respectively in the three months preceding. Vast supplies of war materials of every kind were stored in the great reservoirs near the chief ports of debarkation at St. Nazaire, Nantes, and La Pallice-Bordeaux, and at the central distributing point of Gièvres-Tours. Much of our wealth spent in France

¹ Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, perhaps the most able and far-sighted of all President Wilson's advisers, drew plans for a national soldiers' settlement act, which provided for a fund of \$500,000,000 to furnish employment and rural houses for the ex-service men. The act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire and develop lands and to dispose of them to the soldiers at prices to cover the cost of reclamation. Liberal loans were to be made by the government for the improvement of the farms and the purchase of live stock. Many of the states passed land-settlement acts. But the choice of the soldiers was decidedly for a cash bonus rather than for a farm, in spite of the efforts of President Butterfield to interest them in agricultural education at the A.E.F. university at Beaune, in France. Congress failed to take action on the soldiers' settlement scheme. Secretary Lane wrote, late in 1919, that he considered a cash bonus "altogether impossible, improvident, and not in the interest either of the country or of the soldiers" ("The Letters of Franklin K. Lane," 1922, p. 339).

had been put into fixed forms in harbors, docks, warehouses, railroad and road construction. At the close of hostilities there were about four hundred engineering projects under way, employing one hundred and fifty thousand men. It was estimated that the surplus of our mobile and salable supplies in France was worth about \$1,700,000,000, and on the disposal of so much of this surplus as we were able to sell to France and other European nations we realized something more than 50 cents on a dollar.¹ The need of every available ton of shipping for bringing our soldiers back made the retransportation of cargo material inadvisable; besides, there were surplus war stocks in this country reaching into the billions of dollars. In the orgy of high prices that prevailed after the war the government sought to bring relief by selling without profit a great variety of commodities like shoes, blankets, clothing, tins of beef and bacon, kitchen utensils, and plumbers' fixtures from the camps. Government contracts for munitions, arms, ships, trucks, motors, etc. totaled billions at the close of the war. For example, on November 27 we had contracts for 95,973 airplanes; 5693 motors had been turned out in the month of October, and production at the rate of 10,000 a month was planned. Congress authorized the War Department (March 2, 1919) to settle outstanding contracts, canceling those on which work had not begun and adjusting on an equitable basis those partially fulfilled. The Board of War Claims and the Liquidation Commission established under this act had by the end of the summer salvaged about \$7,000,000,000 in canceled and adjusted contracts.

Of course the government's losses were heavy. They were estimated at about \$80,000,000 on the army camps and cantonments alone. But the most serious item of loss was ships. At the outbreak of the war the tonnage of our merchant marine

¹ A Liquidation Commission created by the War Department under an act of Congress of March 2, 1919, negotiated an agreement with the French government by which the latter agreed to pay to the United States \$400,000,000 for all the permanent structures and improvements made by American capital in France and for all supplies turned over by the American army.

was 1,758,000. When we entered the contest at the height of the ravages of the unrestricted submarine warfare, the cry from all the Allies had been ships, more ships, and even more ships! We built 3,000,000 tons in 1918 and 4,000,000 in 1919. The program of the Emergency Fleet Corporation of the United States Shipping Board contemplated the construction of 3200 steel, wooden, and concrete vessels, with an aggregate tonnage of 17,800,000. By September 1, 1919, there had already been delivered 1321 ships with a tonnage of 7,284,000, and 845 more, aggregating 4,885,000 tons, were on the ways or in the basins. With a merchant marine increased 570 per cent since the beginning of the war, and foreign trade hard hit by the distress of the European nations at the close of the war, the United States had millions of tons of shipping that it could not use or profitably dispose of. The Merchant Marine act, signed June 5, 1920, provided for the sale of the whole government merchant fleet, as soon as possible, to American citizens or to corporations in which American citizens held a majority of the stock. Purchasers were allowed to pay for the ships in fifteen annual installments, and a fund of \$25,000,000 was provided to enable the Shipping Board to make loans to private owners for the establishment of new routes of trade. But American citizens were not eager to buy. Even if trade conditions had been favorable, the American shipowners were handicapped by the Seamen's Act (the La Follette act of 1915, upheld by the Supreme Court in November, 1921), which prescribed such rules for the wages, food, and accommodations of sailors as made it impossible to compete with foreign shipping. England could operate her merchant fleet at a cost of 25 per cent below the American expense, Sweden from 30 to 40 per cent less, and Japan from 40 to 50 per cent less. Our shippers were confronted by a dilemma. With the La Follette act in force they could not meet competition; if the act were repealed, they could not get the crews. As a critic of the situation remarked, "One cannot expect a man to go to sea in the focast'l of a dirty ocean tramp for \$75 a month, when he can make twice as much in a factory." So the Merchant Marine act remained virtually a dead letter.

Such of the ships as were not operated (at a loss) by the government were laid up in rivers and bays to deteriorate. Five years after the armistice was signed the useless merchant marine was costing the government at the rate of \$1,000,000 a day. Denman's fleet of wooden ships built at a cost of \$250,000,000 were written off as a total loss in August, 1920. Two years later George D. Perry of San Francisco bought 226 of them for \$750,000. They had cost about \$700,000 apiece. Late in February, 1924, the metropolitan newspapers ran an advertisement by the Shipping Board, inviting offers for the purchase of its fleet, and containing the description of 1216 coal-burning and oil-burning steel cargo, refrigerator, tank, and passenger vessels, to be sold "as is and where is," without guaranty as to "seaworthiness, condition, description, capacity, or tonnage."

Such was one of the items of the expense of the war which cost America \$22,625,000,000 exclusive of the \$10,000,000,000 lent to the Allies—a sum equal to \$1,000,000 an hour from April, 1917, to April, 1919, and enough to have run the government since 1791 or to have continued the American Revolution, at the rate of its expenditure, for a thousand years.

When hostilities ceased, the government found itself in control of most of the producing and distributing agencies of the country. President Wilson seemed to think that the transition to a state of peace would not be difficult. In his message to Congress, just before his departure for France, he said: "So far as our domestic affairs are concerned, the problem of our return to peace is a problem of economic and industrial readjustment. That problem is less serious for us than it may turn out to be for the nations which have suffered the disarrangements and the losses of the war longer than we. Our people, moreover, do not wait to be coaxed or led. They know their own business, are quick and resourceful at any readjustment, definite in purpose, and self-reliant in action. Any leading strings that we might seek to put them in would be hopelessly tangled, because they would pay no attention to them and go their own way. . . . From no quarter have I seen any general scheme of 'reconstruction' emerge which I thought it likely we could force our spirited

business men and self-reliant laborers to accept with due pliancy and obedience." This statement, so remarkable both for its optimism and its confessed renunciation of government leadership, combined with the President's own absence from the country for more than a half a year, was a bad omen for the smooth transition from a thoroughgoing paternalism to a state of harmonious voluntary coöperation. The government sought to divest itself of its extraordinary powers as rapidly as possible. The War Industries Board was dissolved at the end of 1918. The next summer the War Labor Board was dissolved, the diminishing functions of the War Trade Board were transferred to the State Department, and the telephone, telegraph, and cable wires were returned to private operation. Executive orders of January and February, 1919, abolished control over fuel, and in April food restrictions were removed. On December 24, 1919, President Wilson issued a proclamation fixing the first of the following March as the date for the return of the railroads to their owners. But these gestures of decentralization did not at all indicate the way to "reconstruction." The mere removal of the hand of the government from industries could not insure the automatic return to pre-war conditions. For the experience of the war itself had made such a return forever impossible.

Never in our history had there been so complete and sudden a revolution in the social and economic habits of the nation or in the relation of the people to their government. In the common enthusiasm for the task of winning the war, capital and labor had laid aside their chronic quarrel waged at the expense of the public, men had left their business and professions to serve the government at a dollar a year, the people had willingly submitted to sumptuary restrictions at the behest of the food and fuel dictators. Never before had the public come so close to the government, either to feel its direct constraint upon their wonted freedom of action or to contribute their voluntary support to its program. In April, 1917, there were perhaps 200,000 holders of government bonds in the country; a little more than two years later, with the completion of the Victory Loan, the number had grown to 25,000,000, and millions more, too poor

to buy a fifty-dollar "baby bond," had lent their pittance to the government in the purchase of war saving stamps. Subscriptions as low as 25 cents for a thrift stamp might be made. In former wars the burden of taxation had fallen upon the poor and middle classes in the shape of tariff duties and excises, while the rich held the government securities and drew the interest thereon. Now millions of the middle class and some, even, of the poor held part of the government debt, while the heavy income and excess-profits taxes fell upon the rich: \$12,000,000,000 in war taxes were taken from people with incomes of \$2000 or over, whereas more than twice the number of people who enjoyed the minimum income entitling them to the privilege of paying an income tax held government bonds. It was a revolution in the relations of the taxpayer and the security holder.


The war brought to the surface of our national life, as all wars do, both the noblest and the basest qualities of human nature. On the one hand, there were those who prophesied that the social synthesis created by the war would be carried over into the peace, and that the old incentive to private profit would be replaced by a new incentive to social service; on the other hand, there emerged the selfish greed of the profiteer, eager to make his country's need the opportunity for unwonted gain. Beginning with the concessions to the railroad brotherhoods in the Adamson Act of September, 1916, the administration had treated labor with what seemed to many uncalled-for generosity. The wages paid in the shipyards and cantonments had been unprecedented. Under the stress of speeding up production, contracts had been let on the "cost plus" basis, which meant that the contractor welcomed the chance to pay his workmen the highest wages possible, since his own profit was a percentage of the cost of construction. Carpenters who had earned \$4 a day were paid \$10. Untrained and unskilled laborers who had been earning \$50 a month crowded into the factories to earn three and four times that amount. The men bought silk shirts at \$15 apiece, and the women appeared in jewels and fur coats. The chairman of the Committee on Appropriations in the House acknowledged that whereas the cost of the shipbuilding program

would be \$4,000,000,000, the value of the ships built would probably not exceed \$2,000,000,000.

Neither "our spirited business men" nor our "self-reliant laborers" showed any disposition to forego the enormous rewards which they had reaped during the war. Profiteering, which Senator Capper of Kansas denounced as "open, scandalous, and shameful," had invaded every branch of industry. Manufacturers and dealers who had been content with profits of from 10 to 20 per cent before the war advanced the prices of goods to make 50 or 100 per cent. A report of the Federal Trade Commission on August 7, 1919, revealed the most sickening facts of the gouging and cheating of the public by the profiteers. There was plenty of food in the country, but tens of millions of eggs, millions of pounds of butter, and great quantities of meat and vegetables were hoarded by the wholesale dealers and the packers to be sold at exorbitant prices. A prominent woolen manufacturer who received over \$500,000 in commissions in 1919 was indicted under the Lever Act, which gave the government control over "wearing apparel," but the indictment was quashed on the technicality that wearing apparel was *clothes* and not *cloth*. The Philadelphia *North American* said on January 1, 1920: "Manufacturers have looted the purchasing public not only by cornering raw materials and inflating prices, but by shamelessly lowering the quality standard of their goods, until today merchants who are jealous of their reputation have to fight to get products they dare to guarantee as sound. Wholesalers, jobbers, retailers, down to the smallest, have joined in the game of grab. Labor, yielding to the prevailing spirit, has used its power of organization to get its share. Nay, the whole public has been infected, and over the entire country there is sweeping a wave of greed, of extravagance, of idleness, of devil-may-care defiance of all the principles of economics and morals."

Wages and prices were engaged in a mad topping contest. Every price increase was met by a demand for higher wages, and every rise in wages was capitalized as a basis for new and exorbitant prices. It was only necessary to have something to sell, or to work for somebody who had something to sell, in

order to grow rich. The unfortunate class who lived on salaries or on fixed income from investments found themselves crushed between the upper and nether millstones of capital and labor. The carpenter, the plumber, and the plasterer were commanding wages sufficient to pay for the necessities and often the luxuries of life. The professor and the clerk found their salaries virtually cut in halves and were hard put to it to maintain a respectable standard of living. The purchasing power of the dollar of 1914 was 76.2 cents in 1917 and 48.0 cents in 1920, at the peak



of high prices. The above table prepared by the National Industrial Conference Board shows the rise in prices in three of the main necessities of life between 1914 and 1921.

In August, 1919, the President turned to the problem of high prices, appointing a select committee to investigate cases of profiteering and addressing Congress in a special message, in which he declared that the excessive prices were not justified by the economic condition of the country, but were "largely the result of improper practices on the part of the manufacturers and the dealers." He recommended the extension of the provisions of the Lever Act to cover all articles of necessary consumption, the limitation of the period of storage, the publicity of prices paid by the wholesale distributors, and the licensing of corporations engaged in interstate commerce, so as "to insure competitive selling and to prevent unconscionable profits." But

Congress in 1919 was not looking to the President for leadership. Except for a slight amendment to the Lever Act, his program was ignored. Prices continued to rise. In December, 1919, they showed an advance of 80 per cent since July, 1914. By November, 1920, the average advance had reached 104 per cent. Potatoes and sugar¹ were selling for three times their price in 1914.

About one thousand actions against alleged profiteering were brought under the Lever Act. A combination of the five big packing-houses was forced to relinquish lines of industry unconnected with meat-packing and to dispose of their interests in "public stockyards, terminals, market newspapers, public storage warehouses, and general groceries." But the activities of the Department of Justice were not remarkably successful in the prosecution of the most flagrant profiteers. About one hundred and eighty convictions resulted in the assessment of fines aggregating only \$275,000. Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin declared that the Attorney-General was "setting a few mousetraps around the country when he ought to be setting bear traps." Local fair-price committees made it uncomfortable for the rent gouger and the food leech. Women boycotted the exorbitant butcher and grocer. To rebuke the profiteering in clothing, an "overalls campaign" was inaugurated in the spring of 1920. "Couples were married in denim and calico." Men took their last year's suits to the tailor to press for another season, and women refurbished their last year's gowns. It took many months for the fever of extravagance, which had infected the nation like

¹ The case of sugar was notorious. In the late summer of 1919 the Sugar Equalization Board warned the President of a prospective shortage and urged him to buy the Cuban crop, which was offered at 6½ cents a pound. The Louisiana sugar output for 1919, owing to a shortage of labor, bad weather, and a disease of the canes, was less than half that of the previous year. But the President declined to buy the Cuban sugar, most of which was sold elsewhere. Then Attorney-General Palmer allowed the Louisiana planters to charge 15 cents a pound at the plantations. The Cuban growers immediately put up their price. In the early months of 1920 the public was paying from 18 to 22 cents a pound, and the sugar profiteers were reaping a harvest of hundreds of millions of dollars. Prices reached even 30 and 35 cents in some places in midsummer. By the end of the year the shameless game was played out, and sugar dropped to 8 cents a pound retail.

some malignant germ from the war, to run its course. Sanity began to return with the sobering effects of deflation and the promise of an approximation of prices to values.

During the war, as we have seen, there had been a generous truce in the contest between capital and labor. The American Federation of Labor had agreed to submit its complaints to the War Labor Board, which had settled over one thousand cases involving some five hundred thousand employees. But soon after the signing of the armistice industrial strife broke out anew.¹ Neither capital nor labor was willing to accept the necessary readjustment to peace conditions, each fearing that the other would exploit its rival's renunciation and fasten its hold upon the industry of the country. Capital complained that the orgy of high prices and the social chaos were due to the rapacity of the wage-earners, who had formed a conspiracy to demand exorbitant pay for work poorly and grudgingly done. Labor pointed to the greed of the profiteers, who were unwilling to give up their 100 per cent. An epidemic of strikes broke out all over the country. Longshoremen, street-car men, pressmen, garment workers, textile workers, brass workers, carpenters, builders, miners, steelmen, expressmen, policemen, actors, waiters, barbers, and bakers followed each other out of their jobs. The statistics of the Department of Labor for the week of September 11-18, 1919, showed 151 strikes under way and 53 threatened.² The public suffered equally from the hostility and the collusion of the two competing monopolies of capital and labor. There was no authority to compel the contestants to settle their disputes in the interests of the public. Any attempt of the executive or the legislature to interfere was resented as an infringement of the rights of American freemen. Counsel and persuasion were the only methods possible.

¹ The waning power of the War Labor Board was shown by its decision in December, 1918, not to interfere further in disputes, unless invited by both capital and labor. At the same time, the pressure which the President could exert for the enforcement of the board's decrees, by commandeering the factories or withdrawing draft exemption from the workers, ended with the cessation of the war.

² The department's report of July 7, 1920, put the total number of strikes for the year 1919 at 3374, affecting 4,000,000 workers.

Just before starting on his Western tour (September 2) President Wilson issued an invitation to representatives of capital, labor, and the general public to meet in a conference at Washington on October 6 to "consult together on the vital questions concerning our industrial life." Wilson himself was too ill to welcome the half a hundred delegates when they met at the capital. His place was taken by the Secretary of Labor. Franklin K. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior, was made the chairman of the conference, which he described as "the greatest and most important extra-legal body that has been called in this country, certainly in our own time." It was, he said, "bound to be a success." But his prophecy was false. The conference polarized into the groups of capital and labor, the representatives of the public vainly striving to hold the balance between the two. Instead of trying to formulate principles for the future conduct of industry, as ex-President Eliot of Harvard urged them to do, the capitalist and labor groups fell to arguing the merits of the case in the actual strike of the steel workers. The utter hopelessness of reconciliation was shown by the demands on both sides. The labor representatives argued that the employers should deal with the federated unions, and the employers insisted that they would deal only with the workers in each separate shop. The latter demand meant nothing less than the repudiation of the basic principle of the American Federation of Labor. When Mr. Gompers submitted as an ultimatum a resolution to the effect that "the right of wage-earners to organize without discrimination, to bargain collectively, and to be represented by the representatives of their own choosing in negotiating with employers in respect to wages, hours of labor, and conditions of employment," the labor and public groups accepted the resolution, but the employers group rejected it by a decisive vote. Whereupon Mr. Gompers, declaring that "further attempts to reach an agreement would be futile," withdrew with the labor group from the conference (October 23). The President then dismissed the employers group and called a new conference consisting of a body of seventeen men—principally government officials and representatives of big business—to

suggest some plan by which "our industries may be conducted with such regard for justice and fair dealing that the workman will feel himself induced to put forth his best efforts, that the employer will have an encouraging profit, and that the public will not suffer at the hands of either class." The plan proposed by the President's Industrial Conference was the creation of twelve industrial regions on the analogy of the Federal Reserve districts, each with a regional board of adjustment for labor disputes, and the establishment of a National Industrial Tribunal of nine members to act as a court of appeals from the decisions of the regional boards. But the plan remained a suggestion only.¹

Following the failure of the industrial conference, the American Federation of Labor and the railroad brotherhoods called a labor conference to meet at Washington, December 13, to "define the general policies to be adopted by labor in seeking to promote its interests." The conference, representing one hundred and twelve national and international labor unions, adopted resolutions repudiating Bolshevism and the I. W. W. as "destructive to American ideals," reiterating the principles of voluntary arbitration and collective bargaining, indorsing the steel strike and the coal strike (see paragraphs immediately following), denouncing the use of the injunction in labor disputes, condemning the clause of the Cummins railroad bill prohibiting strikes (see page 757), and demanding the retention of the railroads by the government at least until January 1, 1922, "in order that a thorough test may be made of government operation under normal conditions." The conference also advocated the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.

Just a fortnight before the first industrial conference met at Washington, a nation-wide strike of the steel workers, involving about three hundred and seventy thousand men, was inaugurated. The strike arose out of the attempt of the American Federation to unionize the laborers in the steel industry,

¹ Mr. Gompers criticized the report of the conference as containing "a reflection of the philosophy of uplift commonly found in the rarefied atmosphere where real labor, with its difficulties and problems, does not exist."

which was the most important industry of the country that still dealt with its workers individually. The issue was made on collective bargaining. Judge E. H. Gary, of the United States Steel Corporation, acting for the manufacturers generally, flatly refused to recognize the representatives of the international unions of the steel industry or even to hold an interview with them. He explained his position in a public statement of September 17: "The declaration was made for two reasons: first, because I did not believe that the gentlemen were authorized to speak for large numbers of our employees, whose interests and wishes are of prime importance; secondly, because a conference with these men would have been treated by them as a recognition of the 'closed shop' method of employment. We do not combat labor unions as such. We do not negotiate with labor unions, because it would indicate the closing of our shops to non-union labor, and large numbers of our workmen are not members of the unions and do not care to be." The strike was set for September 22, in spite of the President's request that no action be taken until the industrial conference had met. Many of the demands of the strikers, such as the abolition of the seven-day week and the twenty-four-hour shift, sufficient wages to "guarantee an American standard of living," an eight-hour day, reinstatement of men discharged for activities in the unions, standard classification of employees, were undoubtedly justified. The Interchurch Report on the Steel Strike (1920) revealed facts which showed that the charge, made by the strike committee, of "intolerable and brutal conditions under which the men are compelled to work" was not malevolent rhetoric. Nevertheless the strike was a failure from the start, and was called off before the close of the year. The main reason for this was the confessed purpose of its chief promoter, William Z. Foster, to introduce the very methods of un-American agitation condemned by the labor unions in their conference at Washington. An investigating committee of the Senate, headed by William S. Kenyon of Iowa, recognized that many of the complaints of the strikers were justified, but added, "Behind this strike there is massed a considerable element of I.W.W.'s, anarchists, and

revolutionists, and the Russian soviets; some radicals are attempting to use the strike to elevate themselves to power within the ranks of organized labor." It recommended "an Americanization law to provide for the effective education and Americanization of illiterate foreigners," and "the amendment of the naturalization laws, to compel aliens to learn to speak the American [*sic!*] language and to become naturalized within five years or be deported." It advocated the creation of a permanent Federal Industrial Commission, "somewhat similar to the War Labor Board, to have large powers in mediation and conciliation, pending whose decisions strikes should not be declared."

More serious than the steel strike, and "the most important labor difficulty calling for action by the national government," was a strike of the bituminous-coal miners, four hundred thousand strong and firmly unionized, which began on the first day of November, 1919. The coal workers had, through collective bargaining, made an agreement with the operators which was to last until "the close of the war," should that come before January 1, 1920. Claiming that the war was actually over, the United Mine Workers, in a meeting at Cleveland on September 13, made demands for a 60 per cent increase in wages and the guaranty of at least thirty working hours a week. They charged the mine operators with making enormous profits, which, in fact, the income-tax returns showed to have reached 800 per cent in some parts of the country. The operators refused to consider any revision of the agreement unless they were allowed to advance the price of coal 20 per cent, which would have added \$150,000,000 to the people's coal bill. Realizing the disastrous effects which the tying up of transportation and industry would have throughout the country at the very crisis of the struggle to return to normal conditions, the President urged the miners to rescind the strike order and continue production pending the decision of a board of arbitration. When his appeal was refused, he issued a statement condemning a strike under present conditions as "not only unjustifiable, but unlawful." "I feel it my duty in the public interest," he added, "to declare

that any attempt to carry out the purposes of this strike and thus paralyze the industry of the country, with the consequent suffering and distress to all our people, must be considered a grave moral and legal wrong against the government and people of the United States. I can do nothing less than to say that the law will be enforced and means will be found to protect the interests of the nation in any emergency that may arise out of this unhappy business." Mr. John L. Lewis, the acting president of the United Mine Workers, not only refused to suspend the strike order but returned a defiant answer to the President's rebuke. He spoke of the members of the cabinet as "the allies of sinister financial interests," and said that the President "threatened the mine workers with sanctified peonage" by calling their exercise of the right to strike "unlawful."

As we were technically still at war with Germany, the Lever food and fuel control act of 1917, which made it a penal offense to "conspire or take action leading to the interference with the production of coal" during the war, was still in force. Under its authority Attorney-General Palmer secured from Judge A. B. Anderson of Indianapolis an injunction (October 31) restraining the officials of the United Mine Workers from supporting the strike. The next day four hundred thousand men in the bituminous fields quit work. Although the operators claimed that 65 per cent of the normal supply was being mined in Pennsylvania and West Virginia by the non-union workers, the situation was alarming. The American Federation of Labor and the railroad brotherhoods declared their approval of the strike. President Wilson revived the fuel administration and called Dr. Garfield to Washington again. Troops were ordered to West Virginia, Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexico. A series of negotiations undertaken by Secretary of Labor Wilson, himself an ex-official of a Pennsylvania miners' union, failed to move the heads of the United Mine Workers. A second injunction was issued by Judge Anderson, on November 8, ordering the officials to recall the strike order within three days. The protest of the labor officials against this order was bitter. Mr. Lewis condemned it as "the most sweeping abrogation of the rights of

citizens, guarded under the Constitution and defined by statutory law, that has ever been issued by any Federal court." Mr. Gompers said, "The autocratic action of our government in these proceedings is of such a nature that it staggers the human mind." Nevertheless the Executive Council of the United Mine Workers, after a session of seventeen hours at Indianapolis, decided at 4 A.M. on November 11 to obey the order and call off the strike. "We will comply with the mandate of the court," said Mr. Lewis. "We do it under protest. We are Americans. We cannot fight the government. That is all." The men were slow in returning to work. Only about 40 per cent of the normal supply of bituminous coal was being mined by the middle of December. In two or three of the states the governor even took over the control of the mines and called for volunteers to work them.

Meanwhile Secretary Wilson and Dr. Garfield had been working with the operators and miners to arrive at a satisfactory adjustment. The Secretary favored a 31.6 per cent increase of wages, but the Fuel Administrator offered a 14 per cent raise, with the provision that the price of coal was not to be increased and that a permanent arbitration committee should be formed with Secretary Lane as chairman. The President's compromise proposition that an immediate advance of 14 per cent in wages should be granted and that a commission be appointed to consider further concessions was accepted by the miners on December 10. Dr. Garfield resigned three days later because the settlement had been taken out of his hands. The eventual concession of the commission was a wage increase of 27 per cent, with no change in the hours or conditions of labor. It was estimated that the strike had cost the country \$125,000,000 and the loss of a million tons of coal daily. The government control of the situation ended April 1, 1920, with the coming into effect of the commission's award.

Another strike, local in situation but sinister in character, added to the social chaos of the autumn of 1919. On September 9 Police Commissioner Curtis of Boston suspended nineteen patrolmen for breaking the orders of the department in organiz-

ing a union in affiliation with the A. F. of L. Whereupon 90 per cent or more of the Boston police force of 1544 men went out on a strike. For two or three days a reign of terror threatened the city. The criminal element emerged boldly. Rioting, hold-ups, and looting followed. Banks and stores quickly organized private armed protection. Harvard students volunteered for the preservation of order. Guards were rushed to the city from the navy yard. Governor Coolidge mobilized five thousand of the state militia and appealed to Secretary Baker for help in case it should be needed. Quiet was restored by September 12. On the same day Mr. Gompers telegraphed to Governor Coolidge, advising that the striking policemen be reinstated and that the question of permitting them to unionize be left to the decision of the industrial conference which President Wilson had called to meet in Washington early the next month. But the police commissioners refused to take back the striking men, and the Boston police force was newly recruited. Governor Coolidge gave his hearty support to the commissioner, declaring in his reply to Gompers, "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time." President Wilson wrote to Governor Coolidge, commending his stand, and the quiet, modest chief magistrate of the Bay State, whose name had been scarcely known outside its borders, suddenly found himself a figure of national importance. He was enthusiastically re-elected by the people of Massachusetts in the autumn of 1919; and the next summer, at the Republican national convention at Chicago, he was nominated for the vice presidency on the first ballot, with 674 votes to 146 for his nearest competitor.

The industrial unrest of the hectic year 1919 was serious enough from the economic point of view alone, but it took on an ultra-serious character from the elements of social revolution which appeared in its program. The chaos which followed the war not only invited men of good will to labor for the reconstruction of society along the lines of our tested constitutional democracy, but also incited the revolutionary agitators to plot the destruction of representative government, the abolition of the industrial order, and the appropriation of the wealth of the

country by the workers, under a dictatorship of the proletariat. The Russian Bolsheviks aimed at nothing less than the conquest of the world by communism, as the German High Command had aimed at the conquest of the world by militarism. "The power that has crushed Germany," said Lenin at the time of the Spartacide revolution, "is the power that in the end will crush England and the United States." The Russian Bolsheviks had an ally in the American I. W. W. The "one big union" dominating industry was a close parallel to the Russian federation of soviets. Ludwig C. A. K. Martens appeared in this country as "the official representative of the Lenin-Trotsky government, with credentials signed by Chicherin, the Bolshevik minister of foreign affairs. Neither he nor the government from which he came was recognized by our State Department, yet he opened offices in New York with an official staff and directed an active campaign of propaganda in this country. "All-Russia Soviet of America" was the strange name borne by radical associations in many of our cities. In February, 1919, an attempt was made at Seattle, Washington, in support of the striking shipyard workers, to paralyze the whole industrial life of the city by a general strike. Only the most necessary activities for the preservation of health and life (such as the filling of doctors' prescriptions, the work for hospitals, the collection of garbage, the establishment of milk stations) were allowed exemption from the strike order.

Anarchistic outrages were perpetrated during the summer. A bomb exploded on the doorstep of Attorney-General Palmer's house in Washington, wrecking the façade of the building, but injuring no one besides the man who threw it. Bombs destined for other officials were discovered and intercepted in the mails. A raid on the quarters of the Union of Russian Workers in New York disclosed quantities of explosives and chemicals for the manufacture of bombs. On the anniversary of the signing of the armistice (November 11) a parade of the American Legion was fired upon in Centralia, Washington, and four men were killed. The I. W. W. were held responsible for most of the violence. Of thirty-three of the members of the organization tried

before Judge Pollock of Kansas City, twenty-seven were convicted of seditious activities and sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying from three to nine years and to fines ranging from \$3000 to \$10,000. In his message of December, 1919, the President warned Congress that "the evidences of world-wide unrest which manifest themselves in violence . . . bid us pause and consider the means to be found to stop the spread of this contagious thing before it saps the very vitality of the nation itself. . . . With the free expression of opinion and with the advocacy of orderly political change, however fundamental, there must be no interference; but toward passion and malevolence tending to incite crime and revolution under the guise of political evolution, there should be no leniency. . . . The instrument of all reforms in America is the straight road of justice. . . . Let those beware who would take a shorter road of disorder and revolution."

The administration was preparing, meanwhile, to send the "Reds" on a long road. On November 7, by orders of the Secretary of Labor, over 250 radical agitators were arrested in a dozen cities of the country. At Ellis Island, awaiting deportation as aliens who had come into the country in violation of the provisions of the immigration laws, was a rapidly growing group of agitators. The Attorney-General, in his report of December 8, urged drastic legislation against the Reds. He said that the department had examined 472 publications in various foreign languages advocating the forcible overthrow of this government. On December 21 the transport *Buford*, dubbed the "Soviet Ark," sailed from New York, carrying 249 aliens who were "a menace to law and order here" to soviet Russia, where they belonged. The *Buford* reached Finland on January 17, 1920, and its passengers were taken across the battle trenches into Russia. The Department of Justice asserted that there were more than 2500 agitators in the country who deserved deportation. Ellis Island was crowded with them, and plans were made to utilize Camp Upton for their detention. About 800 were confined in Federal prisons.

The activities of the Department of Justice and of various

state authorities in combating radical propaganda¹ aroused a lively discussion in the country. On the one hand, there were those who believed that the government was too lenient. The American Legion, in its second national convention, in 1920, demanded the dismissal of Louis F. Post, Assistant Secretary of Labor, for lowering the bail of the arrested radicals and attacking the policy of deportation. Representative Johnson of Washington declared in a debate on the Stirling-Johnson law of June 5, 1920, for the suppression of Bolshevism, that the mere fact of membership in the I.W.W., the Communist party, or the Communist Labor party, should make a person subject to deportation. "Deprive these organizations of their aliens," he cried, "and they will either become American or fade away. The United States is not going to be run by aliens who do not vote." On the other hand, the Attorney-General was attacked as a panic-stricken reactionary who was doing more harm to our free institutions by his "illegal arrests" and "shocking and brutal raids" than all the Reds in the country put together. Liberal associations of every kind denounced the repression of free speech and free assembly. There was being created an atmosphere of suspicion where every man must fear his neighbor as the people feared the "delators" of Tiberius's reign. A number of prominent attorneys and legal authorities signed a manifesto on May 27, 1920, in which they declared: "American institutions have not been protected by the Attorney-General's suppres-

¹ A committee of the New York legislature headed by Senator Lusk, for example, went so far as to secure the passage of educational bills requiring all persons or associations conducting schools, classes, or "courses of instruction in any subject" to secure a license from the regents of the state and forbidding the licensing of any teacher who had "advocated, either by word of mouth or in writing, a form of government other than the government of the United States or of this State." On the recommendation of the Lusk Committee the legislature, by a vote of 140 to 6, excluded five Socialist members from their seats, on the ground that the Socialists were dangerous enemies of the country. Governor Smith declined to sign the Lusk educational bills, which were approved by his successor, Governor Miller, to the sorrow of all friends of academic freedom. Governor Smith, ex-Governor Hughes, and Theodore Roosevelt (serving his first term in the legislature) were among the thousands who protested against the exclusion of the Socialists.

sions. On the contrary, those institutions have been seriously undermined and revolutionary unrest vastly intensified. No organization of radicals acting through propaganda over the last six months could have created so much revolutionary sentiment in America as has been created by the Department of Justice itself." Doubtless there were agitators who preached resistance to law and the subversion of order. But that the situation demanded any such drastic application, in the time of peace, of the Espionage Act, passed as a war measure, it is hard to believe. The Attorney-General was widely suspected of using *agents provocateurs* to keep up the radical agitation, so that he might exploit the all too ready spirit of crowd psychology and pose as the defender of an endangered American patriotism, and to prepare the way for his nomination for the presidency at the approaching Democratic convention.

Of the many problems of economic demobilization the most difficult was the proper disposition of the railroads, which the government had taken over at the close of 1917 (p. 680). Government management had been costly. During the year 1918 the revenues of the roads increased 21.4 per cent, but the operating expenses rose 40.3 per cent. The expense was chiefly due to a wage increase of \$583,000,000 granted by the Director General. The deficit amounted to over \$200,000,000 for 1918, and a further deficit of \$192,000,000 was accumulated in the first four months of 1919. Thirty per cent of the stock was paying no dividends. The Bureau of Railroad Economics estimated the net loss to the government in its twenty three months of railroad operation at \$594,000,000. With the express companies and steamship lines added, the loss rose to \$700,000,000. The government had no intention of holding on to the roads after the war, yet it could not in equity turn them over without more ado to their former owners. The large sums advanced to the railroads for improvements, and the obligations put upon the roads by the government grant of wage increases, made it inevitable that much closer relations between the government and the railroads must exist henceforth than had existed before the war. But just what those relations should be was the question.

President Wilson had no specific plan to propose. He declared in his message of December 2, 1918, that it would be "a disservice alike to the country and to the owners of the railroads to return to the old conditions unmodified." But the details of the modification he left to Congress. A few days later Director General McAdoo made a report (December 11) recommending the extension of the government operation of the roads for a period of five years, to the first of January, 1924, both to test the value of the experiment in time of peace and to give the roads the benefit of the government's credit until they should be able to take care of themselves. Walker D. Hines, who succeeded McAdoo on January 10, 1919, approved the suggestion. The Interstate Commerce Commission reported on December 18, making a careful examination of the possible methods of settling the railroad question, rather than committing itself to any one of them. The government might hand back the roads to their owners or keep control of them indefinitely. Between these two extremes of policy there were several forms of compromise possible: public ownership with private operation, private ownership with government subsidies or guaranties, private management under various degrees of government regulation. If the public ownership of the roads were contemplated, there were certain most important problems that the government would have to solve, such as a fair price to pay for the property, the creation of the proper organs of administration, the relation of these organs to Congress and the Interstate Commerce Commission, the elimination of the railroads from politics, and the provision of tribunals for the settlement of the disputes which would still arise over wages, hours, and conditions of labor.

The railroad owners and the railroad workers had their respective plans, too, each of them containing novel suggestions. On June 5, 1919, a meeting of the operators representing 92 per cent of the mileage of the country approved the proposition that the roads should be returned to private ownership, but with extensive government supervision. Roads doing interstate business should be incorporated under Federal charters, the weaker roads should be consolidated into strong competing systems, and

a Federal Transportation Board, thoroughly posted on the conditions of traffic, should certify to the Interstate Commerce Commission rates sufficient to insure fair profits to the stockholders and should facilitate the arbitration of disputes. This was an astonishing program to come from the railroad owners. It was the voluntary concession of all that a La Follette had ever asked, a complete contrast to the hostility to any schemes of government interference or control shown in the days of the Cullom Act and the Sherman Act.

The new consciousness and claims of organized labor were illustrated in the plan submitted by Glenn E. Plumb of Chicago, counsel for the railroad brotherhoods. The Plumb plan advocated the purchase of the roads by the government, whose securities were to replace their stock and bonds. Then they were to be leased at a rental of 5 per cent to a National Railway Operating Corporation, consisting of the whole body of railroad officials and employees, and to be managed by a directorate of fifteen men, five chosen by the officials, five by the workers, and five by the President. The government was to meet any deficiency arising from the operation of the roads and to share equally with the workers any surplus above the 5 per cent rental. Rates were to be proposed by the Operating Corporation, subject to review by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Wages were to be fixed by the mixed board of directors. Disputes were to be settled by a tribunal composed of five officials and five employees, with appeal to the directors in case of a tie. The Plumb plan was indorsed by the American Federation of Labor. A Plumb Plan League was formed to push the scheme, and members of Congress who were hostile were threatened with the loss of the labor vote in the coming election. The Plumb plan roused a great deal of debate in the country. It was commended by its friends as a practical step toward the ideal which President Wilson himself had set up in his cabled message from Paris on May 20, 1919: "A genuine democratization of industry, based on the full recognition of the rights of those who work, in whatever rank, to participate in some organic way in every decision which directly affects their welfare." But to its oppo-

nents the plan was a dangerous economic experiment, the entering wedge of the "sovietization" of industry, which had wrought such havoc in Russia.

President Wilson had announced the date of the return of the railroads as March 1, 1920, but it was doubtful whether Congress could agree upon a plan of restoration before that date. In November and December widely divergent bills had been passed in the House and Senate bearing the names of J. J. Esch of Wisconsin and Albert Cummins of Iowa, the respective chairmen of the committees dealing with interstate transportation. The notable and novel feature of both bills was their friendly intent toward the railroads. The Cummins bill advocated the funding of the roads' indebtedness to the government for capital expenditures for a period of at least ten years, the merging of a score or so of the roads into regional systems, whose revenues were to be pooled so as to make the successful roads pay for the weaker ones, and the prohibition of railroad strikes. For nine weeks the conference committee worked to come to an agreement. It was not until the close of February, 1920, that House and Senate, by votes of 250 to 15 and 47 to 17, passed the compromise Esch-Cummins bill, which was signed by the President two days before the proclamation for the return of the roads took effect. The elaborate Esch-Cummins Act, or Railroad Transportation Act of 1920, contained as its main provisions: (1) the compulsory submission of disputes on wages, hours, and conditions of labor to a Railway Labor Board of nine members appointed by the President—three from the railroad owners, three from the workers, and three from the public; (2) the adjustment of rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission so as to guarantee a return of $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent for two years (plus $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent for improvements) on the estimated value of the roads;¹ (3) a government guaranty against deficit until September 1, 1920, no increase in rates or decrease in wages to be made before that date; (4) government

¹ On the estimated capitalization of \$19,000,000,000 the $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent guaranty meant an income of \$1,045,000,000, as contrasted with a \$900,000,000 guaranty under the law of March 21, 1918 (p. 681).

aid to the roads in an appropriation of \$200,000,000, and the creation of a revolving fund of \$300,000,000 for loans; (5) the prohibition of interlocking directorates in railroad boards after December 31, 1921; and (6) the increase of the membership (from 9 to 11), the salary (from \$10,000 to \$12,000), and the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission. That body was now to have supervision over the issue of securities, the adjustment of car service, the establishment of both maximum and minimum rates, the joint use of terminals, the declaration of priorities and embargoes in transportation, and the complete centralization of all the railroads in case of war or the threat of war.

The Railroad Transportation Act of 1920, which still remains in force, has never been acceptable to labor. The railroad brotherhoods asked President Wilson to veto it, and in June the American Federation of Labor in its convention at Montreal voted 19,058 to 8348 in favor of government ownership of the roads. A wage decision of the Railway Labor Board published in July, guaranteeing the employees an increase of 20 to 27 per cent and raising the average wage to \$1900 a year as against \$830 in 1915, was denounced by Mr. Gompers as "grossly inadequate." It represented an increase of 117 per cent in wages, he said, whereas the index figures showed an advance of 159 per cent in prices since 1913. The operators, in turn, asked for large increases in freight and passenger rates. The assignment of authority over wages to one board (the Railway Labor Board) and over rates to another (the Interstate Commerce Commission) created confusion and contention. The real solution of the railroad problem, however, lay not so much in any form of congressional legislation or public administration as in the slow return of the country to more normal conditions of industry and foreign and domestic trade.

Two amendments to the Constitution went into effect in the year 1920. The woman suffrage amendment (the Nineteenth, ratified August 18) we have already studied in connection with the movement for the enlargement of popular government (see pages 470-473). The Eighteenth Amendment, ratified January

16, 1919, to go into effect one year later, established nation-wide prohibition. It is probable that prohibition would have come in time, even without the war. The sentiment in favor of it was growing rapidly in some parts of the country. Five states of the South were "dry" before 1914, besides three Western states and Maine. By the end of 1917 exactly half the states of the country, representing all sections from New England to the Pacific coast, had adopted prohibition, and both Houses of Congress had passed a resolution for a prohibition amendment to the Constitution by large majorities (Senate 65 to 20, House 282 to 128). The war-time legislation hastened ratification. A clause of the Food Stimulation Act of November 21, 1918, provided that from May 1, 1919, no grains, cereals, or fruits should be used for the manufacture of intoxicating beverages, and that from July 1, 1919, until the presidential proclamation of the end of the war and demobilization, no distilled spirits, beer, wine, or other intoxicating beverages should be sold. During the last six months of 1919, therefore, there was a strange situation. By the terms of the Eighteenth Amendment the liquor interests had been given a year of grace (till January 16, 1920) to dispose of their stocks and wind up business, and yet the war-time prohibition legislation tied their hands. President Wilson was asked to lift the embargo imposed by the Food Stimulation Act, but he could not commit the inconsistency of declaring that the war was over for the purpose of relieving the liquor interests and maintaining that the war was still going on for the purpose of enforcing the Lever Act against the striking miners (p. 748). He did veto the drastic Volstead Act for the enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment, but Congress passed the act over his veto (October 28) by votes of 176 to 55 in the House and 65 to 20 in the Senate. He recommended to Congress the repeal of the war-time prohibition, in view of the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, but his advice was not heeded. The "wets" questioned both the legality of the war-time measure, now that war was over, and the justice of the Volstead Act in defining as "intoxicating" all beverages containing $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 per cent of alcohol. They also maintained that the ratification by the legislatures of

the states whose constitutions provided for the referendum was not final. But the Supreme Court in decisions of June, 1920, unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the Volstead Act and the amendment, and swept aside the appeals from half a dozen states praying for a stay of action.

The Eighteenth Amendment has been the subject of a wider popular discussion than any other public measure of half a century. Objectors have maintained that it is an intolerable invasion of private rights; that it was forced upon the people against their will;¹ that the expensive attempts to enforce it are farcical in their results; that, while it deprives the treasuries of license fees, it has enriched bootleggers and rum runners, who imperil the health of the people by the poisonous liquors they sell at exorbitant prices; and, worse of all, that it has encouraged a widespread contempt for law by the defiant and unpunished violation of its provisions. The defenders of the prohibition amendment, on the other hand, point to statistics to show the enormous decrease in the amount of liquor consumed,² the reduction in the number of arrests for drunkenness; the elimination of the sinister influence of the saloon in politics; the increase in longevity as reported by the life-insurance companies, enhanced industrial efficiency, empty jails and workhouses, reduced police forces, and swelling savings-bank deposits. In general, each side is more strongly confirmed in its own opinion by its opponents' arguments, which it characterizes as specious

¹ It is true that only 6780 persons out of the 105,000,000 citizens of the country voted directly on the Eighteenth Amendment in Congress and the state legislatures, but the overwhelming votes in favor of the amendment seem to justify the claim that it represented the will of the nation. The vote in the upper houses of the legislatures was 85 per cent in favor to 15 per cent against it, and in the lower houses 78 per cent to 22 per cent. Fourteen state senates and eight assemblies ratified unanimously. In thirty-four senates and twenty-one assemblies the adverse vote was less than 10 per cent. In South Dakota, Kansas, Idaho, Washington, Wyoming, and Utah there was not a dissenting vote in either house. All the states except Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Jersey had ratified the amendment before the end of February, 1919.

² The official figures of the United States Statistical Abstract for 1920 give the per-capita consumption of wines and liquors as 3.01 gallons, as compared with 9.34 gallons in 1919, 19.61 in 1916, and 22.69 in 1914.

in logic and unfounded in fact. But whatever one's private opinion may be on the subject, prohibition is the law of the land. No one can be forced to approve a law, but neither is anyone at liberty to break the law. One may advocate its alteration or abolition; while it stands, no one may defy its provisions. Therefore, while questioning the first sentence, one must indorse the second sentence of the public statement of Internal Revenue Collector Daniel C. Roper, on New Year's Day, 1920: "Whether prohibition is a wise national policy is not longer a question for debate or contention among good citizens. This step on the part of our people has been incorporated as an integral part of the Constitution of our country, and all law-abiding citizens will demand its observance."

THE PROPHET OF A BETTER UNDERSTANDING

The country was still in the turmoil of peace when the national conventions met in the early summer of 1920 to select the candidates to compete for the succession to the power which had already passed out of the hands of President Wilson. The conspicuous feature of the situation was the number of applicants for the nomination and the lack of leaders. Of the two strong men who had filled the political stage so completely in the first and second decades of the century respectively, the one was in his grave and the other stricken with paralysis. Roosevelt had made his peace with the Republican party during the war, leading the attack on Wilson in his speeches and writings. He was far and away the most popular Republican in the country, and was already being spoken of as the inevitable nominee of the party, when death overtook him in his sleep before dawn, January 6, 1919. There were two men among the contestants for the nomination by the Republican convention, which met at Chicago on June 8, 1920, who could claim in a sense to be the political legatees of Theodore Roosevelt: General Leonard Wood, his old favorite in the army and his close associate in the campaign for an ample preparedness program, and Senator Hiram Johnson, his running mate on the Progressive ticket of 1912

and the representative of his radical ideas on popular government. The men of the Hanna tradition, who wanted a candidate of unquestioned soundness on the matter of the government's favorable attitude toward big business, inclined to the wealthy, efficient governor of Illinois, Frank O. Lowden. A large group of people, including many of the women voters and the more liberal-minded of the professional classes, for whom Wood was too military, Johnson too radical, and Lowden too conservative, started a boom for Herbert Hoover, whose management of the Belgian relief and the food dictatorship during the war had revealed him as an administrator of the first quality. Hoover represented efficiency divorced from professional politics. But partisanship was fatal to the Hoover boom. The Democrats would not support him if he ran on the Republican ticket, and his advocacy of the League of Nations made him unacceptable to the senatorial group who, as it proved, had the control of the convention in their hands. A month before the convention met they had already selected one of their own number, Warren G. Harding of Ohio, a signer of the round robin of March 3, 1919 (pp. 716-717), and a Lodge reservationist on the Treaty of Versailles—although they waited for the psychological moment to impose him upon the convention.

The first ballot showed General Wood in the lead, with 287½ votes to 211½ for Lowden, 133½ for Johnson, 65½ for Harding, and the rest of the votes divided among thirteen other candidates with fewer than 100 apiece. For several ballots the relative strength remained unchanged, each of the leading candidates, except Harding, gaining at the expense of the scattering vote. When it became evident that Senator Johnson, in spite of a lively campaign which he was himself leading, was weakening, and when Senator Borah announced that the radicals would bolt if either Wood or Lowden were nominated,¹ a group of senators

¹ It was revealed at the time that the managers of both these candidates had used large sums of money, \$40,000 having been spent to secure the Missouri delegation for Lowden. The *Chicago Tribune* of June 2, 1920, asserted that more than \$2,000,000 had been spent by General Wood's backers, and that William C. Procter, the wealthy soap manufacturer, had led with a contribution of \$500,000.

(including Lodge, the chairman of the convention, Smoot, Watson, Wadsworth, and New) held a meeting at Hotel Blackstone on the night of June 11, from which the announcement came that Harding was to be the man. The next day he received 692 votes on the tenth ballot. Governor Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts was nominated for the vice presidency on the first ballot. The convention issued a platform condemning the "unconstitutional and dictatorial course" of President Wilson, and promising to "allay unrest, suspicion, and strife in the country" and to secure "the coöperation and unity of all its citizens" (a large order!). Public interest centered in the Republican pronouncement on "our deplorable situation in the eyes of the world," which was laid wholly to President Wilson's conduct: "The policy of the administration has been founded upon no principle and directed by no definite conception of our nation's rights and obligations [!]. It has been humiliating to America and irritating to other nations, with the result that, after a period of unexampled sacrifice, our motives are suspected, our moral influence is impaired, and our government stands discredited and friendless among the nations of the world." The platform commended the Senate for its "courage and fidelity" in its action on the Treaty of Versailles, and pledged the party, when it should come into power, to "fulfill our world obligations without sacrifice to our national independence." President Wilson called the Republican proceedings at Chicago "the apotheosis of reaction," and declared that they "should have quoted Bismarck and Bernhardt rather than Washington and Lincoln."

The Democrats met at San Francisco on June 28, with even more divided counsels and clashing ambitions than had characterized the Republicans. For all his loss of health and prestige, the stricken President was the only man in the party who deserved the name of leader. But he resolutely refrained from attempting to exercise the slightest influence over the convention, except to beg it to nominate a man who supported his views on the League of Nations. When Chairman Cummings of the national committee called on him, with Senator Glass and Secre-

tary Colby, before their departure for San Francisco, to ask if he had any message to send, he replied that he had none. His son-in-law, ex-Secretary McAdoo, was looked upon as the leading aspirant for the nomination, and, in fact, led on the opening ballots. President Wilson would have been gratified by McAdoo's nomination, but he gave no support to his candidacy, even, if we may believe Mr. Tumulty, in private conversation with McAdoo himself ("President Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 494, 495). Mr. Bryan, the "peerless leader" of other days, had apparently lost his interest in politics, and was transferring his extraordinary powers of antagonism from the fight against gold and the trusts to a crusade against rum and evolution. When his motion for the introduction of a "dry" plank into the platform was defeated by a vote of 959 to 155 in the convention, he took no further interest in the proceedings.¹ He was out of sympathy with the administration, disapproving the President's course both in proposing to make the League of Nations the subject of a "solemn referendum" in the election of 1920 and in vetoing the Volstead Act. In answer to the Republican attacks on the administration in the Chicago convention, Chairman Cummings made a strong defense of the Wilson policies, declaring that the \$2,000,000 spent by a Republican Congress in eighty investigations of the departments had only proved that we had conducted "the cleanest war ever fought in the history

¹ His "heart was buried with the dry plank," he said—like Antony's in Cæsar's coffin. It will be remembered that Bryan had virtually given the nomination to Wilson in 1912. But now he was hardly less antagonistic to the administration than was Colonel Harvey himself. Commenting on the Democratic defeat after the election, he said: "President Wilson laid the foundation for the disaster. . . . He attempted to drive out of public life every Democrat who dared to differ from him even on minute details, while he made no effort to strengthen the Democrats who had made him the keeper of their conscience. He alienated all Republican support. He refused to deal with the Senate as a coördinate branch of the government. By preventing the ratification of the treaty, the President assumed responsibility for the nation's failure to enter the League of Nations. The people, confronted with the choice between presidential infallibility and respect for the opinion of the majority of the Senate, naturally chose the latter, and the Democratic party, by indorsing the President's position, invited the defeat that has overtaken it."

of civilization"; and painting a pathetic picture of the stricken President whose only offense was that "he strove to redeem the word that America had given to the world, that he sought to save a future generation from the agony through which this generation has passed." The Democratic platform advocated the "prompt ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, without reservations which would imperil its essential integrity." McAdoo (266) and Palmer (256) led on the first ballot, with Governor James M. Cox of Ohio (134), Governor Alfred Smith of New York (109), Secretary of Agriculture Meredith (72), and eight other names following. It was not till the forty-fourth ballot that the deadlock was broken by the nomination of Governor Cox. Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was nominated for the vice presidency.

On May 8 the Socialists had for the fifth time nominated their veteran leader Debs, who was behind the bars of the Federal prison at Atlanta for the violation of the Espionage Law. They issued their challenge to "the whole rotten capitalistic society," declared their determination not to "recede one inch in their program of revolutionary socialism," and petitioned the Attorney-General for the release of Debs and the other political prisoners, calling attention to the fact that all other belligerent countries had granted amnesty. "To say that the United States is still at war," the petition read, "is to reply to a demand for justice by an unworthy quibble. The United States is not at war at this time, and has not been engaged in warfare for eighteen months. Further detention of the so-called political war offenders assumes the character of a vindictive persecution of political opponents." An attempt to fuse the non-Socialist radicals, the heirs of the defunct Progressive party, the left wing of the American Federation of Labor, the farmers, and the single taxers was made by the Committee of Forty-eight (one from each state in the Union). The resultant Farmer-Labor party, however, had no more equilibrium than the Greenback-Labor party of forty years before. The farmers and the laborers simply would not fuse. Radical labor got control of the organi-

zation, and both the Committee of Forty-eight and the Non-Partisan League (see page 466) bolted the party. Its platform contained planks demanding the public ownership of the railroads, mines, and all public utilities; our immediate withdrawal from the Philippines and the West Indies; no connection with European affairs through the Treaty of Versailles; the recognition of the Irish Republic and the Russian soviet government; the repeal of the war-time legislation against sedition; and the payment of a soldiers' bonus and old-age pensions. After offering the nomination to Senator La Follette and Henry Ford, the Farmer-Labor party selected P. P. Christensen of Utah, who was best known as counsel for the defense of the I. W. W. leaders. The Prohibitionists tried to induce Mr. Bryan to accept their unanimous nomination for the presidency, and, on his refusal, turned to A. S. Watkins of Ohio.¹

Neither Harding nor Cox could be called a national figure of prominence or a great party leader. The former, to be sure, had nominated Taft in the convention of 1912 and had been mentioned as a "dark horse" in the convention of 1916; but his actual political record was summed up in service in his state senate, as lieutenant-governor (he had been defeated for the governorship in 1910), and as United States senator for one term. He was the owner of a local newspaper in his home town of Marion, Ohio, and was "played up" in the campaign as a representative average American citizen, a true "son of the middle border." The country didn't want any more college presidents or "supermen." "We are just folks," said Mrs. Harding on entering the White House. Governor Cox had even less claim to national reputation than his rival. He had served in Congress from 1909 to 1913 and had since been three times governor of his state. He had been a newsboy and a printer in his

¹ A unique feature of the campaign was the virtual monopoly of candidates enjoyed by Ohio. This state furnished three presidential nominees in the persons of Harding, Cox, and Watkins, and, in addition, the vice-presidential candidates of the Farmer-Labor party (Hughes) and the single taxers (Barnum). There have been only two other instances in our history in which the candidates of the two great parties have come from the same state: Lincoln and Douglas from Illinois in 1860 and Roosevelt and Parker from New York in 1904.

youth and, like Harding, was the owner of a local paper.¹ He was wealthy, but it suited the purpose of the campaign better for him to be photographed pitching hay or plowing than sitting in the library of his luxurious mansion "Trail's End." Governor Cox visited the President and received his blessing. He tried to make the League of Nations the sole issue of the campaign. But important as that issue was in the eyes of the more thoughtful of our citizens, it was obscured and relegated to a minor position for millions of voters by questions which seemed to touch them more closely. Europe and its problems were still far remote from the people of the Mississippi Valley. The League of Nations meant the world supremacy of England, the surrender of our independence, a drain on our wealth, and the conscription of our young men to fight the interminable wars of the Old World at the bidding of an international council. "America first!" was the slogan of the Republican candidate.² We had done our part and more than our part in the war. It was time to set our own house in order. There was plenty to do at home. Industrial unrest was universal. Prices reached their peak in the summer of 1920. The country was arguing angrily over the futility and the finality of the Eighteenth Amendment. The railroad workers were dissatisfied with the Esch-Cummins Act and indignant over the failure of the Plumb plan. The large anti-British element in the population were clamoring for the recognition of the Irish Republic. The criticisms of President Wilson's cabinet were not confined to the Republicans alone. Attorney-General Palmer was anathema to the liberals for his "strong arm" methods in dealing with alleged disloyalty. Postmaster-General Burleson was accused of an arbitrary and unjust administration of his department in the interests of a narrow partisanship. Both Baker and Daniels were targets for

¹ The cleverest cartoon of the campaign depicted Harding and Cox as rival newsboys in front of the White House, with bunches of the *Marion Star* and the *Dayton News* in their straps, each claiming that the other was trespassing on his delivery route.

² In a speech at a dinner of the Ohio Society in New York, just before his nomination, Senator Harding said, "Stabilize America first, prosper America first, think of America first, exalt America first!"

severe criticism in the management of the War and Navy Departments. "You cannot win as a Wilson man," wrote ex-Secretary Lane to Governor Cox in the midst of the campaign.¹

Toward the end of the campaign President Wilson broke his long silence by an appeal to the voters to make the League the issue of the election. But it was in vain. They voted on the general policies of the administration, and condemned them by a majority of over 7,000,000 (16,152,220 to 9,147,553). It was Wilson rather than Cox who was defeated in 1920. The Republicans carried every state of the North and West, all the border states except Kentucky, and for the first time invaded the old states of the secession by capturing Tennessee. "It was not a landslide," said Tumulty, "it was an earthquake." Harding's vote in the electoral college was 404 to 127 for Cox. The Republicans won the House by a majority of 309 to 132, the largest in our history. A hundred and nineteen members were defeated for reelection, including Champ Clark, who had sat in thirteen Congresses. The Republicans would control the Senate of the Sixty-seventh Congress by a margin of 22 (59 to 37). Twenty-nine out of thirty-five states elected Republican governors. Vice President-elect Coolidge hailed the victory as the "end of a period which has substituted words for things, and the beginning of a period of real patriotism and national honor." But the President's comment on the country's choice was: "They have disgraced us in the eyes of the world. The American people have repudiated a fruitful leadership for a barren independence. . . . The enemies cleverly aroused every racial passion and prejudice, and by poisonous propaganda made it appear that the League of

¹ Lane had resigned from the cabinet on March 1, 1920, on cordial personal terms with President Wilson and in hearty sympathy with the League of Nations, but distressed over the confusion of the administration and the quarrels in the cabinet, in which, he said, "the country is not interested." His long letter of excellent advice to Governor Cox (July 25) should be read entire: "Loyalty to the President's principles," he wrote, "does not mean loyalty to his methods. They have been wrong, in my opinion, as to the League of Nations. You could deal with Congress, even with a Republican Congress on this matter, I believe, and come out with the essentials. . . . The nation is crying out for leadership, not pussyfooting nor pandering" ("Letters of Franklin K. Lane," pp. 343-350).

Nations was a great Juggernaut which was intended to crush and destroy, instead of saving and bringing peace to the world. The people will have to learn now by bitter experience just what they have lost. . . . We had a chance to gain the leadership of the world. We have lost it, and soon we will be witnessing the tragedy of it all" (conversation reported by Tumulty in "President Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 501-502). A tragedy Washington certainly did witness a few months later, when the feeble President, who had literally given his life for the cause which his fellow countrymen had rejected, drove to the Capitol by the side of his hale and hearty successor to lay down the trusteeship which he had assumed eight years before. Another generation, farther removed from the partisan praise and blame of our own, will better estimate his place in history.¹

The new President created a favorable impression by omitting the usual expensive inaugural display and by inviting men of such conspicuous ability as Charles E. Hughes of New York, Andrew Mellon of Pennsylvania, and Herbert Hoover of California into his cabinet as Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce respectively. Both Hughes and Hoover were known to be in favor of America's coöperation with the nations of the world for the establishment of lasting peace. Although a Senate investigation coming to a head after President Harding's death two years later, in regard to the leasing to private interests of

¹ Ex-President Wilson formed a partnership with his last Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, for the practice of law. But he was never able to resume the profession which he had abandoned at Atlanta thirty years before. He lived quietly at his new home in Washington, failing slowly in spite of the devoted care of his wife and his physician, until his death in the morning of February 3, 1924. The vigorous man with whom he had taken his last ride to the Capitol had already preceded him to "the undiscovered country" six months before, and it fell to President Coolidge to issue the mourning proclamation: "As President of the United States he was moved by an earnest desire to promote the best interests of the country as he conceived them. His acts were prompted by high motives and his sincerity of purpose cannot be questioned. He led the nation through the terrific struggle of the World War with a lofty idealism which never failed him. He gave utterance to the aspirations of humanity with an eloquence which held the attention of all the earth, and made America a new and enlarged influence in the destiny of mankind." Senator Lodge pronounced a eulogy.

government oil deposits (especially the Teapot Dome field in Wyoming) reserved for the use of the navy, showed that he had been unfortunate in the appointment of Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico and Edwin F. Denby of Michigan to the posts of Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of the Navy respectively, there was no serious objection to the cabinet appointments in the spring of 1921, except in the case of Harry M. Daugherty of Ohio, chosen, it appeared, as a reward for political service to the Republican candidate. Daugherty was severely criticized for inefficiency during his whole tenure of the headship of the Department of Justice, until he resigned under pressure, in March, 1924, and was succeeded by Harlan F. Stone, former dean of the Columbia Law School and a man of the highest character and ability. The other appointments were John W. Weeks of Massachusetts, as Secretary of War; Will H. Hays of Indiana, the chairman of the national committee, as Postmaster-General; Henry C. Wallace of Iowa, as Secretary of Agriculture; and James J. Davis of Indiana, as Secretary of Labor. The first break in the cabinet came just a year after the inauguration, when Postmaster-General Hays resigned to head the national association of motion-picture producers at a reputed salary of \$150,000 a year. His place was taken by the First Assistant Postmaster-General, Dr. Hubert Work of Colorado. In the spring of 1923, before the revelation of the oil leases, which sadly damaged his reputation, Secretary Fall resigned the portfolio of the Interior and was succeeded by Postmaster-General Work, whose place was taken by Senator H. S. New of Indiana. The Teapot Dome investigation forced Secretary Denby out in March, 1924, and President Coolidge appointed Judge Curtis D. Wilbur of California, an Annapolis graduate, as the new head of the Navy Department.¹ President Harding established an

¹ Naturally, in the spring of a presidential year, every effort was made by the opposition senators to bring discredit on the administration. Noses were sharpened to detect the smell of oil on the official garments of any important person in the government. The attempt was made to involve even President Coolidge because he had sat in the Harding cabinet when the leases were discussed. It seemed in the spring of 1924 as if the Senate had abandoned every function except partisan bickering, and that we had come to a "government by investigation." In

innovation by inviting the vice-president to sit in the cabinet, an idea which John Adams had entertained for a moment in 1797.

Congress was called in extra session on April 11, 1921. Domestic problems were uppermost in the President's mind. He recommended the creation of a national budget, the enactment of an emergency tariff law, the readjustment of the war taxes, economy and retrenchment, the restriction of immigration, generous treatment of the disabled soldiers, and aid to the farmers. "The return to normalcy" was the phrase in which he summed up the country's need. As to foreign affairs, he reiterated the sentiment of his inaugural address: "We seek no part in directing the destinies of the Old World. . . . We crave friendship and harbor no hate. . . . We are ready to associate ourselves with the nations of the world, great and small, for conference and counsel, for the suggestion of plans of mediation, conciliation, and arbitration; but every commitment must be made in the exercise of our national sovereignty. . . . This is not aloofness but security. It is patriotic adherence to the things that have made us what we are." The Knox resolution for the declaration of peace with Germany, which President Wilson had indignantly vetoed a year before, was immediately introduced into the Senate and passed. It was signed by President Harding on July 2 and accepted the next month by the government of the German republic. After exchange of ratifications full diplomatic relations were resumed with Germany, on January 1, 1922. Alanson B. Houghton of New York was appointed ambassador to Berlin. Peace was also formally concluded with Austria and Hungary. In regard to Russia, however, the policy of the Wilson administration was maintained. Litvinov's over-

April there were no less than eleven special committees and subcommittees of the Senate, comprising fifty of its ninety-six members, occupying most of their time in the investigation of somebody else's conduct. Secretary Mellon wrote the President a note on April 10, saying that his position was being made intolerable by the inquisition headed by Senator Couzens, to fix upon the companies in which the Secretary of the Treasury was interested the charge of undue favor from the government in the refund of taxes; and the next day the President addressed a communication to the Senate, declaring that if such methods were continued, the government would be "thrown into disorder."

tures to Secretary Hughes for the recognition of the Bolshevik government and the resumption of trade relations with Russia were rebuffed.

It was not to be expected that the Republicans would let the tariff of 1913 stand. They had already passed an emergency bill looking toward the restoration of protective duties, when they had regained control of Congress in the latter part of the Wilson administration. President Wilson had effectively vetoed the bill on the last day of his term, declaring it a "blow at the large and successful efforts which have been made by many of our great industries to place themselves on an export basis." Repassed by the extra session in the spring of 1921, the emergency tariff was completed and supplemented in the regular session by the Fordney-McCumber tariff, signed by President Harding on September 21, 1922. The new bill was a frank return to the high rates of the Payne-Aldrich Act, levying higher duties than any previous bill on agricultural products, and almost prohibitive duties on many manufactured articles, like cutlery, yarns, laces, and embroideries. Pig iron, manufactures of iron and steel, salt, wool, hemp, and many food products were taken from the free list of the Underwood tariff. A unique feature of the new bill was the authority given to the President to alter the rates up to a limit of 50 per cent whenever he found, upon investigation by the Tariff Commission, that the congressional rates did not fairly equalize the difference in costs of production here and in the chief competing countries. The Democrats characterized the bill as a "monstrosity," alleging that it would add \$4,000,000,000 to the cost of living of the American people at a time when retail prices were 60 per cent higher than they had been in 1914, and that it would discourage foreign trade at a time when the large debts owed us by the European countries would have to be paid chiefly in goods, if at all. The war, they claimed, had made a protective tariff an anomaly. We were no longer inviting European capital for the development of our industries, as in the days after the Civil War, but were ourselves the chief supply of the world's money, and had been exporting capital at the rate of \$2,700,000,000 a year since the armistice. Representative Ford-

ney of Michigan, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, replied that the new act would not increase costs to the American consumer "to any considerable extent," but would "divert at least a small part of their enormous profits from the foreigner and his representative in this country to the United States." The most serious objection to the revival of high protection, however, was its erection of economic barriers between the United States and foreign nations for the alleged reason of saving our industries from ruin. Economic coöperation is admittedly one of the chief requisites for the restoration and preservation of good feeling between the nations. President Wilson made the removal of economic barriers one of the first of his famous fourteen points. In our political policy, through the promotion of arbitration, the advocacy of reduced armaments, and the preservation of the open door, we have made notable contributions to the cause of international good will. Unless our commercial policy is equally liberal and enlightened we shall do much to frustrate our own beneficent efforts in this field. The increase of a few hundred millions of dollars in customs revenues (from \$356,443,000 in 1922 to \$561,928,000 in 1923) in a budget of approximately \$2,500,000,000 was an insignificant factor to set over against the charge of selfish nationalism and commercial retaliation.

The revision of the war taxes was begun with the repeal of the excess-profits taxes and transportation tax, and a reduction in the surtaxes on incomes. Still the internal-revenue receipts for the year ending June 30, 1922, were over \$3,000,000,000, and the Treasury surplus for 1923 was about \$310,000,000. Congress was still debating in the spring of 1924 the form which tax reduction should take. The Democrats opposed any drastic cut in the levy on wealth. They would have surtaxes as high as 44 per cent on incomes above \$94,000. Secretary Mellon, on the other hand, contended that the high surtaxes were failing to accomplish their object, because wealthy men were transferring their investments to tax-exempt bonds, of which no less than \$11,000,000,000 had been issued up to the year 1922. Surtaxes on incomes above \$300,000 had brought \$248,600,000 into

the Treasury in 1919. The next year this amount had fallen to \$135,000,000, and in 1921 to \$85,000,000. A reduced rate was the only thing that would induce capital to go into productive ventures. The Secretary therefore proposed a plan reducing the surtaxes to a maximum of 25 per cent and making a considerable cut in the normal income-tax rate, which still remained at the high figure of 4 per cent on the first \$4000 and 8 per cent for the amounts above. The plan carried also the proposal for the reduction or abolition of a number of miscellaneous taxes. A bill embodying the Secretary's plan and estimated to reduce revenues by some \$446,000,000 for the fiscal year 1924-1925 was passed by the House on February 29, 1924, by a vote of 408 to 8. On April 12 Senator Smoot, chairman of the Committee on Finance, reported to the Senate a bill containing a somewhat smaller reduction (\$434,720,000). As the estimated surplus for the year 1923-1924 was \$395,000,000, the new bill would apparently result in a deficit of nearly \$50,000,000, but it was thought by the Secretary that this loss would be more than absorbed by the rapidly improving economic condition of the country and the stimulus to business furnished by the bill itself.¹

The whole question of tax revision was complicated by political and sectional antagonisms. The war brought a new theory of taxation in the direct levy of a large toll on the usufruct of capital. Four fifths of the war taxes were laid on capital and business. People of small incomes in America were subject to very much lower taxes than they were in any of the European countries. The highest rate levied on incomes of married people with incomes of not more than \$4000 above the \$2000 personal exemption was 6 per cent in America, while people in England were paying a tax of 22½ per cent on incomes of a few hundred pounds. In 1920, for example, 90.6 per cent

¹ One feature of the proposed tax reduction was the immediate abatement of 25 per cent of the income taxes for 1923, the first installment of which was due March 15, 1924. President Coolidge favored this suggestion and urged Congress to separate the rebate from the tax bill and pass it before the date mentioned. Many people delayed their payments till the last moment, hoping that Congress would accept the advice.

of the total number (7,250,000) of income-tax payers in this country, with net incomes between \$1000 and \$5000, paid only 15.4 per cent of the total tax. The agricultural sections of the country, which suffered most severely and most immediately from the post-war deflation, wanted industrial capital to continue to pay heavily; whereas, the business interests maintained that it was both unjust and impolitic for the government to take nearly 50 per cent of capital's earnings in time of peace. Moreover, at every stage of the discussion, tax revision was closely bound up with the proposal that the government should pay the men (and women) who entered the war service a bonus, whose eventual cost has been estimated at all the way from \$2,000,000,000 to \$6,000,000,000. The bonus bill and the tax-revision bill were bitter rivals for the favor of Congress. The Secretary of the Treasury, intent upon the second, declared that we could not expect to have both.¹

The American Legion in its first national convention at Minneapolis, in the autumn of 1919, passed a resolution to the effect that "the government has an obligation to all service men and women to relieve the financial disadvantages incident to their military service." Though many of the Legion men, believing that the government's treatment of the soldiers had been as generous as could be asked, were not in favor of a bonus for the able-bodied ("nothing for the sound; everything for the disabled"), the majority thought that the government ought to make up to the soldier, at least in part, the undoubted financial loss he had suffered by going into the service while his civilian compatriots were earning fabulous wages in war industries. On February 26, 1920, the House, by a vote of 325 to 4, instructed the Committee on Ways and Means to report a bonus bill for monetary and land grants to the soldiers. Shortly afterwards

¹ In spite of Secretary Mellon's prediction, we have had both. A liberal soldiers' bonus bill was passed over President Coolidge's veto in May, 1924 (see p. 778). The flourishing condition of the National Treasury during the Coolidge administration has permitted two substantial reductions in the normal rates (from 4 and 8 per cent to 1½, 3 and 5 per cent) and the surtaxes on incomes. With a surplus of approximately \$500,000,000 in the Treasury as the presidential year of 1928 approaches, further tax reduction may be expected.

the Executive Committee of the American Legion approved the plan of a bonus in the shape of a fourfold option: (1) land for a farm, (2) aid in building a home, (3) vocational training, and (4) a cash payment of \$50 a month. In May the Fordney bonus bill passed the House by 289 to 92, but it was not acted upon by the Senate before the expiration of the session.

During the extra session of 1921 President Harding advocated generous treatment for the disabled soldiers and sailors, but showed no sympathy for a general bonus bill. The American Legion, however, urged the plan in each annual convention. In March, 1922, Representative Fordney again introduced the bonus bill with its optional features of the bill of 1920, plus the scheme of payment in the form of "certificates," or paid-up twenty-year endowment policies, on which the holder might borrow up to 50 per cent of the face value. There were about 4,450,000 persons who would be entitled to claim a bonus in one form of option or another, and it was thought that 70 per cent of them would choose the certificate plan. The value of the certificates was based on "adjusted service" at the rate of \$1 a day for the men who remained at home and \$1.25 for the men who went overseas, with a maximum of \$500 and \$625 respectively. It was estimated that the cost in paid-up certificates to the government would be about \$3,000,000,000. The bill passed the House on March 23 by the large majority of 333 to 70, amid cheering from the crowded galleries, where a delegation of ex-service men were massed. It was reported in the Senate on June 8; and in spite of the attempt of the caucus to postpone it until after the passage of the tariff bill, it was put through the upper House on August 30 by a vote of 47 to 22. President Harding had already foreshadowed his attitude on the bill in a letter of February 16, 1922, to Chairman Fordney: "Any compensation legislation enacted at this time," he said "ought to carry with it provision for raising the needed revenue." The Treasury, he reminded Congress, had \$6,000,000,000 of obligations to meet in the next sixteen months. On September 19, 1922, he vetoed the bill, declaring that the soldiers themselves while serving in the World War did not expect a bonus. The House passed the

bill over the veto (258 to 54), but the Senate failed to do so by a margin of four votes (44 to 28).

It was not alone the cost of the bonus to which its opponents objected. They insisted that the allotments, the compensation for disability, and the insurance practically given to the soldiers were understood to be in lieu of a pension. They pointed to the generosity of the government to the service men. Figures published by the Veterans' Bureau (the successor of the War Risk Bureau) showed that up to February 1, 1922, the government had spent \$2,427,491,285 for the disabled soldiers, was paying out over \$1,000,000 in cash every day to the ex-service men or their dependents, was giving vocational training to 100,000 of the disabled, and was conducting an insurance business of \$3,500,000,000 for 600,000 men without cost of administration to the holders of the policies. The rate of pay for our enlisted men overseas had been \$33 a month, as compared with \$11.40 a month for the British soldier and \$1.50 a month for the French soldier. The allowances of our government to families and dependents of soldiers had averaged \$360 a year per man, as against an average of \$202 paid by the British government, \$50 by the French government, and \$11 by the Italian government. Though the casualties in the French and British armies had been enormously greater than in ours, our government had spent more than the British and French governments combined for benefits to the disabled and insurance to their dependents. The Ex-Service Men's Anti-Bonus League, formed in 1922, rebuked the insinuation of the government's neglect of the soldiers in the remark of the commander of the American Legion that "the returned soldier considered himself entitled to receive some of the grand promises of 1917." He had received, it maintained, all that the government had promised and, in addition, a cash payment of \$60 on discharge, paid to every soldier and sailor. A bonus, it continued, would tend to "pauperize the body and the spirit of the ex-soldier."

Undeterred by President Harding's veto, the advocates of the bonus continued their efforts. In May, 1924, a conference report of an "adjusted compensation" bonus bill, providing for

twenty-year paid-up insurance certificates, reaching a maximum of about \$2000 for the men who served overseas and \$1500 for those who remained at home, was passed over President Coolidge's veto by votes of 313 to 78 in the House and 59 to 26 in the Senate. Its estimated cost to the Treasury is about \$100,-000,000 a year.¹

Besides the tariff, tax revision, and the bonus, a fourth important financial topic of the administration has been the question of whether and how the European nations should pay their debts to the United States, which, according to the report of the Treasury on September 30, 1922, reached a total of \$9,386,311,178. More than 90 per cent of this was owed by Great Britain (\$4,136,000,000), France (\$2,293,000,000), and Italy (\$1,648,000,000). Many Americans agreed with our European debtors that it was only fair that we should make this contribution to the war, considering the late date of our entrance and the large profits which we had made during the early years of the war. Many financial experts also believed that it would be more embarrassing to be paid than not, since payment would have to take the form of a deluge of commodities which would injure our home industries. The question of cash payments by France and Italy was bound up with the payment of reparations to those countries by Germany; and that subject, complicated by political and military factors, remained in an apparently hopeless muddle—at least up to the spring of 1924.² Our gov-

¹ See page 775, note.

² In order to compel Germany to make the payments imposed upon her by the Treaty of Versailles and the subsequent decisions of the Reparations Commission, the French, after many threats, forcibly occupied the Ruhr district in January, 1923, and attempted, against constant passive resistance, to work the mines and the great industrial plants. In October the French government agreed to Secretary Hughes's suggestion that an international commission of experts be appointed to determine Germany's capacity to pay and to suggest a plan of payment, on the condition that the United States should be represented on the commission. Our government consented. Brigadier General Charles G. Dawes of Chicago (Comptroller of the Currency from 1897 to 1902, American agent for the purchase of supplies for the allied armies in France during the war, and the first Director of the Budget chosen by President Harding), Owen D. Young of New

ernment has never entertained the idea of writing off the European debts. Congress passed a refunding measure early in 1922, and President Harding appointed Secretaries Mellon, Hughes, and Hoover, together with Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Theodore E. Burton, as a committee to deal with the subject. In January, 1923, Stanley Baldwin, chancellor of the exchequer, and Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank of England, came to the United States to discuss the settlement of Great Britain's debt to us. The terms finally agreed upon provided for the payment of principal and interest (at rates varying from 3 to $4\frac{1}{4}$ per cent), totaling \$4,604,000,000 in installments spread over a period of sixty-two years. Mr. Baldwin characterized the settlement as "the largest financial transaction between two friendly nations in the history of the world."

The return to "normalcy" was slow. The mining and transportation industries were vexed with bitter quarrels, and the farmers were clamoring for help from the government. In the West Virginia coal fields the attempt to unionize the workers had resulted in a veritable civil war. Governor Morgan put

York, a lawyer and financial expert, and Henry M. Robinson, a prominent bank director of Los Angeles, California, were appointed the American representatives. After an immense amount of work in one hundred and seventy-six meetings from January 14 to April 9, 1924, the Dawes Commission made its report to the Reparations Commission. Its main recommendations were (1) that Germany should pay from her taxes, railroads, and industries to the full limit of her capacity; (2) that the payments should be on a diminishing scale, calling for \$250,000,000 the first year; (3) that Germany should be helped by a loan of \$200,000,000 raised abroad to help her meet her immediate financial obligations; (4) that her industries, railroads, and controlled revenues should be subject to supervision by trustees to insure faithful payments, and (5) that France and Belgium should relinquish the economic control (but not the military occupation) of the occupied German territory. The Dawes report was immediately adopted by the Reparations Commission and was enthusiastically hailed in the allied countries as a fair and workable proposition, designed "not so much to inflict penalties as to aid recovery." The German government accepted the Dawes plan and has promptly and fully met the reparations payments prescribed thereunder. More than half the German external loan of \$200,000,000 was taken by American subscribers.

Mingo County under martial law in May, 1921, but the disorder grew until in August the President issued a proclamation ordering the rioters to disperse, and sent Federal troops under General Bandholtz to the region. Duncan McDonald, treasurer of the United Mine Workers in Illinois, declared: "Penitentiary doors have no terror for us. . . . If putting two or three hundred men in jail will organize West Virginia, we will send two or three hundred down." The union spent over \$2,500,000 in the war to drive out of the market all West Virginia coal produced in the non-union mines before order was restored in the state in the autumn of 1921. The next April a long-threatened coal strike went into effect, involving 600,000 miners. Operations came to a standstill in 6000 of the 7800 mines of the country. The strike affected both the bituminous and the anthracite regions, causing a daily loss of 1,200,000 tons of soft coal and 300,000 tons of anthracite. There was considerable violence, notably at Herrin, Illinois, where on June 22 strike breakers were brutally attacked by the strikers and nineteen persons murdered. President Wilson had invoked the war powers under the Lever Act to quell the strike of 1919 (p. 748), but peace had already been formally concluded and demobilization completed before the summer of 1922. Persuasion was all that was left to President Harding to rely upon. He called the mine owners in conference at Washington on July 17 and urged on them the necessity for a settlement. "I cannot permit you to depart," he said, "without reminding you that coal is a national necessity. . . . The freedom of action on the part of the workers and the employers does not measure in importance with public welfare and national security. I therefore invite you to return to your mining properties and resume operations." But it was the United Mine Workers who resisted arbitration now. The tone of labor had changed since 1902 (the last serious anthracite strike), when Mr. Mitchell had been eager for mediation, and the operators had haughtily refused (see page 387).

As the reserves of coal dwindled and the price mounted, public indignation grew. There was a third party involved in the chronic quarrel between the operators and the workers—the

long-suffering public.¹ On the day after his conference with the operators President Harding sent telegrams to the governors of twenty-eight coal-producing states, assuring them of Federal protection in the operation of mines. A week later, in view of the diminishing supply of coal and the railroad strike which had begun on July 1, the Interstate Commerce Commission declared that a state of public emergency existed. The President appointed Secretary Hoover as chairman of a committee to control the transportation and distribution of the available coal supplies east of the Mississippi. The persistent pressure of public opinion and the President's personal efforts brought the strike in the bituminous fields to an end after five months, by an agreement signed by the operators and the miners at Cleveland on August 15. The anthracite strike lasted until September 2. In response to a special request from the President on August 18, Congress established a National Coal Commission whose duty it was to investigate the coal situation fully, to recommend a fair price for the consumer, to help Congress legislate to assure a steady supply of coal, and to suggest measures by which future strikes in the industry might be averted. The United Mine Workers, who, according to the claims of John L. Lewis, had "added more than 100,000 to their membership roster during the conflict," asserted before the coal commission in May, 1923, that the only way to eliminate the periodical coal strikes was to unionize the industry completely.

In the very midst of the coal strike the continual discontent of the railroad workers with the awards of the Railway Labor Board culminated in the walkout of three hundred thousand shopmen, involving every important road in the country and,

¹ Largely as a result of the strike of 1919, when the miners had said "the public might freeze," and when ten thousand volunteer workers had gone to the coal fields under the protection of the militia, the state of Kansas had established in 1920 a Court of Industrial Relations, with three judges, to see to it that the industries necessary for the people's health and comfort should be "operated with reasonable continuity, in order that the people of this state may live in peace and security and be supplied with the necessities of life." In June, 1923, the Supreme Court struck a blow at the Kansas institution by declaring unconstitutional that part of the act which applied to the meat packers.

according to a recent report of the executives, costing the roads \$125,000,000. Though most of the places in the shops had been filled, there were still (in the spring of 1924) localities in which the unions had not called off the strike. President Harding labored hard to bring about a settlement on the basis of the reinstatement of the striking shopmen, with their rights of seniority unimpaired, and a rehearing of the Railway Labor Board's decisions; but it was only gradually that separate settlements were made on the various railroads. In no branch of railroad operation was it more necessary that the continuity and efficiency of labor should be maintained than in the shops. During the strike the equipment deteriorated to such a degree that not only was transportation demoralized, but the risks of accident were greatly increased. The railroad brotherhoods, who, like the American Federation of Labor, supported the strike, even advised their men to refuse to take out the trains in case of personal danger.¹ An injunction was obtained by Attorney-General Daugherty from Judge J. H. Wilkerson of the Federal district court of Chicago on September 1, prohibiting the strikers from picketing shops, hindering the inspection or repair of locomotives and cars, obstructing the operation of the trains, trespassing on the premises of the railroads where work on repairs was going on, or injuring or intimidating any of the employees of the roads. The injunction was, as usual, bitterly assailed by labor as a violation of constitutional rights and "a reversion to slavery." There was no "conspiracy," said Mr. Gompers. The only "crime" that the strikers were guilty of was "quitting work when conditions became intolerable." Figures made public early in 1924 by the Department of Justice showed the seriousness of the shopmen's strike. The department spent about \$2,000,000 for additional United States deputies to preserve order, besides the 60,000 special guards and police employed by the railroads. There were 19

¹ The writer rode in an "express train" from New York to Boston on a mild day in the winter of 1922. Three engines broke down on the trip, and the fourth brought the train into Boston five hours late. It was not an uncommon experience.

deaths due to violence, over 1500 cases of assault, and about 200 attempts to wreck bridges and other railroad property.¹ The strike cost the railroads almost 20 per cent of the income for 1923.

No more important domestic problem has confronted the country since the close of the World War than the economic plight of the farmer. Industrial laborers, organized into highly effective unions and massed in great manufacturing centers, make their protests and demands known in insistent fashion. The farmers are not unionized; they do not strike; they do not threaten to paralyze the economic life of the country by refusing to produce food. Therefore they do not attract the public attention that is given to the spectacular contests between organized labor and entrenched capital. Still, the prosperity of the country rests ultimately upon the labor of the farmer. It is true and will continue to remain true, as Bryan said in his convention speech of 1896, that if the great industrial centers were destroyed, they would spring up again; but if the farms were ruined or abandoned, grass would grow in the city streets. That the American people should allow such a calamity to happen is inconceivable, yet the latest census figures and the statistics of the Department of Agriculture are far from reassuring. The loss of farm population in the year 1922 was more than 1,000,000, and the shortage of farm labor was about 11 per cent. The cities and towns are increasing at the rate of 4 per cent annually, while the cultivators of the land are decreasing. The census of 1920 shows for the first time in our history a majority (51.9 per cent) of our population living in places of over 2500 inhabitants.

The American farmer is industrious and enterprising. He feeds more people per unit of labor than the farmer of any other country of the world. He uses the best machines, tools, and fertilizers. He is proud of his citizenship and intensely loyal to

¹ Attorney-General Daugherty in his report of December 8, 1921, had spoken of the "marked success" of the I.W.W. propaganda in the United States and claimed that the leaders here were "taking their orders from Moscow." He advised further deportation of aliens.

American ideals of democracy. Yet he is discontented and discouraged. The chief cause for this situation is the disproportionately heavy share of the post-war deflation which the farmer has had to bear. During the war his grain and hogs sold at high prices. The unprecedented demand for his products led him to increase his acreage. Land was high, to be sure, but he could pay for it with \$2.20 wheat. But with the coming of peace, the farmer's prices quickly returned to pre-war levels. The crop acreage shrank 8 per cent between 1919 and 1921, and the crop values fell in the same period from \$15,423,000,000 to \$7,028,000,000.¹ Meantime, the average prices of the products of the great manufacturing industries of the country remained approximately 50 per cent higher than the pre-war levels. The farmer's dollar of 1913, which had a purchasing power of \$1.29 in 1919, had sunk to 70 cents by the end of 1921. Burdened often with debt incurred for the purchase of land on easy credit in war time, the farmers were in a straitened position. They were, in a sense, at the mercy of their crops. They could not regulate country-wide production, like the great industrial combinations, in order to keep prices high. They had to dispose of their products in season, whether the market was glutted or not, and to take such prices as they could get. They turned to the government, as they had done in the days of the Greenbackers and the Populists, for the relief which they were unable to get for themselves through efficient economic organization.

¹ The following figures are taken from the report of the Department of Agriculture published on October 13, 1923:

AVERAGE OF PRICES RECEIVED BY THE PRODUCERS

YEAR	WHEAT (Per bu.)	CORN (Per bu.)	APPLES (Per bu.)	COTTON (Per lb.)	BUTTER (Per lb.)	HOGS (Per cwt.)
1913	0.779	0.753	0.81	0.133	0.275	7.68
1918	2.00	1.59	1.335	0.318	0.473	17.50
1920	2.143	1.213	1.328	0.255	0.541	13.98
1922	0.904	0.616	1.096	0.20	0.362	8.23
1923	0.932	0.857	1.00	0.272	0.414	7.81

On January 23, 1922, the Secretary of Agriculture, on instructions from the President, convened at Washington an Agricultural Conference attended by three hundred and twenty-five delegates representing farmers, packers, bankers, and government officials. "It is unthinkable," said the President, "that with this country's vast agricultural resources the United States should develop into a distinctly industrial nation." In its five days' session the conference discussed the questions of providing a larger working capital for the farmers, of protecting them against price fluctuations, of securing better relations between them and the transportation agencies, of the encouragement of coöperative marketing associations, and of further reclamation projects for the improvement of farm lands. The conference helped to stimulate and formulate the demands of the farmers for congressional legislation in their behalf. Already the session of 1921 had seen a new and extremely important development in the formation of a bipartisan "farm bloc" comprising about one hundred men of the House and a group of a dozen or so of the Senate,¹ backed by fifteen hundred county farm associations in the West and South. The farm bloc cared little for the political program of tariff reform, tax revision, bonus, and shipping subsidies. They bent their whole effort to securing legislation in the interests of the farmers, and actually achieved a considerable amount of such legislation—a Futures Trading Act to prevent speculation on the exchanges, and the boards of trade from gambling on the nation's grain supply; a Filled Milk Act to protect the dairymen from the competition of adulterated milk; an Agricultural Credits Act, establishing government agencies in "intermediate credit banks" connected with the Farm Loan Banks, to help the farmers in recovering from the post-war depression.

¹ Prominent in the Senate group were the Republicans Kenyon (Iowa), Norris (Nebraska), La Follette (Wisconsin), Capper (Kansas), Ladd (North Dakota), and the Democrats Kendrick (Wyoming), Sheppard (Texas), Ransdell (Louisiana), Heflin (Alabama), and Smith (South Carolina). The farm bloc, taken with the rise of the Farmer-Labor party, foreshadowed a possible new alignment of forces in Congress based on economic group interests rather than on the traditional political and sectional lines.

The mid-term elections of November, 1922, reduced the Republican majority from 168 to 14 in the House and left the administration with a majority of only 8 in the Senate, where the strength of the farm bloc was increased by the election of S. W. Brookhart of Iowa and the two Farmer-Labor candidates, Hendrik Shipstead and Magnus Johnson of Minnesota. In the Sixty-eighth Congress the almost equal division of the two parties gave the farm bloc the balance of power, and consequently they were given due recognition in the committee assignments and in the calendar. For the first time in our history the farmers made their influence really felt in the national government.¹

For some time the immigration problem had been growing more and more serious in the eyes of the American people. The prosperous years of the early twentieth century had brought to our shores great hordes of immigrants from the countries of eastern and southeastern Europe. The arrivals in the decade 1900-1910 had been 8,796,308, as compared with 3,844,359 in the previous decade. Until 1880 our country had been fairly homogeneous, or, at least, easily able to assimilate and Americanize the immigrants. In that year, for example, only about 25,000 Austro-Hungarians, 12,000 Italians, and 7000 Russians had come to America. By the end of the century these figures had increased to 114,000, 100,000, and 90,000 respectively, and in the year 1914 more than 800,000 immigrants from these three countries alone had entered our ports. Our doors were wide open. Except for a few restrictions as to contract laborers, criminals, idiots, and avowed anarchists, all who would might come. Two considerations—one ideal, the other material—militated against shutting out the immigrant. America had been

¹ The demands of the farm bloc were not modest. For example, the McNary-Haugen bill (reported by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in the spring of 1924) aimed to restore the prices of farm products to the levels of the decade before the war by the creation of an Agricultural Export Commission, with a capital stock of \$200,000,000, authorized to buy up surplus farm products and sell them abroad for what they would bring. The McNary-Haugen bill, slightly modified, was passed by both houses of Congress in February, 1927, and was vetoed by President Coolidge a few days before the expiration of the 69th Congress.

from the beginning the beacon of promise to the poor and the asylum of refuge for the oppressed of the nations of the Old World—and our industries demanded cheap and abundant labor. But the enormous influx of immigration in the new century gave us pause. The aliens were coming faster than we could assimilate them. They were bringing from centers of social turmoil and proletarian revolution ideas which were repugnant to an orderly freedom and the voluntary respect for law. The war, which turned a searching light upon the hidden places of our social life, revealed the incompleteness of the fusion of the foreign elements into a truly American people. There were Polish, Hungarian, and Russian unions in our labor organizations, with their interests and sympathies primarily with the fortunes of the lands from which they had come. There were communists who “took their orders from Moscow” and set the Russian soviet above the American Constitution. Over one thousand newspapers printed in thirty foreign languages were in circulation. Eleven per cent of the population over ten years of age could not speak the English language. Great numbers of the immigrants showed no desire to acquire American citizenship. The unassimilated and unassimilable elements of our population were growing to alarming proportions.

The war, of course, stayed the tide of immigration. The increase of our population in the decade from 1910 to 1920 was but 14 per cent, as compared with an increase of 21 per cent for the preceding decade. But it was evident that the terrible plight of the eastern countries of Europe after the war would stimulate immigration. “The world is preparing to move to America,” said Commissioner of Immigration Wallis. On May 19, 1921, President Harding signed a bill limiting the quota of immigrants which any country could send the United States in the next 13 months to 3 per cent of its people already here according to the census of 1910. No more than 20 per cent of the total of the 357,000 aliens permitted to come here by this act could land in any one month. In the spring of 1922 the law was extended for two years, to July 1, 1924. The law was open to serious objections. Its selective feature mechanically gave the largest quotas

to the nations which had already flooded the country with immigrants of questionable desirability and prevented the proportional increase from lands like Denmark, Sweden, and Holland, that sent us fewer immigrants after the opening of the twentieth century. Moreover, the 20 per cent provision resulted in a rush of the steamship companies to get their steerage passengers landed before the month's quota should be filled. On November 1, 1923, for example, eleven vessels with about 9000 immigrants arrived at New York. This spasmodic influx taxed the facilities of Ellis Island and made the proper inspection of the immigrants impossible.¹

The outstanding event of the Harding administration was the Washington conference for the limitation of naval armaments and the insurance of better relations in the regions of the Pacific, held from November 12, 1921, to February 6, 1922. Although many months had passed since the signing of the armistice, the burden of military and naval expenditures had not been lightened. There were more men under arms in Europe than there had been in 1914. Our own naval program called for the construction of 100 new units, including 11 battleships, with a total

¹ The Johnson-Lodge Immigration Bill, signed by President Coolidge on May 26, 1924, reduces the immigration quotas by more than 50 per cent (to 161,990) and allows each country to send 2 per cent of what the census of 1890 showed to be the number of its nationals in this country. The year 1890 is substituted for 1910 in order to decrease the proportion of immigrants from the countries of southern and eastern Europe. Italy's quota is reduced from 42,000 under the law of 1921 to 3889 under the new bill, Poland's from 30,000 to 8872, Russia's from 24,000 to 1792; whereas Great Britain, Germany, and France, which may send 77,000, 67,000, and 5729 under the law of 1921 respectively, are reduced only to 62,000, 50,000, and 3878. The new bill also bars out all aliens ineligible to citizenship, thereby abrogating the Root-Takahira "gentleman's agreement" of 1907 between the United States and Japan, which left to the latter power the responsibility of limiting the immigration of her laboring class to this country by the refusal of passports. The Japanese have faithfully kept the agreement for more than fifteen years, and feel that the exclusion feature of the new bill is a reflection on their people. Mr. Hanihara made it the subject of a respectful but forceful protest to our State Department in a note of April 10, 1924, and his protest found a sympathetic echo from public men and associations of various kinds all over the country. But, although President Coolidge asked that the clause excluding the Japanese be eliminated or at least postponed a year or two, Congress refused to change the bill.

of nearly 800,000 tons, to bring us to a virtual parity with Great Britain.¹ We had no idea of competing in land armaments with the European nations, which felt obliged to maintain huge armies. We had quickly reduced our military strength to something like the pre-war figures. At the close of the year 1923 our army of 136,000 meant only one soldier for every 808 of our population and every \$2,560,000 of our wealth, as compared with an army in France of one to every 52 of her population and every \$133,000 of her wealth. However, as a naval power with a building program far larger than that of any other nation, we had an opportunity to show our sincerity in the cause of peace by initiating the movement for the reduction of naval armaments. On May 15, 1921, Senator Borah of Idaho proposed an amendment to the naval-appropriation bill of \$494,000,000, authorizing the President to invite the great naval powers to a conference in Washington to discuss the feasibility of putting an end to competition in naval construction. The amendment was passed without a dissenting vote. President Harding enlarged the scope of the conference to deal with questions of the Pacific and the Far East. On August 11 he sent invitations to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and China, and later included the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal, as nations having large interests in the Orient. Delegates from eight European and Asiatic nations, therefore, met in Washington. The United States was represented by Secretary of State Hughes, Elihu Root, Senator Lodge (chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations), and Senator Underwood of Alabama. A. J. Balfour, Lord Lee of Fareham, Sir Robert Borden (former premier of Canada), and Sir Auckland Geddes (later ambassador at Washington) formed the British delegation. Premier

¹ The relative position of the three chief naval powers in 1921 was as follows:

	TONNAGE COMPLETED	TONNAGE PROJECTED	TOTAL
Great Britain	1,588,442	76,890	1,665,332
United States	779,173	842,109	1,621,282
Japan	340,596	328,460	669,056

Briand, Ambassador Jusserand, and the eloquent Viviani represented France. V. K. Wellington Koo and Alfred Sze, envoys to Great Britain and the United States respectively, were the Chinese delegates. Prince Tokugawa, Ambassador Shidehara, and Admiral Kato represented Japan, and Senator Schanzer and Ambassador Ricci represented Italy.

After a graceful address of welcome from President Harding, Secretary Hughes, chairman of the conference, came straight to the point with the proposal of a drastic cut in naval strength, in which the United States was willing to take the lead. The world had had enough of "investigations, statistics, reports, and the circumlocution of inquiry," he said; "it wants a practical program which shall at once be put into execution." He suggested a "naval holiday" for at least ten years, during which no new capital ships should be built, and proposed the scrapping of a number of older capital ships or ships under construction. The United States was to destroy 30 fighting ships with a tonnage of 845,740. Great Britain was asked to scrap 19 capital ships with a tonnage of 583,375, and Japan 17 ships with a tonnage of 448,928—a grand total of 66 fighting ships with a tonnage of 1,878,043.¹ The ratio of naval strength of capital ships² was fixed at 5:5:3:1 $\frac{2}{3}$:1 $\frac{2}{3}$ for Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy respectively. Mr. Balfour wanted to have the submarine abolished entirely as "an inhuman agent of warfare," and Secretary Hughes proposed a reduction of submarine tonnage to 60,000 for the United States and Great Britain and 31,500 for France and Japan; but the French delegation, while agreeing to the capital-ship ratio, held out for 90,000 tons of submarines and 330,000 tons of cruisers and auxiliaries on account of her long line of coast to be defended. Secretary Hughes's attempt to include the reduction of land armaments in the discussion was also vetoed by the French

¹ The treaty as finally signed provided for the scrapping of 68 ships with a tonnage of 1,876,432.

² A capital ship was defined in the treaty (Part IV, sect. 1) as "a vessel of war . . . whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons, or which carries a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches."

delegation. Premier Briand made an impassioned plea for the necessity of a strong army for the defense of his country against the recuperation of a populous and vindictive Germany. A treaty was signed, however, binding the powers to observe the rule of visit and search in submarine warfare, and making it an act of piracy for a submarine commander to destroy a merchantman without placing the passengers and crew in a position of safety. The allocation of the former German colonies in the Pacific north of the equator to Japan, and those south of the equator to countries of the British Empire, as mandates, made it advisable for the naval powers to come to an understanding on their attitude toward one another in the Pacific region. And finally, a number of questions affecting the territorial, economic, and administrative independence of China were waiting solution.

Out of the three months' incessant labor of the conference there came a sheaf of nine treaties: (1) a five-power treaty abolishing competition in capital ships and limiting the size of guns and the tonnage of airplane carriers; (2) a five-power treaty prohibiting the use of the submarine as a commerce destroyer and of asphyxiating gases in warfare; (3) and (4) four-power treaties (Italy omitted) binding the signatories to respect one another's rights in their insular possessions in the Pacific, and to submit to the decision of a joint conference any question "likely to affect the harmonious accord and happiness subsisting between them"; (5) a nine-power treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the sovereignty of China and the "open door" for trade; (6) a nine-power treaty regulating the Chinese customs tariffs; (7) a treaty between China and Japan, by which the latter power agreed to restore the former German leasehold of Kiaochow and the Shantung province; (8) a treaty between the United States and Japan guaranteeing our rights in the important cable station of the island of Yap; and (9) a six-power treaty allocating the German cables in the Pacific. President Harding presented the treaties to the Senate on February 10, 1922, stating that they involved no alliances, "no narrowed liberty, no hampered independence, no shattered sovereignty," but that they dissipated apprehensions and anxieties that might have

led to war. The Yap treaty was ratified on March 1, and on the thirty-first of the month Secretary Hughes announced that all the conference treaties to which the United States was a party had been ratified. The two most important ones—the five-power naval treaty and the four-power Pacific pact ¹—became effective when ratifications were exchanged at Washington, August 17, 1923.

The Washington conference has been criticized as a futile affair. It has failed to cut naval expenses or stop naval competition, say the critics, because only capital ships (and mostly old ones at that) were scrapped, while the competition in submarines, cruisers, destroyers, aircraft, and land armaments goes on.² They point out that America spent 174 per cent more on its navy in 1922-1923 than 1914, that the Hughes program cost us \$70,000,000 in contracts for uncompleted ships which were destroyed, that we have been left with a navy inferior to that of Japan, and that it would cost us \$800,000,000 to reach a parity in naval strength with Great Britain. The criticisms coming from those who complain that too much was done in the way of naval disarmament, combined with the criticisms of those who are dissatisfied because too little was done, show how much like squaring the circle is the problem of reconciling disarmament with preparedness. So long as national hates and rivalries last, so long will the nations "put their trust in reeking tube and iron shard." President Coolidge stated the dilemma clearly in his message to Congress on December 6, 1923: "We want no more compelling armaments. We want no more war. But we want no weakness that invites imposition. A people who neglect their national defense are putting in jeopardy their national honor." If the day ever comes when physical disarmament will be safe, it will be only because a moral disarmament has preceded. It is as a step toward such moral disarmament, rather than for any

¹ An important feature of this treaty was the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance which had existed since 1902.

² Early in 1927 President Coolidge made the proposal, to which Great Britain and Japan have signified their assent, for a second conference at Washington for the limitation of naval construction. A conference on disarmament is also on the program of the League of Nations at Geneva for the summer of 1927.

specific reduction of naval tonnage, that the Washington conference has its chief significance. It was a contribution to a better understanding among the nations who took part. It revealed, along with some fears and mistrusts, a large amount of unrealized good will and readiness to make sacrifices for the sake of international harmony. "Its most important results," said Secretary Hughes in his speech before the American Historical Association at New Haven on December 29, 1922, "were those which were unwritten and imponderable, . . . for where there is friendship and confidence, treaties to maintain peace are of least importance."

On June 30, 1923, President and Mrs. Harding, with a party of sixty-five, started for a tour across the country and a visit to the territory of Alaska. The President was far from a well man when he left Washington. His labor of the previous year in striving to compose the industrial unrest from which the country was suffering had impaired his splendid physique. He was taken ill in Alaska; and when he reached San Francisco, on his homeward trip, his condition became serious. Still, his countrymen were not prepared for the shock of the news of his death, which occurred in San Francisco in the evening of the second of August. As his body was borne across the country to lie in state at the Capitol before the interment at Marion, the scenes of respect and mourning recalled the honors paid twenty-two years before to President McKinley, whom Mr. Harding resembled closely in the tactful, congenial, unaffected amiability which endeared him to all who were associated with him in private life or in official station. Except for the Washington conference there was little of the dramatic in his administration. He was not a leader of the brilliant, aggressive type. He neither dominated Congress nor strove with it—though he showed by his veto of the bonus bill and his urgency of the ship-subsidy bill that he had his convictions and could stand by them. The greatest need of the country as he saw it was to return to old and tried paths. To many of his fellow countrymen this course seemed like the repudiation of the opportunity to make America a leader among the nations. But to him and to those who supported him

it seemed the very condition and guaranty of our peace at home and our helpfulness abroad. He worked diligently and conscientiously at the prosaic tasks of budget reform, economy and retrenchment, tax revision, and the mitigation of industrial strife. He was eager to coöperate with foreign nations, in every way that he deemed consistent with our constitutional duty and our political security, for the improvement of world relations. He coveted most the title of "the prophet of a better understanding."

PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT DAY

Vice-President Coolidge was enjoying his vacation at his boyhood home in Plymouth, Vermont, when the news of President Harding's death in San Francisco came over the wires. In the early morning of Aug. 3, 1923, the oath of office was administered to the new President by his aged father, a justice of the peace, on the family Bible, beneath the kerosene lamp which lighted the farm-house parlor. President Coolidge entered upon his duties at Washington without display of any sort, showing himself extremely simple in tastes, laconic in speech, and thoroughly absorbed in his exacting task—a typical hard-headed, hard-working, deliberate, thrifty Yankee. He requested all the members of the Harding cabinet to retain their portfolios,¹ and announced his intention of continuing the policies of his predecessor. While never failing in his messages and speeches to emphasize the value of the American heritage of democratic virtues and beckoning opportunity, President Coolidge has nevertheless been a consistent, if discreet, supporter of the great industrial

¹ We have already noted (p. 770) certain changes in the cabinet in the years 1923 and 1924. After a brief period of office as Attorney-General, Harlan F. Stone was appointed to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Bench, and was succeeded in the cabinet by John G. Sargent of Vermont (1924). In 1925 Secretary Hughes resigned from the State Department, to be replaced by Frank B. Kellogg of Minnesota, Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Secretary of War Weeks was forced to retire the same year, by an illness which proved fatal, and the assistant Secretary Dwight F. Davis, was promoted to his place. William M. Jardine of Kansas became Secretary of Agriculture in 1925. Thus the only original Harding appointees to retain their cabinet positions to the present (1927) are Secretaries Mellon (Treasury), Hoover (Commerce), and Davis (Labor).



THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. COOLIDGE AT THE WHITE HOUSE

and financial interests, justifying, by an apparently sincere conviction that so righteous and generous a nation as the United States can do no wrong, policies in regard to weaker and dependent peoples which to many critics at home and abroad have seemed to come dangerously close to "benevolent despotism."

Although, as we have seen, the administration's recommendations on tax revision (p. 774), the bonus (p. 778), immigration (p. 788), and several measures of less importance met with defeat in Congress, the President accepted the results with characteristic silence, and seemed to gain rather than lose in popularity with each rebuff from the Capitol. Nor did the revelations of corruption in the management of the Veterans' Bureau and the naval oil reserves,¹ although they were played up by the Democrats and the farmer and labor groups in the campaign of 1924, appear to shake the public faith in President Coolidge. He was nominated at the Republican convention at Cleveland (June 10) on the first ballot, with 1065 votes to 34 for Senator La Follette and 10 for Senator Johnson. General Charles G. Dawes (see page 778, note 2) was named for vice president. The Democrats met at Madison Square Garden, New York, on June 24, where the partisans of ex-Secretary William G. McAdoo and Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York battled for a fortnight in sweltering heat. At last the wearied convention turned on the 103rd ballot to John W. Davis, an able lawyer from West Virginia and the successor of Walter H. Page as our ambassador to England. Governor Charles W. Bryan of Nebraska, brother of William J. Bryan, was nominated for the vice presidency to satisfy the more radical elements of the party. On the adjournment of the Republican convention, Senator La Follette repudiated Coolidge, who, he said, had "literally turned his back upon the farmer," and organized an independent-progressive party, which was launched at Cleveland on July 4, with La Follette and Burton K. Wheeler, a Democratic senator from Montana, as the candidates. The Socialists, who had cast 920,000 votes for

¹ See page 770 and note.

Debs in 1920, indorsed the La Follette ticket, as did the Farmer-Labor party and the American Federation of Labor. La Follette stood for the public ownership of the railroads, the safeguarding of the government's oil reserves, generous measures of relief for the farmers, and a constitutional amendment permitting Congress to override a decision of the Supreme Court declaring a law unconstitutional. It was predicted that La Follette would carry enough of the Western states to deprive Coolidge of a majority in the electoral college and throw the election into the House. But Coolidge swept the country on election day, carrying every state north of Mason and Dixon's line, except Wisconsin, and securing 382 electoral votes to 136 for Davis (in twelve Southern states). The popular vote was 15,729,060 for Coolidge, 8,391,431 for Davis, and 4,820,758 for La Follette. The Republicans won a majority of 60 in the House and 15 in the Senate, which, in spite of the general prosperity of the country in 1925 and 1926, was cut down in the congressional elections of the latter year by about one-half in the House and practically wiped out in the Senate. The composition of the upper chamber which will sit in the 70th Congress (1927-29) consists of 48 Republicans and 47 Democrats, with one Farmer-Labor member (Shipstead of Minnesota), who by voting with the Democrats can create a tie. A novel feature of the election of 1924 was the choice of women for 123 seats in state legislatures and the election of two women governors, Mrs. Nellie T. Ross of Wyoming and Mrs. Miriam A. Ferguson of Texas.

There is little cause for comment on the domestic program of President Coolidge, which has been succinctly defined in his own words, "The business of America is business." The encouragement of prosperity by a wise abstention from hampering governmental interference with big business and finance, and an economical administration at Washington to permit a steady reduction in federal taxes,¹ have been the main policies

¹ See note, page 775. The interest-bearing debt of the federal government, which totalled \$25,234,500,000 on June 30, 1919, stood at \$18,822,500,000 on Jan. 1, 1927. This reduction of nearly \$6,500,000,000 in seven years and a half

of the Coolidge régime. Nor has the President departed from the policy of his predecessor in respect to foreign affairs. Strained relations with Mexico, arising from article 27 of the Mexican constitution of 1917 (pages 580 ff.) and with Nicaragua arising out of a resolution following the presidential election of 1924, have been handled with a patient insistence on the protection of American industrial and financial interests—accompanied by the dispatch of several thousand American marines to the Central American republic. In the Far East civil war in China attendant upon the efforts of the Nationalists to end the devastating strife of rival feudal military lords and the control of China's economic resources by the foreigner, has led the United States, like other Western powers, to send warships and marines to safeguard the life and prosperity of its citizens in that distracted country.

There remains as probably the most important problem in our foreign relations the question of the definitive attitude of the United States toward the League of Nations. In spite of the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, of the overwhelming vote cast the next year for the anti-League candidate, Senator Harding, and of the repeated assurances of the present Republican administration that the case is closed, there is no such consensus of opinion among the American people. Positively, the League has proved itself, in the words of Lloyd George, "an essential part of the machinery of civilization." It has grown stronger every year. It has settled a number of important international disputes, and its activities in the fields of finance, transit, customs, health, repatriations, labor, legal advice, taxation, mandates, armaments, and a host of other questions have been fruitful. Negatively, the "ghosts of 1920" have failed to materialize. There has been no invasion of the sovereignty of the member nations, no sign

is unprecedented in the history of public finance. But while federal debts and taxes have steadily decreased since 1921, local debts and taxes have mounted to dangerously high figures. In 1926 the total state and local taxes in our country were over \$5,200,000,000, as compared with a tax bill of \$3,207,000,000, collected by the federal government; and the per capita taxes were respectively \$29.92 and \$18.13.

of a "superstate," no provocation to war. The League has not moved a single soldier. If our government has refused to join, our citizens have not held aloof. More than one hundred Americans have given their services on various commissions and in various consultative capacities. Our citizens show an interest in the meetings of the Assembly at Geneva. American journalists report the proceedings of the League with diligence. More League documents are sold in the United States than in any other country. Moreover, the attitude of our government toward the League has changed notably, for all the protestations to the contrary. Ambassador Harvey's unrebuked statement in the spring of 1921 that the idea of our entering the League "by hook or by crook" was "absurd," and that our government would "not have anything to do with the League, or with any commission or committee appointed by it or responsible to it, either directly or indirectly, openly or furtively," would not be made today. It has been refuted by the facts. We have taken part "indirectly" and "furtively" in more than thirty activities of the League and have been officially represented on a number of its commissions.

The distinguished American lawyer Elihu Root served on the committee to draw up the constitution of the Permanent Court of International Justice (provided for in the 14th article of the Covenant of the League of Nations) in 1920, and the distinguished American authority on international law, Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University, was elected by the League as one of the eleven judges of the Court sitting at The Hague. President Harding, in February, 1923, advised the Senate to sanction our entrance into the World Court, and President Coolidge on several occasions repeated the recommendation. At last the Senate, in spite of the opposition of Mr. Borah and the other "irreconcilables," who would have nothing to do with an organization created by the League, voted, in January, 1926, to join the Court on certain conditions. Delegates from the forty-four member states of the League which are in the World Court met at Geneva on September 1, 1926, to consider the conditions proposed by our Senate, and showed the

utmost desire to welcome the United States to membership in the Court, if the Senate would accept such an interpretation of a part of its reservations as would make it clear that we were not asking for privileges (like the veto power) not shared by the other member nations. The Senate, however, has thus far (1927) refused to accept the suggestions of the Geneva meeting, so that we still remain outside the World Court.

In the year that Thomas Jefferson bought the wilderness of Louisiana between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains, when the population of our country was about equal to that of New York City today, when most of the people lived on farms or in villages, when the constitutions of the states limited the suffrage to a comparatively small percentage of the adult males, and when there was even less of social than of political democracy, Fisher Ames, a Federalist lawyer of Massachusetts, complained that our country was "too big for union, too sordid for patriotism, and too democratic for liberty."¹ This lugubrious forecast, made sixscore years ago, has been repeated by the prophets of calamity in every generation since. The framers of the Omaha platform, like the men of the Essex Junto, saw the country tottering on the verge of ruin. The pages of the records of Congress are filled with impassioned pleas against measures whose passage would mean the downfall of the Republic and the end of American liberty. Still, the Republic endures; and the millions of its citizens, of whatever party, creed, or race, who go about their business daily are as devoted to their country as ever their fathers were. The apparently universal trait of human nature that makes calamity and evil so interesting tempts to the emphasis of sinister events in the press. No headlines feature the faithful administration of public office, the honest conduct of business, or conjugal fidelity. The poets and moralists since the days of antiquity have celebrated a golden age in the past, which has degenerated into brass and iron in their own time.

¹ Henry Adams, "The History of the United States in the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison," Vol. I, p. 84.

But the student of history knows that this picture is not true. When the sentimental idealism with which we invest the past is removed by a sober study of the records, the "good old times" are seen to have harbored cruelties, injustices, bigotries, misery, and squalor which would not be tolerated today. If anyone is inclined to believe, for example, that all the men of the early days of our republic were paragons of patriotism, honesty, and high-mindedness, he has only to read the letters of that most scrupulous of judges, George Washington, to be disillusioned.

This is not to contend that our age is free from faults. The catalogue of our national shortcomings is long. We have not yet learned how to make laws wisely or enforce them honestly. We are careless, self-indulgent, impatient of wholesome restraint, and untrained in self-control. Our losses by fire, almost all of them preventable, in the single year 1921 were \$485,000,000—more than the total cost of the Panama Canal. The deaths by accident in the same year were over 75,000, or one every six minutes. We have a million drug addicts in the country. While our population increased 14.9 per cent in the decade from 1910 to 1920, divorces increased 57 per cent. At the beginning of this century there were about 140 defectives in every 100,000 of the population; in 1920 there were 220 in every 100,000. So we could extend the list of plagues which afflict our present age—the miscarriage of justice, the persecution of unwelcome opinion, the impunity of crime, the ineffectiveness of our elaborate educational systems to impart wisdom or to kindle genius. If the recognition and confession of these evils meant a fatalistic acceptance of their inevitability, instead of a stimulus to their elimination, we should have cause to despair of the Republic. But such is not the case. The American people are not ready either to sink into that indifference to the forms and faults of government which has been the prelude to national decay since the days of the Roman "bread and circuses" or to relax the constant battle against the cancers of the body social. "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."

The task before us is a serious one. In our political life it means that the constantly threatened ideals of disinterested pub-

lic service must be recovered and cherished, that corruption in high places must be eliminated, that the chastened coöperation of all good men in the common work of honest government must be substituted for partisan glee in fixing a stigma upon political opponents, and that public servants must be rebaptized with courage to incur unpopularity and even to sacrifice votes for the sake of fidelity to principles. A democracy is the rule of the people, and it is capable of being the best or the worst form of government according as the people are at their best or at their worst. There is no magic potency in the name democracy to commute base metal into gold. Government cannot make good men, but men can make good government. To heed the partisan politicians one would be tempted to believe that the salvation or the ruin of the country depended on intrusting the government to this party or that. What it really depends upon is the virtue of its citizens. In a democracy they, as Jefferson long ago insisted, are themselves the government acting in their political capacity. We have no government imposed upon us by the divine right of dynasties or the triumphant armies of conquerors. If we allow other forms of privilege to usurp the popular sovereignty, the fault is in ourselves. The government of a free people is the reflection of their own qualities. Injustice, oppression, greed, and corruption can persist in a government only among a people who cherish or tolerate these evils in their social philosophy. It is a trite saying, but one whose profound truth we are still far from realizing. The temptation to look to some form of political machinery to cure our social ills is inveterate. We place tens of thousands of laws upon the statute books of the nation and the states every year—some good, some bad, most indifferent. We are constantly tinkering with constitutions, charters, ordinances, and by-laws. We multiply administrative boards and commissions, appoint investigating committees, publish ponderous and voluminous reports, mail masses of government statistics, until we bid fair to be entangled in the red tape of routine. It might be well if a legislative moratorium were declared. The whirl of the political machinery threatens to drown the calm voices of reasoned counsel.

Respect for the laws which exist is infinitely more important than the enactment of a host of new statutes. We have the unenviable reputation of being a nation of "scofflaws." Especially since the war there has been a disquieting amount of support for such a judgment in the facts of our social life. "Crime waves" have been common in our cities. Groups of men have taken the administration of justice into their own hands and presumed to enforce their own conception of law by secret and essentially unlawful associations. Our court dockets are choked with criminal cases. The indictments impending in the Federal courts increased from 9503 in 1912 to over 70,000 in 1921, more than 30,000 of these being for the violation of the prohibition laws. The losses paid by burglary-insurance companies grew from \$1,686,000 in 1916 to \$10,189,000 in 1921, a gain of 543 per cent. The year ending August 31, 1921, saw a bank robbery for every business day in the year. One motor car out of every 22 registered in Chicago and one out of every 30 registered in New York were stolen. The thefts from railroads, express companies, piers, and mails were enormous. Moreover, crime is encouraged by its impunity. There were 336 murders in Chicago in 1919, and only 44 convictions.

Undoubtedly the aftermath of the war is responsible to some extent for these sinister conditions. With the removal of the hand of the government from our economic and social activities and with the return to the fierce competitive order, we have confused liberty and license. The artificial stimulation of prices and wages, the easy reaping of profits utterly incommensurate with the services rendered or with the quality of the goods delivered, have encouraged a feverish spirit in our social life which manifests itself in a thirst for pleasure, an aversion to honest work, and a mad desire to get somebody else's money by fair means or foul. We have difficulties to cope with also in the nature of the population of our large cities, which are breeding-places of crime—difficulties which our Americanization agencies and our legislation restricting immigration are attempting to remedy. Berlin has a foreign-born population of only 2.90 per cent, London of 3 per cent, and Paris of 6 per cent; but 36

out of every 100 of the population of Chicago, and 41 out of every 100 in New York, are foreign-born. By the census of 1920 four-fifths of the 5,620,000 inhabitants of the latter city were either foreign-born or born of foreign parentage. Statistics show that 70.1 per cent of the criminals in prison in 1923 were foreign-born. These are not pleasant facts to contemplate, but to ignore them would be worse than folly. The nation, like the individual, that is blind to defects or acquiescent in evils is headed for degeneracy. The remedy is not in legislation. To pass a law for the enforcement of violated law is only a temptation to further violation. We have tried that remedy again and again in the last generation with our revisions and amplifications and interpretations of the anti-trust legislation, for example. The real hope of betterment lies in the unceasing effort to educate public opinion in the appreciation of our common responsibility for the success of democratic government and the realization that the man who is recreant to this responsibility is his own worst enemy, because he is destroying the safeguards of his own liberty and security. "Free government," said President Coolidge in his message of December 6, 1923, "has no greater menace than disrespect for authority and continual violation of law."

Our economic task is still to make good the promise of equal opportunity proclaimed so confidently by the fathers as the essence of American democracy. We are proud of our economic strength. Our national wealth in 1927 is approaching \$500,000,000,000, or nearly \$5000 per capita. Our foreign trade is nearly \$10,000,000,000, an increase of 100 per cent in a decade. Foreign investments in Latin America, Canada, Europe and Asia, represent another \$10,000,000,000, as against \$2,000,000,000 in 1910 and \$500,000,000 in 1900. With only 6 per cent of the world's area and 7 per cent of its population, we have 80 per cent of the world's automobiles (one for every five inhabitants of the country), 57 per cent of the world's telegraph and telephone lines, 40 per cent of its harnessed water power, and 37 per cent of its railway mileage. We produce over 70 per cent of the world's cotton, 65 per cent of its pe-

troleum and steel, 60 per cent of its copper and zinc, 55 per cent of its coal and iron. Every region of our country from the coastal lowlands of the Atlantic and the Gulf through the central plains to the towering ridges of the Rockies and beyond to the fertile valleys of the Pacific states, produces its mounting surplus of food, raw materials, and manufactured goods.

Yet the distribution of the vast wealth of the country is so unequal that millions are on the verge of misery. Monopoly and privilege still flourish. Our basic industries are controlled in a way to stifle competition, discourage initiative, and exact enormous tribute from the people. In spite of the valiant efforts of President Roosevelt to hold the big corporations to a strict observance of the law, and of President Wilson's courageous attack on the walls of privilege to "set human rights above property rights," the battle is still to be won. The "Wisconsin platform" of yesterday echoes the grievances of the Grangers and the Anti-Monopolists of half a century ago. The great problem of the industrial age, which began with the private exploitation of our marvelous natural resources after the Civil War, remains unsolved. In the midst of abundance great masses of our people are in want. We pay exorbitant prices for our coal and building-material. Rents rise. Taxes increase. Twenty-five years ago we were taxed \$20.00 per capita; in 1926 we paid \$48.05 per capita. It is certain that the benefits received have not grown two-and-a-half-fold.

The complaint of the farmer persists. His champions in Congress and the state legislatures maintain that the whole political and financial machinery of the country is run to discriminate against his interests. The figures of the Department of Commerce show increasing prosperity in industry, with extra dividends, new capitalization, and mounting surpluses. The agricultural bulletins tell another story. In the fifteen leading wheat-growing states, says Senator La Follette, more than 108,000 farmers have lost their farms since 1920 by the foreclosure of mortgages, 122,000 more have surrendered their farms without waiting for legal proceedings, and 375,000 more have kept their farms only through the leniency of their creditors—a total of

600,000 farmers "virtually bankrupt." These figures certainly do not represent the true condition of the sound and conservative farmer class, but include the land speculators and the reckless borrowers. Other statistics—selected, doubtless, with no less "tendency" than Senator La Follette's—show that the proportion of farm mortgages to farm values dropped from 35 per cent in 1890 to 18.5 per cent in 1920, that the farmers' crops in 1923 sold for more than they had brought in any year since 1917, and that the conservative life-insurance companies are investing larger amounts of capital each year in farm mortgages. In the report of the Equitable Life for 1922 it is stated that the company had \$98,000,000 in such mortgages, and adds, "We have never lost one cent on a farm loan." But whether or not the condition of the farmer is as bad as he believes it to be, the fact remains that he believes it. This is the disquieting element of the situation.

The interests of capital and labor are fundamentally antagonistic. Both want the same thing; namely, a larger share of the fruits of their joint production. If they unite at times at the expense of the consumer, it is a temporary and unnatural alliance. Capital, unrestrained by the united efforts of labor, would force the pay of the workers below a fair standard of living; and labor, if it had its way unchecked, would take so large a part of the profits of industry as to discourage capital investment. In the struggle capital has several advantages: (1) it owns the tools of production, (2) it has reserves that enable it to last out a strike better than labor, (3) the large numbers of the working class eager for a job furnish capital with a field for the recruitment of strike breakers, and (4) the stoppage of production by a strike (the only effective weapon in the hands of labor) injures the strikers as well as the employers. If the Samson of labor should pull down the pillars of the temple of industry, he himself would perish beneath the ruins. But while it is utopian to prophesy a perfect harmony between capital and labor, it is no less true that the savage and destructive hostility between them which has characterized so many of the years of our industrial age is a disgrace to civilized society.

There must be consideration and concession on both sides. The right of labor to organize and to bargain collectively should be frankly recognized. It is labor's only protection. "Employers who attempt to meet labor's demands by smashing the unions," says Professor Seager, truly, "are sowing the wind to reap the whirlwind."¹ On the other side, methods of violence, terrorization, and sabotage on the part of labor are equally suicidal. Progress toward a better understanding depends upon the subordination of an intolerant class consciousness, of selfish greed and mutual hostility and suspicion to a spirit of fair play and common devotion to American democratic ideals. Our economic problem, like our political problem, is at bottom a moral one. No amount of machinery can avail to heal the industrial strife unless that machinery is operated by men of good will.

America is strong, rich, powerful, courageous and hopeful. She need have no fear of foes from without. But there are dangers that threaten within. We are a wasteful people in the midst of our abundance, consuming the resources which we should be conserving for a future generation. It is estimated that the hasty plundering of our mines, oil fields, and forests entails an annual waste of 750,000,000 tons of coal, 1,000,000,000 barrels of oil, 600,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas, and 5,000,000,000 cubic feet of lumber. Strikes and lockouts, preventable illness and accidents, the maladjustment of labor supply to labor demand, result in the unemployment of about 15 per cent of the man power of the nation, and fully another 15 per cent of the workers are engaged in the manufacture of useless luxuries to flatter our vanity, or positively harmful "goods." More than three million people a year are made sick by food adulterations; another million are drug addicts; and no one knows how numerous are the dupes of the patent medicines, cure-alls, and beautifiers which have made us the victims of "the gaudiest collection of quacks in the world's history." Our preoccupation with material success threatens to blind us to the value of the patient, honest cultivation of mind and character.

¹ Henry R. Seager, "Practical Problems in Economics," p. 600.

The conquest of the forces of nature has far outrun the organization of intelligence. If we have the enviable record of leading the world in economic prosperity, we have also the unenviable record of leading the world in recklessness, instability, and crime.

These are appalling facts. They are sicknesses in the body of the nation, and, like illness in the human body, they must be diagnosed in order to be remedied. If our Republic ever fails to fulfill the high hopes of the men who founded it and who sustained it in the days of weakness and trial, the fault will be with a generation that has lost the inspiration of their ideals. No clearer call to the task of a newly awakened America in the newly forming world could be found than the words with which President Coolidge closed his first message to Congress and the American people, on December 6, 1923: "It is one hundred years since our country announced the Monroe Doctrine. . . . This principle must be maintained. But in maintaining it we must not be forgetful that a great change has taken place. We are no longer a weak nation, thinking mainly of defense, dreading foreign imposition. We are great and powerful. New powers bring new responsibilities. Our duty then was to protect ourselves. Added to that, our duty now is to help give stability to the world. We want idealism. We want that vision which lifts men above themselves. These are virtues by reason of their own merit. But they must not be cloistered; they must not be impractical; they must not be ineffective.

"The world has had enough of the curse of hatred and selfishness, of destruction and war. It has had enough of the wrongful use of material power. For the healing of the nations there must be good will and charity, confidence and peace. . . . Our authority among the nations must be represented by justice and mercy. . . . The spiritual forces of the world make all its final determinations. It is with these voices that America should speak."

INDEX

- Abbott, Lawrence F., *ii*, 504
 Abbott, Lyman, *ii*, 451
 "A B C" powers, *ii*, 575 f.
 Aberdeen, Lord, *i*, 417
 Abolitionists, *i*, 318, 388 f., 397 f., 532, 598
 Ackerman, A. T., *ii*, 41
 Acts of Trade, *i*, 42, 61
 Adams, Charles Francis, *i*, 615 n., 618; *ii*, 43 f., 53 n., 54, 171
 Adams, Charles Francis, Jr., *ii*, 187 n.
 Adams, Henry, *i*, 238, 253 n., 346 n., 558 n.2, 581 n.1
 Adams, James T., *ii*, 290 n.
 Adams, John, and American Revolution, *i*, 66, 77 n., 99, 103; on national government, *i*, 108 n., 109; minister to Great Britain, *i*, 121, 124, 128; on the Constitution, *i*, 134, 144 n.; vice president, *i*, 147, 151; on the "people," *i*, 165; relations with France, *i*, 180 f.; president, *i*, 189 f.
 Adams, John Quincy, *i*, 141 n., 239; minister to Russia, *i*, 253, 275; expansionist, *i*, 298; relations with Spain, *i*, 302 f.; on Missouri Compromise, *i*, 316 f.; on Monroe Doctrine, *i*, 324 f.; in election of 1824, *i*, 331 f.; character, *i*, 334; policy, *i*, 337 f.; in election of 1828, *i*, 345; on tariff, *i*, 370 f.; and slavery, *i*, 378, 390, 397; on Texas, *i*, 413 f.
 Adams, Samuel, *i*, 62, 71, 75
 Adamson Act, *ii*, 626 f., 658 n., 739
 Addams, Jane, *ii*, 527
 "Agrarian Crusade," *ii*, 86 f.
 Agricultural Conference, *ii*, 785
 Agricultural Credits Act, *ii*, 785
 Aguinaldo, Emilio, *ii*, 309 f., 361 f.
 Aircraft scandal, *ii*, 651
 Alabama, the, *i*, 618 and n.
 Alabama claims, *ii*, 46, 51 f.
 Alabama Midland case, *ii*, 189
 Alaska, *ii*, 46 f., 470 f.
 Albany Congress, *i*, 49, 109, 113
 "Albany Regency," *i*, 335
 Albert, Dr. Heinrich, *ii*, 613
 Aldrich, Nelson W., *ii*, 426, 487 f., 547
 Aldrich-Vreeland Act, *ii*, 431, 547
 Alexander I, Czar, *i*, 275, 322 f.
 Alexander II, Czar, *ii*, 193
 Alexander, J. W., *ii*, 723 n.
 Algeciras Conference, *ii*, 424 f.
 Alger, Richard A., *ii*, 192, 314
 Alien and Sedition Acts, *i*, 191 f.
 Alien Land-holding (Webb) Act, *ii*, 564 f.
 Alien Property Custodian, *ii*, 660 f.
 Allen, General H. T., *ii*, 732
 Allison, William B., *ii*, 117, 378 n.
 Allotments, soldiers', *ii*, 732
 Altgeld, John P., *ii*, 262
 Alvarado, *ii*, 579
 Alverstone, Lord, *ii*, 410
 Alvey, Judge R. H., *ii*, 272 n.
 Amendment, Twelfth, *i*, 200 n.; Thirteenth, *i*, 597 f.
 American Antislavery Society, *i*, 388
 A. E. F. (American Expeditionary Force), *ii*, 665 f., 678 f., 682 f., 699 f., 731 f., 734 n.
 A. F. L. (American Federation of Labor), *ii*, 194, 627, 642, 743, 758, 796
 American Legion, *ii*, 733 f., 775 f.
 A. P. A. (American Protective Association), *ii*, 245 f.
 American Railway Union, *ii*, 259 f.
 American Revolution, *i*, 55 f.
 American Rights Committee, *ii*, 615 n.
 "American System," *i*, 343, 370
 American Tobacco Company, *ii*, 436 n.
 Ames, Adelbert, *ii*, 60
 Ames, Fisher, *i*, 152, 179 n.2, 182, 185; *ii*, 799
 Ames, Oakes, *ii*, 31, 57, 184
 Ames, Oliver, *ii*, 31
 Amherst, General Jeffrey, *i*, 50
 Amiens, Peace of, *i*, 215, 232
 Ammons, Governor E. M., *ii*, 561
 Amnesty Act, *ii*, 46 and n.

- Ampudia, General, *i*, 424
 Anabaptists, *i*, 3
 Anarchists (Chicago), *ii*, 194
 Anderson, A. B., *ii*, 748
 Anderson letter, *ii*, 239
 Anderson, Major Robert, *i*, 524 f.,
 541 f., 548, 620
 Andersonville, *ii*, 74 n.2
 Andrew, Governor John A., *i*, 545
 Andros, Sir Edmund, *i*, 25 f., 31, 37, 42
 Annapolis Convention, *i*, 136 f.
 Anthony, Susan B., *ii*, 470, 472
 Anthracite, use of, *ii*, 443 n.
 Antietam, battle of, *i*, 571 f.
 Anti-Federalists, *i*, 162 f.
 Anti-imperialism, *ii*, 345 f., 350 f.
 Anti-Masons, *i*, 361 and n.
 Anti-Nebraska men, *i*, 489 f.
 Appalachian Forest Reserve Act, *ii*, 494
Appam case, *ii*, 623 n.
 "Appeal of the Independent Democ-
 rats," *i*, 485
 Appomattox, surrender at, *i*, 591
Arabic case, *ii*, 611
 Aranda, Count, *i*, 125
 Arbitration treaties, *ii*, 422 f., 504
 Archbold, R. W., *ii*, 492 n.1
 Archibald, J. F. J., *ii*, 613
 Arizona, *ii*, 352 n.2, 466
 Armada, Spanish, *i*, 6
 Armaments, limitation of, *ii*, 788 f.
 Armed merchantmen, *ii*, 617 f., 643
 "Armed neutrality," *i*, 96
 Armistice, *ii*, 696 f.
 Armstrong committee, *ii*, 416 n.
 Army, *ii*, 616 f., 649 f., 670 f., 699
 Arnold, Benedict, *i*, 91, 96
 Aroostook War, *i*, 409 f.
 Arrears of Pensions Act, *ii*, 156 n.1
 Arthur, Chester A., *ii*, 108 f., 123, 146,
 148, 154 f.
 Article X, *ii*, 716 f., 719 f.
 Articles of Confederation, *i*, 91, 110 f.,
 115 f., 130 f.
 Ashburton, Lord, *i*, 411 f., 422
 Ashley, J. M., *ii*, 17
 "Asiento," the, *i*, 311
 Asquith, H. H., *ii*, 599 n.2
 Assemblies, colonial, *i*, 40, 42, 45
 "Association," the American, *i*, 72
 "Assumption," *i*, 155
 Astor, J. J., *i*, 305
 Astor, William B., *ii*, 83
 Atchison, D. R., *i*, 488 n.
 Atlanta, capture of, *i*, 588
 Austerlitz, battle of, *i*, 226, 234
 Australian ballot, *ii*, 242 n.1
 Austria, *i*, 459 f.
 Ayres, Leonard P., *ii*, 668 n., 690 n.
 Babcock, O. E., *ii*, 41 n.
 Baer, George F., *ii*, 386 f.
 Bainbridge, Captain, *i*, 264
 Baker, George F., *ii*, 547
 Baker, Newton D., *ii*, 579 n., 617, 649,
 651, 767
 Baker, Ray Stannard, *ii*, 704
 Baldwin, Stanley, *ii*, 779
 Balfour, A. J., *ii*, 634, 665, 701, 789 f.
 Balkans, *ii*, 598
 Ballinger, R. A., *ii*, 484 n., 492 f.
 Balmaceda, *ii*, 222 f.
 Baltimore, city of, *i*, 545, 547
 Baltimore, Lord, *i*, 12, 18, 22 and n.,
 27 n.
Baltimore case, *ii*, 223 f.
 Bancroft, Archbishop, *i*, 11 n.1
 Bancroft, George, *i*, 133 n.
 Bank, National (first), *i*, 158 f.
 Bank, National (second), *i*, 284 f.,
 307 f., 358 f., 362 f., 382 f., 404 f.
 Banks, General N. P., *i*, 565 f.
 Banks, state, *i*, 285 n., 607 n.
 Barbary States, *i*, 128, 210 f.
 Barbé-Marbois, *i*, 215
 Barclay, Captain, *i*, 268
 Baring Brothers, *ii*, 250
 "Barnburners," *i*, 441
 Barnett, General George, *ii*, 591
 Barron, Captain, *i*, 231
 Bates, Edward, *i*, 521, 541 and n.2
 "Battle of the Maps," *i*, 411 n.
 Bayard, T. F., *ii*, 169, 195 n., 219, 221 n.
 Bayard, Thomas, *i*, 275
 Bayonne Decree, *i*, 247
 Bazaine, Maréchal, *i*, 619
 Bear Flag, *i*, 428 and n.
 Beard, Charles A., *i*, 144 n., 163 n.,
 166 n.2, 199 n., 201 n.1
 Beauregard, General P. G. T., *i*, 543,
 546, 552 f., 560
 Beck, J. B., *ii*, 181 n.
 Bedford, Gunning, *i*, 140
 Beecher, H. W., *i*, 532
 Beer, G. L., *i*, 30 n.1
 Bela Kun, *ii*, 710
 Belgium, *ii*, 602
 Belknap, W. W., *ii*, 73

- Bell, General J. F., *ii*, 362
 Bell, John, *i*, 403, 520
 Bellamy, Edward, *ii*, 193 n.
 Belleau Wood, *ii*, 679
 Belmont, August, *ii*, 521
 Benjamin, J. P., *i*, 574, 602 f.
 Benson, Allan, *ii*, 479 n., 628 n., 662 n.
 Benton, T. H., *i*, 304 and n., 337 n., 340, 358 f., 374 n.1, 385 n., 438 f., 444, 488 n.
 "Benton's Mint Drops," *i*, 386
 Bering Sea controversy, *ii*, 220 f.
 Berkeley, Governor William, *i*, 16, 24 n.
 Berlin conference, *ii*, 220
 Berlin Decree, *i*, 235, 238
 Bernstorff, Count Johann von, *ii*, 608 f., 612 f., 637 f., 648 n., 700 n.
 Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor von, *ii*, 618, 637 f., 640 n.
 Beveridge, A. J., *ii*, 527
 Biddle, Nicholas, *i*, 359 f., 363 f., 382, 386
 Bienville, Céleron de, *i*, 47
 Bigelow, John, *ii*, 50
 "Biglow Papers," *i*, 434
 "Billion-dollar Congress," *ii*, 215
 Bimetallism, *ii*, 115 f.
 Birney, James G., *i*, 419 f.
 Bismarck, Prince Otto von, *ii*, 50, 53, 80, 220, 685
 Black, Jeremiah W., *i*, 524, 527
 "Black codes," *ii*, 8
 "Black Friday," *ii*, 42
 Black Rock, raid, *i*, 263
Black Warrior affair, *i*, 464 f.
 "Bladensburg races," *i*, 272
 Blaine, James G., *i*, 492, 595 n.; *ii*, 74 n.2; in convention of 1876, *ii*, 74 f.; chides Hayes, *ii*, 105; in campaign of 1880, *ii*, 122 f.; Secretary of State, *ii*, 145 f.; foreign policy, *ii*, 150 f.; in election of 1884, *ii*, 161 f.; defeated, *ii*, 166; on tariff in 1888, *ii*, 191 f.; on reciprocity, *ii*, 208 f.; on trusts, *ii*, 217; foreign policy, *ii*, 219 f.; jingoism, *ii*, 225; resignation, *ii*, 226; character, *ii*, 226 f.
 Blair, Francis P., *ii*, 21
 Blair, Francis P., Jr., *i*, 548
 Blair, James, *i*, 151
 Blair, Montgomery, *i*, 501 n., 541 and n.2, 596 f., 602
 Bland, R. P., *ii*, 117, 282
 Bland-Allison Act, *ii*, 117 f., 176 f.
 Blennerhassett, H., *i*, 229
 Bliss, General T. H., *ii*, 704, 727
 Blockade of South, *i*, 545 f., 562 f., 574, 610
 Blount, J. H., *ii*, 263 n.2
 Board of Trade, *i*, 44
 Boer War, *ii*, 347
 Boies, Horace, *ii*, 240
 Bolivar, Simon, *i*, 339
 Bolsheviks, *ii*, 673 f., 698, 710, 746, 751
 Bonaparte, C. J., *ii*, 433 n.
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, *i*, 183 f., 213, 226, 232, 235, 245, 247 f., 252 f., 270 n., 276, 321 f.
 Bond sales, *ii*, 265 f.
 Bonus bill, *i*, 297 f., *ii*, 734, 775 f.
 Boone, Daniel, *i*, 104, 113
 Booth, John Wilkes, *i*, 620
 Borah, W. E., *ii*, 718 and n., 722, 762, 789, 798
 Borden, Sir R. L., *ii*, 500, 708 n., 787
 Boscawen, Admiral, *i*, 61
 "Boston Massacre," *i*, 68
 "Boston Tea Party," *i*, 69 f.
 Bourgeois, Léon, *ii*, 714 f., 725
 Bourne, Jonathan, Jr., *ii*, 502 f.
 Boutelle, C. A., *ii*, 301 n.1
 Boutwell, G. S., *ii*, 42, 347
 Bovay, E. A., *i*, 491
 Bowen, H. W., *ii*, 393
 Boxer rebellion, *ii*, 339 f.
 Braddock's defeat, *i*, 48
 Brady, T. J., *ii*, 147 f.
 Bragg, General Braxton, *i*, 571, 573, 582 f.
 Brandywine Creek, battle of, *i*, 91
 Breckinridge, John, *i*, 194
 Breckinridge, J. C., *i*, 497, 520
 Brest-Litovsk, treaty of, *ii*, 675 and n.
 Brewer, Judge David J., *ii*, 272 n., 287 n.
 Briand, Aristide, *ii*, 619, 790 f.
 Brice, C. S., *ii*, 256
 Bristow, B. H., *ii*, 67, 75
 Brock, General Isaac, *i*, 262
 Brockdorff-Rantzau, *ii*, 710 f.
 Brookhart, S. W., *ii*, 786
 Brooklyn Heights, battle of, *i*, 84
 Brooks, James, *ii*, 57
 Brooks, Preston S., *i*, 496
 Brougham, Lord, *i*, 285, 416
 Brown, B. Gratz, *ii*, 43 f.
 Brown, Judge H. B., *ii*, 370 and n.
 Brown, General Jacob, *i*, 269 f., 287

- Brown, J. E., *ii*, 157 n.
 Brown, John, *i*, 496, 515 f.
 Brown, Governor Joseph E., *i*, 574, 601
 Brownsville affair, *ii*, 454 and n.
 Brussels Conference, *ii*, 251 n.1
 Bryan, W. J., and repeal of Sherman
 Act, *ii*, 252 f.; defeated in 1894, *ii*,
 264; on Cleveland, *ii*, 274 f.; "The
 First Battle," *ii*, 274 n.; in campaign
 of 1896, *ii*, 280 f.; of 1900, *ii*, 334 f.;
 and Colombia treaty, *ii*, 409 f.; de-
 nounces Cleveland, *ii*, 413; and
 Parker, *ii*, 414 f.; in campaign of
 1908, *ii*, 452 f.; attacks Taft, *ii*, 498;
 at Baltimore convention of 1912, *ii*,
 521 f.; Secretary of State, *ii*, 538 f.;
 sent to Sacramento, *ii*, 564; Carib-
 bean policy, *ii*, 586 f.; arbitration
 treaties, *ii*, 599 f.; and World War, *ii*,
 604 f.; resigns, *ii*, 611 n.; pacifism, *ii*,
 641 f.; at San Francisco convention
 of 1900, *ii*, 764 and n.; declines
 prohibition nomination, *ii*, 766
 Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, *ii*, 592
 Bryant, W. C., *i*, 171 n.
 Bryce, James (Viscount), *i*, 142, 364 n.,
 461, 476; *ii*, 528
 Buchanan, James, and Ostend Mani-
 festo, *i*, 464; minister to England, *i*,
 467; nominated 1856, *i*, 497; presi-
 dent, *i*, 500 f.; indecision, *i*, 524 f.;
 change of spirit, *i*, 545
 Buck, S. J., *ii*, 86, 98
 Buckner, General Simon B., *i*, 558; *ii*,
 283
 Buell, General Don Carlos, *i*, 557, 573
 Buena Vista, battle of, 431 f.
 Buford, Major, *i*, 495
 Bulgaria, *ii*, 694
 Bullard, General R. L., *ii*, 678, 685
 Bullitt, W. C., *ii*, 723 n.
 Bullock, James, *i*, 617 f.
 Bull Run, battle of (first), *i*, 553 f.
 Bull Run, battle of (second), *i*, 569 f.
 Bülow, Prince von, *ii*, 337, 371
 Bulwer, Sir Henry L., *i*, 461 f.
 Bunau-Varilla, Philippe, *ii*, 403 f.
 Bundy, General Omar, *ii*, 679
 Burchard, S. D., *ii*, 166
 Burgess, J. W., *i*, 107, 137 n., 390, 489;
 ii, 13, 78
 Burgesses, House of, *i*, 13
 Burgoyne, General John, *i*, 90 f.
 Burián, Baron, *ii*, 614
 Burke, Edmund, *i*, 58 f., 64, 67, 81 n.
 Burleson, A. S., *ii*, 495, 538, 703 n.,
 723 n., 767
 Burlingame Treaty, *ii*, 153
 Burnside, General A. E., *i*, 572 and n.2
 Burr, Aaron, *i*, 198 f., 222, 224, 228 f.,
 230 f.
 Burr, George L., *ii*, 272 n.
 Burt, Silas D., *ii*, 108, 157
 Burton, T. E., *ii*, 448, 779
 Bushnell, Asa, *ii*, 297 n.
 Butler, A. P., *i*, 444, 495 f.
 Butler, General B. F., *i*, 554, 561; *ii*,
 18 f., 40, 58, 60, 163 n., 192
 Butler, Marion, *ii*, 282
 Cabinet, *i*, 150 f.
 Cable, Atlantic, *i*, 275, 530; *ii*, 33 f.
 Cabot, John, *i*, 21
 Cadore, Duc de, *i*, 247 f.
 Cadorna, General, *ii*, 673 n.1
 Calhoun, John C., as a nationalist, *i*,
 249, 283 f., 287, 296 f.; and Jackson,
 i, 301 f., 354 f.; as Secretary of War,
 i, 341; as vice president, *i*, 342, 353;
 opposes tariff, *i*, 345 f., 353, 369; on
 nullification, *i*, 373; on abolitionists,
 i, 389, 398 f.; relations with Texas, *i*,
 417, 419; on Wilmot Proviso, *i*, 444;
 on Compromise of 1850, *i*, 449 f.; and
 Nashville convention, *i*, 454; on
 slavery, *i*, 539
 California, *i*, 427 f., 433, 444 f., 448 f.,
 454
 Callender, G. S., *i*, 131 n., 161 n.
 Calvinists of Rhine, *i*, 3
 Calvo, Carlos, *ii*, 394
 Cambon, Jules, *ii*, 320, 374
 Cameron, Don, *ii*, 207
 Cameron, Simon, *i*, 541 n.2, 547, 556,
 602; *ii*, 41
 Campbell, L. D., *ii*, 50 n.
 Canada, French, *i*, 45 f., 54; and War
 of 1812, *i*, 259 f.; in 1837, *i*, 396 f.
 Canadian reciprocity, *ii*, 499 f.
 Canning, George, *i*, 102, 238 f., 241,
 245, 256, 324, 326
 Cannon, J. G., *ii*, 451 n., 485, 495 f.
 Canovas de Castillo, Antonio, *ii*, 297
 Cantigny, battle, *ii*, 678 f.
 Canton, *i*, 131
 Capelle, Admiral von, *ii*, 619
 Caperton, W. B., *ii*, 589 f.
 Caporetto, battle, *ii*, 672 f.

- Capper, Arthur, *ii*, 629, 740
 Caribbean policy, *ii*, 594 f.
 Carlisle, J. G., *ii*, 251, 265 n.
 Carlotta, *ii*, 50
 Carlton, Sir Guy, *i*, 99, 102
 Carmarthen, Lord, *i*, 121, 124
 Carnegie, Andrew, *ii*, 192, 329 f., 448, 486, 584 n.2
 Caroline affair, *i*, 397, 409 f.
 Carpetbaggers, *ii*, 15
 Carranza, Venustiano, *ii*, 571 f., 576 f., 580
 Carrizal, battle of, *ii*, 578
 Cass, Lewis, *i*, 410, 441 f., 446, 458, 503, 527 n.
 Cassini, Count, *ii*, 419
 Castlereagh, Lord, *i*, 256, 275, 277
 Cavité, *ii*, 306
 Cecil, Lord Robert, *ii*, 714 f.
 Cedar Creek, battle of, *i*, 588
 Censorship, in war, *ii*, 622 f.
 Census, of 1850, *i*, 467 f.; of 1880, *ii*, 124 f.
 Central America, *i*, 462 f.
 Central Pacific Railroad, *ii*, 28, 30 n.
 Cerro Gordo, battle of, *i*, 432
 Cervera, Admiral Pascual, *ii*, 310 f., 317 f.
 Chadwick, F. E., *ii*, 299 n., 303
 Chaffee, General A. R., *ii*, 315
 Chamberlain, D. H., *ii*, 61 f., 103 f.
 Chamberlain, G. E., *ii*, 615, 651 f.
 Chamberlain, Joseph, *ii*, 349
 Champlain, *i*, 36 n.
 Chancellorsville, battle of, *i*, 575
 Chandler, W. E., *ii*, 105
 Chandler, Zachary, *ii*, 77
 Channing, Edward, *i*, 29 n.3, 42 n.1, 129 n.2, 131 n., 186, 217
 Charles I, King, *i*, 10, 23 f.
 Charles II, King, *i*, 9, 11, 14, 24 f., 56
 Charleston, *i*, 93 f., 519 f., 524 f., 543 f., 620
 Chase, Salmon P., on Compromise of 1850, *i*, 453; in convention of 1860, *i*, 521; Secretary of the Treasury, *i*, 534, 541 and n.2, 558; and War finance, *i*, 576 and n., 584, 605 f.; *ii*, 19, 20 n.2
 Chase, Samuel, *i*, 78, 114, 211, 225
 Château-Thierry, *ii*, 676
 Chatham, *see* Pitt
 Chattanooga, *i*, 574, 582 f.
 Cherbourg, battle of, *i*, 618
 Cherokees, *i*, 340 f.
 Chesapeake affair, *i*, 231 f., 239, 250
 Chesapeake defeated, *i*, 267
 Chesterfield, Lord, *i*, 49, 51
 Cheves, Langdon, *i*, 249, 329, 490
 Chickamauga, battle of, *i*, 582
 Chile, *ii*, 222 f.
 China, *ii*, 30 n., 31, 123 n.2, 153 f., 338 f., 508, 713, 791
 Chinda, Ambassador, *ii*, 564, 715
 Chippewa, battle of, *i*, 270
 Choate, J. H., *ii*, 469
 Choate, Rufus, *i*, 500
 Choiseul, *i*, 54
 Christensen, P. P., *ii*, 766
 Christian Commission, *i*, 611
 Cipher dispatches, *ii*, 119 n.
 Cities, government, *ii*, 126 f., 477
 Civil Rights Bill, *ii*, 11, 71
 Civil Service, *ii*, 106 f., 109 n.2, 156 f., 170 f., 213, 473
 Clapp committee, *ii*, 416 n.
 Clarendon, Lord, *i*, 25
 Clark, Captain C. E., *ii*, 312 n.
 Clark, Daniel, *i*, 229
 Clark, E. E., *ii*, 388
 Clark, George Rogers, *i*, 100 n.1, 126
 Clark, J. B. ("Champ"), *ii*, 415, 487, 500 f., 521 f., 524 n., 649, 706
 Clarke amendment, *ii*, 367
 Clarkson, J. S., *ii*, 213, 238
 Clay, Henry, and War of 1812, *i*, 249, 252, 260; at Ghent, *i*, 276; on National Bank, *i*, 284, 358, 363, 385, 404 f.; opposes treaty of 1819 with Spain, *i*, 304 and n.; on Missouri Compromise, *i*, 316, 318 n.; on Monroe Doctrine, *i*, 322 f.; in campaign of 1824, *i*, 327, 330 f.; Secretary of State, *i*, 333 f., 338 f.; in campaign of 1832, *i*, 362 f.; compromise of 1833, *i*, 373; on abolition, *i*, 398 f.; and Harrison, *i*, 399, 430; and Tyler, *i*, 404 f., 407; in campaign of 1844, *i*, 418 f.; and compromise of 1850, *i*, 447 f., 453, 456; death, *i*, 458
 Clayton, J. M., *i*, 461 f.
 Clayton Act, *ii*, 557 f.
 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, *i*, 462; *ii*, 150 and n.2, 399 f.
 Clayton Compromise, *i*, 440
 Clemenceau, Georges, *ii*, 678, 702, 704, 708 n., 710 f., 714 and n.

- Cleveland, Grover, elected governor, *ii*, 161; nominated for presidency, *ii*, 162; character, *ii*, 162 f.; contest with Senate, *ii*, 168 f.; cabinet, *ii*, 169 n.; and civil service, *ii*, 170 f.; and pensions, *ii*, 172 f.; currency problems, *ii*, 176 f.; and conservation, *ii*, 182, 446 n., 447; and railroads, *ii*, 188; and tariff, *ii*, 191 n., 254 f.; and labor, *ii*, 194, 261 f., 388; defeated in 1888, *ii*, 196; elected in 1892, *ii*, 238 f.; surgical operation, *ii*, 251 n.2; gold reserve, *ii*, 251 f.; in Hawaii, *ii*, 263 and n.2; bond sales, *ii*, 265 f.; Venezuela, *ii*, 269 f.; repudiated in 1896, *ii*, 282; supports Indianapolis ticket, *ii*, 283; retires to Princeton, *ii*, 292 f.; on Cuba, *ii*, 295 f.; criticizes Roosevelt, *ii*, 411; and campaign of 1904, *ii*, 412 f.; death, *ii*, 446 n.
- Clinton, DeWitt, *i*, 266
- Clinton, George, *i*, 119
- Clinton, Sir Henry, *i*, 84, 90 f., 93, 96, 98
- Coal strike, of 1900, *ii*, 379 f.; of 1902, *ii*, 385 f.; of 1919, *ii*, 747 f.; of 1921, *ii*, 779 f.
- Coats, J. & P., *ii*, 486
- Cobb, Howell, *i*, 316, 447, 503 f., 527 n.
- Cockburn, Admiral, *i*, 272
- Cockburn, Alexander, *ii*, 53 n.1, 54
- Cockran, Bourke, *ii*, 240
- Coin's Financial School, *ii*, 287 f.
- Colbert, *i*, 30 n.1, 45
- Colby, Bainbridge, *ii*, 629, 722 n., 763, 769 n.
- Cold Harbor, battle of, *i*, 587 and n.
- Colfax, Schuyler, *ii*, 4, 20
- Colfax massacre, *ii*, 60
- Collins, E. L., *i*, 478 and n.1
- Collins, P. M., *ii*, 33
- Colombia, *i*, 323, 338, 461; *ii*, 399 f., 401 f., 409 f., 567 f.
- Colorado strike, *ii*, 561
- Columbia, South Carolina, *i*, 590
- Columbia River, *i*, 160 n.2, 221
- Columbian Exposition, *ii*, 260
- Columbus, raid on, *ii*, 577
- Commerce, of United States, *i*, 160, 173 and n., 174, 232 f., 236, 241, 248, 256, 266 f., 285, 290 n.1, 477 f.
- Commerce Court, *ii*, 492 f. and n.1
- Commission form of government, *ii*, 476 f.
- Committee on Public Information, *ii*, 622 f., 702 f.
- Committees of Correspondence, *i*, 70 n., 71
- Committees of Safety, *i*, 71
- "Common Sense," *i*, 81
- Commons, J. R., *ii*, 193
- Compromise, Missouri, *i*, 309 f.
- Compromise of 1833, *i*, 374 f.
- Compromise of 1850, *i*, 443 f., 466
- Comstock lode, *ii*, 116, 130
- Conciliatory Act, *i*, 92
- Concord, battle at, *i*, 75
- Condominium in Samoa, *ii*, 220 and n.
- Confederacy, Southern, *i*, 529, 535 and n., 610 f.
- Conference of governors, 1908, *ii*, 448 f.
- Confiscation Act, *i*, 554, 593 f.
- Conger, E. H., *ii*, 339 f.
- Congress, First Continental, *i*, 71 f.
- Congress, Second Continental, *i*, 74 f., 89, 107
- Congress of Vienna, *i*, 277, 322
- Conkling, Roscoe, *ii*, 40 f., 75 and n., 108, 122 f., 145 f., 161, 166 n.
- Connolly, R. B., *ii*, 56 n.
- Connor, Commodore, *i*, 430
- Conscientious objectors, *ii*, 661 f.
- Conscription Act, Southern, *i*, 574; Northern, *i*, 575 f.
- Conservation, *ii*, 397 f., 442 f.
- Constitution and flag, *ii*, 353 f.
- Constitution of the United States, *i*, 112, 132 f., 138 f., 141 f., 145 f.
- Constitutional Union Party, *i*, 520
- Constitutions, state, *ii*, 464 f.
- Continental System, *i*, 253, 275
- Continuous voyage, *ii*, 605
- "Contraband of war," *i*, 554 n.2
- Contreras, battle of, *i*, 432
- Cooke, Jay, *ii*, 63 f.
- Cooley, T. M., *ii*, 189
- Coolidge, Calvin, *ii*, 161; and Philippines, *ii*, 367; and Mexico, *ii*, 581 f., and Boston police strike, *ii*, 750; vice-president, *ii*, 750; on election of 1920, *ii*, 768; on Wilson, *ii*, 769 n.; and tax reduction, *ii*, 774 n.; vetoes bonus bill, *ii*, 775 and n.; on Japan, *ii*, 788 n.; on wars, *ii*, 792; president, *ii*, 794; and election of 1924, *ii*, 796, policy, *ii*, 796 f.; on free government *ii*, 803; on America, *ii*, 807
- Coolidge, L. A., *ii*, 210 n.1

- "Cooling off" treaties, *ii*, 600 n.
 Cooper, Peter, *i*, 381; *ii*, 72, 82, 93 n.2, 98
 Cooper, Thomas, *i*, 343
 Cooper Union speech, *i*, 518 f.
 Copenhagen, *i*, 240
 "Copperheads," *i*, 575 f.; *ii*, 24
 Corbin, A. R., *ii*, 42
 Corbin, General H. C., *ii*, 341
 Corinth, *i*, 560
 Cornell, A. B., *ii*, 108 f.
 Cornwallis, General, *i*, 85, 89 f., 93 f., 96 f., 98
 "Corrupt bargain," *i*, 333
 Cortelyou, G. B., *ii*, 415, 417, 433
 Corwin, Thomas, *i*, 446
 Costa Rica, *ii*, 593
 Cotton, John, *i*, 20 and n.; *ii*, 458
 Cotton, production and trade, *i*, 287, 295, 314 and n., 472 f., 551 n.1, 562 f., 609 and n., 610
 "Cotton is King," *i*, 473, 513
 Coudert, F. R., *ii*, 272 n.
 Council of National Defense, *ii*, 615 f., 624, 657
Coueurs de bois, *i*, 34
 Courts, *ii*, 797; Central America, *ii*, 584 and n.2, 592 f.; industrial relations (Kansas), *ii*, 781 n. *See also* Supreme Court and World Court
 Coushatta massacre, *ii*, 60
 Cowpens, battle of, *i*, 96
 Cox, J. D., *ii*, 41
 Cox, J. M., *ii*, 765 f.
 Coxey's army, *ii*, 259
 Crane, W. M., *ii*, 390
 Crawford, W. H., *i*, 285, 288, 331 f., 337 n., 354 f.
 Crédit Mobilier, *ii*, 31, 57 f.
 Creeks, *i*, 273, 340 f.
 Creel, George, *ii*, 662, 664 n.
Creole affair, *i*, 410 f.
 "Crime against Kansas," *i*, 495
 "Crime of '73," *ii*, 116, 236
 Crime waves, *ii*, 802
 Crimean War, *i*, 465
 Cripple Creek, *i*, 258 n.
 Crittenden, Colonel, *i*, 463
 Crittenden, J. J., *i*, 404, 406
 Crittenden Compromise, *i*, 525 f., 528, 537
 Cromwell, Oliver, *i*, 13 f., 23 f., 31
 Cromwell, W. N., *ii*, 401 n.
 "Cross of gold" speech, *ii*, 280 f.
 Crowder, E. H., *ii*, 684
 Crozier, William, *ii*, 336 n.
 Cuba, *i*, 339, 462 f., 514; *ii*, 294 f., 353 f.
 Cullom, S. M., *ii*, 187 f., 225 n., 245
 Cullom Act, *see* Interstate Commerce Act
 Cumberland Road, *i*, 257, 321
 Cummings, H. S., *ii*, 763, 764
 Cummins, A. B., *ii*, 488, 503, 718, 720 n.
 Cunard, Samuel, *i*, 477 f.
 Cunningham claims, *ii*, 492 f.
 Currency, in Revolution, *i*, 96; Continental, *i*, 120 f.; in Jackson's day, *i*, 386; in Civil War, *i*, 603 f.
 Curry, J. L. M., *ii*, 137 n.
 Curtis, B. R., *i*, 502; *ii*, 19 n.
 Curtis, G. W., *ii*, 40, 106 and n.2, 113 f., 161, 170 f.
 Custer, General G. A., *ii*, 73
 Customs Administration Act, *ii*, 202
 Czernin, Count, *ii*, 675
 Dallas, Alexander J., *i*, 285, 290 n.2
 Daniel, J. W., *ii*, 280
 Daniels, Josephus, *ii*, 538, 586 n., 588, 590, 723 n., 767
 Danish West Indies, *ii*, 48 and n., 593 f.
 Dartiguenave, Philip, *ii*, 590
 Dartmouth, Lord, *i*, 79, 311
 Dartmouth College case, *i*, 306 f.
 Daugherty, H. M., *ii*, 770, 782, 783 n.
 Davies, William, *i*, 183, 185
 Davila, F. C., *ii*, 359 n.
 Davis, C. K., *ii*, 321
 Davis, David, *i*, 521; *ii*, 44, 78, 94 n.2, 97, 143 n.
 Davis, Dwight F., *ii*, 794 n.
 Davis, H. G., *ii*, 415
 Davis, Henry Winter, *i*, 599, 619 n.1
 Davis, James J., *ii*, 770, 794 n.
 Davis, Jefferson, Secretary of War, *i*, 467; on railroads, *i*, 480; in Senate, *i*, 504; resolutions of 1860, *i*, 518; on secession, *i*, 533; as president, *i*, 535, 545, 553, 558, 565, 574, 587; on Union, *i*, 590; escape of, *i*, 591; opposition to, *i*, 600 f.; *ii*, 8 f., 74 n.2, 205
 Davis, J. C. B., *ii*, 54
 Davis, John W., *ii*, 795
 Davis-Wade Bill, *i*, 599 f.; *ii*, 2
 Dawes, C. G., *ii*, 778 n.2, 795
 Dawes Act, *ii*, 181 f.
 Dawson, T. C., *ii*, 395, 585
 Day, W. R., *ii*, 284, 320 f.

- Dearborn, General Henry, *i*, 206, 257, 263, 267
- De Bow, quoted, *i*, 473 n.3, 476 and n., 513, 515
- Debs, E. V., *ii*, 259 f., 416, 453, 479 and n., 765, 796
- Debt, colonial, *i*, 60 and n.; in 1783, *i*, 118 and n.; in 1789, *i*, 154 f.; extinguished, *i*, 391; of states, *i*, 410, 479 f.; in Civil War, 606 f.
- Debtors' prisons, *i*, 380
- Decatur, Stephen, *i*, 211, 264
- Decentralization after war, *ii*, 738 f.
- Declaration of Independence, *i*, 71 f., 80 and n., 107, 123
- Declaration of London, *ii*, 604 and n.1
- Declaratory Act, *i*, 65
- De Grasse, Admiral, *i*, 97, 102
- Demobilization, *ii*, 730 f.
- Democracy, *i*, 348 f., 402; *ii*, 457 f., 801
- Denby, Edwin, *ii*, 361, 770
- Denman, William, *ii*, 653
- Denonville, Governor, *i*, 37 and n.
- Dent, S. H., *ii*, 649, 704
- Dependencies, administration, *ii*, 348 f.
- Dependent Pension Bill, *ii*, 174, 213
- Depew, C. M., *ii*, 192
- Derby, Lord, *ii*, 51
- Dernburg, Bernhard, *ii*, 612
- D'Estaing, Admiral, *i*, 97 n.
- Detroit, surrendered, *i*, 262; recovered, *i*, 268
- Deutschland*, *ii*, 623 n.
- Devens, Charles, *ii*, 103 n.
- Dew, Thomas, *i*, 391 and n.
- Dewey, Admiral George, *ii*, 303 f., 308, 361, 392
- Diaz, Felix, *ii*, 570
- Diaz, Porfirio, *ii*, 508 f., 569 f.
- Dickinson, J. M., *ii*, 484 n.
- Dickinson, John, *i*, 76, 110, 139; *ii*, 458
- Dickman, General Joseph, *ii*, 679
- Diederichs, Admiral von, *ii*, 308
- Dingley, Nelson, Jr., *ii*, 202, 334
- Dingley Act, *ii*, 334 f., 485
- Dinwiddie, Governor, *i*, 21 n., 45
- Direct government, *ii*, 462 f.
- Direct primaries, *ii*, 467 f.
- Directory, French, *i*, 179
- Disraeli, Benjamin, *ii*, 23
- Distribution Act, *i*, 392, 395 n.
- Dixon, Archibald, *i*, 484
- Dixon, Thomas, *ii*, 285
- Dodd, W. E., quoted, *i*, 450, 456 n., 473 n.2; *ii*, 663
- Dodge, A. C., *i*, 483
- Dole, Sanford B., *ii*, 360
- "Dollar diplomacy," *ii*, 508, 573 n.
- Dolliver, Jonathan, *ii*, 488, 493
- Donalson, A. J., *i*, 420 f.
- Dongan, Governor Thomas, *i*, 21 n., 36 f.
- Doniphan, Colonel, *i*, 426 f.
- Dorchester, Lord, *i*, 173
- Derr, Thomas, *i*, 349 n.2
- Dorsey, S. W., *ii*, 147 f.
- Douglas, Stephen A., *i*, 483 f.; on Kansas, *i*, 498 f.; and Buchanan, *i*, 504 f.; and Lincoln, *i*, 507 f.; on slave trade, *i*, 514 f.; in campaign of 1860, *i*, 519 f.; on South, *i*, 522, 545; *ii*, 12
- Draft riots, *i*, 584, 599 n.1
- Drago doctrine, *ii*, 394
- Drake, Francis, *i*, 6
- Dred Scott case, *i*, 501 f., 521 n.
- Drew, Daniel, *ii*, 184
- Drum, General R. C., *ii*, 175
- Drummond, Sir Eric, *ii*, 715
- Duane, William, *i*, 224, 383
- Du Barras, *i*, 98
- Dumba, Constantin, *ii*, 613 f.
- Dunmore, Governor, *i*, 109
- Dunning, W. A., *ii*, 16 n.1, 20 n.1, 663
- Dupuy de Lome, *ii*, 298 f.
- Duquesne, Fort, *i*, 50
- Durand, Sir Mortimer, *ii*, 421
- Duskin, G. M., *ii*, 168
- Dutch on Hudson, *i*, 3, 21 n.
- Dwight, Timothy, *i*, 198, 292
- D'Yrujo, *i*, 229
- Early, General Jubal, *i*, 587 f.
- Eaton, Dorman B., *ii*, 106, 109 n., 157
- Eaton, John, *i*, 354 n.
- Ebert, Friedrich, *ii*, 710 f.
- Edict of Nantes, *i*, 3
- Edmunds, G. F., *ii*, 122 f., 162, 217 n.
- Edmunds Act, *ii*, 152
- Edmunds-Tucker Act, *ii*, 153
- Education, in colonies, *i*, 15 f.; North and South, *i*, 474 f.; in South, *ii*, 153 f.
- Edward VII, *ii*, 422
- Egan, Patrick, *ii*, 223 f.
- Eisner, Kurt, *ii*, 710
- El Caney, battle of, *ii*, 315 f.
- Election, of 1792, *i*, 166, 167 n.1; of 1796, *i*, 188; of 1800, *i*, 185, 195 f.,

- 202 f.; of 1812, *i*, 266; of 1816, *i*, 288; of 1824, *i*, 330 f.; of 1828, *i*, 345; of 1832, *i*, 365; of 1836, *i*, 393; of 1840, *i*, 401; of 1844, *i*, 419 f.; of 1848, *i*, 442; of 1852, *i*, 458 f.; of 1856, *i*, 500; of 1860, *i*, 522 f.; of 1864, *i*, 588; of 1868, *ii*, 21; of 1870, *ii*, 40; of 1872, *ii*, 45; of 1874, *ii*, 68 f.; of 1876, *ii*, 76 f.; of 1880, *ii*, 123; of 1882, *ii*, 156; of 1884, *ii*, 166 f.; of 1888, *ii*, 190 f., 195 f.; of 1890, *ii*, 212; of 1892, *ii*, 243 f.; of 1894, *ii*, 264; of 1896, *ii*, 284 f., 290 f.; of 1900, *ii*, 342 f.; of 1904, *ii*, 412 f.; of 1908, *ii*, 450 f.; of 1910, *ii*, 479 f.; of 1912, *ii*, 511 f.; of 1914, *ii*, 561; of 1916, *ii*, 622 f.; of 1918, *ii*, 706; of 1920, *ii*, 766 f.; of 1922, *ii*, 786; of 1924, *ii*, 796
- Electoral Commission, *ii*, 77 f., 79 n.2
- Electoral Count Act, *ii*, 181
- Eliot, C. W., *ii*, 163, 354 n.1, 563, 636, 744
- Elizabeth, Queen, *i*, 6 f., 10 f.
- Elkins, S. B., *ii*, 491
- Elkins Act, *ii*, 385
- Ellmaker, Amos, *i*, 361
- Ellsworth, Oliver, *i*, 139, 151, 183
- Ely, General H. E., *ii*, 679 n.
- Emancipation, compensated, *i*, 594
- Emancipation Proclamation, *i*, 572 n.1, 595 f.
- Embargo, of 1794, *i*, 174; of 1808, *i*, 240 f.
- Emergency Fleet Corporation, *ii*, 653, 736 f.
- Emerson, Ralph Waldo, *i*, 489; *ii*, 81
- Emigrant Aid Society, *i*, 493
- Employers' Liability Act, *ii*, 430 and n.1
- Endicott, W. C., *ii*, 169 n.
- Enforcement Acts, *ii*, 37 f., 38 n., 69
- English Bill, *i*, 506 f.
- "Enumerated commodities," *i*, 44 and n.
- Enwright, T. F., *ii*, 670 f.
- Eppes, John, *i*, 228 n.
- "Era of good feelings," *i*, 289 f., 299, 320, 347
- Ericsson, John, *i*, 563
- Erie Canal, *i*, 329, 337
- Erlanger loan, *i*, 609 f.
- Erskine, David, *i*, 245
- Erzberger, Matthias, *ii*, 696
- Esch-Cummins Act, *ii*, 757 f.
- Espérey, General d', *ii*, 694
- Espionage Act, *ii*, 658 f., 661 f.
- Essex case, *i*, 233
- Eutaw Springs, battle of, *i*, 96
- Evans, Admiral R. D., *ii*, 440
- Evarts, W. M., *ii*, 19 n., 103
- Everett, Edward, *i*, 351, 487, 520
- Ewell, General, *i*, 576
- Ewing, Secretary of the Treasury, *i*, 404, 406
- Ex parte* Milligan, *ii*, 39 n.
- Excise of 1791, *i*, 209
- Expedition Act, *ii*, 385
- "Exposition and Protest," *i*, 345 f.
- Fair Oaks, battle of, *i*, 565
- Fairbanks, C. W., *ii*, 412, 415 n.
- Fairchild, C. S., *ii*, 169 n., 178
- Falkland Islands, battle of, *ii*, 603
- Fall, A. B., *ii*, 581, 770
- Fallen Timbers, battle of, *i*, 177
- "Family Compact," *i*, 172 n.
- Faneuil, Peter, *i*, 43
- Farewell Address, *i*, 123, 188
- Farmer-Labor party, *ii*, 765 f., 785 and n., 796
- Farmers, conditions, *ii*, 86 f., 128 f., 234 f., 325, 624 n., 783 f.
- Farragut, Admiral D. G., *i*, 561, 587; *ii*, 13, 304
- Fava, Baron, *ii*, 222
- Federal election laws, *ii*, 120 f., 206 f.
- Federal Interstate Trade Commission, *ii*, 557
- Federal Reserve Act, *ii*, 548 f.
- "Federalist, The," *i*, 143
- Federalists, *i*, 162, 175, 202 f., 241 f.
- Fenian movement, *ii*, 54
- Ferguson, Colonel, *i*, 94
- Ferry, T. W., *ii*, 77
- Fessenden, W. P., *ii*, 6, 20 n.1
- Field, C. W., *ii*, 33
- Field, Roswell, *i*, 501 n.
- Fifteenth Amendment, *ii*, 15, 22 and n., 37 f., 80, 205 f.
- "Fifty-four forty or fight," *i*, 437
- Filled Milk Act, *ii*, 785
- Fillmore, Millard, *i*, 454, 458, 498, 500
- Finance, war, *ii*, 654 f.
- Finances, Confederate, *i*, 555 n., 604, 608 f.
- Finances, Northern, *i*, 576 n., 584, 603 f.
- Fink, Albert, *ii*, 184 n.1

- Fish, Hamilton, *ii*, 41 and n., 48, 52 f., 68 n.1
 Fisher, Warren, Jr., *ii*, 165
 Fisheries, *i*, 305 n.
 Fisk, Jim, *ii*, 40 f.
 Fite, E. D., quoted, *i*, 611 f.
 Five Forks, battle of, *i*, 591
 "Five-twenties," *i*, 605
 Fletcher, N. P., *ii*, 579, 596
 Fletcher vs. Peck, *i*, 228
 Fletcher vs. Peck, *i*, 228
 Flint, Timothy, *i*, 299, 309
 Florida, *i*, 59, 99, 105, 272, 300 f., 303 f., 399, 443 n., 446
 Florida, the, *i*, 617
 Florida-Blanca, *i*, 126
 Floyd, James, *i*, 504, 572 n.1
 Floyd, John, *i*, 371
 Foch, General Ferdinand, *ii*, 677 f., 682, 685 f., 696 f.
 Folger, C. J., *ii*, 161
 Food, and war, *ii*, 659 f., 759
 Foote, A. H., *i*, 355, 557 f., 561
 Foraker, J. B., *ii*, 175, 411, 415 n., 453
 Foraker Act, *ii*, 357 f.
 Forbes, General, *i*, 50
 "Force Bill," of 1833, *i*, 374 f.; *ii*, 119, 207
 Ford, Henry, *ii*, 766
 Fordney, J. W., *ii*, 776
 Fordney-McCumber Act, *ii*, 772 f.
 Forests, conservation, *ii*, 446 f.
 Forney, J. W., *i*, 505
 Forster, W. E., *i*, 618
 Forsythe, John, *i*, 397, 532
 Fort Donelson, *i*, 557 f.
 Fort Duquesne, *i*, 50
 Fort Henry, *i*, 557
 Fort Jackson, *i*, 273
 Fort Lee, *i*, 85
 Fort McHenry, *i*, 272
 Fort Mimms, *i*, 273
 Fort St. Marks, *i*, 301
 Fort St. Philip, *i*, 273
 Fort Washington, *i*, 85
 "Forty-niners," *i*, 444 f.
 Foster, Charles, *ii*, 251
 Foster, J. W., *ii*, 210
 Foster, W. Z., *ii*, 746
 Fouché, *i*, 231 n.
 "Fourteen Points," *ii*, 692 f.
 Fourteenth Amendment, *ii*, 11 f., 15, 205 f.
 Fowler, J. S., *ii*, 20 n.1
 Fox, C. J., *i*, 81 n., 235
 Fox, G. V., *i*, 554 n.
 France, aid from, *i*, 83, 92 f., 97 n., 166; war with, in 1798, *i*, 181 f.
 Franco-Prussian War, *ii*, 53
 Franklin, Benjamin, *i*, 40, 65, 77 and n., 86 n., 92, 99, 105, 109, 113, 124, 132, 139 f.
 Franklin, state of, *i*, 127
 Frederick the Great, *i*, 90
 Fredericksburg, battle of, *i*, 572 n., 573, 575
 Freedmen's Bureau, *ii*, 10 f., 136
 Freeman's Farm, battle of, *i*, 91
 "Freeport Doctrine," *i*, 510 f.
 Free-silver campaign, *ii*, 275 f.
 Free-Soilers, *i*, 441 f., 499
 Frelinghuysen, F. T., *ii*, 151
 Frémont, J. C., *i*, 428 f., 497, 556, 566, 594
 French claims, *i*, 248 n., 379
 French Revolution, *i*, 160, 169 f., 183, 321 f.
 Frenchtown, battle of, *i*, 267
 Freneau, Philip, *i*, 164 f.
 Frick, H. C., *ii*, 244, 329, 433
 Fries, John, *i*, 196
 Frontenac, Count, *i*, 36
 Frontier, *ii*, 82 f., 326
 Frye, W. P., *ii*, 209, 321
 Fugitive Slave Law, of 1793, *i*, 312; of 1850, *i*, 448, 454, 457, 467
 Fuller, Judge M. W., *ii*, 273 n.
 Funston, General Frederick, *ii*, 362 and n., 578 f.
 Futures Trading Act, *ii*, 785
 Gadsden Purchase, *i*, 480
 "Gag rule," *i*, 390
 Gage, Governor, *i*, 70, 72, 75
 Gaines, General, *i*, 341
 Gaines's Mill, battle of, *i*, 566
 Gallatin, Albert, *i*, 206 f., 241, 244, 248, 256 f., 266, 275 f.
 Galloway, James, *i*, 72
 Galveston, *ii*, 476
 Gardner, A. P., *ii*, 615, 649
 Gardner, Gilson, *ii*, 513
 Gardoqui, *i*, 126
 Garfield, H. A., *ii*, 660, 748 f.
 Garfield, J. A., *ii*, 38; and Crédit Mobilier, *ii*, 57 n.; on currency, *ii*, 65 n., in campaign of 1880, *ii*, 122 f.; on South, *ii*, 132; military career, *ii*,

- 143 f.; as president, *ii*, 145 f.; assassination, *ii*, 146; and Star Route frauds, *ii*, 147 f.; cabinet, *ii*, 150 n.1
- Garfield, J. R., *ii*, 493, 529 n.
- Garland, A. H., *ii*, 62 n., 168
- Garland, Hamlin, *ii*, 432
- Garrison, Lindley M., *ii*, 538, 617
- Garrison, William Lloyd, *i*, 380, 388, 620
- Gary, E. H., *ii*, 433, 746
- Gates, General Horatio, *i*, 91
- Geary, J. W., *i*, 499, 504
- Geary Act, *ii*, 155
- Geddes, Sir Auckland, *ii*, 789
- Genêt, Edmond, *i*, 170 f., 175
- Geneva tribunal, *ii*, 46, 51 f., 54 f.
- George, Henry, *ii*, 192 n.
- George III, *i*, 41, 51, 56 f., 67, 74 f., 80, 89 n., 98, 129, 255 f., 290
- Georgia, *i*, 42 n.2, 94, 114, 227, 340 f.
- Gerard, James, *ii*, 634 f., 641
- Germantown, *i*, 3; battle of, *i*, 91
- Gerry, Elbridge, *i*, 180
- Gettysburg, battle of, *i*, 577 f.
- Ghent, Treaty of, *i*, 271, 275
- Gibraltar, *i*, 99
- Gillespie, Lieutenant, *i*, 428
- Gilman, D. C., *ii*, 272 n.
- Gist, Christopher, *i*, 47
- Gist, Governor, *i*, 522
- Gladstone, W. E., *i*, 133
- Glass, Carter, *ii*, 548, 723 n., 753
- Glass, Captain Henry, *ii*, 309 and n.
- Glavis, L. R., *ii*, 492 f.
- Godkin, E. L., *ii*, 1
- Godoy, Don Manuel, *i*, 177
- Goethals, George W., *ii*, 407 n., 592, 653
- Gold, discovery, *i*, 444 f., 471
- Gold Democrats, *ii*, 283 f.
- "Gold pills," *i*, 58
- Gold plank, *ii*, 278, 279 n.
- Gold reserve, *ii*, 250 f., 264 f.
- Gold Standard Act, *ii*, 118, 333
- Gomez, General Maximo, *ii*, 294, 356
- Gompers, Samuel, *ii*, 422, 454, 657, 744 f., 749 f., 758, 782
- Goodloe, D. R., *ii*, 234 n.
- Gore, R. L., *ii*, 617
- Gorgas, W. C., *ii*, 354 n.2, 407 n.
- Gorman, A. P., *ii*, 170, 188, 240, 256, 323
- Gould, Jay, *ii*, 40 f., 184
- Grady, H. W., *ii*, 139
- Grain Corporation, *ii*, 660 n.
- "Grandfather clause," *ii*, 233 n.
- Granger, Gideon, *i*, 206
- Grangers, *ii*, 87 f., 90 f., 92 n.
- Grant, F. D., *ii*, 213
- Grant, Robert, *ii*, 530
- Grant, Sir William, *i*, 233
- Grant, General U. S., *i*, 557 f., 579 f., 583, 586 f., 591; report on South, *ii*, 9 n.; and Johnson, *ii*, 13; and reconstruction, *ii*, 14, 37 f., 48 f., 59 f., 71 and n., 105 n.; and Stanton, *ii*, 18 n.; nomination, *ii*, 20; as president, *ii*, 39 f.; and finance, *ii*, 42, 66 f.; and Mexico, *ii*, 49; and *Alabama* claims, *ii*, 52; second inaugural, *ii*, 58 f.; and third term, *ii*, 74, 121 f.; and civil service, *ii*, 106 and n.1 and n.2; financial ruin, *ii*, 161; on railroads, *ii*, 187
- Graves, Admiral, *i*, 98
- Gray, George, *ii*, 321, 389, 413, 452
- Gray, Captain Robert, *i*, 160 n.2, 305
- Great Britain, and colonies, *i*, 20 f., 55 f., 103; and United States, *i*, 121 f., 172 f., 285, 329; and Confederacy, *i*, 614 f.
- Greeley, Horace, *i*, 489, 491, 507, 521, 533, 598 n.2; *ii*, 44, 59, 97
- Greenback currency, *ii*, 21 and n., 23, 65 f., 71, 89, 114 f.
- Greenback party, *ii*, 72, 94
- Greenback-Labor party, *ii*, 99 f.
- Greenbacks, *i*, 605 f.
- Greene, General F. V., *ii*, 309
- Gregory, T. W., *ii*, 538 n., 643, 723 n.
- Grenville, George, *i*, 57 f., 62 f., 65
- Gresham, J. D., *ii*, 670 f.
- Gresham, W. Q., *ii*, 192, 243
- Gresham's Law, *ii*, 115 n.
- Grey, Edward (Viscount), *ii*, 727
- Greytown, bombarded, *i*, 461
- Grimes, J. W., *ii*, 20 n.1
- Grimke sisters, *ii*, 470
- Groesbeck, Judge W. S., *ii*, 19 n.
- Gronna, A. J., *ii*, 646
- Grundy, Felix, *i*, 249, 372, 392 n.
- Guadalupe-Hidalgo, treaty of, *i*, 433
- Guadeloupe, *i*, 54
- Guam, *ii*, 309, 323 n.2
- Guerrero, Amador, *ii*, 404 f.
- Guiteau, Charles J., *ii*, 146 f.
- Gummeré, S. R., *ii*, 424
- Habeas Corpus, *i*, 13, 592 f., 598 n.1, 601 f.; *ii*, 39 n., 71

- Hacker, Louis M., *ii*, 190
 Hague Conference, first, *ii*, 336 f., 418;
 second, *ii*, 395, 441 n.1
 Hague Court of Arbitration, *ii*, 337
 "Hail Columbia," *i*, 181
 Haiti, *ii*, 589 f.
 Haldane, Lord, *ii*, 599
 Hale, Eugene, *ii*, 323
 Hale, J. P., *i*, 442
 "Half-breeds," *ii*, 150, 160
 Hall, A. O., *ii*, 56 n.
 Halleck, General W. H., *i*, 556 f., 569
 Halstead, M., *ii*, 117 n.
 Hamilton, Alexander, and the Consti-
 tution, *i*, 135, 137, 143; Secretary of
 the Treasury, *i*, 150, 152 f., 171 f.;
 defends Jay's Treaty, *i*, 176; and
 French war, *i*, 181 f.; and Whisky
 Rebellion, *i*, 186 f.; and Adams, *i*,
 189, 191, 192 n., 197, 199; and Burr,
 i, 200, 222; *ii*, 115
 Hamilton, Governor, of South Carolina,
 i, 371, 373
 Hamlin, C. S., *ii*, 554
 Hammond, Senator, *i*, 513, 517 f.
 Hampton, General Wade, *i*, 267; *ii*, 62,
 103 f.
 Hampton Institute, *ii*, 136 n.2, 182 n.
 Hampton Roads, battle of, *i*, 563 f.;
 conference at, *i*, 589 f.
 Hancock, John, *i*, 43, 60 n.
 Hancock, General W. S., *i*, 376, 577 f.;
 ii, 111 f., 123
 Hanihara, Ambassador, *ii*, 713 n., 788 n.
 Hanna, M. A., *ii*, 192; and McKinley,
 ii, 276 f., 374; and trusts, *ii*, 332; in
 Senate, *ii*, 296 and n.2, 358 n.1, 401
 and n.; and coal strike, *ii*, 379, 386;
 and Roosevelt, *ii*, 344, 411 f.; char-
 acter, *ii*, 292 n.
 Harbord, General J. G., *ii*, 679
 Hardina, William M., *ii*, 794 n.
 Harding, W. G., *ii*, 479 n., 518, 535;
 and Mexico, *ii*, 580 f.; election, *ii*,
 762 f., 766 f.; cabinet, *ii*, 769 f.; and
 tariff, *ii*, 772; and bonus, *ii*, 776 f.;
 and coal strike, *ii*, 780 f.; and rail-
 roads, *ii*, 781 f.; and immigration, *ii*,
 787; and Washington Conference, *ii*,
 788 f.; death, *ii*, 793; character,
 ii, 793 f.
 Harlan, Judge J. M., *ii*, 189, 218, 287 n.,
 370, 498 and n.1
 Harlem Heights, battle of, *i*, 85
 Harmon, Judson, *ii*, 520 f.
 Harpers Ferry, *i*, 516, 571
 Harriman, E. H., *ii*, 382, 416 n.
 Harriman, Job, *ii*, 479
 Harris, I. G., *ii*, 188, 276
 Harrisburg convention, of 1827, *i*, 343;
 of 1839, *i*, 399
 Harrison, Benjamin, *i*, 142; *ii*, 192;
 elected, *ii*, 196 f.; personality, *ii*,
 197; and tariff, *ii*, 201, 210 f.; and
 silver, *ii*, 204; and election laws, *ii*,
 206 f.; and Blaine, *ii*, 209, 225 n.; on
 pensions, *ii*, 213 f.; and navy, *ii*, 214;
 on trusts, *ii*, 217; and Italy, *ii*, 222
 and n.; and Chile, *ii*, 224; nominated
 and defeated, *ii*, 226, 237 f.
 Harrison, Burton, *ii*, 367
 Harrison, General W. H., *i*, 250, 268,
 299, 393, 399, 403
 Hartford Convention, *i*, 279 f.
 "Hartford wits," *i*, 136
 Hartranft, Governor J. F., *ii*, 111
 Harvard College, *i*, 15, 378
 Harvey, Ambassador George, *ii*, 524 n.,
 525, 798
 Harvey, John, *i*, 14
 Haskell, Governor C. N., *ii*, 453
 Havemeyer, H. O., *ii*, 414
 Hawaiian Islands, *ii*, 263 n.2, 323 n.2,
 359 f.
 Hawkes, Admiral, *i*, 61
 Hawkins, General H. S., *ii*, 315
 Hay, George, *i*, 230, 264
 Hay, James, *ii*, 617
 Hay, John, *ii*, 320 n.; on Philippines, *ii*,
 322, 323 n.; and China, *ii*, 338 f.; at
 London, *ii*, 400; death, *ii*, 419; and
 Senate, *ii*, 423
 Hay, Merle D., *ii*, 670 f.
 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, *ii*, 407
 Hay-Herran Treaty, *ii*, 402 f.
 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, first, *ii*, 347 n.;
 second, *ii*, 372, 400
 Hayes, J. L., *ii*, 158, 159 n.1
 Hayes, R. B., character, *ii*, 75 f., 101 f.;
 career, *ii*, 76; election, *ii*, 76 f.; cabi-
 net, *ii*, 103; and South, *ii*, 103 f.; and
 civil service, *ii*, 105 f., 145 n.1; and
 railroads, *ii*, 110 f.; and currency, *ii*,
 113 f., 117; and Congress, *ii*, 119 f.;
 and election of 1880, *ii*, 121, 123;
 retirement, *ii*, 124; and Isthmian
 Canal, *ii*, 150 n.2, 399; and China,
 ii, 154

- Haymarket affair, *ii*, 194
 Hayne, Robert Y., *i*, 340, 345, 355 f., 373
 Haynes, F. E., *ii*, 100 n.1
 Hays, Will S., *ii*, 705, 770
 Haywood, W. D., *ii*, 482
 Hearst, W. R., *ii*, 413 f., 453
 Heike, Charles, *ii*, 434
 Helfferich, Vice Chancellor von, *ii*, 634 f.
 Helper, H. R., *i*, 517
 Henderson, J. B., *ii*, 20 n.1
 Hendricks, T. A., *ii*, 20, 170, 181
 Heney, F. J., *ii*, 398, 629
 Henry, Patrick, *i*, 57, 59 n.1, 64, 100 n., 108, 141 f., 163 n.1, 312 n.
 Hepburn, W. P., *ii*, 401, 426
 Hepburn Act, *ii*, 426 f.
 Hepburn Comm ttee, *ii*, 186
 Hepburn vs. Griswold, *ii*, 21 n.
 Herbert, Sir Michael, *ii*, 410
 Herrin massacre, *ii*, 780
 Hertling, Chancellor von, *ii*, 694
 Hessians, *i*, 80
 Hewitt, A. S., *ii*, 160, 192 n.
 Hicks, Governor, of Maryland, *i*, 547
 Higginson, H. L., *ii*, 432
 High prices, *ii*, 741 f.
 Hill, General A. P., *i*, 576
 Hill, D. B., *ii*, 180, 196 n., 239 f., 256, 280
 Hill, General D. H., *i*, 571
 Hill, Isaac, *i*, 353, 357
 Hill, J. J., *ii*, 382 f., 448, 567 n.2
 Hillsborough, Lord, *i*, 23
 Hindenburg, General von, *ii*, 635
 Hindenburg Line, *ii*, 677 f.
 Hines, W. D., *ii*, 755
 Hise, Elijah, *i*, 461
 Hitchcock, F. H., *ii*, 484 n.
 Hitchcock, G. M., *ii*, 721 f.
 Hoar, E. R., *ii*, 40 f., 49, 53 n.1
 Hoar, G. F., *i*, 132; *ii*, 55 f., 122, 155 n.2, 169, 217 n., 323, 347
 Hobart, G. A., *ii*, 343
 Hobson, R. P., *ii*, 313 n.2
 Hoffman, Governor J. T., *ii*, 56 n.
 Holden, Governor W. W., *ii*, 4
 Holleben, Ambassador von, *ii*, 392
 Hollis-Bulkley Act, *ii*, 624
 Holls, F. W., *ii*, 336 n.
 Holmes, G. K., *ii*, 480
 Holmes, Judge O. W., *ii*, 126
 Holy Alliance, *i*, 322
 Home rule in South, *ii*, 37, 62 n.
 Homestead Act, *ii*, 25 f., 129 and n.2
 Homestead Bill, *i*, 515
 Homestead strike, *ii*, 242 n.3, 244 f.
 Honduras, *ii*, 585 f.
 Hood, General J. B., *i*, 589
 Hooker, General Joseph, *i*, 575, 577, 583
 Hooker, Thomas, *i*, 20 n.
 Hoover, H. C., *ii*, 659 f., 668, 720, 762, 769, 781, 794 n.
 Hopkinson, Joseph, *i*, 181
 Houghton, A. B., *ii*, 771
 House, Colonel E. M., *ii*, 538, 638 f., 696, 704, 715
 Houston, D. F., *ii*, 538 n., 539, 723 n.
 Houston, General Samuel, *i*, 412 f.
 Howard, J. A., *ii*, 302
 Howard, General O. O., *ii*, 10
 Howe, General George, *i*, 86
 Howe, Lord Richard, *i*, 84
 Howe, S. G., *ii*, 49
 Howe, General William, *i*, 83 f., 88 and n., 90 f.
 Hubbard, J. F., *ii*, 405 f.
 Hudson, campaign for, *i*, 90 f.
 Huelsemann, Chevalier, *i*, 459
 Huerta, Adolfo de la, *ii*, 579, 581 n., 582
 Huerta, Victoriano, *ii*, 570 f., 612 and n.
 Hughes, C. E., *ii*, 451 n.; governor, *ii*, 455, 468 n.1; on Mexico, *ii*, 581; on Monroe Doctrine, *ii*, 593, 595; in election of 1916, *ii*, 620, 622 f., 628 f.; and Japan, *ii*, 713 n.; on Versailles Treaty, *ii*, 720; on Lusk Laws, *ii*, 753 n.; Secretary of State, *ii*, 769; and invasion of Ruhr, *ii*, 778 n.2; and Washington Conference, *ii*, 789 f.; on American coöperation, *ii*, 793; resignation, *ii*, 794 n.
 Huguenots, *i*, 3
 Hull, Isaac, *i*, 264
 Hull, General William, *i*, 257, 260 f.
 Humbert, king of Italy, *ii*, 222
 Hungary, *i*, 459 f.
 "Hunkers," *i*, 441
 Hunt, Gaillard, *ii*, 107
 Hunt, Mrs. R. L., *i*, 534 f.
 Hunter, General, *i*, 594 n.
 Hutchinson, Thomas, *i*, 55, 64, 66, 70, 74 n.
 Hymans, M., *ii*, 715
 Ide, H. C., *ii*, 363, 365
 Ide, William B., *i*, 428

- Illinois admitted, *i*, 299
 Illiteracy, *ii*, 137
 Immigration, *i*, 5, 468 f., 530; *ii*, 26 n.2, 95 n., 129 and n., 155 and n.1, 475, 786 f.
 "Impending Crisis, The," *i*, 517
 Impressment, *i*, 237 f., 254 f., 277 n.
 Income tax, *i*, 605; of 1894, *ii*, 256 n.1, 286 f.; of 1913, *ii*, 545 f.
 Independent Treasury, *i*, 395 f., 405, 443 n.
 Indiana admitted, *i*, 299
 Indians, *ii*, 32 and n.2, 73, 182 and n.
 Industrial Commission, report, *ii*, 332 and n.
 Industrial conference, *ii*, 744 f.
 Industrial Revolution, *i*, 469
 I. W. W. (Industrial Workers of the World), *ii*, 194, 331, 481 f., 746 f., 751 f., 766, 783 n.
 Industry, concentration of, *ii*, 215 f.
 Inflation Bill, *ii*, 66 f.
 Ingersoll, Colonel R. G., *ii*, 74, 244
 Initiative and referendum, *ii*, 462 f.
 Injunction, *ii*, 262, 560
 Insular Cases, *ii*, 369 f.
 Internal Improvements, *i*, 321 and n.2, 337
 Interstate Commerce Commission, *ii*, 182 f., 755
 Intolerable Acts, *i*, 70, 72, 92
 Iowa admitted, *i*, 443 n.
 Ireland, *i*, 60, 79 n., 469 f.
 Ireland, Archbishop John, *ii*, 300, 386, 422
 Irons, Martin, *ii*, 193, 229
 Iroquois, *i*, 36 n., 114
 "Irrepressible Conflict, The," *i*, 521
 Irrigation, *ii*, 445 f.
 Itajuba, Vicomte d', *ii*, 53 n.1
 Italy, dispute with, *ii*, 221 f.
Itala case, *ii*, 223
 Izard, General George, *i*, 269
- Jackson, Andrew, senator, *i*, 189; and Burr, *i*, 229; in War of 1812, *i*, 269, 273 f., 287; and Indians, *i*, 300 f.; on Texas, *i*, 304 n.; campaign of 1824, *i*, 330 f., 335 n.; campaign of 1828, *i*, 345; presidency, *i*, 348 f.; character, *i*, 351 f., 365 f.; and Calhoun, *i*, 354 f.; and Bank, *i*, 358 f., 363 f.; reelected in 1832, *i*, 365; and nullification, *i*, 368 n., 369 f., 372; second term, *i*, 377 f.; foreign affairs, *i*, 378 f.; censured, *i*, 384; opposition to, *i*, 387; end of era, *i*, 402; on Texas, *i*, 413
 Jackson, Judge H. E., *ii*, 287 n.
 Jackson, General T. J., ("Stonewall"), *i*, 533 f., 569 f., 575
 Jackson, Michigan, *i*, 491
 Jackson, Mississippi, *i*, 579
 Jackson Day dinner, *ii*, 723
 "Jackson's Yellow Boys," *i*, 386
 James, Ollie M., *ii*, 521, 622
 James, T. L., *ii*, 107, 147, 150 n.1
 James, William, *ii*, 347
 James I, *i*, 1 f., 7 f., 22
 James II, *i*, 11 n.1
 Jameson, J. F., *i*, 141 n.; *ii*, 272 n.
 Jameson raid, *ii*, 272 f.
 Japan, relations with, *ii*, 31 f., 438 f., 509 n., 564 f., 788 n.
 Jay, John, *i*, 77 n., 99, 119, 126, 129, 143, 150, 199, 306
 Jay-Gardoqui treaty, *i*, 127 f.
 Jay's Treaty, of 1794, *i*, 175 f., 178 f., 187 f.
 Jeanes, Anna, *ii*, 136 n.1
 Jefferson, Thomas, on grievances of American colonies, *i*, 58, 66 n., 70 and n., 72 n.1, 74, 77 n., 78; and Declaration of Independence, *i*, 80; on Union, *i*, 109; on Articles of Confederation, *i*, 110; and Western land claims, *i*, 115; minister at Paris, *i*, 121 f.; on Constitution, *i*, 135; on Washington, *i*, 149 n.; Secretary of State, *i*, 150, 157, 169, 326; on Bank, *i*, 159; opposes Hamilton, *i*, 165, 166 n.2, 185; organizes Republicans, *i*, 186 f.; vice president, *i*, 189, 193; and Kentucky Resolution, *i*, 194; elected president, *i*, 195 f., 201; policy, *i*, 204 f., 209 f., 212; on New Orleans, *i*, 214 f.; on West Florida, *i*, 220, 225 f., 234; reelected, *i*, 222; and Chesapeake affair, *i*, 239 f.; criticisms of, *i*, 242 f.; on War of 1812, *i*, 269; on manufactures, *i*, 286, and Marshall, *i*, 308; on slavery, *i*, 311, 314; ordinance of 1784, *i*, 312 f.; on states' rights, *i*, 337; Jeffersonian Democracy, *i*, 348 f.; birthday dinner of 1830, *i*, 356 f.; *ii*, 458 f., 512.
 Jena, battle of, *i*, 235

- Jenckes, T. A., *ii*, 100
 Joffre, Marshal, *ii*, 665, 667, 700
 Johnson, Andrew, *ii*, 2 and n., 3; and South, *ii*, 4 f.; and Congress, *ii*, 10 f.; impeachment, *ii*, 17 f.; and *Alabama*, *ii*, 52 n.
 Johnson, Arthur, *i*, 88 n.1
 Johnson, H. V., *i*, 520
 Johnson, Hiram, *ii*, 527, 564, 629, 656, 722, 761 f.
 Johnson, John, *ii*, 452
 Johnson, Magnus, *ii*, 786
 Johnson, General R. M., *i*, 249, 269, 393
 Johnson, Reverdy, *ii*, 51
 Johnson-Clarendon convention, *ii*, 51 f.
 Johnson-Lodge bill, *ii*, 788 n.
 Johnston, General A. S., *i*, 558 f.
 Johnston, General J. E., *i*, 552 f., 565, 579, 586, 591; *ii*, 103
 Jones, George, *ii*, 56 n.
 Jones, John Paul, *i*, 211, 264
 Jones Act, *ii*, 359, 366 f.
 Juarez, *i*, 619
 Juarez, Benito, *ii*, 49, 50 n.
 "Judas of the West," *i*, 333
 Judiciary Act, of 1789, *i*, 151, 207, 306; of 1801, *i*, 201, 206
 Jusserand, Ambassador J., *ii*, 425, 790
 Kahn, Julius, *ii*, 649, 706
 Kalm, Peter, *i*, 42, 56 and n.
 Kaneko, Baron, *ii*, 421 f.
 Kansas, *i*, 492 f., 498 f., 504 f., 507; *ii*, 234 f.
 Kansas-Nebraska Bill, *i*, 484 f.
 Kaskaskia, *i*, 100 n.
 Kasson, J. A., *ii*, 335
 Kearney, Dennis, *ii*, 154
 Kearny, General S. W., *i*, 426 f.
 Kearsarge, the, *i*, 618
 Kellogg, Frank B., *ii*, 794 n.
 Kellogg, W. P., *ii*, 59 f.
 Kelly, John, *ii*, 170
 Kelly, O. H., *ii*, 87
 Kendall, Amos, *i*, 384, 389
 Kennesaw Mountain, battle of, *i*, 587
 Kent, General J. F., *ii*, 315
 Kentucky, admitted, *i*, 313; loyalty of, *i*, 548, 556 f.; invaded, *i*, 573
 Kentucky Resolutions, *i*, 194 f.
 Kenyon, W. S., *ii*, 746
 Kerensky, Alexander, *ii*, 674
 Ketteler, Baron von, *ii*, 340
 Key, D. M., *ii*, 103
 Keynes, J. M., *ii*, 709 n.
 Kiaochau, *ii*, 308, 338
 King, Rufus, *i*, 212, 232, 244, 288 f., 316
 King's Mountain, battle of, *i*, 94
 Kitchin, Claude, *ii*, 649, 706
 Klondike, *ii*, 324
 Knapp, Captain H. S., *ii*, 587
 Knight case, *ii*, 556
 Knights of Labor, *ii*, 95 f., 96 n.1, 193
 "Know-Nothings," *i*, 470 f., 492
 Knox, Henry, *i*, 150, 152
 Knox, P. C., *ii*, 381 f., 417, 451 n., 484 n., 508, 585, 718, 771
 Knox vs. Lee, *ii*, 21 n.
 Komura, Baron, *ii*, 420
 Königgrätz, battle of, *ii*, 50
 Koo, V. K. W., *ii*, 715, 790
 Kossuth, Louis, *i*, 460
 Kruger, Paul, *ii*, 272
 Ku-Klux Act, *ii*, 36 f.
 Kyle, J. H., *ii*, 243
 Labor, in thirties, *i*, 359 f.; in Civil War, *i*, 612 f.; parties, *ii*, 94 f., 192 f., 379 f., 478; in Clayton Act, *ii*, 559 f.; in war, *ii*, 627 f., 657 f.; after war, *ii*, 733, 739 f.; and capital, *ii*, 805 f.
 Lafayette, Marquis de, *i*, 88, 97, 103
 La Follette, R. M., *ii*, 380 and n., 541 n., 467, 477 f., 488, 492, 501 f., 513, 629, 646, 736, 766, 795 f., 804 f.
 Laissez faire, *ii*, 85 f.
 Lake Champlain, battle of, *i*, 271
 Lake Erie, battle of, *i*, 268 f.
 Lakes, Great, *i*, 481 f.
 Lamar, president of Texas, *i*, 414
 Lamar, Judge J. R., *ii*, 498 n.2
 Lamar, L. Q. C., *ii*, 169
 Lamont, Daniel, *ii*, 275
 Lamont, T. W., *ii*, 581 n.
 Land sales, *i*, 223, 293
 Landis, Judge K. M., *ii*, 435
 Lane, F. K., *ii*, 524 n., 534 f., 538, 723 n., 734 n., 744, 768 and n.
 Lane, Harry, *ii*, 646
 Lane, Joseph, *i*, 520
 Lansdowne, Lord, *ii*, 692
 Lansing, Robert, *ii*, 611 n., 638 f., 643, 696, 704, 722 n.
 Lansing-Ishii agreement, *ii*, 713
 Lapham, E. G., *ii*, 146
 La Salle, *i*, 36
 Las Guasimas, battle of, *ii*, 315
 Latin America, *i*, 338 f.

- Latin-American relations, *ii*, 209, 353 f., 390 f., 568 f.
- Laud, Archbishop, *i*, 11, 17, 73
- Laurens, Colonel John, *i*, 97
- Laurier, Sir Wilfred, *ii*, 500
- Law, Bonar, *ii*, 647
- Lawrence, Amos, *i*, 493
- Lawrence, Captain, *i*, 267
- Lawrence, Kansas, *i*, 495
- Lawton, General H. W., *ii*, 315
- Lazear, Dr. J. W., *ii*, 354 n.2
- League to Enforce Peace, *ii*, 632, 701
- League of Nations, *ii*, 596 f., 634, 702 f., 714 f., 721 f., 724 f., 767, 797 f.
- Le Bœuf, Fort, *i*, 47
- Lecky, W. E. H., quoted, *i*, 58 f., 63, 79, 83, 148
- Le Clerc, General, *i*, 215
- Lecompton, Judge, *i*, 495, 499
- Lecompton Constitution, *i*, 504 f.
- "Lecompton Junior," *i*, 506
- Lee, Charles, *i*, 89
- Lee, General Fitzhugh, *ii*, 298 f.
- Lee, Richard H., *i*, 78, 80, 110, 142
- Lee, General Robert E., *i*, 516, 545 f., 565 f., 571 f., 576 n., 578, 590 f., 601 n.
- Lee, William, *i*, 81
- Lee of Fareham, Lord, *ii*, 789
- Legal Tender cases, *ii*, 21 n.
- Leisler, Jacob, *i*, 38 n.
- Lenin, Nikolai, *ii*, 673 f.
- Leonard, Daniel, *i*, 70 n.
- Lesseps, Ferdinand de, *ii*, 399
- Letcher, Governor, of Virginia, *i*, 549
- Lever Act, *ii*, 658 f., 740, 748 f.
- Lewis, J. L., *ii*, 748 f., 781
- Lewis, W. D., *ii*, 532 n.
- Lewis and Clark expedition, *i*, 221 and n., 305
- Lexington, battle of, *i*, 75
- Liberal Republicans, *ii*, 43 f., 98
- Liberator*, the, *i*, 380
- Liberty Loans, *ii*, 655 f.
- Liberty party, *i*, 401
- Liggett, General Hunter, *ii*, 685
- Liliuokalani, Queen, *ii*, 263 n.2
- Lincoln, Abraham, in Congress, *i*, 440; in convention of 1856, *i*, 498; debates with Douglas, *i*, 508 f.; Cooper Union speech, *i*, 518 f.; nominated in 1860, *i*, 521; on Compromise, *i*, 526; on secession, *i*, 536 f.; first inaugural, *i*, 540 f.; cabinet, *i*, 541 and n.; call for volunteers, *i*, 544; and McClellan, *i*, 567 f.; opposition to, in 1862, *i*, 570 f.; on Gettysburg, *i*, 578; on the freeing of the Mississippi, *i*, 580 n.; criticism of, in 1863, *i*, 584 and n.2, 598 f.; reëlected, *i*, 588; at Hampton Roads, *i*, 589; war powers, *i*, 592 f.; opposition to, in war, *i*, 598 f.; on Reconstruction, *i*, 599; on the Treasury, *i*, 608; on war relief, *i*, 612 n.; assassination, *i*, 620; character, *i*, 620 f.; *ii*, 1 f.; 38 n., 49, 605, 630, 649, 663
- Lincoln, General Benjamin, *i*, 94
- Lincoln, Levi, *i*, 201 n.2, 206
- Lincoln, R. T., *ii*, 150 n.1
- Lind, John, *ii*, 571
- Linn Bill, *i*, 437
- Liquidation Commission, *ii*, 735 and n.
- Liscum, Colonel E. H., *ii*, 341
- Littleton, M. W., *ii*, 466 n.1
- Livermore, T. L., *i*, 552
- Livingston, Edward, *i*, 219, 360
- Livingston, R. R., *i*, 213
- Lloyd-George, David, *ii*, 599, 619, 692, 702, 704, 725, 797
- Loans to Allies, *ii*, 778 f.
- Locke, John, *i*, 73
- Lodge, H. C., *i*, 153 and n.; *ii*, 161, 207, 410, 452 n., 509 n., 567 n.2, 651, 718 f., 769 n., 789
- Loeb, William, Jr., *ii*, 414
- Logan, General J. A., *i*, 589; *ii*, 161
- Long, J. D., *ii*, 303
- Longstreet, General James, *i*, 570, 576
- Lookout Mountain, battle of, *i*, 583
- Lopez expedition, *i*, 463
- Lorimer, William, *ii*, 469
- Louis XIV, *i*, 3, 34, 38, 45
- Louis XVI, *i*, 83, 93
- Louisburg, *i*, 50
- Louisiana, ceded to France, *i*, 213; purchased, *i*, 214 f., 304; admitted as state, *i*, 219, 298, 309, 313 n.1
- Louisville, *i*, 573
- Lovejoy, Elijah, *i*, 397, 509
- Low, Seth, *ii*, 336 n., 422
- Lowden, Governor F. O., *ii*, 474, 762
- Lowell, J. R., *i*, 422, 434, 450, 452, 528, 530 f., 615 n.; *ii*, 52, 73 n.2, 293
- Lowndes, William, *i*, 249, 287, 330
- Ludendorff, General von, *ii*, 635, 676, 685, 695
- Ludlow, riot at, *ii*, 561
- Ludlow, General William, *ii*, 315

- Lundy's Lane, battle of, *i*, 270
 Lurton, Judge H. H., *ii*, 498 n.2
Lusitania case, *ii*, 609 f.
 Lusk Committee, *ii*, 753 n.
 Lyon, Captain Nathaniel, *i*, 548 f.
 Lyons, Lord, *i*, 616 f.
- McAdoo, W. G., *ii*, 538, 548, 655 f., 658 n., 680 f., 723 n., 732, 755, 764 f., 795
 McArthur, General Arthur, *ii*, 362, 365
 Macaulay, T. B., *ii*, 37
 McCardle case, *ii*, 39 n.
 McClay, Senator, *i*, 151
 McClellan, General G. B., *i*, 549 and n., 555 f., 558, 564 f., 567 f., 570 f., 588
 McClure, A. K., *ii*, 29
 McCormick, Medill, *ii*, 513, 722
 McCrary, G. W., *ii*, 103 n., 187
 McCulloch, Hugh, *ii*, 3, 35, 63, 65, 93
 McCulloch vs. Maryland, *i*, 160 n.1, 307
 McDonald, Duncan, *ii*, 780
 MacDonough, Thomas, *i*, 271
 McDowell, General Irvin, *i*, 553, 565
 McDuffie, George, *i*, 345, 360, 367 f.
 McEnery, John, *ii*, 59 f.
 McGovern, Governor F. E., *ii*, 515
 McKay, Donald, *i*, 477 n.
 McKinley, William, *ii*, 192, 198; in Congress, *ii*, 200 f.; and South, *ii*, 206 n.1; and Hanna, *ii*, 277 f.; in campaign of 1896, *ii*, 288 f.; and Spanish War, *ii*, 306 f., 307, 313; Philippine policy, *ii*, 321 f., 346 f., 362; foreign relations, *ii*, 335 f., 342; reelected, *ii*, 343 f.; and reciprocity, *ii*, 372; assassination, *ii*, 372; estimate of, *ii*, 373 f.; and forests, *ii*, 447
 McKinley Bill, *ii*, 88 n.3, 202 f., 211 f.
 McLane, Louis, *i*, 360, 383
 McLean, John, *i*, 497 f., 502
 McLean, Thomas, *i*, 197
 McLemore, Jeff, *ii*, 617
 McLeod, Alexander, *i*, 409
 McMaster, J. B., quoted, *i*, 105
 McNamara brothers, *ii*, 506 and n.
 McNary-Haugen Bill, *ii*, 786 n.
 McParlan, James, *ii*, 112 n.
 McPherson, J. R., *ii*, 159
 McReynolds, J. C., *ii*, 538
 MacVeagh, Franklin, *ii*, 484 n.
 MacVeagh, Wayne, *ii*, 150 n.1
 Macon Bill No. 2, *i*, 248 f.
 Madagascar, *ii*, 349
- Madero, Francisco, *ii*, 508 f., 570 f.
 Madison, James, *i*, 107; on Mississippi, *i*, 127; work for Constitution, *i*, 129, 136, 143; party affiliations, *i*, 163 n.1; on Virginia Resolutions, *i*, 194; Secretary of State, *i*, 206, 237, 243; president, *i*, 244 f.; and War of 1812, *i*, 251 f., 254, 275 f., 280 f.; reelected, *i*, 266; on expansion, *i*, 282 f., 296; vetoes Bank bill, *i*, 297
 Mafe, *ii*, 221
 Magoffin, Governor, of Kentucky, *i*, 548
 Magoon, E. C., *ii*, 356
 Magruder, General J. B., *i*, 564, 567 f.
 Mahan, Captain A. T., *i*, 281, 328; *ii*, 336 n.
 Mahone, William, *ii*, 143 n.
 Maine, destruction of, *ii*, 299
 Maine admitted, *i*, 317
 Makino, Baron, *ii*, 715
 Malietoa, *ii*, 219
 Mallory Bill, *i*, 343
 Malvern Hill, battle of, *i*, 567
 Manassas, battle of, *i*, 553 f., 569
 Manila, battle of, *ii*, 303 f.
 Mann, J. R., *ii*, 491, 495
 Mann-Elkins Bill, *ii*, 491 f.
 Manning, Daniel, *ii*, 169 n.
 Manufactures, in 1812, *i*, 256 f.; in 1815, *i*, 281, 285; in 1819, *i*, 342 f., 349; in 1850, *i*, 471 f.; in 1860, *i*, 529; in Civil War, *i*, 612 f.; *ii*, 98 n.1, 126 f.
 Marbury vs. Madison, *i*, 207
 March, General P. C., *ii*, 732 n.
 Marcy, W. M., *i*, 351, 464 f.
 Maret, *i*, 253
 Marne, battle of, *ii*, 603
 Maroquin, *ii*, 402 f.
 Marshall, John, *i*, 117, 133, 143 n., 160 n.1, 180 f., 230, 306 f.
 Marshall, T. R., *ii*, 497, 524
 Martens, Frederic de, *ii*, 422
 Martens, L. C. A. K., *ii*, 751
 Martin, Luther, *i*, 139
 Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee, *i*, 306
 Martineau, James, *ii*, 526
 Martineau, Harriet, *i*, 381 n.; *ii*, 471
 Martinique, *i*, 61
 Martinsburg, *ii*, 110 f.
 Mason, George, *i*, 138
 Mason, Jeremiah, *i*, 359
 Mason, John M., *i*, 464, 616 f.
 Matta, Señor, *ii*, 224

- Maximilian, Archduke, *ii*, 49 f.
 Maximilian of Austria, *i*, 619 f.
 Maxmilian of Baden, *ii*, 694 f.
 Maxwell, G. H., *ii*, 398
 Mayo, Admiral H. T., *ii*, 573 f.
 Maysville veto, *i*, 358
 Meade, General George, *i*, 577 f.
 Meat Inspection Act, *ii*, 429
 Mellon, A. W., *ii*, 769, 770 n., 773 f., 779, 794 n.
 Memphis riots, *ii*, 13 n.
 Mercantile theory, *i*, 27
 Merchant marine, *i*, 478; *ii*, 24 n., 624 f., 736 f.
 Meredith, E. T., *ii*, 723 n., 765
 Merritt, General E. A., *ii*, 108 f., 145 f.
 Merritt, General Wesley, *ii*, 309
 Merry, Anthony, *i*, 229
 Metcalf, Victor, *ii*, 417
 Metternich, *i*, 215, 459
 Meuse-Argonne, battle of, *ii*, 686 f., 690 n.
 Mexican War, *i*, 421 f., 434 f.
 Mexico, *i*, 322, 412, 414 n., 422 f., 514, 619 f.; *ii*, 49 f., 337, 508 f., 568 f.
 Meyer, G. von L., *ii*, 419, 424, 484 n.
 "Middle passage," the, *i*, 311
 Milan Decree, *i*, 236
 Miles, General Nelson A., *ii*, 320 f.
 Mill, J. S., *ii*, 192 n.
 Mill Spring, battle of, *i*, 557
 Miller, Governor Nathan, *ii*, 753 n.
 Miller, Warner, *ii*, 146, 188
 Miller, W. A., *ii*, 411
 Mills, R. Q., *ii*, 180, 257
 Mills Bill, *ii*, 180
 Minden, battle of, *i*, 50
 Mines, floating, *ii*, 607 and n.
 Mining, *ii*, 130 f.
 Minutemen, *i*, 75
 Miranda, *i*, 182 n.
 Missionary Ridge, battle of, *i*, 583 f.
 Mississippi, admission, *i*, 299
 Mississippi Bubble, *ii*, 34 n.2
 Mississippi River, *i*, 126 f., 556 f., 580
 Missouri, slavery in, *i*, 304 n.; territory, *i*, 309
 Missouri Compromise, *i*, 309 f., 318 n.1, 320, 483 f.
 Mitchell, John, *ii*, 385 f., 448
 Mobile, *i*, 273
 Mobile Bay, battle of, *i*, 587 f.
 Molly Maguires, *ii*, 112 n.
 Money trust, *ii*, 547
 Monitor and Virginia, battle of, *i*, 562 f.
 Monmouth, battle of, *i*, 93
 Monroe, James, *i*, 129 n.1, 137; envoy to France, *i*, 178 f., 196 f., 215 f.; envoy to England, *i*, 238; Secretary of State, *i*, 245, 249; and Jackson, *i*, 274, 302; elected president, *i*, 288; tour, *i*, 289; on internal improvements, *i*, 297; on Texas, *i*, 304 n.; on Missouri Compromise, *i*, 317; re-elected, *i*, 321 and n.; success, *i*, 330
 Monroe Doctrine, *i*, 322 f., 325, 328, 460 f., 615, 619 n.1; *ii*, 49 f., 270 f., 391 f., 509 n., 583 f., 595 f., 719, 807
 Montague, G. H., *ii*, 327
 Monterey, California, *i*, 427 f., 445
 Monterey, Mexico, *i*, 429
 Montgomery, Alabama, *i*, 529, 535
 Montojo, Admiral, *ii*, 304 f.
 Montreal, *i*, 50 f.
 Moody, W. H., *ii*, 417
 Moore, J. B., *ii*, 220, 320 n., 538
 Morey letter, *ii*, 123 n.2
 Morgan, General Daniel, *i*, 573
 Morgan, J. P., *ii*, 266 f., 328 f., 379, 382, 386, 547
 Morgan, T. J., *ii*, 245
 Morgan, William, *i*, 361 n.
 Mormons, *ii*, 152 f.
 Morrill Act, *ii*, 152
 Morris, Gouverneur, *i*, 118, 141, 178
 Morris, Robert, *i*, 118 f., 153
 Morrison, W. R., *ii*, 160
 Morristown, *i*, 85, 89
 Morton, Governor, of Indiana, *i*, 575
 Morton, Levi P., *ii*, 192
 Morton, Governor Oliver P., *ii*, 40, 75 and n.
 Morton, Paul, *ii*, 379 n., 417
 Moses, Bernard, *ii*, 363, 365
 Moses, Governor F. J., *ii*, 61
 Most, Johann, *ii*, 193
 Motley, J. L., *ii*, 49, 605 n.
 Mott, Lucretia, *ii*, 470
 Moultrie, Fort, *i*, 84
 Mount Vernon, *i*, 137
 Moustier, Count, *i*, 152
 Muckraking, *ii*, 429 and n.
 Mugwumps, *ii*, 163 n.
 Mulligan letters, *ii*, 165 f.
 Municipal government, *ii*, 474 f.
 Munitions board, *ii*, 657
 Munn vs. Illinois, *ii*, 92 n.
 Muravev, Count, *ii*, 336

- Murchison letter, *ii*, 195 n.
 Murfreesboro, battle of, *i*, 573
 Murphy, C. F., *ii*, 522 f.
 Murray, William Vans, *i*, 182 f.

 Nagel, Charles, *ii*, 484 n.
 Napoleon I, *see* Bonaparte
 Napoleon III, *i*, 581 and n.2, 614 f., 619 f.; *ii*, 49 f.
 Nashville, *i*, 454 f., 558 n.2, 574, 588
 Nast, Thomas, *ii*, 45, 56 n., 76
 Natchez, *i*, 127
 National army, *ii*, 650
 National Coal Commission, *ii*, 781
 National Defense Act, *ii*, 623
 National Defense Society, *ii*, 615 n
 National Guard, *ii*, 670 and n.
 National Labor Union, *ii*, 95 f.
 National Republicans, *i*, 335, 362
 National Security League, *ii*, 615
 Native-Americanism, *i*, 387 f., 470
 Nat Turner's Rebellion, *i*, 391 n.
 "Natural rights," *i*, 66 and n.
 Naturalization, *ii*, 475
 Naturalization Act, *i*, 191
 Navigation Acts, *i*, 25, 28 f., 32, 38, 43 f., 52, 67 n., 378 f., 477
 Navy, *i*, 207, 258, 264 f., 562 f.; *ii*, 214, 440 f., 623 f., 652 f., 788 f.
 Nebraska, *i*, 483 f.
 Necker, *i*, 116
 Negroes, *ii*, 14 f., 137 f., 475 n.
 Nelson, Knute, *ii*, 449
 Nelson, Judge Samuel, *ii*, 53 n.1
 Nelson, T. R. R., *ii*, 19 n.
 Nelson, William, *i*, 548
 Neutrality act of 1794, *i*, 171
 New, H. S., *ii*, 770
 New England, *i*, 11 f., 258 f., 279, 388
 New France, *i*, 45 f.
 New Granada, *see* Colombia
 New Mexico, *i*, 433, 440, 445
 "New Nationalism," *ii*, 496 f.
 New Orleans, *i*, 213 f., 274 f., 294 f., 463, 481, 561
 New Orleans riot, *ii*, 13 n., 60
 "New South," *ii*, 125 f., 139 f.
 Newel, Stanford, *ii*, 336 n.
 Newell, F. H., *ii*, 398
 Newlands Act, *ii*, 397 f., 442
 Newport, *i*, 93
 Niagara, *i*, 50, 263
 Nicaragua, *i*, 461, 474 n.; *ii*, 401, 584 n.2, 585 f., 591 f., 797

 Nicholas II, Czar, *ii*, 336, 599, 643 f.
 Nicholls, F. T., *ii*, 104
 Nineteenth Amendment, *ii*, 472 f.
 Nitti, Francisco, *ii*, 673 n.1
 Nobel prize, *ii*, 422
 Nominating conventions, *i*, 360 f.
 Nonintercourse Act, of 1794, *i*, 188 n.; of 1806, *i*, 235; of 1809, *i*, 242, 246; of 1811, *i*, 248; of 1861, *i*, 593
 Non-Partisan League, *ii*, 466 and n.2, 766
 Nootka Sound controversy, *i*, 169, 212
 Norman, Montague, *ii*, 779
 Norris, Frank, *ii*, 429
 Norris, G. W., *ii*, 495, 646
 North, Lord, *i*, 58, 69, 73, 79, 88 n.1, 92, 98, 109
 Northern Pacific Railroad, *ii*, 63, 382 f.
 Northern Securities case, *ii*, 381 f.
 Northwest boundary settlement, *ii*, 55
 Northwest Ordinance, *i*, 131 f., 313
 Nullification, in 1798, *i*, 195; in 1832, *i*, 367 f., 371 f., 375 f.

 Obaldia, Governor, *ii*, 403
 Oberholtzer, E. P., *ii*, 57
 Obregón, Álvaro, *ii*, 579 f., 580 n., 582
 Ocala, *ii*, 232
 O'Connor, Charles, *ii*, 97 n.2
 Official Bulletin, *ii*, 662 f.
 O'Gorman, J. A., *ii*, 566
 Ohio, admission, *i*, 222 f.
 "Ohio idea," *ii*, 20
 Ohio valley, contest for, *i*, 47 f.
 Oil, speculation in, *ii*, 34 n.2
 Oklahoma, *ii*, 352 n.2, 448 n.
 Old Colonial System, *i*, 28, 61
 Olmstead, F. L., *i*, 480 n., 539 n.2
 Olney, Richard, *i*, 327; *ii*, 261 f.
 Omaha platform, *ii*, 232 f., 236 f., 241 f.
 Onís, Don Luis de, *i*, 302 f.
 Orders in Council, *i*, 235 f., 240, 251, 256, 275, 277 n.; *ii*, 604 f.
 Oregon, *i*, 221, 305 f., 381 f., 409 f., 436 f., 438 n.1, 440 f.; direct government, *ii*, 463 f., 470
 Oregon, voyage of, *ii*, 312 n., 313
 Oreto, the, *i*, 617
 Orient, trade with, *i*, 131
 Orlando, Vittorio, *ii*, 673 n.1, 704
 Orleans, territory of, *i*, 218
 Osawatomie speech, *ii*, 496
 Osgood, H. L., *i*, 20 n.
 Ostend Manifesto, *i*, 464 f.

- Otis, General E. S., *ii*, 361
 Otis, James, *i*, 43, 59 n.1, 62 f., 66, 77 n.
 Overland Line, *ii*, 30
 Ovington Act, *ii*, 557
 Owen, R. L., *ii*, 548
 Owen-Glass Act, *i*, 608 n.1
 Owen-Glass Bill, *ii*, 550 f.
- Pacific pact, *ii*, 791 f.
 Pacific Railroad, *i*, 480, 515
 Pacific railroads, *ii*, 32 f.
 Pacifists, *ii*, 641
 Packard, S. M., *ii*, 104
 Page, W. H., *ii*, 541 n., 567 and n., 632 f., 653
 Paine, Thomas, *i*, 72 n.1, 81, 120
 Pakenham, Sir Edward, *i*, 274 f.
 Palma, T. E., *ii*, 355
 Palmer, A. M., *ii*, 660, 723 n., 748, 751, 767
 Palmer, B. M., *i*, 539 n.1
 Palmer, General J. M., *ii*, 283
 Palmerston, Lord, *i*, 422
 Palo Alto, battle of, *i*, 424
 Panama, *ii*, 398 f., 403 f., 592 f.
 Panama Canal, *ii*, 150 and n.2, 564 f., 584, 592, 593 and n.
 Panama mission, *i*, 338
 Pan-American Congresses, *ii*, 208 f., 394 f., 595 f.
 Pan-American policy, *i*, 323
 Panic, of 1837, *i*, 394 f.; of 1857, *i*, 512 f.; *ii*, 24; of 1873, *ii*, 63 f., 72, 91; of 1893, *ii*, 257 f.; of 1903, 328; of 1907, *ii*, 430 f.
 Papen, Franz von, *ii*, 613 f.
 Paris, Treaty of, 1763, *i*, 54, 56 f.; Treaty of, 1783, *i*, 99 f.; peace of, *ii*, 321 f.
 Paris International Exposition of 1900, *ii*, 371 n.3
 Parker, A. B., *ii*, 414 f.
 Parker, G. F., *ii*, 273, 289 n.
 Parker, Joel, *ii*, 97
 Parkman, Francis, *i*, 34, 49 n.
 Parliament and colonies, *i*, 22 f., 33, 39, 42, 52, 65 f.
 Parr, Richard, *ii*, 414
 Patent Office, *i*, 472 n.
 Patrons of Husbandry, *see* Grangers
 Patterson, Governor, of New Jersey, *i*, 139
 Patterson, General Robert, *i*, 552
 Pauncefote, Sir Julian, *ii*, 273
- Payne, J. B., *ii*, 581, 723 n.
 Payne, S. E., *ii*, 202, 487
 Payne-Aldrich Act, *ii*, 487 f.
 Peabody, George, *ii*, 136 n.1
 Peace convention of 1861, *i*, 530
 Peace of Versailles, *ii*, 699 f.
 "Peace without victory," *ii*, 635 f.
 Peel, Robert, *i*, 416 f.
 Peik *vs.* Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, *ii*, 92 n.
 Peking, siege of, *ii*, 341 f.
 Pelton, W. T., *ii*, 119
 Pemberton, General J. C., *i*, 579
 Pendleton, G. H., *ii*, 20
 Pendleton Act, *ii*, 156 f.
 Peninsular campaign, *ii*, 564 f.
 Penn, Richard, *i*, 77
 Penn, William, *i*, 3, 22 n., 27 n.
 Penrose, Boies, *ii*, 501
 Pensacola, *i*, 273, 301
 Pensions, *ii*, 172 f., 213 f.
 Perceval, Spencer, *i*, 253, 256
 Perry, G. D., *ii*, 737
 Perry, Oliver H., *i*, 268 f.
 Perryville, battle of, *i*, 573
 Pershing, General J. J., *ii*, 577 f., 579 n., 652 n., 665 f., 677, 685 f., 700 n., 732 and n.
 Personal Liberty Acts, *i*, 446
 Petersburg, siege of, *i*, 587, 590
 Petersham, battle of, *i*, 122
 Philadelphia Exposition of 1876, *ii*, 71 f.
 Philippines, *i*, 20; *ii*, 321 f.; administration of, *ii*, 360 f.; commissions, *ii*, 361, 363; Act of 1902, *ii*, 365 f.; and independence, *ii*, 366 f.; progress, *ii*, 368 f.; and free trade, *ii*, 544 n.
 Phipps, H. M., *ii*, 329
 Pickens, Governor, of South Carolina, *i*, 543
 Pickering, John, *i*, 211
 Pickering, Timothy, *i*, 181 n., 182 f., 191, 241, 279, 288
 Pickett's Charge, *i*, 577 f.
 Pierce, Franklin, *i*, 458, 464, 466, 494 f., 498, 502
 Pierpont, F. H., *i*, 549
 Pike, J. S., *ii*, 61
 Pike, Zebulon, *i*, 221 n.
 Pinchot, Gifford, *ii*, 398, 442 f., 445 f., 449, 492 f., 513
 Pinckney, C. C., *i*, 179 f., 197, 222, 345
 Pinckney, Charles, *i*, 390

- Pinckney, Thomas, *i*, 141 and n., 177, 189, 257
 Pinkney, William, *i*, 238, 241, 249, 315
 Pious fund, *ii*, 337
 Pitney, Mahlon, *ii*, 498 n.2
 Pitt, Fort, *i*, 50
 Pitt, William, *i*, 40, 49, 51 f., 57 f., 61, 64, 72, 75, 79, 81 n.
 Pittsburgh strike, *ii*, 111 f.
 Plantation system, *i*, 473 f.
 Platt, O. H., *ii*, 188, 208
 Platt, T. H., *ii*, 108, 160 f., 343 f., 469
 Platt amendment, *ii*, 354 f.
 Plots, German, *ii*, 612 f.
 Plumb, Glenn E., *ii*, 756 f.
 "Pocket veto," *i*, 600 n.
 Poincaré, R., *ii*, 599, 647
 Poindexter, Miles, *ii*, 718
 Poinsett, Joel, R., *i*, 372
 Poland Committee, *ii*, 56
 Police strike, *ii*, 749 f.
 Polk, F. L., *ii*, 727
 Polk, James K., Speaker of the House, *i*, 389; in campaign of 1844, *i*, 418 f.; and Mexico, *i*, 423, 426 f.; and Oregon, 438 f.; on Cuba, *i*, 463
 Polk, General Leonidas, *i*, 556 f.
 Polly case, *i*, 233 n.
 Polo, Señor, *ii*, 302
 Pomeroy, M. M. ("Brick"), *ii*, 94
 Pondicherry, *i*, 51
 Pontiac, *i*, 59 f.
 "Pony express," *i*, 530
 Pools, railroad, *ii*, 110, 184 and n.1
 Poor, H. W., *ii*, 184 n.3
 Pope, General John, *i*, 561, 569 f., 570 n.; *ii*, 17 n.
 "Popgun" bills, *ii*, 501
 "Popocrats," *ii*, 284
 "Popular sovereignty," *i*, 445 f., 505
 Population, in 1790, *i*, 104 n.1, 313 n.2; in 1850, *i*, 468; in 1860, *i*, 529, 550
 Populists, *ii*, 230 f., 282 f., 296 n.1, 460 f.
 Porter, Admiral, *i*, 579
 Porter, General Fitz-John, *i*, 566
 Porter, Horace, *ii*, 222
 Porter, Peter B., *i*, 249, 251, 263, 269, 296
 Porter, R. P., *ii*, 130 n.2
 Port Hudson, *i*, 561, 580 and n.
 Portland, Oregon, *ii*, 464
 Porto Rico, *ii*, 321, 356 f.
 Port Royal, *i*, 34 n.
 Portsmouth, Treaty of, *ii*, 420 f.
 Post, L. F., *ii*, 753
 Pottawatomie, *i*, 496 f.
 Potter, Bishop H. C., *ii*, 386
 Powderly, T. V., *ii*, 193
 Preëemption Act, *ii*, 26
 Preferential primaries, *ii*, 468 f.
 Preparedness, *ii*, 615 f., 623 f.
 Presidential Succession Act, *ii*, 181
 Prevost, Sir George, *i*, 259, 270 f.
 Price, General Sterling, *i*, 549
 Prince, L. B., *ii*, 108
 Princeton, battle of, *i*, 89
 Privateers, *i*, 278 n.
 Proclamation Line, *i*, 60, 113
 Procter, General, *i*, 267, 269
 Procter, W. C., *ii*, 762 n.
 Profiteering, *ii*, 740 f.
 Progressive movement, *ii*, 457 f., 502 f., 518 f., 526 f., 562
 Prohibition party, *ii*, 70
 Proportional representation, *ii*, 477
 Public lands, *i*, 218 n., 295, 391
 Pugh, G. E., *ii*, 181 n.
 Pujo Committee, *ii*, 547
 Pulaski, Count, *i*, 88
 Pullman strike, *ii*, 259 f.
 Pure Food and Drugs Act, *ii*, 429
 Puritans, *i*, 11, 15 f.
 Putman, General Israel, *i*, 84
 Pym, John, *i*, 23
 Quadruple Alliance, *i*, 322 f.
 Quakers, *i*, 17
 Quartering Act, *i*, 68 n., 70
 Quay, M. S., *ii*, 207 f., 344
 Quebec, *i*, 34 and n., 45 f., 50, 56, 59, 72, 86, 113
 Queenstown Heights, battle of, *i*, 263
 Quiberon, battle of, *i*, 51
 "Quids," *i*, 227
 Quincy, Josiah, *i*, 283, 298
 Quitman, Governor, of Mississippi, *i*, 457, 463
 Quitrents, *i*, 26 n., 42
 Railroads, *i*, 380 f., 478 f., 512, 582 and n.; grants to, *ii*, 28 f.; mileage, *ii*, 82; strikes, *ii*, 110 f., 259 f., 781 f.; regulation of, *ii*, 182 f., 757 f.; in panic of 1893, *ii*, 257 n., 381 f.; Adamson Act, *ii*, 626 f.; in World War, *ii*, 657 f., 659 n., 680 f.; disposition of, after war, *ii*, 754 f.

- Raleigh letter, *i*, 418 f.
 Rambouillet Decree, *i*, 231 n., 236, 248
 Randall, S. J., *ii*, 160, 179 n.
 Randolph, Edmund, *i*, 138, 150, 159
 Randolph, Edward, *i*, 30 and n.
 Randolph, John, *i*, 207, 224, 243, 248 n., 249, 283, 287, 317, 333, 344 n., 346 n.
 Ray, P. O., *i*, 488 n.
 Reagan Bill, *ii*, 187
 Recall, *ii*, 465; of judges, *ii*, 465; of judicial decisions, *ii*, 519 n., 532 n.
 Reciprocity, *ii*, 208, 210, 371, 499 and n.
 Reconcentrados, *ii*, 295 f.
 Reconstruction, *ii*, 1 f., 13 f., 59 f.
 Red Cross, *i*, 611 and n.2
 Redemptioners, *i*, 9 n.1
 Redfish, W. C., *ii*, 539, 723 n., 730
 "Reds," *ii*, 752 f.
 "Red Sticks," *i*, 273
 Reed, J. A., *ii*, 718
 Reed, T. B., *ii*, 159, 197 f., 206, 212, 215 f., 278, 347
 Reed, Walter, *ii*, 354 n.2
 Reed rules, *ii*, 198 f.
 Reeder, A. H., *i*, 493 f.
 Reid, Whitelaw, *i*, 55; *ii*, 238, 321, 424
 Reily, E. Mont, *ii*, 359 and n.
 Religion in colonies, *i*, 16 f.
 Removal of deposits, *i*, 383 f.
 Renaissance, *i*, 5
 Republicans, of 1791, *i*, 163 n.2; of 1815, *i*, 282; of 1854, *i*, 490 f., 498, 537
 Resaca de la Palma, battle of, *i*, 424
 Restoration of 1660, *i*, 23
 Resumption of specie payment, *ii*, 70, 72, 113, 114 and n.
 Revenue Act, of 1916, *ii*, 625 f.; of 1917, *ii*, 655 f.; of 1918, 656 f.
 Revolution, American, *i*, 55 f.
 Revolution, English, *i*, 40
 Revolution, French, *see* French Revolution
 Reyes, General, *ii*, 406
 Reynolds, General J. F., *i*, 577
 Rhea letter, 300 and n.1
 Rhett, R. B., *i*, 457, 524 n.
 Rhode Island, *i*, 13, 38 f., 61 n.2, 65, 119, 122, 148 n., 349 and n.2
 Rhodes, J. F., *i*, quoted, 453 n., 460, 487, 489, 505 n., 527 n.3, 538, 581, 614 n.; on bond sales, *ii*, 268 n.; on Spanish War, *ii*, 300 and n.
 Ricci, Ambassador, *ii*, 790
 Richardson, W. A., *ii*, 67
 Richmond, *i*, 550, 553, 564 f., 586 f., 591
 Ripley, W. Z., *ii*, 558 f.
 River and harbor bills, *ii*, 155 and n.2, 172, 447 f.
 Rives, W. C., *i*, 379
 Robertson, James, *i*, 104, 113
 Robertson, W. H., *ii*, 145 f.
 Robinson, Charles, *i*, 494 f.
 Robinson, H. M., *ii*, 778 n.2
 Robison, Admiral S. S., *ii*, 587
 Rochambeau, General, *i*, 96 f.
 Rochefoucauld, Duke of, *i*, 16
 Rockefeller, J. D., *ii*, 136 n.1, 137 n., 185
 Rockefeller, William, *ii*, 185
 Rockingham, Marquis of, *i*, 65, 98
 Rodgers, Commodore, *i*, 250
 Rodney, Admiral, *i*, 100
 Roosevelt, F. D., *ii*, 765
 Roosevelt, James, *ii*, 108
 Roosevelt, Theodore, *i*, 150; opposes Blaine, *ii*, 161; and civil service, *ii*, 171; runs for mayor of New York, *ii*, 193 n.; and railroads, *ii*, 315 and n., 426 f.; in Spanish War, *ii*, 315 f.; career, *ii*, 315 n.; and China, *ii*, 342 n.; governor of New York, *ii*, 343 f.; on McKinley, *ii*, 344 n.3; vice president, *ii*, 344, 348; on Cuban reciprocity, *ii*, 355 f.; succeeds McKinley, *ii*, 373; cabinet, *ii*, 379, 417; and coal strike, *ii*, 385 f.; injured, *ii*, 390; and Venezuela, *ii*, 390 f.; and Santo Domingo, *ii*, 395 f.; and Panama, *ii*, 398 f.; and Hanna, *ii*, 411 f.; reelection, *ii*, 412, 416; mediates in Russo-Japanese War, *ii*, 419 f.; and arbitration, *ii*, 422 f.; and Morocco, *ii*, 423 f.; and panic of 1907, *ii*, 432 f.; and conservation, *ii*, 432 f.; and Japan, *ii*, 438 f.; sends fleet around the world, *ii*, 440 f.; and Taft, *ii*, 451, 452 n., 484, 493; African trip, *ii*, 455 f.; and the New Nationalism, 496 f.; and Progressives, *ii*, 503 f., 513 f., 517 f.; on trusts, *ii*, 507 n.; in campaign of 1912, *ii*, 527, 529, 532; on Colombia, *ii*, 567; on Mexico, *ii*, 583; and World War, *ii*, 602 and n., 620, 622 n., 649 n.; and election of 1916, *ii*, 620, 621 and n.; criticizes Wilson, *ii*, 622 n., 705; death, *ii*, 761
 Roosevelt, Theodore (son of former), *ii*, 753 n.
 Root, Elihu, on Cuba, *ii*, 354 f.; and Philippines, *ii*, 362 f.; visits Morgan,

- ii*, 388; Secretary of State, *ii*, 394; and Alaskan boundary, *ii*, 410; services in cabinet, *ii*, 417; and arbitration, *ii*, 423; and Morocco, *ii*, 424 f.; in convention of 1912, *ii*, 515; favors tolls repeal, *ii*, 567 n.; and campaign of 1916, *ii*, 620; and Treaty of Versailles, *ii*, 720; and Washington Conference, *ii*, 789 f.; and League of Nations, *ii*, 798
 Root-Takahira agreement, *ii*, 439, 788 n.
 Roper, D. C., *ii*, 761
 Rose, George, *i*, 241
 Rose, John, *ii*, 53
 Rosecrans, General W. S., *i*, 573, 582 f.
 Rosen, Baron, *ii*, 420
 Rosenwald, Julius, *ii*, 136 n.
 Ross, Betsy, *i*, 309 n.
 Ross, E. G., *ii*, 20 n.1
 Ross, General, *i*, 272
 "Rough Riders," *ii*, 315 f.
 Rousseau, L. H., *i*, 548
 Roxas, Señor, *ii*, 367
 Rhur occupation, *ii*, 778 n.2
 Rule of 1756, *i*, 173, 233 n., 245
 Rules, Committee on, *ii*, 495
 Rush, Richard, *i*, 324
 Rusk Bill, *i*, 480
 Russell, C. E., *ii*, 479 n.
 Russell, John, *i*, 254
 Russell, Lord John, *i*, 616, 618; *ii*, 51 and n.
 Russell, Jonathan, *i*, 275 f.
 Russell, Governor W. E., *ii*, 280
 Russell, W. H., *i*, 532
 Russia, treaty with, *i*, 323, 327 n.; sells Alaska, *ii*, 46 f.; revolution, *ii*, 643 f.
 Russo-Japanese War, *ii*, 418 f.
 Rutledge, Edward, *i*, 111 f., 306
 Rutledge, John, *i*, 86 n., 151
 Ryan, T. F., *ii*, 521
 Sackville-West, Lord, *ii*, 195 n.
 Sagasta, Praxedes M., *ii*, 297
 St. Augustine, *i*, 300 and n.2
 St. Clair, General Arthur, *i*, 167, 174
 St. Leger, General, *i*, 90 f.
 St. Louis Exposition, *ii*, 413
 St. Mihiel, battle of, *ii*, 686 f.
 "Salary grab," *ii*, 58
 Salisbury, Lord, *ii*, 269 f.
 Samoa, *ii*, 219 f.
 Sampson, Admiral W. T., *ii*, 303 f., 312 f., 317 f.
 Sanborn contracts, *ii*, 67
 Sandford, John, *i*, 501
 Sanitary Commission, *i*, 611
 San Jacinto, battle of, *i*, 412
 San Juan, battle of, *i*, 313 n., 315 f.
 San Pascual, battle of, *i*, 427, 429
 Santa Anna, General, *i*, 412, 423, 430 f.
 Santa Fé, *i*, 426
 Santiago, battle of, *ii*, 312 f., 317 f.
 Santo Domingo, *i*, 215; *ii*, 40, 48 f., 395 f., 587 f.
 Saratoga, battle of, *i*, 91
 Sargent, John A., *ii*, 794 n
 Savannah, *i*, 94, 589
 Savannah, the, *i*, 329
 Scheidemann, Philip, *ii*, 712
 Schenck, R. C., *ii*, 53 n.1
 Schenectady, *i*, 46
 Schleswig-Holstein, *ii*, 50
 Schley, Admiral W. S., *ii*, 223, 302, 312 f., 318 f.
 Schofield, General J. M., *ii*, 20, 49, 388
 Schomburgk line, *ii*, 269 f.
 Schurman, J. G., *ii*, 361
 Schurz, Carl, *ii*, 8, 38, 43 f., 103, 107
 Schuyler, General Peter, *i*, 91
 Schwab, C. M., *ii*, 329, 654
 Schwab, J. C., *i*, 601 n.2
 Sclopis, Count, *ii*, 53 n.1, 54
 Scotch-Irish, *i*, 2
 Scott, Governor A. M., *ii*, 61
 Scott, Dred, *i*, 501 f.
 Scott, T. A., *ii*, 329
 Scott, Sir William, *i*, 233 n.
 Scott, General Winfield, *i*, 269 f., 397, 429 f., 432, 458, 525, 528 n.1, 532, 540 n.2, 542, 547, 552 f.
 Seamen's Act, *ii*, 736
 Seager, H. R., *ii*, 806 and n.
 Seattle strike, *ii*, 751
 Secession, *i*, 523 f., 527, 534 f.
 Secret treaties, *ii*, 700 f., 701 n.
 Securities Commission, *ii*, 492 n.2
 Sedan, American army reaches, *ii*, 690
 Sedition Act, *i*, 192 f.
 Selective draft, *ii*, 649 f., 684
 Seligman, E. R. A., *ii*, 654
 Seminole War, *i*, 300 f.
 Semmes, Captain Raphael, *i*, 618
 Senate, popular election, *ii*, 469 f.; and Wilson, *ii*, 717 f.
 Sequestration Act, *i*, 554
 Serajevo, *ii*, 600
 S. O. S. (Service of Supply), *ii*, 667 f

- Seventeenth Amendment, *ii*, 470
 Seventh-of-March speech, *i*, 450 f.
 Sewall, Arthur, *ii*, 282
 Sewall, Samuel, *i*, 17
 Seward, W. H., governor of New York, *i*, 395; on Texas, *i*, 436; and Tyler, *i*, 445; on Compromise of 1850, *i*, 453; on Kansas, *i*, 492; in campaign of 1856, *i*, 497; in campaign of 1860, *i*, 520 f.; offers compromise, *i*, 538; Secretary of State, *i*, 541 and n.2, 542 f.; on war, *i*, 551 n.2; at Hampton Roads, *i*, 589; on Trent affair, *i*, 617; warns Napoleon III, *i*, 619; *ii*, 3, 14, 47 f., 50 f., 348
 Seymour, Governor Horatio, *i*, 577; *ii*, 21
 Shafter, General W. R., *ii*, 315 n.
 Shannon, William, *i*, 494 f.
 Shantung, *ii*, 713 f., 720 n.2
 Sharpsburg, *see* Antietam
 Shays's Rebellion, *i*, 122, 129, 136
 Sheehan, Governor W. F., *ii*, 414
 Shelburne, Lord, *i*, 99
 Shenandoah, the, *i*, 618
 Shenandoah campaign, *i*, 565 f.
 Shepard, Alexander ("Boss"), *ii*, 67
 Sheridan, General Philip H., *i*, 583 f., 588, 620, *ii*, 49
 Sherman, James S., *ii*, 452 n.1
 Sherman, John, *i*, 517; *ii*, 6, 9 n.2, 66, 93, 103 n., 107, 109 n.1, 113 f., 122 f., 144 n., 149, 175, 181 and n., 192, 206, 277, 296 and n.2, 320 n.
 Sherman, L. Y., *ii*, 718, 720 n.
 Sherman, General W. T., *i*, 579 f., 586, 588, and n.2, 590 f.; *ii*, 29, 50 n.
 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, *ii*, 216 f., 261 and n., 384, 435 f., 555 f.
 Sherman Silver Act, *ii*, 204 f., 249, 252 f.
 Shidehara, Ambassador, *ii*, 790
 Shields, General, *i*, 566
 Shiloh, battle of, *i*, 560 f.
 Shipbuilding, *i*, 476, 562 and n.
 Shipping, American, *ii*, 210, 625, 653, 671 f., 682
 Shipping Board, *ii*, 625, 671 n.2, 736 f.
 Shipstead, H., *ii*, 786
 Shopmen's strike, *ii*, 782 f.
 Short ballot, *ii*, 473
 Sickles, General D. E., *ii*, 68 n.1
 Sigbee, Captain C. D., *ii*, 298 f.
 Silver, *ii*, 115 f., 138 f., 176 f., 203
 Sims, Admiral W. S., *ii*, 653
 Sinclair, Upton, *ii*, 429, 479 n., 662 n.
 Single tax, *ii*, 192 and n.
 Sitting Bull, *ii*, 73
 Sixteenth Amendment, *ii*, 546 and n.
 Slade of Vermont, *i*, 388 f.
 Slater, J. F., *ii*, 136 n.1
 Slaughter House cases, *ii*, 69
 Slave trade, abolished in 1808, *i*, 244; in colonies, *i*, 311; on African coast, *i*, 409; in the fifties, *i*, 448, 473, 514 f.; abolished in District of Columbia, *i*, 454
 Slavery, introduction of, *i*, 310; and nullification, *i*, 376; in New Mexico, *i*, 440 f., 446 f.; status in 1850, *i*, 456; tread to lower South, *i*, 473 and n.1 and n.2; in Lincoln-Douglas debates, *i*, 510 f.; and business, *i*, 531 f.; discussion of, *i*, 539; during Civil War, *i*, 594 f.
 Slidell, John, *i*, 423 f., 514, 518 n.2, 615 f.
 Sloat, Commodore, *i*, 427
 Smith, Adam, *ii*, 85
 Smith, Governor Alfred, *ii*, 753 n., 765, 795
 Smith, Caleb, *i*, 541 n.2
 Smith, Goldwin, *i*, 546 n.; *ii*, 285 n.
 Smith, Herbert K., *ii*, 445
 Smith, Hoke, *ii*, 283, 605
 Smith, General Jacob H., *ii*, 362
 Smith, James, *ii*, 526
 Smith, Joseph, *ii*, 152
 Smith, Justin H., *i*, 423, 435 n.
 Smith, General Kirby, *i*, 573, 591
 Smith, Robert, *i*, 206, 244 f., 249
 Smith, Samuel, *i*, 206
 Smith, General W. F., *i*, 583
 Smith-Lever Act, *ii*, 564
 Smoot, Reed, *ii*, 774, 779
 Smuts, General Jan, *ii*, 714
 Smythe, General Alexander, *i*, 263
 Snowdon, Admiral Thomas, *ii*, 588
 Socialism, *ii*, 437 f., 460, 478, 479 n., 528 f., 631, 662, 765
 Soldiers, treatment of, *ii*, 731 f., 777
 Sonnino, Baron Sidney, *ii*, 673 n.1
 Soulé, Pierre, *i*, 464 f.
 South, prostration after Civil War, *ii*, 35 f., 132 f.; recovery, *ii*, 138 f.; education, *ii*, 135 f.; the "solid," *ii*, 16, 140 and n., 205; evades Fifteenth Amendment, *ii*, 233 and n.
 Southern Alliance, *ii*, 233

- "Southern Rights" associations, *i*, 457
 "Soviet Ark," *ii*, 752
 Spain, explorers, *i*, 6 f.; in Revolution, *i*, 96; disputes with, in West, *i*, 124 f., 168 f.; Treaty of San Lorenzo (1795), *i*, 177; sells Florida, *i*, 303; relations with, in 1850-1854, *i*, 462 f.
 Spanish-American War, *ii*, 294 f.
 Spargo, John, *ii*, 479 n., 662 n.
 Sparks, Jared, *i*, 411 n.
 Spartacides, *ii*, 710
 Specie Circular, *i*, 392 f.
 Speck-Sternberg, *ii*, 420
 Sperry, Admiral C. S., *ii*, 440 f.
 Spoils system, *i*, 353
 Spooner, J. C., *ii*, 365, 379, 401
 Spottsylvania, battle of, *i*, 587
 Springer, W. M., *ii*, 275
 "Squatter sovereignty," *i*, 445 f., 486
 Stalwarts, elimination of, *ii*, 146 f.
 Stamp Act, *i*, 62 f., 67, 79
 Stämpfli, Jacques, *ii*, 53 n., 54
 Standard Oil Company, *ii*, 185 f., 435 f.
 Standard time, *ii*, 187
 Stanford, Leland, *ii*, 31, 153
 Stanton, Edwin M., *i*, 527 n.1, 541 n.2, 556, 582 f., 591 n., 620; *ii*, 14, 18 f.
Star of the West, the, *i*, 529
 Star Routes, *ii*, 147 f.
 Star-spangled Banner, *i*, 272
 Stars and Bars, *i*, 546
 Steel strike, *ii*, 745 f.
 Steffens, L., 428
 Stephen, Father, *ii*, 246
 Stephens, Alexander H., *i*, 77, 423, 485, 514, 527, 535, 589, 601; *ii*, 6
 Stephenson, George, *i*, 381
 Stephenson, Isaac, *ii*, 469
 Steuben, Baron, *i*, 88, 129
 Steunenberg, Governor Frank, *ii*, 482
 Stevens, J. L., *ii*, 263 n.2
 Stevens, Thaddeus, *ii*, 4 f., 10, 19
 Stevenson, A. E., *ii*, 171, 240, 251 n.2, 253
 Stewart, W. M., *ii*, 32
 Stimson, H. L., *ii*, 414, 496
 Stockton, Commodore R. F., *i*, 428
 Stoddard, Benjamin, *i*, 181
 Stoeckl, Baron, *ii*, 47
 Stokes, J. G. P., *ii*, 479 n., 662 n.
 Stone, H. F., *ii*, 770, 794 n.
 Stone, W. J., *ii*, 616, 631, 646
 Story, Justice, *i*, 13 n.2
 Straus, O. S., *ii*, 422, 450, 508, 529 n., 532 and n.
 Stuarts, *i*, 1, 9
 S. A. T. C. (Student Army Training Corps), *ii*, 685
 Submarine warfare, *ii*, 638 f., 653 and n.
 Subtreasury, *i*, 395
 Suez Canal, *ii*, 399
 Suffolk Resolves, *i*, 71 f.
 Suffrage, negro, *ii*, 15 and n.1, 22 and n.; woman, *i*, 470 f., 758
 Sugar, *ii*, 203 n.1, 255 f., 414, 543 n., 742 n.
 Sugar Act, of 1764, *i*, 62 f.
 Sugar and Molasses Act, of 1733, *i*, 44, 61
 Sullivan, General John, *i*, 86 n.
 Sumner, Charles, *i*, 495 f., 615 n., 617; *ii*, 5 f., 47, 49, 52
 Sumner, General E. V., *i*, 565 f.
 Sumner, General S. S., *ii*, 315
 Sumter, Fort, *i*, 541 f.
 Supreme Court, *i*, 501 f., 503; decisions, *ii*, 21 n., 38 n., 69, 71, 92 n., 233 n., 263, 286, 360, 450, 605, 760, 781 n.
 Supreme War Council, *ii*, 677
 Surplus, *ii*, 152 n., 159, 177 n., 773 f.
Sussex pledge, *ii*, 618 and n., 631, 639
 Swedes, *i*, 3
 Sweeney, P. B., *ii*, 56 n.
 Sze, Ambassador A., *ii*, 790
 Taft, W. H., on Philippine Commission, *ii*, 363 f.; as Secretary of War, *ii*, 366 f., 417; on Roosevelt, *ii*, 379; elected in 1908, *ii*, 451 f.; career, *ii*, 483 f.; and tariff, *ii*, 486 f., 490 f.; and insurgents, *ii*, 483 f.; and conservation, *ii*, 492 f.; and Supreme Court appointments, *ii*, 498 and n.; and trusts, *ii*, 507, 720; and Mexico, *ii*, 509 f.; in campaign of 1912, *ii*, 507, 512 f., 518 f.; estimate of, *ii*, 534 f., Chief Justice, *ii*, 534; and Caribbean; *ii*, 585 f.; and Wilson, *ii*, 705, 717
 Takahira, Ambassador, *ii*, 420
 Talleyrand, *i*, 180 f., 216 n.
 Tallmadge, James, *i*, 310, 315, 317
 Tamasese, *ii*, 219
 Tammany Hall, *i*, 470; *ii*, 56 n., 164, 170
 Tampico affair, *ii*, 573 f.
 Taney, Roger B., *i*, 383 f., 502
 Tardieu, André, *ii*, 652 n., 709 n.

- Tariff, of 1789, *i*, 149 f.; of 1816, *i*, 286 f.; of 1824, *i*, 331 f., 342 f.; of 1828, *i*, 344 f., 367; of 1832, *i*, 371; of 1833, *i*, 374 n.2; reform of, *i*, 377; of 1842, *i*, 407 of 1846, *i*, 471; n.2, 477; in Civil War, *i*, 604; *ii*, 71, 158 f., 178 f., 191, 200 f., 211 f., 219, 241, 355, 358 n., 368, 486, 490, 501, 542 f., 563 n., 722 f.
- Taussig, F. W., *ii*, 449
- Tawney, J. A., *ii*, 449
- Tax reduction, *ii*, 773 f.
- Taylor, Captain H. C., *ii*, 303
- Taylor, John, *i*, 193, 195
- Taylor, General Richard, *i*, 581, 591
- Taylor, Zachary, *i*, 424 f., 429 f., 441 f., 445, 454
- Tea, tax on, *i*, 68 f., 92
- Teapot Dome, *ii*, 770
- Tecumseh, *i*, 177, 250, 269
- Teller, H. M., *ii*, 279 and n.2
- Teller Resolution, *ii*, 302 n., 353
- Tennessee, *i*, 313, 549, 584 n.1
- Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, *ii*, 433 f.
- Tenure-of-Office Act, *ii*, 14 n.2, 18, 168 f.
- "Terrapin policy," *i*, 240 n.
- Texas, "surrender" of, *i*, 304 and n.; expansion toward, *i*, 381; annexation of, *i*, 397 f., 412 f., 420 f.; British influence in, *i*, 414 f.; in Compromise of 1850, *i*, 448; convention in 1861, *i*, 527
- Thames, battle of, *i*, 269
- Thanksgiving Day, *i*, 581 n.3, 584
- Thayer, Eli, *i*, 493
- Thayer, W. R., *ii*, 530
- Thomas, General G. H., *i*, 317, 557, 582 f., 588 f.
- Thomas, General Lorenzo, *ii*, 18
- Thompson, R., *ii*, 103 n.
- Thornton, Captain, *i*, 424
- Thornton, Sir Edward, *ii*, 53 and n.1
- Tientsin, *ii*, 340
- Tilden, S. J., *ii*, 56 n., 76, 94 n.2, 119 and n.
- Tilghman, General, *i*, 557
- Tillman, B. R., *ii*, 230, 291, 426 f.
- Tippecanoe, battle of, *i*, 250
- Tirpitz, Admiral von, *ii*, 619, 637, 640 n., 676
- Tocqueville, Alexis de, *i*, 365
- Tokugawa, Prince, *ii*, 790
- Tompkins, Governor, of New York, *i*, 241
- Toombs, Robert, *i*, 423, 447, 498, 500, 540 n., 543
- Topeka Constitution, *i*, 494, 498
- Total, General, *ii*, 316
- Tories, *i*, 79, 81 f., 86, 88, 92, 100, 102, 123 f.
- Torres, Colonel, *ii*, 405 f.
- Toussaint L'Ouverture, *i*, 215
- Townshend, Charles, *i*, 67 and n., 68
- Tracy, Benjamin, *ii*, 214
- Trade, Latin-American, *ii*, 596 and n.; in World War, *ii*, 604 f.
- Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, *ii*, 658, 660 f.
- Treaty, of Paris (1763), *i*, 54, 56 f.; of Paris (1783), *i*, 99 f., 123; Jay, *i*, 175 f., 178 f., 187 f.; of Grenville, *i*, 177; of San Lorenzo, *i*, 177; of 1800 with Napoleon, *i*, 184; of San Ildefonso, *i*, 213; of 1806 with England, *i*, 238; of Ghent, *i*, 277 f.; of Fort Wayne, *i*, 299; of 1819 with Spain, *i*, 303 f.; of 1818 with Great Britain, *i*, 305 f.; of Indian Springs, *i*, 341; of 1827 with Great Britain, *i*, 409; Webster-Ashburton, *i*, 410 f.; of 1844 with Texas, *i*, 417 f.; of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, *i*, 433; of 1846 with Great Britain, *i*, 438; of Washington, *ii*, 53; of Paris, *ii*, 320 f.; of Versailles, *ii*, 711 f.; of Washington Conference, *ii*, 791 f.
- Trenholm, Secretary, *i*, 603 f.
- Trent affair, *i*, 556, 616 f.
- Trenton, battle of, *i*, 89
- Trescot, W. H., *i*, 524; *ii*, 151
- Trianon Decree, *i*, 248
- Triple Alliance, *i*, 25
- Tripoli, *i*, 210 f.
- Trist, Nicholas, *i*, 432 f.
- Trotsky, Leo, *ii*, 673 f.
- Troup, Governor, of Georgia, *i*, 341 f.
- Trumbull, Lyman, *ii*, 6, 20 n.1, 38, 44
- Tuan, Prince, *ii*, 339
- Tucker, Dean Josiah, *i*, 78, 116
- Turner, F. J., *ii*, 235 and n.2, 326
- Turner, Nat, *i*, 380
- Tuscania, *ii*, 683 n.
- Tutuila, *ii*, 220 n.
- Tuyl, Baron, *i*, 324
- Tweed Ring, *ii*, 56 n., 76
- "Twilight zone," *ii*, 496

- Tyler, John, *i*, 375 n., 400, 404 f., 406 f., 414 f., 419 n., 530
 Tyler, L. G., *i*, 408

 "Uncle Tom's Cabin," *i*, 517
 "Underground railroad," *i*, 446, 457
 Underwood, Oscar, *ii*, 501, 521, 789
 Underwood-Simmons Act, *ii*, 542 f., 563 n.
 Union Labor party, *ii*, 192 f.
 Union Leagues, *ii*, 36 f.
 Union Pacific Railroad, *ii*, 28, 30 and n., 31, 382
 Unionists, Southern, *i*, 490 n.
 United Labor party, *ii*, 192
 United States Steel Corporation, *ii*, 328 f., 507
 Upshur, A., Secretary of State, *i*, 415 f.
 Utah, *ii*, 153 n.1

 Vallandigham, C. L., *i*, 575, 588; *ii*, 21
 Valley Forge, *i*, 88
 Valmy, battle of, *i*, 169
 Valparaiso riot, *ii*, 223 f.
 Van Buren, Martin, senator, *i*, 335; Secretary of State, *i*, 354; vice president, *i*, 362, 385; nominated to English mission, *i*, 378; president, *i*, 382, 393; criticism of, *i*, 400; and Texas, *i*, 413 f.; in campaign of 1844, *i*, 418; nominated in 1848, *i*, 441 f.
 Vance, Governor, of North Carolina, *i*, 602; *ii*, 171 and n.1, 181 n.
 Vanderbilt, W. H., *ii*, 82
 Van Devanter, Judge Willis, *ii*, 498 n.2
 Van Dorn, General, *i*, 571, 574 n.
 Van Hise, C. R., *ii*, 442
 Van Rensselaer, General Stephen, *i*, 263
 Van Tyne, C. H., quoted, *i*, 92 n., 108 n.
 Van Winkle, P. G., *ii*, 20 n.1
 Vardaman, J. K., *ii*, 646
 Vaudreuil, Marquis de, *i*, 51
 Venango, Fort, *i*, 47
 Venezuela, *i*, 327; boundary dispute, *ii*, 269 f., 273 and n.; and Germany, *ii*, 390 f.
 Venizelos, E., *ii*, 715
 Vera Cruz, *i*, 432; capture of, *ii*, 574 f.
 Verdun, battle of, *ii*, 619
 Vergennes, Comte de, *i*, 56, 92, 99, 102, 125
 Verplanck Bill, *i*, 374 f.
 Vest, G. G., *ii*, 323
 Vicksburg, *i*, 514, 561, 579 f., 595
 Vicksburg riots, *ii*, 60
 Victor, General, *i*, 220
 Victoria, Queen, *ii*, 33
 Victory Loan, *ii*, 655 n.
 Vilas, W. F., *ii*, 169 n., 280
 Villa, Francisco, *ii*, 572, 576 f., 581
 Vincennes, *i*, 100 n.1, 127
 Virgin Islands, *see* Danish West Indies
 Virginia, the, *i*, 563 f.
 Virginia Company, *i*, 7 f., 31; settlement, *i*, 11 n.1, 15, 39
 Virginia Resolutions, *i*, 194 f.
 Virginius affair, *ii*, 68 n.1
 "Visiting statesmen," *ii*, 79
 Viviani, René, *ii*, 665, 790
 Vocational representation, *ii*, 477
 Vocational training for soldiers, *ii*, 733
 Volstead Act, *ii*, 759 f., 764

 Wabash Railroad *vs.* Illinois, *ii*, 92 n.
 Wade, Benjamin, *i*, 599; *ii*, 5 n., 49, 105
 Wainwright, Lieutenant Commander Richard, *ii*, 319
 Waite, Governor D. H., *ii*, 258 and n.
 Walcott, Governor, of Connecticut, *i*, 294
 Walcott, C. D., *ii*, 398
 Waldersee, Count von, *ii*, 341 n.
 Walker, Edwin, *ii*, 261
 Walker, L. P., *i*, 541 n.1
 Walker, Robert J., *i*, 504 f.
 Walker, William, *i*, 474 f., 514
 Walker commission, *ii*, 399
 Walker tariff, *i*, 471 n.2, 477
 Wallace, H. C., *ii*, 770
 Wallace, General Lew, *i*, 560
 Walling, W. E., *ii*, 479 n., 622 n.
 Walpole, Horace, *i*, 51
 Walpole, Robert, *i*, 57 and n.
 War, World, declaration of entry of United States into, *ii*, 644 f.; industry in, *ii*, 657, 730; labor policies, *ii*, 657, 743 and n.; trade, *ii*, 657; finance, *ii*, 562 f., 658, 738 f.; risk, *ii*, 732 f.
 "War hawks," *i*, 249
 Warburg, P. M., *ii*, 548
 Warren, C. B., *ii*, 581
 Washburne, E. B., *ii*, 122
 Washington, Booker T., *ii*, 136 n.2
 Washington, city of, *i*, 204, 271 f., 546 f.; 554 and n.1, 587
 Washington, George, in French and Indian War, *i*, 21 n., 47, 48 and n.; in Revolution, *i*, 75 f., 77 and n., 82 f.,

Do 1 52

SEP 30 '57

~~MAR 10 1961~~


~~MAY 26 1962~~

~~6172 MAY 15 63~~

~~FEB 5 1964~~

~~MAR 21 1964~~

MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES



31293200059883